210 Mo. 275 | Mo. | 1908
At the January term, 1907, of the criminal court of Jackson county, the prosecuting attorney of said county filed in open court an information in two counts, charging the defendant, respectively, with the crimes of rape and incest. The prosecuting witness, upon and with whom the offenses were charged to have been committed, is Ella Brown, an unmarried female, and at that time between fourteen and fifteen years of age.
The defendant was arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty, and the court, for want of time to try the cause, continued the same until the next regular term. At the April term, 1907, of said court, the defendant filed a motion moving the court to require the prosecuting attorney to elect upon which of the counts he would. proceed to trial. This motion was ' overruled by the court and exceptions saved to such ruling. The same motion was made a second time at the close of all the evidence, and with the same result. The defendant was then put upon bis trial, convicted of rape and his punishment assessed by the jury at a term of seven years in the State penitentiary. After filing motions for a new trial and in arrest, which were overruled by the court, and exceptions saved, judgment was pronounced and sentence passed, in accordance with the verdict, from which judgment and sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
At the trial the evidence disclosed substantially the following facts:
There was evidence at the trial that the general reputation of the prosecutrix and her mother for virtue and chastity was not good in the community in which they lived, and defendant testified that he had been apprised of this fact before they made their trip to Missouri, and that he had talked with the prosecutrix on the subject on their return trip. Some weeks after their return the defendant talked with his sister upon this subject, and advised her to have her daughter examined by a physician, that she might know the truth in regard thereto, and he offered to pay the physician’s charge for the examination. Hp to that time the relations continued friendly between the brother and his sister and her family as before. The mother had the examination made, and the deposition of the physician who made the examination was taken by the defendant and read in evidence at the trial. Depositions were also taken by the defendant of witnesses who testified to specific acts of unchastity of the prosecutrix before her trip to Missouri with the defendant. This testimony, upon objection of the State, was stricken out by the court, to which action of the court the defendant excepted, and now complains on this appeal.
I. The first count in the information charges that '“on August 14th, 1906, at the county of Jackson in this State, the defendant, unlawfully, violently' and feloniously did make an assault in and upon one Ella Brown •and her the said Ella Brown then and there unlawfully, forcibly and against her will feloniously did ravish and carnally know, against the peace and dignity of the State.”
The information contains a sufficient charge of rape.
There was no error in joining the two counts, one for rape, the other for incest, as they both related to the same transaction. [State v. Mallon, 75 Mo. 355; Owens v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 345; Bishop’s New Crim. Proc., sec. 453; Porath v. State, 90 Wis. 527; Wiggins v. State, 84 S. W. 821; State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654.]
Nor was the State required to elect. It had a right to go to the jury on the different phases of the evidence. The jury acquitted defendant of incest 'by failing to find him guilty thereof and finding him guilty of rape alone.
II. The all-important question on this appeal is whether the testimony in this case is sufficient to sustain the conviction of the defendant. The admonition of Lord Hale that “it must be remembered that this is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved and harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent,” must be heeded. While it is the law of this State, as in most others, where not modified by statute, that a conviction, for rape may be sustained upon the uncorroborated evi
While, on the one hand, it will not do to hold that because the evidence indicates a depravity not ordinarily witnessed among men, it must be rejected, because the annals of crime are replete with examples wherein the most sacred relations have been disregarded and the testimony left no room for a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, yet, on the other, many well-authenticated decisions attest that this •charge has often been the result of malice and hidden motives, and the courts have refused to permit convictions to stand because of the utter improbability of the testimony, in the light of the conceded circumstances.
Instinctively the character of the accused and of his accuser is a prime consideration.
In this case,- the unchallenged evidence discloses that the defendant at the date of the alleged outrage was a man forty-nine years old. From his boyhood he was a telegraph operator, in different parts of the country. Duriug* the Spanish-American war he had served in the United States Navy, and at its close was .a sergeant in the signal corps of the land forces in the Philippine Islands.
In 1904 he received an honorable discharge and resumed his profession as a telegraph operator in California. He had been married and was the father of a family, but his wife, who resided in St. Louis, had obtained a divorce from him, on what ground the record is silent.
In the latter part of July, 1906, the defendant came from California to Colorado City, to visit his
This story defendant denies in toto. He says af- •
During the two weeks after their return the relations between defendant and the mother of prosecutrix and prosecutrix were as friendly as they had ever been. The defendant upon their invitation accompanied them to church and the evidence is that he also took them to the parks in that vicinity. By their invitation he ate at their house. During all this time,
In State v. Witten, 100 Mo. 525, Judge Black, speaking for this court, said: “A concealment of the injury for any considerable time after the woman has had an opportunity to complain, and a failure- on her part to make an outcry, where the act is committed within the probable hearing of other persons, are circumstances which will justify a strong, but not conclusive, inference that the act was with her consent,
Applying that statement of the law to this case, it must be conceded that if this crime was committed at all it was in a public hotel, in a room which had three windows in it and with guests in the adjoining room and yet the prosecutrix says herself she made no outcry.
But conceding that his alleged threats excuse her want or outcry, the testimony still shows a concealment of the injury and a failure to complain by prosecutrix after she had an opportunity to do so. Grant, as we think should be done, that, since she was in a strange city and knew no one to whom she could look for protection, her failure to complain would not be significant evidence of no rape, how are we to explain her failure to unburden her heart to her own aunt when she reached her home near Bolivar and remained there for ten days mingling freely with her cousins and the neighbor children? What was more natural, if she had suffered this terrible outrage, than that she should have informed her own aunt, her mother’s own sister? Who outside of her mother would have so certainly sympathized with her and offered her every protection against any alleged threats?
But, further, when the visit to her aunt’s was about ended and the time came for the defendant to go to St. Louis to visit his relatives there, what must have been the répugnance of prosecutrix, if she had in fact suffered this outrage at the hands of defendant, to
When all these facts are considered with the testimony as to the bad reputation of prosecutrix for chastity and truthfulness, we are of opinion, with the Attorney-General, that “it is difficult, if not impossible, to reach the conclusion arrived at by the jury and permitted to stand by the criminal court or any conclusion involving the defendant’s guilt in his conduct toward the prosecuting witness.” If we take the tests laid down and everywhere accepted as full of wisdom, the testimony did not measure up to the requirements of the law.
We have carefully gone through this record and loth as we are to interfere with a verdict which has met with the approval of the criminal court, we have reached the conclusion that it is not based upon evidence which will stand the tests of law, and no man ought to be incarcerated in the penitentiary upon such an unnatural and unreasonable story, wholly unsupported, as it is, by any fact or circumstance corroborating it.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, and unless stronger evidence is ad-' duced, the court should direct an acquittal of the defendant.
concur with all that is said in this opinion except as to remanding the cause. In their opinion the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the defendant discharged. It is so ordered.