State v. LylesState v. Lyles
Andrew W. Garth, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, and Rebecca Barnett, Assistant Prosecuting Attоrney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
{¶1} A fender bender led to defendant-appellant Antrell Lyles‘s conviсtions for an assured-distance violation, driving under suspension, and a hit-skip violation. Mr. Lyles now appeals, asserting that his guilty plea for driving under suspension violated
I.
{¶2} Fоllowing an automobile accident, Mr. Lyles was charged with three misdemeanor traffic offenses. The state‘s witnesses offered conflicting accounts of what transpired in this accident.
{¶3} Jacob O‘Brien testified that, on the date of the accident, while sitting at a red light in Clifton on Ludlow Avenue, another vehicle struck his car from behind. Mr. O‘Brien spoke with the driver of that vehicle, but that driver was not Mr. Lyles. In fact, Mr. O‘Brien disavowed ever sеeing Mr. Lyles at the scene:
PROSECUTOR: Do you see that guy in the courtroom today?
MR. O‘BRIEN: No.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. So are you able to see Mr. Lyles over there at the defense table in the red-striped shirt?
MR. O‘BRIEN: I did not see him, no.
PROSECUTOR: So that gentleman was not there?
MR. O‘BRIEN: No.
That said, Mr. O‘Brien acknowledged that he believed that another car had bumped the car that ran into his (in a chain reaction manner), as the other vehicle had a license plate buried in its rear bumper.
{¶5} Based on that lead, Officer Jackson sent an investigatory letter to the owner of Unit 1. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lyles responded to the letter and then spoke with her by phone. According to Officer Jackson, Mr. Lyles admitted over the phone that he precipitated the accident and that he fled the scene because the vehicle belonged to his girlfriend, and he feared her reaction if she learned about his involvement in an accident (with her car).
{¶6} Several days later, Officer Jackson went to Mr. Lyles‘s address to write him a ticket. She observed a Nissan Altima in his drivewаy with minor damage to the front bumper, and a conspicuously missing front license plate despite indications that one had been attached to the car. During their encounter, Mr. Lyles again admitted his involvement in the automobile accident, acknowledging that he fled without exchanging his information with the other drivers.
{¶7} At trial, Mr. Lyles‘s counsel stipulated to the fact that he was driving under suspension. Following this stipulation, the trial court inquired whether Mr. Lyles wished to plead guilty to the offense:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: * * * So we will stipulate that he was under that suspension code. * * * We are not contesting that he was driving in violation of that charge.
THE COURT: So [driving under suspension charge] is nоt an issue?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No.
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THE COURT: I think there was just a stipulation. But we can make this even cleaner. What is Mr. Lyles‘s plea going to be?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Guilty.
THE COURT: All right. And do you waive and stipulate?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Waive and stipulate.
THE COURT: All right. Finding of guilty on B. We are going through with A and C.
{¶8} The trial court subsequently found Mr. Lyles guilty on the remaining two charges. Mr. Lyles now aрpeals, arguing that (1) the trial court violated Ohio law by accepting his guilty plea without informing him of the effect of his plea, (2) the trial court erroneously admitted his confession before the state established the corpus delicti of the offenses, and (3) his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
II.
{¶9} Mr. Lyles‘s first assignment of error challenges the propriety of his guilty plea for driving under suspension in light of thе trial court‘s failure to first inform him of the effect of that plea.
{¶10}
{¶11} “Traffic Rule 10(D) and
{¶12} “The right to be informed that a guilty рlea is a complete admission of guilt is a nonconstitutional right and subject to review for substantial compliance.” Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 12. “When a trial court does not substantially comply with
{¶13} We do not believe that the trial court substantially complied with
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Veite, do you understand that on the B charge, which is the public indecency, the maximum possible penalty is 30 days in jail and/or a $250 fine? Yes?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT: And on the C charge (voyeurism), the maximum penalty is 90 days in jail and/or a $700—No. I‘m sorry. 60 days in jail, M3, and а $500 fine. Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Do you have any questions before I accept your plea?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: No? I‘ll accept the pleas of guilty. Facts.
Veite, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190339, 2021-Ohio-290, at ¶ 12. Like in Veite, here the trial court never used any language that would explain to Mr. Lyles that his guilty plea constituted a complеte admission of guilt. In fact, in this case the trial court did not even address Mr. Lyles personally. We accordingly disagree with the state‘s argument that the trial court substantially complied with
{¶14} The state maintains that, even if the trial court violated
III.
{¶15} Mr. Lyles‘s second assignment of error maintains that (1) his confession was inadmissible because the state failed to establish the corpus delicti of the offense, and (2) his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
A.
{¶16} “Before a confession to a crime is admissible, thе state must have some evidence outside of the confession tending to establish the corpus delicti.” State v. Kraft, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060238, 2007-Ohio-2247, ¶ 18, citing State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), paragraph one of the syllabus. “The state‘s evidentiary burden under the corpus delicti rule is minimal: only a ‘modicum of evidence’ is necessary to satisfy the rule.” Id. at ¶ 20. “This evidence does not need to relate to every element of the offense and can be circumstantial.” Id.
{¶17} Both Mr. O‘Brien and Officer Jackson testified to the existence of another vehicle‘s license plate lodged in the rear bumper of Unit 2. We believe that this evidence constitutes the “modicum of evidence” necessary to establish the corpus delicti of the offense. The license plate represents some evidence that another vehicle struck Unit 2, causing the accident. And thus, the admission of Mr. Lyles‘s confession did not violate thе corpus delicti rule.
B.
{¶19} For this point, Mr. Lyles essentially posits that the evidence weighs heavily against the finding of his involvement in this accident. Mr. Lyles emphasizes that the prosecuting witnesses gave conflicting acсounts on the location where this accident occurred and the number of vehicles in the accident. But these testimonial inconsistencies do not weigh heavily against the convictions, particularly where (1) the witnesses agreed that there was a license plate lodged in Unit 2‘s rear bumper, (2) Officer Jackson testified that Mr. Lyles responded to an investigatory letter sent to the owner of that license plаte, and (3) Mr. Lyles confessed that he was in the accident and fled the scene.
{¶20} Accordingly, we reject Mr. Lyles‘s challenge to the weight of the evidence, and overrule his second assignment of error in full.
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{¶21} In light of thе foregoing, we sustain Mr. Lyles‘s first assignment of error, vacate his plea to driving under suspension, and remand that cause for further proceedings. We overrule Mr. Lyles‘s second assignment of error in full and otherwise affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
MYERS, P. J., and CROUSE, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.