State v. Lisa Ricker.
No. 2018-293-C.A. (K3/16-488A)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
June 10, 2021
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on March 31, 2021, on appeal by the defendant, Lisa Ricker, from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court following a jury verdict of guilty on one count of driving under the influence, in violation of
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in limiting cross-examination of a witness and abused its discretion in denying her motion for a new trial. The defendant also raises two purported errors of law related to a jury instruction and the verdict form. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
Facts and Travel
The testimony at trial revealed that defendant visited the Coventry Police Department on the afternoon of May 31, 2016, in order to seek assistance from the police regarding several matters. Officer Jadine Ferri was called in from patrol to
Afterwards, Officer Ferri, who was nearing the end of her shift, proceeded to her car. At trial, she testified that it was her practice to refill her police cruiser‘s gas tank before a shift change. Another car, driven by defendant, was also pulling out of the parking lot in front of Officer Ferri. The officer drove behind defendant‘s vehicle for less than a mile, later testifying that she observed defendant driving between five and ten miles an hour below the speed limit and swerving across both the inner and outer lines of the lane in which she was traveling. At that point, Officer Ferri turned on her emergency lights and pulled defendant‘s vehicle over.
At defendant‘s car, Officer Ferri did not ask her for identification or registration but noted that defendant had been crying. When asked why she was traveling west on Flat River Road, defendant told Officer Ferri that it was “none of [her] business.” The defendant claimed to the officer that she had not been drinking although, Officer Ferri testified, defendant‘s eyes were bloodshot and watery, she spoke loudly and slurred her words, and the officer detected a faint odor of alcohol.
After backup arrived, Officer Ferri asked defendant to step out of her car, observing that, as she did so, defendant was leaning on the car to maintain her balance. Officer Ferri then asked defendant to perform three standard field sobriety tests—the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk and turn test, and the one leg stand test. At trial, Officer Ferri testified that defendant, in her performance of these tests, exhibited multiple indicators that she was under the influence of an intoxicant. Then-Sergeant Kenneth Gebo, also present, asked defendant to perform two additional tests, the lack of convergence test and the Romberg balance test, later testifying that defendant‘s performance on these tests also indicated likely intoxication. At this point, Officer Ferri placed defendant under arrest and returned to the Coventry police station.
After making a phone call, defendant consented to a breath test. Officer Ferri, who was certified to operate the Intoxilyzer 9000,2 observed defendant for the requisite fifteen-minute period to ensure an accurate test, and then took two breath samples. The first sample showed a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of .083 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood and the second sample showed a BAC of .080. The defendant denied having had anything to drink that day but stated she had consumed a “big Bloody Mary” the prior evening and had taken some prescription medications.
During trial, on January 10, 2018, at the end of defendant‘s cross-examination of Officer Ferri, the state objected to a line of questioning regarding a refusal affidavit included in Officer Ferri‘s police report, which had been offered by the state for identification only. The record shows that, despite her testimony that defendant had submitted willingly to the breathalyzer test, Officer Ferri also completed a notarized affidavit which stated that defendant had refused to comply. The state argued that cross-examination should be limited with regard to this affidavit, because it would confuse the jury. The state also explained to the trial justice and defense counsel at sidebar that it was the regular practice of the Coventry Police Department to complete such affidavits in every case, regardless of whether or not defendants had actually refused the test. The trial justice asked defense counsel where she was going with this line of questioning, and counsel replied that it was being offered “[j]ust to point out on that sheet it says, they can take it for whatever it is worth.” Defense counsel also stated that it was her last question. The trial justice then sustained the state‘s objection, citing his “concern for misleading and confusing the jury[,]” and cross-examination of Officer Ferri continued as to other matters.
