State v. LuceState v. Luce
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- John W. Wise, Patricia A. Delaney, Earle E. Wise Jr.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Danielle R. Luce appeals her multi-count conviction, in the Court of Common Pleas, Ashland County, for involuntary manslaughter, aggravated drug trafficking, corrupting another with drugs, and other offenses. Appellee is the State of Ohio. The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows:
{¶2} On August 8, 2016, officers from the Ashland Police Department responded to a suspected drug overdose at the Cleveland Avenue trailer residence of Appellant Danielle Luce and her husband, Christopher Luce. Officers observed that Christopher was unresponsive and having difficulty breathing. Emergency personnel administered multiple doses of Narcan and were able to revive Christopher. In the meantime, appellant appeared to have difficulty comprehending what was happening, was unsteady on her feet, and seemed to be under the influence of something.
{¶3} Responding police officers found items potentially related to drug use in the Luces’ trailer, including a line of powder and a marijuana pipe in a dresser. Tr. at 204. They also discovered a wooden box inside a closet. The box contained “multiple” syringes, along with various tubes of made of plastic, glass, and/or metal. Tr. at 187. Officers also found razor blades, a shoe lace, syringe caps, syringes, a crack pipe, two spoons, cotton, and a syringe filled with a brown liquid. Tr. at 208-209, 216, 218. Appellant admitted to having recently snorted heroin, which she had purchased near a gas station in Mansfield, Ohio. She told officers the heroin in question did not smell or taste right, but she did not say anything at that time about selling any of it to someone else. She was eventually taken into police custody.
{¶5} Detective Brian Evans was assigned to investigate. Det. Evans found a spoon with cotton, syringe, and a Q-tip in Sanders’ bathroom. Tr. at 414. He learned that there had been an overdose incident at the Luces’ residence the evening before. Tr. at 420. He also found that the Luces lived just one block away from Sanders.
{¶6} Officers had collected appellant‘s cell phone as evidence and obtained permission from appellant to search it. Det. Evans thereupon reviewed appellant‘s cell phone history, noting that several texts and/or calls had been made on August 8, 2016 between her and a contact listed as “Jeffrey S.A.” One text from Jeffrey S.A. stated that this individual only had $6.00 to spend, but asked “would you work a trade with me?” Tr. at 431.
{¶7} Det. Evans continued his investigation. Ultimately, appellant admitted to him that Sanders had come to the Luces’ trailer with $20.00 cash, left the money, and took with him a small quantity of drugs in a “corner bag” that had been left for him on a tray.
{¶8} Det. Evans also collected security video from “Donna D‘s,” a store in the vicinity of the Luces’ trailer. He requested video in the time frame of 5:00 PM to 7:00 PM on August 8, 2016. In one segment, Sanders is seen riding a bike in a direction that leads to the Luces’ residence. Sanders is also later seen riding in a direction away from the Luces’ residence.
{¶10} On March 9, 2017, the Ashland County Grand Jury indicted appellant as follows:
{¶11} Count 1: involuntary manslaughter,
{¶12} Appellant initially pled not guilty to all eleven counts. However, appellant subsequently entered pleas of guilty to Counts 9, 10, and 11. The matter then proceeded to a jury trial on Counts 1 through 8 commencing on August 1, 2017. Christopher Luce was also tried as a co-defendant.
{¶13} After hearing the evidence and arguments, the jury found appellant guilty on all eight counts. On October 3, 2017, the trial court sentenced appellant inter alia to
{¶14} On November 1, 2017, appellant filed a notice of appeal. She herein raises the following three Assignments of Error:
{¶15} “I. APPELLANT‘S CONVICTIONS FOR INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER AND CORRUPTING ANOTHER WITH DRUGS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
{¶16} “II. APPELLANT‘S CONVICTIONS FOR COUNTS ONE THROUGH EIGHT OF THE INDICTMENT WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶17} “III. APPELLANT‘S SENTENCE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.”
I.
{¶18} In her First Assignment of Error, appellant argues her convictions for involuntary manslaughter and corrupting another with drugs were not supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree.
Involuntary Manslaughter
{¶20} Appellant herein was convicted inter alia of involuntary manslaughter (Count 1), which is set forth in
{¶21} The predicate offense in this instance (the same as Count 3) was aggravated trafficking in drugs, in violation of
{¶22}
{¶23} Ohio courts have recognized that “[t]he element of proximate cause is satisfied where the defendant, ‘sets in motion a sequence of events that make the death of another a direct proximate and reasonably inevitable consequence.’ ” State v. Feltner, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2008–01–009, 2008–Ohio–5212, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Lovelace, 137 Ohio App.3d 206, 215 (1st Dist.1999) (internal quotations partially omitted)..
