STATE v. FRANK M. LISTON, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Missouri
December 20, 1926
315 Mo. 1305
Division Two
We are of the opinion that the decision of the Court of Appeals was not in conflict with our rulings in the Halsey case, nor with those of State ex rel. v. Allen, 295 Mo. 307, based on similar facts.
II. We see no necessity for prolonging this discussion. The Court of Appeals, in a well-considered opinion, has held on the facts presentеd therein that the relator was not entitled to recover in the action pending in said court. We do not find that the ruling of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with any former or controlling decision of this court on similar facts.
It follows that our writ of certiorari was improvidently issued and should be quashed. It is so ordered. Higbee, C., concurs.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion of RAILEY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All of the judges concur.
THE STATE V. FRANK M. LISTON, Appellant.
Division Two, December 20, 1926.
LARCENY AND BURGLARY: Insufficient Evidence: Prejudice. Where there is not a circumstance in the case that is not consistеnt with the theory of defendant‘s innocence, charged with burglary and larceny, outside the testimony of one witness, who admits convictions and penitentiary terms in four states, and has pleaded guilty to the identical crime and testifies that he has testified for the State “to get even with defendant” for having told of the witness‘s connection with the crime, and the defendant‘s reputation is shown to be good and his conduct at the time is satisfactorily explained and is consistent with his innocence, and his explаnation is corroborated by the consistent testimony of other unimpeached witnesses, the verdict of guilty should be set aside on the ground that it was prompted by prejudice, passion or partiality, and a new trial granted, and if on a new trial no more substantial evidence of his guilt is produced he should be discharged.
Corpus Juris-Cyc. References: Burglary, 9 C. J., Section 132, p. 1076, n. 26 New. Criminal Law, 17 C. J., Section 3593, p. 256, n. 67. Larceny, 36 C. J., Section 483, p. 903, n. 35.
Appeal from Howard Circuit Court.—Hon. W. A. Walker, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
(1) Irrelevant facts draw the minds of the jurors from the point in issue and tend to excitе prejudice, and mislead. State v. Huff, 161 Mo. 459; Harper v. State, 83 Miss. 402; State v. Moore, 129 N. C. 494. (2) There may be many witnesses who give testimony which agree with an accomplice, but which, if it does not serve to identify the accused, is no corroboration of the accomplice. The danger being that the accomplice will attribute a share in the transaction to an innocent person. Roscoe, Crim. Evidence, 130; Ettinger v. Comm., 98 Pa. 338. (3) Trial courts should, on motion, determine whether the verdict is contrary to the evidence. State v. Young, 119 Mo. 495. And should grant a new trial when injustice has been done and a verdict is against the weight of the evidence or so clearly wrong that the verdict raises a presumption of prejudice, corruption or ignorance on the part of the jury. State v. Prim, 98 Mo. 368. And should grant a new trial when a verdict is based upon impeached evidence. State v. Prendible, 165 Mo. 353; State v. Rose, 142 Mo. 418. The case at bar is only a clear one of failure of proof.
North T. Gentry, Attorney-General, and A. B. Lovan, Assistant Attorney-General, for respondent.
There was substantial evidence. The testimony of DeHart to the effect that the defendant invited and persuaded him to burglarize, coupled with the testimony of the several witnesses who saw the defendant and DeHart together on the day of the burglary, and the testimony of the witnesses who saw the defendant at the place where the stolen property was found, certainly would be called substantial evidence. The court, therefore, will not disturb the verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence. State v. Maurer, 255 Mo. 168.
HIGBEE, C.—An information was filed in the Circuit Court of Howard County on December 22, 1925, charging the defendant with burglary and grand larceny. A trial was had on January 27, 1926, resulting in a verdict finding the defendant guilty of burglary in the
The evidence for the State is outlined by the Attorney-General; with a few changes it is as follows:
The defendant is a negro lawyer. For about a year prior to the trial he had an office in Columbia, Missouri, and also maintained a branch office in Kansas City, Missouri. The store which was broken into was known as the New York Style Shop and was owned and operated by the Famous Style Shop, a corporation. It was located next door to a hardware store in Fayette, Missouri. Back of the two stores there was a room which extended across both stores with no partition in it. According to the evidence, a window оr transom was broken and then from the inside the door to the back room was unfastened.