Both the state and defendant rested on January 10, 2018. The following morning, before the trial justice gave the jury its instructions, defendant objected to the verdict form “with respect to the fact that on the verdict sheet we have the two options for a guilty verdict.” The verdict sheet allowed the jury to “check one or both” of the following three options: “GUILTY because she was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs to a degree that rendered her incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle“; “GUILTY because she was operating a motor vehicle in the state of Rhode Island with a blood alcohol level of 0.08%“; or “NOT GUILTY[.]” The defendant‘s objection was based on the fact that the criminal complaint stated only one charge: driving under the influence as evidenced by her BAC.4 The trial
When the jury entered the courtroom, the trial justice proceeded to instruct them on the law. Included was an instruction that, “if you find that the breathalyzer test was administered within a reasonable time after the accident you may draw the inference that the blood alcohol level of the defendant at the time she was driving was as reported by the breathalyzer test.” After the trial justice completed his instructions, defendant and the state pointed out an error in the instruction to the trial justice, i.e., the use of the word “accident” in a case where there had been no accident, and the trial justice corrected the charge to the jury, asking that they substitute “motor vehicle stop” for the term “accident.” The defendant made no other objections to the jury instructions.
Initially, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. However, after receiving an Allen charge5 and submitting several questions to the trial justice, the jury returned a verdict. The jury foreperson first reported the verdict as not guilty, but after the trial justice looked at the completed verdict form, he noted that it was not in conformity with that statement. In fact, the jury unanimously found defendant guilty under the “second theory of intoxication,” based on the blood-alcohol reading from the breathalyzer.6
The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial justice heard and denied. The trial justice then sentenced defendant to one year at the Adult Correctional Institutions, with three months to serve in the home-confinement program and the remaining nine months suspended, with probation. The trial justice also suspended defendant‘s license for six months and ordered her to pay a $100 fine, perform ten hours of community service, undergo a substance-abuse evaluation, and abide by any treatment or counseling recommendations made by her probation officer. Thereafter, defendant timely appealed her conviction to this Court.
Discussion
Before this Court, defendant argues that the trial justice erred in limiting her cross-examination of Officer Ferri. Additionally, defendant contends that the trial justice erred in denying her motion for a new trial. Finally, defendant argues that there were errors of law regarding a jury instruction and the verdict form that merit a new trial.
Limitation of Cross-Examination
The defendant argues that the trial justice erroneously limited her cross-examination of the arresting officer by refusing to allow questioning about the officer‘s sworn affidavit, which contained a false statement.
Before this Court, defendant asserts that her trial counsel sought to impeach the arresting officer by cross-examining the officer regarding her sworn affidavit. However, defendant‘s contention regarding the probative value of this inquiry was equivocal at best. At trial, defendant‘s counsel claimed that the testimony was being elicited “[j]ust to point out on that sheet it says, they can take it for whatever it is worth.” The suggestion by counsel that the jurors ought to be able to “take it for whatever it is worth” does not clearly implicate defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
Additionally, at the sidebar conference, the prosecutor made clear to the trial justice that the single-page “refusal affidavit” contained in the police report reflected the practice or procedure for all officers of the Coventry Police Department to complete such an affidavit in every case, even where the driver submits to the breathalyzer test. The defendant had no response to this assertion. In our view, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by limiting this inquiry, stating:
“I think it is confusing.
“* * *
“I‘m not sure what real benefit you get from that other than that it is a strange procedure why they would include a form that is completely inapplicable to the circumstances in this case. * * * I think it is going to just be confusing to this jury and I don‘t think that it adds that much value to your cross. * * *”
Based on this analysis, the trial justice then sustained the objection, “out of [his] concern for misleading and confusing the jury.”
