State v. KeplingState v. Kepling
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Jonathon A. Kepling (“Kepling”) appеals the judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, asserting that
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On September 10, 2019, Kepling was indicted on one count of felonious assault in violation of
{¶3} On April 29, 2020, Kepling appeared before the trial court for sentencing. Tr. 1. At the commencement of this hearing, the trial court first
{¶4} The appellant filed his notice оf appeal on May 28, 2020. Doc. 40. On appeal, Kepling raises the following two assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error
As amended by the Reagan Tokes Law, the Revised Code’s indefinite sentences for first and second-degrеe qualifying felonies violates the Doctrine of Separation of Powers inherent in the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Ohio.
Second Assignment of Error
As amended by the Reagan Tokes Law, the Revised Code’s indefinite sеntences for first and second-degree qualifying felonies violates the Due Course of Law Clause of the Ohio Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
Against the State’s contrary assertions, Kepling maintains that these two arguments against the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law are ripe for consideration.
{¶5} Kepling argues that the Reagan Tokes Law violates the doctrinе of the separation of powers, alleging that this provision allows the executive branch to exercise judicial powers.
Legal Analysis
{¶6} Recently, this Court, in State v. Hacker, heard a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Rеagan Tokes Law in which the appellant raised the same separation of powers arguments that Kepling asserts in the appeal presently before us. State v. Hacker, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-01, 2020-Ohio-5048, ¶ 7. In Hacker, we followed the Second and Twelfth District Courts of Appeal in concluding that the Reagan Tokes Law did not run afoul of the separation of powers and, in so doing, implicitly determined that this issue was ripe for review. Id. at ¶ 23. See State v. Barnes, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28613, 2020-Ohio-4150, ¶ 32; State v. Guyton, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-203, 2020-Ohio-3837, ¶ 17.2
{¶7} We decline to revisit our prior decision in Hacker and herein apply the holding of this precedent to the facts of the case presently before us. See State v. Morris, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-205, 2020-Ohio-4103, ¶ 10. Thus,
Second Assignment of Error
{¶8} Kepling next argues that the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional because its provisions do not expressly provide protections for the basic procedural due prоcess rights of notice and the opportunity to be heard.
Legal Standard
{¶9} “In order to be justiciable, a controversy must be ripe for review.” State v. Loving, 180 Ohio App.3d 424, 2009-Ohio-15, 905 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 4, quoting Keller v. Columbus, 100 Ohio St.3d 192, 2003-Ohio-5599, 797 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 26.
Ripeness ‘is peculiarly a question of timing.’ Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases (1974), 419 U.S. 102, 140, 95 S.Ct. 335, 357, 42 L.Ed.2d 320, 351. The ripeness doctrine is motivated in part by the desire “to prevent the сourts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies * * *.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967), 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681, 691. * * *.
“The basic principle of ripeness may be derived from the conclusion that ‘judicial machinery should be conserved for problems which are real or present and imminent, not squandered on problems which are abstract or hypothetical or remotе.’ * * * [T]he prerequisite of ripeness is a limitation on jurisdiction that is nevertheless basically optimistic as regards the prospects of a day in court: the time for judicial relief is simply not yet arrived, even thоugh the alleged action of the defendant
foretells legal injury to the plaintiff.” Comment, Mootness and Ripeness: The Postman Always Rings Twice (1965), 65 Colum. L.Rev. 867, 876.
State ex rel. Elyria Foundry Co. v. Indus. Comm., 82 Ohio St.3d 88, 89, 694 N.E.2d 459, 460 (1998). “A claim is not ripe for our consideration if it rests on contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or may never occur at all.” Loving at ¶ 4, citing Texas v. U.S., 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998).
Legal Analysis
{¶10} In this assignment of error, Kepling puts forward two main classes of arguments to establish that the procedural due process rights of offenders subject to the Reagan Tokes Law are violated. In the first class of arguments, Kepling argues that the text of the Reagan Tokes Law does not provide sufficient procedurаl due process protections for subject offenders. In the second class of arguments, Kepling argues that his due process rights are not guaranteed protection in the future and may be violatеd by the ODRC. We will consider each of these two classes of arguments in turn.
{¶11} To address this first class of arguments, we return to our prior decision in State v. Hacker, supra, at ¶ 18. In Hacker, the appellant raised a facial challenge to the Reаgan Tokes Law, contending that this statute
does not provide him adequate notice of the conduct that triggers [the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections] ODRC to maintain the offender’s incarceration after the expiration of the
offender’s minimum prison term and it does not provide a structure as to the hearing to rebut the presumption established under division (B).
Id. at ¶ 18. After reviewing these arguments, this Court fоund that Hacker had not carried the burden of establishing “that the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional on its face * * *.” Id. at ¶ 23. Thus, this Court determined that Hacker had not, by alleging that the text of the Reagan Tokes Law did not provide sufficient due process protections to subject offenders, demonstrated that this statutory scheme was violative of the constitutional due process rights of offenders. Id. Further, in rendering this decision, this Court also implicitly determined that this facial constitutional challenge was ripe for review. Id.
{¶12} Turning to the case presently before this Court, Kepling similarly argues that the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutionally deficient because it does not provide adequate procedural due process protections. Inasmuch as Kepling raises a facial challenge to the Reagan Tokes Lаw by alleging that the text of this provision does not contain sufficient procedural safeguards, we rely on our prior holding in Hacker. Hacker, supra, at ¶ 23. See also State v. Leet, supra, at ¶ 19 (holding that the “Reagan Tokes [Law] does not facially violate a defendant’s right to procedural due process.”). Thus, following Hacker, we find that the first class of arguments raised under this assignment of error are without merit. Id.
{¶13} In his second class of arguments, Kepling goes beyond the actual content of the Reagan Tokes Law and argues that his constitutional due process
Even if the state argues that administrative rules could be put in place to fix these defects, the administrative rules could be modified at any time to undo the fixes because the Revised Code fails to ensure due process is protected.
(Emphasis added.) Appellant’s Brief, 15. The conjectural nature of this argument, which challenges the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law as applied to this situation, is apparent. Kepling asserts that his duе process rights might not be properly protected at some future date or that proper administrative guidelines may not be in place at that time.
{¶14} However, at this point, we cannot even dеtermine whether the ODRC will ever have occasion to hold a hearing to determine whether Kepling should be held beyond his presumptive release date. Similarly, we cannot now determine whether the ODRC will рrovide Kepling with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard if a hearing to hold Kepling beyond his presumptive release date is ever held. Further, as the appellant notes in his brief, wе also cannot now know what administrative protections will be in place in the future to guide the ODRC.
{¶15} This second class of arguments “rests on contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated оr may never occur at all.” Loving at ¶ 4. For this reason, we conclude that the arguments that Kepling raises on appeal that do not raise a facial challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law arе not yet ripe for consideration.
Conclusion
{¶16} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars assigned and argued, the judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.
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