On the morning of the 13th of November, 1925, the proprietor of the New York Style Shop found six or eight hundred dollars’ worth of goods missing. These goods consisted of silk dresses and linen dresses and other goods of that kind. In the back room the proprietor of the hardware store had two sacks of coke. On the morning of the thirteenth it was found that this coke had been emptied and the sacks were missing. On the 14th of November a deputy sheriff and the city marshal found a trunk full of the stolen goods in Slater, Missouri, in the residence of one Bug Smith. The officers found in this house one Romie DeHart, Bug Smith and several others, all of whom were arrested and placed in jail. A number of other persons were in the house at the time of this arrest, but ran away and escaped. The testimony further shows that this defendant, on the 13th of November, drove into Slater in company with Romie DeHart, who got S. H. Cooper to show them the way to Bug Smith‘s residence, where DeHart and Bug Smith carried a trunk into the house. The testimony further shows that the defendant went into the house at the time the trunk was taken into it and stayed for a while and then left. He was not in the house when the officers found the goods. The testimony further shows that on the thirteenth the defendant was seen in Boonville in company with DeHart, and that while there DeHart secured the trunk in which the goods were found by the officers at Slater.
Romie DeHart, a negro, aged twenty-six, testified for the State: I was born in Howard County and hаve lived here nearly all my life.
The defendant testified, in substance: I have lived and practiced law at Columbia, Missouri, a little more than a year; have a branch office at Kansas City, Missouri. I first met DeHart at Boonville, Missouri. I have never been at Sioux City, Iowa. I did not write him a letter last September at Columbia, Missouri, addressed to him at the Iowa penitentiary. At that time I did not know he еxisted. I met him at Boonville about the last of September, 1925, at the colored hotel of Nannie King about 11:30 P. M. I was driving in a Ford car from Kansas City to Columbia and stopped for lunch. I saw some negroes and inquired if anyone cared to make a trip to Columbia. I was ill and it was cold and raining. I was gassed in the World War and can‘t see well at night and wanted to have somebody with me. DeHart said he could handle a Ford and would make the trip with me. We reached Columbia in about an hour. He drove. I left him
Witness continued: The first time I saw the contents of that trunk was yesterday when they opened the trunk here. I never knew I had hauled any of the stolen goods. I didn‘t know the Famous Style Shop had been burglarized or that any of the goods were in my car. I first learned of the burglary over in the Howard County jail. After I made a bond I made a detailed statement of my connection with the things in the trunk to Mr. Burton, the prosecuting attorney, in the presence of Mr. Bagby. I told him I hauled that trunk. (The state-
Liston was corroborated as to the purpose of the trip to Fayette on November 12th, and the repair of the tire, by Mrs. Williams and other grand officers of the society; that they went to Boggs‘s home and had supper; that Liston was ill and was not out of the house till after late breakfast the next morning; that during breakfast DeHart came and had brеakfast; that Liston did not go out with DeHart early that morning; that he and DeHart left in the afternoon in the automobile from in front of Boggs‘s house. He was also corroborated by the colored minister at Slater; that Liston came to his house to arrange for the use of his church for a meeting to organize a local society.
A number of witnesses living in Columbia testified that Liston‘s general reputation in Columbia for truth and veracity, morality and honesty was good. There was no evidence to the contrаry.