This Court has repeatedly held that a trial justice cannot be required to intuitively decipher the unvoiced bases of counsel‘s objections. See, e.g., State v. Doyle, 235 A.3d 482, 495 (R.I. 2020) (requiring a specific objection in order to bring the purported error to the trial justice‘s attention). If defense counsel‘s strategy was to use the affidavit to question the witness‘s
The defendant argues that the limitation of her cross-examination of the arresting officer prejudiced her defense because impeaching the credibility of the state‘s primary witness was vital to her case. Yet our examination of the record shows that the cross-examination of Officer Ferri that did occur successfully raised other examples of discrepancies between her reports and her testimony, giving the factfinder adequate grounds to question her credibility if inclined to do so. Furthermore, while the arguments of counsel are not evidence, defense counsel‘s closing argument drew the jury‘s attention to notable absences in Officer Ferri‘s testimony, such as the fact that no testimony suggested that defendant was intoxicated at the station, despite Officer Ferri‘s close proximity to defendant in a small conference room. Nevertheless, both the jury and the trial justice ultimately found Officer Ferri credible. Absent abuse of discretion, we will not disturb credibility determinations by the factfinder. See State v. Marizan, 185 A.3d 510, 518 (R.I. 2018) (noting that trial justices, given their proximity to the unfolding drama of the trial, are in “a much better position to make factual findings and credibility determinations than we are“).
Furthermore, because the jury found defendant guilty based on the BAC readings and because a second witness testified to defendant‘s failure to perform additional sobriety tests, we are of the opinion that “even if the jury entirely discredited [Officer Ferri], the overall strength of the evidence was sufficient” to convict defendant of driving under the influence. State v. D‘Alessio, 848 A.2d 1118, 1126 (R.I. 2004) (holding harmless any error in refusing to allow defense counsel to pursue a line of questioning where other evidence existed sufficient to convict). Consequently, the trial justice‘s limitation of the cross-examination here did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Motion for a New Trial
The defendant also argues that the jury‘s verdict was against the weight of the evidence and failed to do substantial justice.
It is well established that “when a trial justice is presented with a motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence, [the trial justice] acts as a thirteenth juror and exercises independent judgment on the credibility of witnesses and on the weight of the evidence.” State v. Gumkowski, 223 A.3d 321, 328 (R.I. 2020) (quoting State v. Johnson, 199 A.3d 1046, 1050-51 (R.I. 2019)). “The trial justice must consider the evidence in light of the jury charge, then independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and also ultimately determine whether he or she would have reached a result different from that reached by the jury.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 199 A.3d at 1051). “If, after conducting this independent review, the trial justice agrees with the jury‘s verdict or if the
“This Court‘s review of a denial of a motion for a new trial is deferential because the trial justice is in an especially good position to evaluate the facts and to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Gumkowski, 223 A.3d at 328 (quoting Johnson, 199 A.3d at 1051). “If the trial justice has articulated adequate grounds for denying the motion, [the] decision is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned by this Court unless [the trial justice] has overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 199 A.3d at 1051).
According to defendant, because the evidence offered at trial showed that her BAC was within the margin of error for the Intoxilyzer 9000, neither the jury nor the trial justice could conclude that she was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant implies that, had the trial justice accorded the regulations and testimony the appropriate weight, it would necessarily follow that she would be entitled to a new trial. The defendant essentially argues that the presence of a margin of error, and the fact that her results fell within that margin of error, per se establish enough doubt to defeat the state‘s case against her. We do not agree.
In State v. Lusi, 625 A.2d 1350 (R.I. 1993), this Court stated that, “[g]enerally [we have] permitted the state to rely on evidence other than direct evidence as long as the totality of that evidence constitutes proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lusi, 625 A.2d at 1357. In consideration of that evidentiary standard, in the context of
As the trial justice properly instructed the jury in this case:
“[T]he burden is upon the [s]tate to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant is guilty of the charges * * *. It is a strict and heavy burden but it does not mean that the defendant‘s guilt must be proved beyond all possible doubt. * * *
“Of course, a defendant is never to be convicted on suspicion or conjecture. * * * On the other hand, there are very few things in the world that we know with absolute certainty and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt.”
