State v. King,State v. King,
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Kathryne E. Hathcock, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Christopher W. Brooks, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
Caryn Strickland for defendant-appellee.
ALLEN, Justice.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals interpreted the sentencing statute for impaired driving offenses to require that defendant Jason William King receive a new sentencing hearing because the trial judge found aggravating factors instead of submitting them to the jury. We do not read the statute to require resentencing if the trial judge‘s error did not prejudice defendant. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals as it pertains to defendant‘s impaired driving offense and remand this case to that court for a harmless error determination.
On 30 August 2021, the District Court, Buncombe County, convicted defendant of driving while impaired (DWI), reckless driving, possession of marijuana, and possession of marijuana paraphernalia. The district court found the existence of an aggravating factor but concluded that it was substantially counterbalanced by a mitigating factor. Proceeding under
Defendant appealed to the Superior Court, Buncombe County, where on 18 November 2021, a jury found him guilty of DWI and reckless driving but acquitted him of the remaining charges. Prior to sentencing defendant, the superior court judge found the existence of three aggravating factors: (1) “[t]he driving of the defendant was especially reckless;” (2) “[t]he driving of the defendant was especially dangerous;” and (3) “defendant was convicted . . . of [misdemeanor] death by motor vehicle” in August 2015. Unlike the district court, the superior court judge did not find the existence of any mitigating factors. Based on the three aggravating factors and the absence of any mitigating factors, the superior court judge imposed Level III punishment: six months of imprisonment, suspended pending defendant‘s completion of thirty-six months of supervised probation; an active sentence of three days in custody; and payment of a $500 fine and court costs.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of the superior court. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari asking the Court of Appeals to review his case even if it concluded “that his right to appeal was waived because of failure to comply with the technical requirements of [Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by finding aggravating factors because “such factors must be decided by a jury.”1 State v. King, 288 N.C. App. 459, 464 (2023). The Court of Appeals agreed. Citing the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Court of Appeals explained that a defendant‘s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is violated when a trial judge inflicts punishment beyond what the jury‘s verdict alone authorizes.2 Id. at 465. The court further noted that the General Assembly amended the DWI sentencing statute in 2006 to remove the statutory authority of trial judges to find contested aggravating factors in DWI sentencing proceedings. Id. (citing The Motor Vehicle Driver Protection Act of 2006, S.L. 2006-253, § 23, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1178, 1207). In particular, the legislature added
Though unanimous in holding that the trial court erred, the Court of Appeals split over whether defendant should receive a new sentencing hearing. The majority held that resentencing is required whenever a trial judge finds aggravating factors in violation of
Observing that the General Assembly “is free to provide [criminal defendants with] more protection than constitutionally required,” the majority concluded that the legislature deliberately provided extra protection to persons convicted of DWI offenses when it added
Since the relevant federal cases provide the bare minimum, and all relevant state cases are distinguishable because they were decided prior to the modification of the statute where it is clear from the timing and language of the statute that the legislature intended to change the standards adopted by our courts, we hold aggravating factors must be decided by the jury or the case must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
The dissenting judge disagreed with the majority‘s interpretation of
On 5 May 2023, the State appealed to this Court. At the time,
“We review a lower court‘s interpretation of statutes de novo.” Morris v. Rodeberg, 385 N.C. 405, 409 (2023) (emphasis omitted). “Under a de novo review, the [C]ourt considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted).
This case asks us to decide whether a trial judge‘s finding of aggravating factors in violation of the DWI sentencing statute automatically entitles a defendant to a new sentencing hearing. In urging us to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, defendant argues that the plain language of
Notwithstanding defendant‘s arguments, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to apply harmless error review to the superior court judge‘s finding of aggravating factors. The finding of aggravating factors by a trial judge contrary to
To explain why we so hold, we turn first to the text of
The defendant may admit to the existence of an aggravating factor, and the factor so admitted shall be treated as though it were found by a jury . . . . If the defendant does not so admit, only a jury may determine if an aggravating factor is present. . . . The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating factor exists . . . .
Without question, this provision requires a jury—not a judge—to decide whether the State has established the existence of contested aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the provision nowhere states that a violation automatically entitles a defendant to a new sentencing hearing.
According to defendant, the “unequivocal” nature of the wording used in
For defendant to prevail, we would have to conclude that the General Assembly meant for
The legislative intent behind
The defendant may admit to the existence of an aggravating factor, and the factor so admitted shall be treated as though it were found by a jury . . . . If the defendant does not so admit, only a jury may determine if an aggravating factor is present in an offense.