{¶24} Appellant first challenges the nexus between Sanders’ death and the presence of Carfentanil. The record reveals that Jennifer Acurio, a forensic scientist from BCI, performed tests on some of the evidence in this case. Tr. at 377. Acurio tested State‘s Exhibit 17, a sample of residue found in the Luces’ residence, which was found to “show” Carfentanil. Tr. at 382. Acurio further tested State‘s Exhibit 18, brown liquid from a syringe from the Luces’ residence, which was also found to contain Carfentanil. Tr. at 384. Finally, Acurio tested State‘s Exhibit 19, the pipe found in the Luces’ residence, and found it contained marijuana. Tr. at 385.
{¶25} The Ashland County Coroner, Dr. Dale Thomae, oversaw the investigation of Sanders’ death. Tr. at 333. However, he arranged for Cuyahoga County officials to perform the autopsy, which was ultimately handled by Dr. Todd Barr. Tr. at 319. Dr. Barr testified that Sanders was a healthy twenty-one year old male. Tr. at 353. The toxicology testing in Cuyahoga County showed that there were indicators of a “fentanyl analog” in his blood. Tr. at 356. However, Cuyahoga County was not equipped to reach a conclusion on the specifics of said analog; therefore, necessary samples were sent to AIT Laboratory in Indianapolis. Tr. at 353-356. The toxicology report from AIT indicated that Carfentanil
{¶26} Dr. Barr told the jury that Carfentanil is an analog of fentanyl. Tr. at 355. Dr. Barr testified that someone with Carfentanil in his or her system would have a bloody fluid buildup in his lungs that could come out of the nose and mouth. Tr. at 357-359. Dr. Barr concluded that Sanders’ cause of death was acute intoxication by Carfentanil. Tr. at 359. Dr. Barr further testified that any amount of Carfentanil can be lethal. Tr. at 368. Dr. Thomae declared Sanders’ cause of death to be from “sudden cardiopath due to deep ventricular arrhythmia and due to acute intoxication by Carfentanil.” Tr. at 335. Dr. Thomae also testified that Carfentanil was designed to be used on large animals, not humans. Tr. at 342. Carfentanil is stronger than fentanyl, which itself is stronger than heroin. Id.
{¶27} In sum, while the initial testing showed “there were certain peaks consistent with a fentanyl analog” in Sanders’ blood (see Tr. at 356), further testing by an outside lab provided evidence that the analog was indeed Carfentanil, leading to the coroner‘s determination that intoxication via this substance was the cause of the victim‘s death. We therefore find no grounds for reversal on this basis for want of sufficient evidence.
{¶28} Appellant next contends the State failed to prove that appellant “knowingly” supplied Sanders with Carfentanil. She notes that Dr. Thomae, the Ashland County Coroner, testified that he had not previously seen any Carfentanil overdoses in his eight years in office. Tr. at 345. Trial counsel for Christopher Luce proferred that Cuyahoga County was limited on testing for Carfentanil because “this is a new issue that has been
{¶29} However, we first note that “[i]t is not necessary that the accused be in a position to foresee the precise consequence of his conduct; only that the consequence be foreseeable in the sense that what actually transpired was natural and logical in that it was within the scope of the risk created by his conduct.” State v. Wells, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2016-02-009, 2017-Ohio-420, ¶ 35, citing State v. Losey, 23 Ohio App.3d 93, 96 (10th Dist.1985). Furthermore, “*** the word ‘knowingly’ is an adverb which modifies the verb ‘sell’ or ‘offer.‘” State v. Ward, 3rd Dist. Crawford No. 3-17-02, 2017-Ohio-8518, ¶ 15, citing State v. Patterson, 69 Ohio St.2d 445, 447, 432 N.E.2d 802 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds. Ohio courts are thus not required to read into
{¶30} Thus, even if appellant “only” sought to sell heroin on this occasion and had no interest in supplying anyone with Carfentanil, she was still choosing to engage in the dangerous and illegal business of street-level trafficking in controlled substances. Before this Court takes the step of overturning a jury verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence,
Corrupting Another with Drugs
{¶31} Appellant was also convicted (Count 2) of corrupting another with drugs under
{¶32} Appellant points out that Carfentanil was the only substance named in Count 2 of the indictment under the “to wit” language. However, as summarized above, upon review of the record and transcript in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that reasonable jurors could have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense corrupting another with drugs as charged.
{¶33} Appellant‘s First Assignment of Error is overruled.
II.
