STATE OF OHIO v. JAMES LADSON
No. 111211
Cоurt of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth Appellate District, County of Cuyahoga
October 13, 2022
2022-Ohio-3670
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-21-656142-A
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 13, 2022
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristin M. Karkutt and Alicia Harrison, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Joseph V. Pagano and Marcus Sidoti, for appellant.
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant James Ladson (“Ladson“) appeals from his conviction for murder and other crimes following a jury trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On January 27, 2021, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Ladson on one count of murder in violation of
{¶ 3} Before trial began, the state dismissed the voluntary manslaughter charge. Ladson waived his right to a jury trial on the having weapons while under disability charge, and the case proceeded to a jury trial on the remaining counts on November 29, 2021.
{¶ 4} These charges arose from a July 25, 2020 incident in which Allante Riggins (“Riggins“) was shot and killed in the pаrking lot of Eagle Fresh Mart on Kinsman Road and East 75th Street in Cleveland, Ohio. That day, Riggins was helping his sister Arisia move out of her home, located around the corner from Eagle Fresh Mart. Shortly after 8 p.m. that evening, Riggins went to Eagle Fresh Mart. Riggins, who had recently been diagnosed with schizophrenia, began having what appeared to be a schizophrenic episode in the parking lot. Security footage from Eagle Fresh Mart shows Riggins pacing in the parking lot and appearing agitated. Around 8:15 p.m., security footage showеd a dark blue Infiniti sedan pull
{¶ 5} Several minutes later, Riggins reappeared at the edge of the parking lot, near where the Infiniti was parked. Riggins walked past the Infiniti and entered the store. Shortly thereafter, Riggins exited the store аnd walked the length of the parking lot back towards the Infiniti. Riggins appeared to exchange words with the passenger of the Infiniti, who then got back into the car. Riggins remained near the Infiniti and appeared to be shouting at the vehicle. Security footage showed Riggins begin to walk out of the parking lot and away from the rear of the Infiniti, but he turned around to approach the vehicle again, appearing to lunge at the vehicle in an agitated manner. This continued for several minutes, with Riggins pacing around the vehicle. At approximately 8:39 p.m., Ladson and the front passenger of the Infiniti exited the vehicle and confronted Riggins. The passenger walked around the rear end of the vehicle with his right arm raised toward Riggins.
{¶ 6} Soon after the shooting, Arisia heard that her brother had been shot outside the store. Security footage shows Arisia and her boyfriend pull into the parking lot near where Riggins was shot. Shortly thereafter, Cleveland police arrived at the scene.
{¶ 7} At trial, the state called Riggins‘s sisters, Arisia and Adora Riggins, who both testified as to their brother‘s mental health and the events of July 25, 2020, before Riggins went to Eagle Fresh Mart. The state also called one of the responding officers, Cleveland police officer Brooklyn Barnes (“Barnes“), who testified that upon arriving to the scene, she observed Riggins face-down in the parking lot. Barnes testified that she turned Riggins over and observed a gunshot wound to his head. Barnes began administering first aid and CPR while her partner attempted to control the other people on the scene. Several minutes later, EMS arrived and began giving Riggins medical attention.
{¶ 8} The state also called Cleveland police detectives Zara Hudson (“Hudson“) and Richard Tusing (“Tusing“), who testified as to their respective involvement with the invеstigation in this case. Hudson was initially assigned to the case, and he responded to the scene on July 25, 2020. Hudson canvassed the
{¶ 9} Tusing testified that when the case was assigned to him, Ladson had been identified as a person of interest in the case. He went on to testify that upon being assigned to the case through his role in the homicide unit, he reviewed the file, including the security video, and subsequently obtained information on Ladson and the Infiniti from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles. Tusing determined that a 2008 Infiniti M35 was registered to Ladson at the time of the shooting. Tusing reviewed body camera footage from a traffic stop of Ladson unrelated to this incident. Ultimately, Tusing was able to identify Ladson as the driver of the Infiniti who had shot Riggins.
{¶ 10} The state also called various expert witnesses to testify about the limited physical evidence in this case. Dr. Dan Galita (“Dr. Galita“), a forensic pathologist and medical examiner at the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner‘s Office, testified that he completed an autopsy of Riggins. Dr. Galita testified that the cause of Riggins‘s death was a gunshot wound to the left cheek with skeletal, visceral, and soft tissue injuries, and the manner of death was homicide. The state also presented evidence that the nature of Riggins‘s injuries, including stippling on his face, meant that the shooter fired at Riggins in close range.