The Structured Sentencing Act governs sentencing for most non-DWI offenses. See
Subsection 15A-1340.16(a1) is one in a series of amendments that the legislature made to the Structured Sentencing Act in 2005. See S.L. 2005-145, § 1, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws at 253-57. By enacting
It appears obvious to us that the General Assembly regarded this change to the Structured Sentencing Act as a codification of Blakely. No great powers of deduction are needed to reach this conclusion. For one thing, the title of the 2005 legislation unambiguously states that the legislation‘s main purpose was to incorporate Blakely into the Structured Sentencing Act. See S.L. 2005-145, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 253. Not surprisingly, then, we have referred to the 2005 legislation as “the Blakely Act.” Blackwell, 361 N.C. at 49; see also Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 812 (1999) (“[T]his Court has stated that the title of an act should be considered in ascertaining the intent of the legislature.“). Likewise,
The Blakely Act does not expressly address whether the impermissible finding of aggravating factors by trial judges in violation of
Like everyone else, judges make mistakes. With this reality in mind, “this Court has said on numerous occasions . . . [that] litigants are not entitled to receive ‘perfect’ trials; instead, they are entitled to receive ‘a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.’ ” State v. Malachi, 371 N.C. 719, 733 (2018) (quoting State v. Ligon, 332 N.C. 224, 243 (1992)). This principle holds true even for constitutional errors in criminal trials. “[I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.”5 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). Put differently, constitutional errors that do not prevent defendants from receiving fair trials are not grounds for reversal. See id. (remarking that most constitutional errors are subject to harmless error analysis because “[t]he thrust of the many constitutional rules governing the conduct of criminal trials is to ensure that those trials lead to fair and correct judgments“). The General Assembly codified this understanding in
Since the default rule is that constitutional errors are subject to review for harmlessness, the General Assembly undoubtedly realized that the courts could end up applying harmless error analysis to Blakely errors. See State v. S. Ry. Co., 145 N.C. 495, 542 (1907) (“The Legislature is presumed to know the existing law and to legislate with reference to it.“). Thus, if it had intended the Blakely Act to go beyond the constitutional minimum and mandate automatic reversal for Blakely errors, the legislature would have said so somewhere in the legislation. Finding no such statement, we perceive no such legislative intent. It follows that a trial judge‘s finding of a contested aggravating factor in violation of the Blakely Act does not entitle a defendant to relief unless the error prejudiced the defendant.
This brings us back to the DWI sentencing statute. The General Assembly copied the key language in
Consistent with our view of the legislative intent behind
The rules for determining harmless error vary depending on whether a defendant has asserted the denial of a constitutional right or a statutory right. As explained above, when a defendant seeks relief for the denial of a constitutional right, the burden is on the State to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.
When a defendant requests relief for the denial of a statutory right,
We see no merit in defendant‘s contention that applying harmless error review to violations of
Finally, in ruling for defendant, the Court of Appeals majority relied on State v. Geisslercrain, 233 N.C. App. 186 (2014).
According to the majority, Geisslercrain “did not apply harmless error and evaluate whether . . . [an aggravating] factor existed but decided the finding of that factor placed the defendant at another DWI Level punishment, violating Blakely, and therefore
The Court of Appeals majority incorrectly construed
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Justice EARLS dissenting.
This case involves Mr. King‘s sentence pursuant to
The text of the statute is clear, in cases where a defendant declines to admit an aggravating factor exists, “only a jury may determine if an aggravating factor is present.”
The trial court‘s reliance on these aggravating factors during sentencing was problematic for at least three reasons: (1) it misapplies the clear and unambiguous text of subsection 20-179(a1)(2), which states that only a jury may find aggravating factors; (2) due to this misapplication, Mr. King was incorrectly sentenced at a higher offender level; and (3) based on the facts of this case, it is unknown whether a jury would have found the presence of the “especially reckless” aggravating factor at all.
N.C.G.S. § 20-179(a1)(2)
A. Statutory Background
Before 2006, the applicable version of the DWI sentencing statute required the trial judge to hold a sentencing hearing “to determine whether there [were] aggravating or mitigating factors” present. Act of Oct. 14, 1998, S.L. 1998-182, § 25, 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws 592, 618. This statute was amended in 2006, and now provides that “only a jury may determine if an aggravating factor is present.”