{¶34} In her Second Assignment of Error, appellant argues her convictions for Counts 1 through 8 of the indictment were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶36} Even though a manifest weight analysis may involve an appellate court‘s consideration of credibility (see State v. Sanders, 76 N.E.3d 468, 2016–Ohio–7204 (5th Dist.), ¶ 38), the weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily issues for the trier of fact (see, e.g., State v. Jamison (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 552 N.E.2d 180).
Counts 1 through 4
{¶37} As discussed above, the first three counts against appellant in this matter were, respectively, involuntary manslaughter, corrupting another with drugs, and aggravated trafficking in drugs (
{¶39} Appellant also refers to evidence that Lieutenant Steven Hoover of the Ashland Police Department received a report of an unidentified automobile pulling up to Sanders’ trailer at about 2:30 AM on August 9, 2016. Tr. at 539, 679. This appears to stem from an observation made by Thomas Hatberg, who also testified as a defense witness for Christopher Luce. Hatberg, a neighbor of Sanders, told jurors that he had seen an unfamiliar car sitting near Sanders’ trailer between 1:00 AM and 3:15 PM on the early morning of August 9, 2016. Tr. at 641. We note Detective Evans appeared to have
{¶40} Appellant secondly reiterates some of the argument as to causation and knowledge presented as part of her “sufficiency” claim, supra.2
{¶41} It has been aptly stated that a jury, in making factual determinations, “cannot help but rely upon the collective wisdom embodied in the life-experiences of the individual jurors ***.” State v. Bays, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 95-CA-118, 1998 WL 32595, aff‘d, 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 1999-Ohio-216, 716 N.E.2d 1126 (1999). Furthermore, although the testimony of witnesses on behalf of the State and the defense may conflict, a conviction is not against the manifest weight because the jury chose to credit the State‘s version of events. See State v. Breneman, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 11CA0039, 2012-Ohio-3632, ¶ 9, citing State v. Peasley, 9th Dist. No. 25062, 2010–Ohio–4333, ¶ 18 (internal quotations omitted). Specifically, even in addressing a manifest weight claim, we remain mindful that the jurors, as the firsthand triers of fact, are patently in the best position to gauge the truth as to a defendant‘s advancement of an alibi. See State v. Smith, 5th Dist. Licking No. 14 CA 83, 2015-Ohio-1610, ¶ 24.
{¶42} Upon review, we find the jury, in weighing the testimony of the various witnesses, and taking into account appellant‘s admissions to law enforcement concerning the heroin transaction, did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of
Counts 5 through 8
{¶43} As an initial matter, we note that while Count 5 was felony of the fifth degree, Counts 6 and 7 were misdemeanors for which appellant received thirty-day jail sentences, to be served concurrently with some of the other counts, and fines of zero dollars. Finally, Count 8 was a minor misdemeanor, for which he was fined $100.00. We have recognized that where a defendant, convicted of a misdemeanor criminal offense, has voluntarily paid the fine or completed the sentence for that offense, an appeal is moot when no evidence is offered from which an inference can be drawn that the defendant will suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights from such judgment or conviction. See State v. Crandell, 5th Dist. Licking No. 02CA115, 2003–Ohio–2512, (citation omitted). The briefs do not discuss this potential mootness issue, and we observe that the trial court also ordered court costs and restitution, the present payment status of which is unknown to this Court.
{¶44} We therefore proceed to the merits of appellant‘s argument, which chiefly challenges the proof of her identity, as opposed to that of Christopher Luce, as the possessor of the substances, drug instruments, and paraphernalia found inside the trailer. She adds that the jury was not instructed in this case on constructive possession or complicity.
{¶45} In essence, Count 5 of the indictment went to possession of Carfentanil, Count 6 went to possession of a hypodermic device for shooting drugs, Count 7 went to possession of drug paraphernalia in the form of a zipper pouch, spoons, a wooden box,
{¶46} Appellant‘s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.
III.
{¶47} In her Third Assignment of Error, appellant challenges her sentence, in essence contending that the “seriousness” factors set forth by the General Assembly in
{¶48} The General Assembly, under
{¶50} A presumption of regularity attaches to all trial court proceedings. See, e.g., Black v. Chiropractic Assocs. of Zanesville, L.L.C., 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2013–0012, 2014–Ohio–192, ¶ 20, citing Chari v. Vore (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 325, 744 N.E.2d 763. Upon review, we hold the eight-year sentence for involuntary manslaughter (which was also the aggregate term for all of the offenses) was within the pertinent statutory ranges, and we otherwise do not find by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support her sentence.
{¶51} Appellant‘s Third Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶52} For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Ashland County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed.
By: Wise, John, P. J.
Delaney, J., and
Wise, Earle, J. concur.
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