{¶ 11} Following the state‘s case, Ladson made a
{¶ 12} Defense counsel then renewed its
{¶ 13} On December 3, 2021, the jury returned its verdict. The jury found Ladson not guilty of murder in violation of
{¶ 14} On January 10, 2022, the court held a sentencing hearing. Defense counsel and the assistant prosecuting attorney addressed the court. Riggins‘s sister
{¶ 15} Ladson appeals, presenting five assignments of error for our review:
- The trial court erred by admitting the video and photographic evidence over appellant‘s objection and in violation of
Evid.R. 803(6) andEvid.R. 901(C) . - The trial court erred by denying appellant‘s request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
- The trial court erred when it denied appellant‘s motion for acquittal under
Crim.R. 29 because the state failed to present sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the elements necessary to support the convictions. - Appellant‘s convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
- The admission of the lead detective‘s narration and video footage and his opinions that the images show defendant-appellant engaging in the offenses charged in the indictment, violated the rules of evidence, invaded the province of the jury, and deprived him of his right to due process and a fundamentally fair jury trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Legal Analysis
I. Video and Photographic Evidence
{¶ 16} In Ladson‘s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred by admitting video and photographic evidence over defense counsel‘s objection and in violation of
{¶ 17} The decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard, and reviewing courts will not disturb evidentiary rulings absent a clear showing that the trial court abused its discretion and materially prejudiced a party. State v. Barnes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104045, 2017-Ohio-383, ¶ 17, citing State v. Lyles, 42 Ohio St.3d 98, 99, 537 N.E.2d 221 (1989). The term abuse of discretion implies that the court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983); Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463.
{¶ 18} With respect to video evidence, Ladson objected to the admission of state‘s exhibit Nos. 61, 62, and 63. Exhibit No. 61 is store surveillance footage from approximately 8:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m., exhibit No. 62 is a continuation of store surveillance footage beginning at approximately 8:30 p.m., and exhibit No. 63 is a zoomed in excerpt of the surveillance footage in exhibit No. 62 showing the shooting. Ladson objected to the admission of this footage, arguing that no one from the store testified as to how the videos were prepared or whether they were authentic. With respect to photographic evidence, Ladson objected to state‘s exhibit Nos. 69-77, which were screenshots of a man standing near a vehicle that Adora Riggins provided to law enforcement. Adora testified that she had a personal relationship with one of the store employees, and he provided thеm to her after the incident. Ladson objected to the admission of these photos, arguing that no
{¶ 19} In this appeal, Ladson argues that the videos and photos constitute hearsay because they were introduced to prove that a person in the video committed an offense consistent with Tusing‘s own interpretation and narration of what the videos and photos showed.
{¶ 20}
(A) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
(B) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be.
““The authentication requirement of
{¶ 21} Here, while Ladson correctly points out that none of the testifying witnesses observed the shooting itself, we disagree that the evidence was not properly authenticated. Video and photographic evidence may be admissible under
{¶ 22} In this case, the detective who responded to the scene testified that he personally obtained the surveillance footage from the business. He also testified that the footage itself accurately reflected the scene of the shooting. This testimony is sufficient to have properly authenticated the video evidence. State v. Freeze, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-11-209, 2012-Ohio-5840, ¶ 68.
{¶ 23} With respect to the screenshots provided to law enforcement by Riggins‘s sister Adora, we find that they also satisfy the low threshold for authentication. Adora testified that she received the messages containing the screenshots from a store employee. This is sufficient to authenticate the photos. State v. Primous, 2020-Ohio-912, 152 N.E.3d 1002, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 24} Because the video and photo evidence in question was properly authenticated pursuant to
II. Jury Instruction
{¶ 25} In Ladson‘s second assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, he argues that the grand jury concluded there was probable cause to charge Ladson with voluntary manslaughter and that the evidence presented at trial supported an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
{¶ 26} A trial court‘s decision to grant or deny a requested jury instruction is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90845, 2009-Ohio-2026, ¶ 50. Specifically, a defendant charged with murder is entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter when the evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the charged crime of murder and a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 632, 590 N.E.2d 272 (1992), citing State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 37, 553 N.E.2d 576 (1990).
{¶ 27} Voluntary manslaughter as laid out in
No person, while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, shall knowingly cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another‘s pregnancy.