The General Assembly‘s amendment of subsection 20-179(a1)(2), as well as its passing of the Blakely Act, followed the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Blakely, 542 U.S. 296. See S.L. 2005-145, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws at 253; S.L. 1998-182, § 25, 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws at 618. In Blakely, the Court determined that “[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury‘s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes essential to the punishment, and the judge exceeds his proper authority.” 542 U.S. at 304 (cleaned up). This results in a Sixth Amendment violation. Id. at 305. Later, in Recuenco, the Court held that a trial court‘s failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury is not structural error. 548 U.S. at 222.
Following Blakely, Recuenco, and amendments to section 15A-1340.16, this Court issued its opinion in State v. Blackwell, 361 N.C. 41 (2006), which although governed by Blakely, was not governed by the statutory changes made under the Blakely Act. See State v. Ward, 364 N.C. 157, 170 (2010) (Brady, J., concurring in the result only). Likewise, while the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. McQueen also occurred after the 2006 amendments to subsection 20-179(a1)(2), the court applied the prior version of the statute, which allowed the judge to find an aggravating factor. 181 N.C. App. 417, 422 (2007). Thus, while Blackwell and McQueen may comport with the United States Constitution‘s requirements arising under Blakely, they did not address the subsequent statutory changes at issue here in subsection 20-179(a1)(2).
Instead, the unique requirements of the 2006 amendments to the DWI statute were first recognized in State v. Geisslercrain, 233 N.C. App. 186 (2014). There, a trial court sentenced a defendant to a Level Four punishment after erroneously finding, for itself, that an aggravating factor was present. Id. at 191. Had the trial court not erroneously found such a factor, it would have been required under the statute to sentence the defendant to a lesser Level Five punishment. Id. (citing
B. Mr. King‘s Case
1. Section 20-179 precludes harmless error review where a jury does not find that an aggravating factor is present.
Since the precedents from this Court are distinguishable, the proper standard of error review when a trial court violates the current version of subsection 20-179(a1)(2) is a matter of first impression. I would hold that a faithful reading of the plain text of the statute
The language of the DWI statute is plain. It provides that “only a jury may determine if an aggravating factor is present.”
Our General Assembly can amend state law to grant greater protections than the United States Constitution requires. State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 713 (1988); see also State v. King, 288 N.C. App. 459, 466 (2023). It did so here. By stating that “only a jury may determine” the presence of an aggravating factor,
The majority concedes in a footnote that the statute goes beyond Blakely‘s constitutional floor with other mandates, like requiring the State to give written notice to the defendant of any aggravating factors it intends to use. Yet it reasons the General Assembly “would have said so” if it meant to mandate more than harmless error review for statutory violations. This reasoning does not give proper credit to the General Assembly‘s clear and unambiguous language and our presumption that “the Legislature chose its words with due care” when enacting legislation. See C Invs. 2, LLC v. Auger, 383 N.C. 1, 10 (2022) (citing Sellers v. Friedrich Refrigerators, Inc., 283 N.C. 79, 85 (1973)).
Importantly, the majority‘s reading of the statute contradicts its plain text. It allows a judge to find for herself any aggravating factors, only to be overturned if a different judge guesses that a jury would have reached a different result. See State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 513 (2012) (explaining the harmless error standard for federal constitutional and other legal errors). That system of review sidelines any role for the jury in a statutory scheme where the General Assembly gave the essential task to “only” the jury. See
Moreover, section 20-179‘s sentencing scheme and overall structure reaffirms that harmless error review is not the right test. The provision details extensive, special instructions for convening, selecting, and impaneling the jury to find any aggravating factors, and instructs trial courts on how to impanel a new jury if the jury from the guilt phase is unable to reconvene to hear evidence on the aggravating factors issue.
2. Even if harmless error were the correct standard, the error in Mr. King‘s case is prejudicial because it affected his punishment level, and resentencing is the correct remedy.
Mr. King further argues that if harmless error is the correct standard, then the lower court‘s error was prejudicial because it affected
In DWI cases, correct application of the statute is essential to determine the level at which a defendant is sentenced. Section 20-179‘s sentencing scheme is “systematic and tiered” and does not afford trial judges discretion in sentencing. Geisslercrain, 233 N.C. App. at 190 (cleaned up). This is in contrast to a provision in the Structured Sentencing Act,
No similar discretion applies under section 20-179. For example, if there are no aggravating or mitigating factors present, then the trial court must impose a Level Four punishment. Geisslercrain, 233 N.C. App. at 191; see also
In this case, but for the trial court‘s reliance on the three aggravating factors, which were not found by a jury, the trial court would have been required to impose a lesser Level Four punishment, not the harsher Level Three punishment it imposed on Mr. King. See Geisslercrain, 233 N.C. App. at 190. Mr. King suffered prejudicial error from the trial court‘s improper finding of aggravating factors because his punishment was more severe than it otherwise would have been had the trial court stayed within its constitutional and statutory lane. Cf. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 200 (2001) (holding that a showing of an increased prison sentence can establish prejudice for a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
Importantly, under this approach, not every case in which the trial court erroneously finds an aggravating factor for itself will require reversal. For example, if the State had provided notice to Mr. King of any other aggravating factor in his case and proven it to the jury, then the trial court‘s error in finding the “especially reckless” aggravating factor would not have been prejudicial because it would not have affected Mr. King‘s sentencing level. That is because the Superior Court found no mitigating factors in his case. And in the absence of any mitigating factors, the aggravating factors would necessarily “substantially outweigh any mitigating factors,” and the court would be required to impose a Level Three punishment.