The evidence as to the margin of error here may cast some doubt on whether defendant was guilty under the statute, but the jury was not required to reject the
Additionally, the trial justice found all three witnesses called by the state credible and specifically stated that he agreed with the jury‘s verdict. Trial justices occupy a position better suited to the making of factual findings and credibility determinations than that of this Court because they “actually observed the human drama that is part and parcel of every trial and * * * [were privy to] realities that cannot be grasped from a reading of a cold record.” State v. Gonzalez, 986 A.2d 235, 242 (R.I. 2010); see Marizan, 185 A.3d at 518. Our review of the record shows that the trial justice gave a more than adequate explanation of his rationale for denying defendant‘s motion, neither overlooking nor misconceiving any material evidence. See State v. Mendez, 116 A.3d 228, 247 (R.I. 2015) (holding that the “trial justice ‘need not refer to all the evidence supporting [the justice‘s] decision,’ but need only ‘cite evidence sufficient to allow this Court to discern whether the trial justice has applied the appropriate standards‘“) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Robat, 49 A.3d 58, 71 (R.I. 2012)). Therefore, we discern no error in the trial justice‘s denial of defendant‘s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence.
Jury Instruction and Verdict Form
Finally, defendant contends that both the jury instruction regarding the breathalyzer results and the verdict form listing two separate theories of guilt constituted errors of law, warranting a new trial.
“The raise-or-waive rule is a fundamental precept that is staunchly adhered to by this Court.” State v. Parrillo, 228 A.3d 613, 623 (R.I. 2020). “It is well settled that a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it was not raised before the trial court.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Cusick v. Cusick, 210 A.3d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 2019)). Furthermore, “[t]his Court‘s raise-or-waive rule requires a specific objection to preserve an issue for appeal.” Id. at 625; see State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454, 468 (R.I. 2013) (“We require a specific objection so that the allegation of error can be brought to the attention of the trial justice, who will then have an opportunity to rule on it.“).
First, defendant contends that the jury instruction regarding the breathalyzer results impermissibly removed the issue of the reliability of the breathalyzer test results from the fact-finding function of the jury. Initially, we note that the instruction given to the jury allowed for a permissive inference, not a mandatory one, when it stated that the jury “may draw the inference” rather than using the term “shall” or “must.” In Lusi, cited supra, this Court noted that “[a] mandatory [inference] * * * poses a far greater threat to the adversary system than a permissive [inference]” because “[a] permissive [inference] allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the state of the base fact.” Lusi, 625 A.2d at 1356 (pointing out that, in criminal cases, “an inference must never ‘undermine the factfinder‘s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the [s]tate, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt‘“) (quoting County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979)). In other words, because the trial justice told the jury merely that it was permitted to make an inference does not mean that it removed any issue from the fact-finding function of the jury, as defendant contends.
Furthermore, while the trial justice‘s phrasing of the instruction in question could reasonably be interpreted two ways, there was no objection to this aspect of the wording of the jury instruction at trial.7 This is “[f]atal to defendant‘s challenge” because ”
The second legal error argued by defendant as grounds for a new trial, that the verdict form confused the jury, is also unpreserved on this record. See Hunt, 137 A.3d at 693 (“The raise-or-waive rule similarly applies to an appellate challenge to
the jury-verdict form[.]“). The defendant contends that her objection to the verdict form was preserved at trial when she very clearly articulated an objection to the presentation of both theories of guilt to the jury due to the state‘s specification on the criminal complaint of only one theory.8 We note that defendant argued below that, because she read the complaint as advancing only a single theory of guilt under
We note that defendant‘s argument regarding this alleged error in her motion for a new trial cannot cure the absence of
Notwithstanding precedent of this Court, defendant also argues that the trial justice‘s statement that the verdict sheet would “avoid[] some confusion or jumping to conclusions or muddying of the waters” relieved her of any burden to articulate jury confusion as a basis for her objection to the verdict form going forward. In fact, defendant claims that “the record reveals that another such objection would have been futile.” However, she cites no caselaw for this contention, and she cannot—this is simply not how the preservation of issues for appellate review functions in Rhode Island. See Hunt, 137 A.3d at 693 (noting that, “although a bill of particulars is not mandatory, * * * the timely objection to jury instructions at trial is required“); see also Mendez, 116 A.3d at 245.
After a thorough review of the record, we find that neither of these alleged errors of law was preserved for our review, and both are thus waived. See Hunt, 137 A.3d at 693.
Conclusion
For the reasons articulated above, this Court affirms the judgment of conviction. The papers in this case may be returned to the Superior Court.
Justice Robinson, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case due to my conviction that the trial justice abused his discretion in limiting defense counsel‘s cross-examination of Officer Jadine Ferri. In my opinion, this case should be vacated on that ground and remanded for a new trial.
Toward the end of the cross-examination of Officer Ferri, Ms. Ricker‘s counsel attempted to question Officer Ferri about the fact that she had sworn, in an affidavit (which was marked for identification at trial), that Ms. Ricker had refused to take the breathalyzer test. That statement in the affidavit was directly contrary to Officer Ferri‘s testimony at trial that Ms. Ricker had consented to the breathalyzer.1 The prosecutor objected on relevance grounds and suggested that this line of inquiry had the potential to confuse the jury.2 The prosecutor explained to the trial justice at sidebar that the reason why Officer Ferri had signed the affidavit attesting to Ms. Ricker‘s supposed refusal to
Ms. Ricker contends on appeal that the question at issue was “highly relevant” and had a direct bearing on “the trustworthiness of the testimony of a key witness and it should not have been kept from the jury.” I wholeheartedly agree.
I certainly acknowledge, at the outset, that under Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence a trial justice “retain[s] a considerable degree of discretion to impose reasonable limitations on cross-examination in order to prevent, inter alia, harassment, prejudice, confusion, or repetitive testimony.” State v. Tiernan, 941 A.2d 129, 134 (R.I. 2008). Additionally, it is true that, in a context such as the one before us, “[the] [trial justice‘s] ruling must amount to prejudicial error to constitute a clear abuse of [that] discretion.” State v. Bojang, 83 A.3d 526, 538 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the United States Supreme Court has memorably stated that “this principle cannot be expanded to justify a curtailment which keeps from the jury relevant and important facts bearing on the trustworthiness of crucial testimony.” Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 423 (1953); see also State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 924 (R.I. 1980) (“[Cross-examination] is the principal means by which the credibility of the witness and the truthfulness of his [or her] testimony can be tested.“). Indeed, this Court has also stated that “it is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner.” Tiernan, 941 A.2d at 134 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Anthony, 422 A.2d at 924. Furthermore, “the authority of the trial justice to limit cross-examination comes into play [only] after there has been permitted as a matter of right sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.” Tiernan, 941 A.2d at 134 (emphasis in original).
In my judgment, the trial justice committed an abuse of discretion in limiting the cross-examination of Officer Ferri in this case in a manner which deprived Ms. Ricker of her right to explore the trustworthiness of the primary witness against her.
The Sixth Amendment to the
Cross-examination is “beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,” and it is the “principal means by which the credibility of the witness and the truthfulness of his [or her] testimony can be tested.” Tiernan, 941 A.2d at 133, 134 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Briggs, 886 A.2d 735, 745 (R.I. 2005) (stating that the right of a defendant to cross-examine the witnesses against him or her “is the primary means by which a criminal defendant may challenge the veracity of a witness‘s testimony“). For that reason, the “denial or significant diminution” of the right to cross-examine “calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process * * *.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[c]ross-examination, when well conducted, is not a desiccated syllogistic exercise, but is rather a multifaceted attempt at unveiling what might lie behind the direct testimony of the witness.” Tiernan, 941 A.2d at 133.