Ladson argues that the evidence in this case shows that Riggins “was engaged in a schizophrenic episode, he was highly agitated, appeared to be yelling, and lunging towards the driver of the suspect video.” Ladson argues that Riggins‘s behavior provoked both the passenger and driver
{¶ 29} We disagree with Ladson that this constitutes sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. We agree with the trial court‘s statement that Riggins‘s behavior constituted insufficient provocation for purposes оf
{¶ 30} In light of this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ladson‘s request to issue a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, Ladson‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶ 31} In his third assignment of error, Ladson argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for acquittal under
{¶ 32}
{¶ 33} A sufficiency challenge requires a court to detеrmine whether the state has met its burden of production at trial and to consider not the credibility of the evidence but whether, if credible, the evidence presented would sustain a
{¶ 34} With respect to whether the state presented sufficient evidence as to Ladson‘s identity, we note that the state presented the video and photo evidence discussed at length above, as well as body camera footage showing Ladson being pulled over for a traffic stop in a car with the same features as the car in the video and vehicle registration evidence showing that Ladson owned a blue 2008 Infiniti at the time of this incident. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the state, it is more than sufficient for the jury to have concluded that Ladson was the driver of the car and the individual who shot Riggins.
{¶ 35} With resрect to Ladson‘s extensive list of evidence that was not presented, we note that “[p]roof of guilt may be made by circumstantial evidence, real evidence, and direct evidence, or any combination of the three, and all three have equal probative value.” Brook Park v. Gannon, 2019-Ohio-2224, 137 N.E.3d 701, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Zadar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94698, 2011-Ohio-1060, ¶ 18, citing State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 529 N.E.2d 1236 (1988). Therefore, the fact that the state may not have presented certain kinds of evidence has no bearing on whether it presented sufficient evidence of Ladson‘s guilt.
{¶ 36} For these reasons, Ladson‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Manifest Weight
{¶ 37} In his fourth assignment of error, Ladson argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, he argues that the evidence against him was poor and unreliable, reiterating the various forms of evidence that he argues should have been presented at trial and arguing that the state‘s case was based on a minimal investigation. In addition to reiterating his issues with the photo and video evidence discussed above, Ladson points out that he presented evidence that his 2008 Infiniti wаs not in his possession on the date of the incident, that the initial police reports in the case identified the Infiniti‘s passenger as the shooter rather than the driver, that the police never recovered Ladson‘s vehicle, and that no eyewitnesses testified despite the parking lot being crowded at the time of the shooting.
{¶ 38} Unlike a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a manifest weight challenge attacks the quality of the evidence and questions whether the state met its burden of persuаsion at trial. State v. Hill, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99819, 2014-Ohio-387, ¶ 25, citing State v. Bowden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 13. When reviewing a manifest weight challenge, a court reviews the entire record, weighing all evidence and reasonable inferences and considering the credibility of the witnesses, to determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387.
{¶ 39} “Issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given are primarily for the trier of fact.” State v. Matthews, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97916, 2012-Ohio-5174, ¶ 34, citing State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 80, 434 N.E.2d 1356 (1982), and State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). Further, the trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness. Id., citing State v. Caldwell, 79 Ohio App.3d 667, 607 N.E.2d 1096 (4th Dist.1992). Reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 40} Following a thorough review of the record, we cannot conclude that this is the exceptional case in which the trier of fact lost its way. The entire incident was captured on video, and the state presented various evidence showing that Ladson was the individual depicted in the video. With respect to the evidence that Ladson‘s vehicle was not in his possession on the date of the incident, the record reflects that the vehicle allegedly at Klouda Automotive was a 2008 Infiniti G35, while the BMV records presented at trial reflect that he owned a 2008 Infiniti M35. Further, the state presented evidence at trial that Ladson sold his vehicle after this incident and police were unable to locate the vehicle. Any claimed deficiencies in the state‘s investigation of this case, including discrepancies between the original police report and other evidence, are not such that the jury clearly lost its way in finding Ladson guilty of murder and felonious assault. For example, the statement
V. Tusing‘s Testimony
{¶ 41} In his fifth and final assignment of error, Ladson argues that the admission of Tusing‘s narration of the video footage and his opinions that the images show Ladson engaging in the offenses charged in the indictment violated the rules of evidence, invaded the province of the jury, and deprived him of his right to due process and a fundamentally fair triаl guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Ladson argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled defense objections to Tusing‘s testimony that the person in the video seen shooting Riggins was Ladson because the suspect‘s identity was the primary issue to be determined by the jury.
{¶ 42} Ladson cites
{¶ 43}
{¶ 44} While Tusing did not personally obtain the surveillanсe footage, he was the lead investigator assigned to the case and therefore had adequate personal knowledge to testify as to the contents of the footage. State v. Groce, 2019-Ohio-1007, 133 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 46 (10th Dist.). Therefore, his testimony did not violate
{¶ 45}
{¶ 46} Here, Tusing‘s testimony was based on his perception, his role in the investigation of this case, and his extensive review of the surveillance footage and subsequent investigation and identification of Ladson such that it was helpful to a clear understаnding of his testimony and determination of facts in issue. Therefore, the testimony did not violate
{¶ 47} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR