State v. Martin

Aug 7, 2023
2023 CA 0008
Versions:

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant

JAMES E. YOUNG
136 West Main Steet
Lancaster, OH 43130

For Defendant-Appellee

GARY ANDORKA
3737 Easton Market
Suite 1156
Columbus, OH 43219

O P I N I O N

King, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals the February 15, 2023 entry of the Municipal Court of Fairfield County, Ohio, granting the motion to suppress filed by Defendant-Appellee, Jeffrey L. Martin. We affirm the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} On September 16, 2022, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Tawanna Young stopped Martin for pulling into the far lane for a right-hand turn and failure to stop at a stop bar. Based upon her observations, Trooper Young conducted an investigation for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence (“OVI“). Thereafter, Trooper Young charged Martin with OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19 and violating R.C. 4511.36, rules for turns at intersections.

{¶ 3} On November 3, 2022, Martin filed a motion to suppress, claiming an illegal stop, detention, and arrest. By entry filed February 15, 2023, the trial court found the stop and detention were valid, but found once Trooper Young expanded her investigation, the information she gathered failed to give her probable cause to arrest.

{¶ 4} The state filed an appeal with the following assignment of error:

I

{¶ 5} “WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE OFFICER LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST FOR OPERATING A VEHICLE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS.”

I

{¶ 6} In its sole assignment of error, the state claims the trial court erred in finding the trooper lacked probable cause to arrest Martin for OVI. We disagree.

{¶ 7} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 652 N.E.2d 988 (1995); State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing court must defer to the trial court‘s factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists to support those findings. Burnside at ¶ 8. Once this court has accepted those facts as true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539 (4th Dist.1997); see generally United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). That is, the application of the law to the trial court‘s findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Due weight should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Id. at 698.

{¶ 8} Probable cause to arrest focuses on the prior actions of the accused. Probable cause exists when a reasonable prudent person would believe that the person arrested had committed a crime. State v. Timson, 38 Ohio St.2d 122, 127, 311 N.E.2d 16 (1974). A determination of probable cause is made from the totality of the circumstances. Atwell v. State, 35 Ohio App.2d 221, 301 N.E.2d 709 (1973), paragraph two of the syllabus. As the United States Supreme Court stated when speaking of probable cause “we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life in which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).

{¶ 9} In determining whether probable cause exists to arrest an individual for driving under the influence of alcohol, “the court must examine whether, at the moment of the arrest, the officer had knowledge from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving under the influence of alcohol.” State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 147, 675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist.1996). “The arrest merely has to be supported by the arresting officer‘s observations of indicia of alcohol consumption and operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.” State v. Eustis, 5th Dist. Knox No. 08CA000006, 2008-Ohio-5955, ¶11, citing State v. Van Fossen, 19 Ohio App.3d 281, 484 N.E.2d 191 (10th Dist.1984). Accord State v. Pitroff, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 19 CAC 07 0044, 2020-Ohio-2752, ¶ 15. Probable cause to arrest may exist in the absence of field sobriety tests results if there is evidence “that the defendant caused an automobile accident; a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the defendant; an admission by the defendant that he or she was recently drinking alcohol; and other indicia of intoxication, such as red eyes, slurred speech, and difficulty walking.” State v. Judy, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 2007-CAC-120069, 2008-Ohio-4520, ¶ 27, citing Oregon v. Szakovits, 32 Ohio St.2d 271, 291 N.E.2d 742 (1972).

{¶ 10} Trooper Young testified after stopping Martin, she detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath and slurred speech, and he admitted to consuming two drinks. T. at 10, 16. She stated he did not make eye contact with her. Id. at 15. Trooper Young testified from her experience, individuals under the influence will “try to avoid the eye contact and in this case that‘s what I felt like he was trying to do.” Id. at 16. Trooper Young had Martin exit the vehicle to perform field sobriety tests. The state stipulated that the horizontal gaze nystagmus test was out. Id. at 19. She did not have Martin perform the one-leg stand or walk-and-turn tests because he had had back surgery. Id. She performed a “divided attention skills test” which required Martin to recite the alphabet from “D” to “W.” Id. at 24. Martin recited the letters correctly, but Trooper Young testified he “slurred some of his alphabet.” Id. She arrested Martin for OVI because he made two driving violations, “he wouldn‘t look at me, speech was slurred, strong odor of alcoholic beverage, admission to drinking, slowed speech - - slow movement and that‘s why I decided to effect the arrest.” Id. at 19-20.

{¶ 11} On cross-examination, Trooper Young agreed she did not observe any erratic driving and when pulled over, he stopped promptly and legally, “[l]ike a sober person.” Id. at 28-29. She agreed Martin followed her instructions and was polite and cooperative. Id. at 33-34. Martin had two drinks, one at 8:00 p.m. and the other at 10:00 p.m. Id. at 34. His height and weight were testified to. Id. at 32. Trooper Young agreed alcohol has less of an impact “if an individual weighs a lot.” Id. at 35.

{¶ 12} The encounter was recorded on Trooper Young‘s cruiser and body cameras which were played for the trial court. State‘s Exhibits A and B. In the cruiser camera video (State‘s Exhibit A), Martin turns right at an intersection into the far lane, not “as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway.” R.C. 4511.36(A)(1). Martin proceeds straight down the road without weaving in his lane. He turns his left turn signal on and moves over into the left turn lane. As he approaches the red light, he stops his vehicle over the stop bar, then drifts forward until his rear tires are on or almost on top of the stop bar. The light turns green and he negotiates the left turn without incident. Once Trooper Young activates her lights, Martin pulls over in an orderly fashion. In the body camera video (State‘s Exhibit B), Martin follows the trooper‘s instructions and shows her his hands. She approaches him with a flashlight pointed in his direction. She begins speaking to him and he turns his head toward her, but immediately looks away from the beam of light in his eyes. He sits motionless while she explains why she stopped him. While some of his responses to her questions were slow, they were clear and intelligible. She detects an odor of alcohol and he admits to drinking “a couple” when asked. As he is gathering his paperwork the trooper had asked for, she told him she was concerned about his “slurred speech, uh you won‘t look at me, your movements are slow, I‘m going to bring you out to make sure you‘re good.” He exists the vehicle without stumbling. He follows her instructions and Trooper Young performs the horizontal gaze nystagmus test which the state did not use because it was improperly administered. T. at 39. No further field sobriety tests were conducted. Trooper Young asks Martin to recite the alphabet from “D” to “W” which he did quickly and clearly. At that time, Trooper Young placed Martin under arrest.

{¶ 13} In its February 15, 2023 entry granting Martin‘s motion to suppress, the trial court found the trooper had probable cause to stop Martin and reasonable suspicion to expand her investigation to perform field sobriety tests, but found “once the investigation expanded, the information gathered by the Trooper failed to give her probable cause to arrest.”

{¶ 14} The state argues Trooper Young had probable cause to arrest regardless of the results of the field sobriety tests. In support, the state cites State v. Koteff, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 04-COA-035, 2005-Ohio-1719, ¶ 16, wherein this court stated, “[p]robable cause to arrest a suspect for driving while under the influence of alcohol may exist without consideration of field sobriety tests.” We find Koteff to be distinguishable.

{¶ 15} In Koteff, this court affirmed the trial court‘s denial of the defendant‘s motion to suppress, finding “[e]ven without consideration of the actual results of the field sobriety tests,” based on the totality of the circumstances, there was sufficient probable cause to arrest the defendant for OVI because of an odor of alcohol, his admission to drinking, his red glassy eyes, his ” ‘swaying’ during the field sobriety tests” and he “had trouble keeping his balance during the walk-and-turn test.” Koteff at ¶ 18. Here, Trooper Young did not observe red glassy or bloodshot eyes and swaying or balance issues. T. at 37-38.

{¶ 16} The Koteff court, as well as the state, relied on the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s opinion in State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 732 N.E.2d 952 (2000), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Boczar, 113 Ohio St.3d 148, 2007-Ohio-1251, 863 N.E.2d 155. The Homan court determined, in the absence of field sobriety test results, an odor of alcohol, an admission of drinking, erratic driving, and red glassy eyes could support a finding of probable cause to arrest for OVI. Homan at 427. Here, Trooper Young did not observe the latter two indicators.

{¶ 17} The state also cites State v. Whittington, 5th Dist. Knox No. 03CA000005, 2003-Ohio-3167, wherein this court affirmed the trial court‘s denial of the defendant‘s motion to suppress. In Whittington, the defendant was involved in an accident which was not his fault. Whittington at ¶ 7. This court found the officer‘s observation of an odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes, coupled with the officer‘s opinion that the defendant had been unable to control his vehicle, was sufficient for the trial court to conclude a prudent person could find impaired driving. Id. at 10-11. Here, we have the absence of bloodshot eyes and an accident. In fact, Martin was able to control his vehicle and pull over “promptly and legally.”

{¶ 18} In considering the totality of the circumstances, the facts support the trial court‘s finding that the information gathered by Trooper Young “failed to give her probable cause to arrest.” At the time of arrest, Trooper Young did not have knowledge from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that Martin was driving under the influence of alcohol. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d at 147. Martin smelled of alcohol and admitted to drinking. It follows that there would be an odor of alcohol with an admission of drinking. Like Trooper Young told Martin in the body camera video, “you‘re allowed to drink, you just can‘t just be impaired.” Although Martin committed two minor traffic violations, his driving was not erratic and he pulled over promptly and legally “like a sober person.” He did not have red glassy bloodshot eyes. While he did not make immediate eye contact with the trooper, he looked in her direction, but the trooper was shining a flashlight toward his face. When Martin exited the vehicle, he did not sway or stumble. He properly performed the alphabet test. His speech to questions and instructions was clear and intelligible. He was polite and cooperative and followed instructions. Martin‘s behavior did not show indicia of impairment. Because of a lack of indicia at the time of arrest, we agree Trooper Young lacked probable cause to arrest Martin for OVI.

{¶ 19} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in granting Martin‘s motion to suppress.

{¶ 20} The sole assignment of error is denied.

{¶ 21} The judgment of the Municipal Court of Fairfield County, Ohio is hereby affirmed.

By King, J.

Gwin, P.J. and

Hoffman, J. concur.