In my opinion, Ms. Ricker‘s counsel should have been permitted to question Officer Ferri about the blatant inconsistency between her sworn affidavit and her sworn testimony at trial. That issue went directly to Officer Ferri‘s credibility and her trustworthiness as a witness. If the question had been permitted, the prosecutor would then have been free to ask Officer Ferri on redirect examination if she included the statement that Ms. Ricker refused the breathalyzer in her sworn affidavit only because it was the policy of the Coventry Police Department to do so in every case.4 Contrary to the trial justice and the majority, I can perceive nothing about that line of questioning which would have been confusing to the jury or would have created any kind of unnecessary delay. A trial justice‘s discretion under Rule 403 “must be exercised sparingly.” Wells v. Uvex Winter Optical, Inc., 635 A.2d 1188, 1193 (R.I. 1994); see also State v. Moreno, 996 A.2d 673, 683 (R.I. 2010) (“This Court has stated that a trial justice‘s discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403 must be used sparingly.“) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The determination of the value of evidence should normally be placed in the control of the party who offers it. Unless evidence is of limited or marginal relevance and enormously prejudicial,
Officer Ferri testified about her observations of Ms. Ricker during their initial interaction in the police station; she stated that Ms. Ricker was “erratic,” “antagonistic,” “outlandish,” and “just angry.” But she did not testify that she perceived any indications of impairment during the “10 or 15 minute[ ]” encounter. However, it was then her testimony that, shortly thereafter, she pulled Ms. Ricker‘s vehicle over because it was traveling five to ten miles an hour below the speed limit, crossed the double yellow line, and drove into the bike lane. Inexplicably, Officer Ferri testified that, at that time, she saw various signs of impairment—viz., “watery bloodshot eyes,” “slurred speech,” and “a faint odor of alcohol“—despite not having testified to having observed those signs during their meeting at the police station. Also, she was the only witness who observed Ms. Ricker‘s driving before pulling her vehicle over. The jury should have been permitted to determine whether or not to find her testimony credible with the knowledge that she made an untrue statement on a sworn affidavit—a statement that was the exact opposite of what she testified to at trial. See generally Boscia v. Massaro, 529 A.2d 504, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (“In our system of justice, the jury is sacrosanct and its importance is unquestioned. The members of a jury see and hear the witnesses as they testify. They watch them as they sweat, stutter, or swagger under the pressure of cross-examination. This enables the jury to develop a feel for the case and its personal dynamics which cannot be conveyed by the cold printed page of a record reproduced for appellate review.“).
What is more, I cannot say that the trial justice‘s abuse of discretion in failing to allow the cross-examination at issue in this case was harmless. See State v. Oliveira, 961 A.2d 299, 312 (R.I. 2008). Even though the jury ultimately convicted Ms. Ricker on the basis of her breathalyzer test results, and not on any of the other evidence of impairment, Officer Ferri‘s credibility was still very much at issue. Officer Ferri conducted the breathalyzer test. That test requires an observation period of fifteen minutes before administering the test, which observation period Officer Ferri testified that she conducted. She also testified to placing a new mouthpiece on the instrument with which the breathalyzer test is administered before each of the breath tests; and she also testified that, in administering the test, she followed an “operational checklist” and her training. She further testified that she wore gloves while administering the test. As such, Officer Ferri‘s credibility was directly relevant to the breathalyzer test results.5 Accordingly, failing to allow cross-examination of the primary witness against Ms. Ricker that was directly relevant to that witness‘s credibility was a clear abuse of discretion
For the above-stated reasons, I respectfully, but emphatically and even passionately, dissent from the majority‘s opinion in this case.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK‘S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
| Title of Case | State v. Lisa Ricker. |
| Case Number | No. 2018-293-C.A. (K3/16-488A) |
| Date Opinion Filed | June 10, 2021 |
| Justices | Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. |
| Written By | Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata |
| Source of Appeal | Kent County Superior Court |
| Judicial Officer from Lower Court | Associate Justice Daniel A. Procaccini |
| Attorney(s) on Appeal |
For State: Christopher R. Bush Department of Attorney General For Defendant: Megan F. Jackson Office of the Public Defender |
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)
Notes
“(a) Whoever drives or otherwise operates any vehicle in the state while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, drugs, toluene, or any controlled substance as defined in chapter 28 of title 21, or any combination of these, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor * * * and shall be punished as provided in subsection (d) of this section.
“(b)(1) Any person charged under subsection (a) * * * whose blood alcohol concentration is eight one-hundredths of one percent (.08%) or more by weight as shown by a chemical analysis of a blood, breath, or urine sample, shall be guilty of violating subsection (a) of this section. This provision shall not preclude a conviction based on other admissible evidence. Proof of guilt under this section may also be based on evidence that the person charged was under the influence * * * to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle. * * *”