Case Information
*1
[Cite as
State v. Stover
,
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAKE COUNTY, OHIO STATE OF OHIO, : O P I N I O N
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
CASE NO. 2015-L-041 - vs - :
ISAAC STOVER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas.
Case No. 14 CR 000651.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Chаrles E. Coulson , Lake County Prosecutor, and Teri R. Daniel , Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Aaron T. Baker , 38109 Euclid Avenue, Willoughby, OH 44094. (For Defendant- Appellant).
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J.
Appellant, Issac Stover, appeals from the March 24, 2015 judgment of the
Lake County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of one count of traffiсking in heroin, following a jury trial. Based on the following, we affirm the judgment of the lower court. Mr. Stover was indicted by the Lake County Grand Jury on one count of
trafficking in heroin with two forfeiture sрecifications, a felony of the fifth degree, in *2 violation of R.C 2925.03(A)(1). Mr. Stover pled not guilty, and a jury trial commenced. The following facts were adduced at trial.
{¶3} Michael Spаng, a confidential informant working for the Wickliffe Police Department, testified that he engaged in a controlled buy of heroin. Spang testified the controlled buy was set up over the course of various text messages and four phone calls with “Rob,” the dealer, which were admitted into evidence. They agreed to meet at a parking lot of Gabriel Brothers, a store located in Wickliffe, Lake County, Ohio.
{¶4} In the parking lot, Spang approached a blue Hyundai Sonata. He went to the back door where аppellant was sitting. An individual in the front of the vehicle gave appellant a rolled-up lottery ticket, which he then gave to Spang. Spang gave the buy money to appellant, who then handed it to the same individual in the front seat. After the controlled buy, Spang walked to the other side of the building where he met Detective Dan Moreland of the Wickliffe Police Department. The two officers opened the lottery ticket and observed two tan/brown rocks. While both audio and visual recordings were conducted thrоughout the trade, Spang was unable to identify the individual in the car with whom he was speaking. Additionally, none of the individuals in the vehicle indentified themselves to Spang. Detective Don Dоndrea of the Wickliffe Police Department testified he was
assigned to conduct surveillance during the buy. Detective Dondrea testified that he sat in an unmarked policе car located across the street from Gabriel Brothers. The vehicle in question was a blue Hyundai Sonata, which he observed entering and leaving the Gabriel Brothers parking lot. Upon leaving the parking lot, Detective Dondrea began to follow the vehicle. Detective Dondrea identified appellant as sitting in the rear of the *3 vehiсle. A cell phone recovered from the vehicle was located in the front passenger door handle, later identified as the phone used to facilitate the drug transaction, and the marked money was found in the glove compartment.
{¶7} The jury also heard the testimony of Detective Dan Moreland of the Wickliffe Police Department. Detective Moreland searched both Spang and his vehicle for any narcotics prior to the controlled buy to avoid potential conflict. Nothing was found. Detective Moreland indicated that he observed the buy from his vehicle, and he testified to the same set of facts as Spang.
{¶8} The lottery ticket contained two tan/brown rоcks, approximately 0.17 grams, which tested positive for heroin.
{¶9} The jury found appellant guilty of trafficking in heroin, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1). Appellant was sentenced to ten months in prisоn. On appeal, appellant assigns the following error:
The trial court erred by failing to grant a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), on the charge of Trafficking in Heroin, and thereafter entering a judgment of conviction of that offense which was not supported by sufficient evidence, in derogation of Appellant’s right to due process of law, аs protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. When measuring the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must
consider whether the state set forth adequate evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict as a
matter of law. Kent v. Kinsey , 11th Dist. Portage No. 2003-P-0056,
“No person shall knowingly * * * [s]ell оr offer to sell a controlled substance[.]”
Appellant argued, below and on appeal, that the term “knowingly” refers to
the particular controlled substance аppellant was charged with selling, i.e., heroin.
[1]
This court, however, has considered and rejected this argument. In State v. Keen , 11th
Dist. Ashtabula No. 2004-A-0016,
In Ohio, courts have held that to be convicted under R.C. 2925.03,
it is not required that the defendant have knowledge of the
underlying nature of the controlled substance. In State v. Mughni,
omitted.) State v. Sheffey , 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2003-A-0011,2004-Ohio-2204 , at ¶13, quoting State v. Henton , 121 Ohio App.3d 501, 510 (1997).
The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated: ‘We will not read the additional element of knowledge of the nature of the substance into R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (5) or (7).’ Patterson at 447.
We further note that nothing in the statute indicаtes to us that the General Assembly intended such an interpretation or result. Rather, ‘R.C. 2925.03 demonstrates a clear legislative intent to define commerce in controlled substances as criminal.’ State v. Scott , 69 Ohio St.2d 439, 440 (1982). Contrary to appellant’s argument, the state was not required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had knоwledge he was selling heroin. Instead, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly sold or offered to sell what he knew to be a controlled substance. Here, the confidential informant testified that he approached the vehicle to make a controlled purchase of herоin. Appellant, sitting in the rear seat, took the heroin, which was rolled in a lottery ticket, from the individual sitting in the front and passed it to the confidential informant. In exchange for the package, the confidential informant gave appellant money, which was directly transferred by appellant to the individual sitting in the front. Regardless of whether the confidential informant could have obtained the heroin directly from the individual sitting in the front, appellant was a direct conduit to the transaction by handling the money and heroin. Additionally, we note that during his interrogation, appellant stated that if a transaction had occurred, “it was marijuana.” Marijuana, like heroin, is a controlled substance and, thus, subject tо penalty under R.C. 2925.03. As such, the state presented sufficient evidence upon which the jury could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the elements of R.C. *6 2925.03(A)(1), were proven. Thus, the trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion. Appellant’s assignment of error is without merit. The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is hereby
affirmed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
concur.