Such prejudice occurred here, when the trial court in Mr. King‘s case incorrectly found, for itself, the presence of three aggravating factors. The subject of this appeal relates specifically to the “especially reckless” aggravating factor, the only factor the State gave notice to Mr. King that it intended to prove. See
Assuming that the harmless error standard applies to the DWI sentencing statute, the error in Mr. King‘s case was not harmless. Our courts have stated that “[i]mpaired driving is in and of itself reckless and dangerous.” State v. Mack, 81 N.C. App. 578, 585 (1986) (cleaned up). “Therefore, to determine whether there [is] enough evidence to prove the defendant‘s driving was . . . especially reckless[,] . . . [the court] must focus on whether the facts of [the] case disclose excessive aspects of recklessness . . . not normally present in the offense of impaired driving . . . .” Id. (cleaned up). The evidence in Mr. King‘s case does not conclusively reach this standard.
While the State argues that the evidence in Mr. King‘s case was “uncontroverted” such that the trial judge could substitute its own judgment for that of the jury, the factual nuances present here do not support that conclusion. The evidence in Mr. King‘s case did not show the signs of especially reckless driving often present. Namely, it did not show that he drove at an excessive speed, drove off the road, or that he hit anyone. There is also testimony from Deputy Martin that Mr. King stopped at a red light and complied with Deputy Martin‘s instructions pulling over “very quickly” and without any problem. Contradictory testimony was also offered by Trooper Onderdonk and Deputy Martin. While Trooper Onderdonk testified that Mr. King was driving between two lanes and almost hit another car, Deputy Martin testified that when he pulled Mr. King over, “[t]here was nobody around . . . other than the off-duty . . . trooper behind me” and that he did not recall the incident Trooper Onderdonk referenced. Moreover, at trial Deputy Martin testified that he pulled Mr. King over based on the information he received from the dispatch officer and that without that information he could not say if he would have
Moreover, although some of the aggravating factors listed in subsection 20-179(d) are based entirely on objective factors (e.g., driving with a revoked driver‘s license), the “especially reckless” driving aggravating factor depends on discretionary judgments about all of the circumstances. Based on this alone, it is questionable whether a jury would have found that Mr. King was “especially reckless” in his driving. In light of the facts of this case, which are not so ” ‘overwhelming’ and ‘uncontroverted,’ ” it is truly unknown whether “any rational fact-finder would have found the disputed aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Blackwell, 361 N.C. at 49.
The majority may agree with many of these points. Because it only remands this case to the Court of Appeals for a harmless error determination, the Court of Appeals is seemingly free to adopt parts of the approach I outline here. But that raises another question: why does the majority remand this case to the Court of Appeals in the first place? This Court is equally as capable of assessing prejudicial error based on the record before us as the intermediate appellate court. It does not serve the interests of judicial economy and the expeditious resolution of cases to subject this matter to yet further appellate review.
With that in mind, I would hold that if the harmless error standard applies, prejudice occurs when the evidence shows that a trial court‘s error affected the defendant‘s sentencing level, and I would remand this case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.
II. Conclusion
Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision and hold that subsection 20-179(a1)(2) should be applied as written and thus, the harmless error standard does not apply. Additionally, because the aggravating factors in Mr. King‘s case should have been found by a jury and because the trial court‘s misapplication of the statute impacted the level Mr. King was sentenced at, his case should be remanded for resentencing. Alternatively, even under the harmless error standard this Court has chosen to import into the statute, a policy choice different from that made by the General Assembly, I would hold that the trial court finding—rather than the jury finding—that Mr. King‘s driving was “especially reckless” was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This is because based on these facts, the jury could find that Mr. King‘s driving was not especially reckless, which in turn affected the level at which Mr. King was sentenced.
Justice RIGGS joins in this dissenting opinion.