The evidence does not show when Liston came to this State. He had been a resident and a member of the bar at Columbia for a year. He must have been admitted to practice law by this court after due inquiry into his character, antecedents, legal attainments and professional standing. He has filed a creditable typewritten brief and argument, prepared by himself while confined in jail. Aside from the testimony of DeHart there is not a word of evidence or circumstance tending tо prove that Liston was an accessory before the fact to the crime charged, except that he was in Fayette at the time the crime was committed, and that he hauled the plunder in his car from Fayette to Slater, where the trunk was carried by DeHart and Bug Smith into the latter‘s house. He remained there a few minutes to warm his hands and inquire where the minister lived and went there at once. Aside from DeHart‘s evidence, Liston knew nothing of the burglary, was a stranger in Fayette and knew nothing about the contents of the sacks or trunk until he saw the trunk and its contents in the office of Mr. Burton, the prosecuting attorney, when he made his statement a few days before his trial implicating DeHart in the burglary and larceny. In this connection DeHart testified: “I plead guilty yesterday. When Liston made a statement before the prosecuting attorney, that made me mad, and I am getting even with him now.” Leaving DeHart‘s evidence out of consideration, there is not a circumstance in the case that is not consistent with the theory of Liston‘s innocence of the charge.
DeHart admits convictions for felonies in four states. He swore he testified for the State “to get even with” Liston; that he first met defendant after dark at Sioux City, Iowa, on June 18, 1920; that they
In State v. Prendible, 165 Mo. 352, 65 S. W. 566, Judge SHERWOOD said:
“Looking at the testimony of Barry and Tierney from every point of view, it seems quite clear that they, and each of them, were guilty of perjury when testifying in this cause; direсt, brazen-faced, audacious perjury. But it seems that perjury need not consist of false testimony directly bearing on the issue; it will suffice, it will be deemed material, if it tend, even circumstantially, to the proof of the issue. [2 Archb. (8 Ed.) 1727.]
“And, at common law, it was ground for a new trial, if the witness or witnesses who testified in behalf of the prevailing party were ‘shown to be evidently foresworn.’ [1 Chitt. Crim. Law (5 Am. Ed.) 656.]
“And under statute (
Sec. 2688, R. S. 1899 ), it is one of the grounds for a new trial that the ‘verdict is contrary to the evidence,’ and this was one of the grounds alleged in the motion for a new trial. And this statutory ground is clearly comprehensive enough to embrace within its scope, testimony of the character above noted; testimony impeached in all its more prominent features and bearings, for testimony completely impeached is no testimony at all, and no conviction based on such testimony should be permitted to stand when called in question in an appellate court. [People v. Lyons, 51 Mich. 215, 16 N. W. 380; see also, State v. Huff, 161 Mo. l. c. 487, and cas. cit.]“But in addition to what is above said, this court, in numerous instances, has decided that where a verdict is evidently prompted by prejudice, passion or partiality and is not the result of the calmer weighing of the facts in evidence which should always characterize the deliberations of a jury, it will interfere. [State v. Packwood, 26 Mo. 315 Mo.—83.
340; State v. Brosius, 39 Mo. 534; State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470; State v. Daubert, 42 Mo. 238; State v. Marshall, 47 Mo. 378; State v. Burgdorf, 53 Mo. 65; State v. Jaeger, 66 Mo. 173; State v. Castor, 93 Mo. 242; State v. Primm, 98 Mo. 368.]”
See also State v. Welton, 225 S. W. 965, 968, where Judge WHITE approves the ruling in the Prendible case.
To my mind, when the circumstances are considered, it is apparent that the testimony is of such a character that it is evident that the verdict was prompted by prejudice, passion or partiality, and that in the exercise of a sound discretion a new trial should hаve been awarded.
There were affidavits read in support of the motion for new trial by persons having knowledge of the facts stated, that the defendant had an office and was personally present in the city of Indianapolis, as one of the affiants, the assistant city attorney of Indianapolis, deposed, during the first fifteen days of June, 1920; another, Liston‘s client for whom he was attending to legal business, that Liston was in Indianapolis during the months of May and June, 1920. Other affidavits stated that he was not in Columbiа, Missouri, during the month of September, 1925. If any probative force should be conceded to DeHart‘s evidence, these affidavits should, of themselves, cast so great a doubt upon the credibility of his testimony as to require a new trial, in the interests of justice. If the defendant was arrested at Sioux City, Iowa, on June 18, 1920, there should be a record of it. If, on a retrial of this case, there should be no additional evidence for the State, the defendant should be discharged. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. Railey, C., not sitting.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by HIGBEE, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All of the judges concur.
