State v. JonesState v. Jones
SCHAFER, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Phillip Jones, appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion for leave to file a motion for a new mitigation trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
{¶2} Jones was sentenced to death for the rape and murder of S.Y. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed Jones’ convictions and sentence of death in State v. Jones, 135 Ohio St.3d 10, 2012-Ohio-5677, ¶ 267 (“Jones I”). Prior to the release of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones I, Jones filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court denied the petition and this Court ultimately affirmed. See State v. Jones, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25695, 2011-Ohio-6063, ¶ 66 (“Jones II”) (affirming the trial court’s decision in part but reversing and remanding for further proceedings on Jones’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Jones, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28063, 2019-Ohio-289, ¶ 83 (“Jones III”) (affirming the trial court’s denial of Jones’ claim for postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel).
{¶3} While Jones III was pending, Jones filed a motion for leave to file a motion for a new mitigation trial instanter pursuant to
{¶4} Jones filed this timely appeal, raising two assignments of error for our review. For ease of analysis, we elect to consider the assignments of error together.
II.
{¶5} As an initial matter, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The dissent contends that the trial court’s judgment at issue in this matter is void because the trial court did not retain jurisdiction to rule on Jones’ motion for leave to file a motion for a new mitigation trial since Jones III was pending before this Court at the time his motion for leave was filed. We disagree.
{¶6} Although neither the State nor Jones raised this jurisdictional issue in their merit briefs, “[t]his Court is obligated to raise sua sponte questions related to our jurisdiction.” State v. Claren, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 17AP0030, 2019-Ohio-260, ¶ 7, citing Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Geupel Constr. Co., 29 Ohio St.2d 184, 186 (1972). Generally, “[o]nce a case has been appealed, the trial court loses jurisdiction except to take action in aid of the appeal. [However, t]he trial court retains jurisdiction over issues not inconsistent with the appellate court’s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or affirm the judgment appealed from.” (Internal citation
{¶7} Moreover, a motion for a new trial pursuant to
{¶8} Upon review, we do not find that the trial court’s consideration of Jones’ procedural motion for leave to file a motion for a new mitigation trial during the pendency of Jones III was inconsistent with this Court’s ability to act in regard to the trial court’s judgment on the motion for postconviction relief. Jones filed his motion for leave on the basis that he was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for a new mitigation trial within fourteen days of the verdict because Hurst was decided nearly eight years after he was sentenced. In contrast, Jones argued in Jones III that the trial court had abused its discretion when it denied his motion for postconviction relief filed on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, the issues raised in Jones’ motion for leave are wholly unrelated to the issues considered by this Court in Jones III and the trial court’s grant or denial of the motion for leave would not have altered, modified, or reversed its judgment relating to the denial of Jones’ petition for postconviction relief.
Assignment of Error I
The trial court erred in denying Jones’ motion for leave to file a motion for new mitigation trial without making any determination as to whether Jones was unavoidably prevented pursuant to
Crim.R. 33(B) from filing his motion within 14 days after the verdict was rendered.
Assignment of Error II
The trial court erred when it denied Jones’ motion for a new mitigation trial when Jones proved that he was sentenced to death under a statutory scheme that violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution * * * .
{¶9} Jones contends in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for leave to file a motion for a new mitigation trial without making a
{¶10} Jones filed his motion for leave “pursuant to [
Defendant requests a new mitigation hearing based upon Crim. Rule 33 and Hurst v. Florida, ___U.S.___, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016). However, since the Hurst decision, two Ohio Courts, including the Ohio Supreme Court, have found that Ohio’s capital sentencing scheme differs from the Florida capital sentencing scheme found to be unconstitutional in Hurst. See, State v. Belton, 2016-Ohio-1581 and State v. Mason, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-16-34, 2016-Ohio-8400. Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to review two death penalty cases in which the Defendant requested a review based upon Hurst. See, State v. Fears, 147 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2016-Ohio-7681, 63[.]
{¶11} “A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for leave to file a delayed motion for a new trial will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Davis, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010256, 2013-Ohio-846, ¶ 6. Similarly, a trial court’s ultimate
{¶12} A motion for a new trial, except on the ground of newly discovered evidence, must be filed within fourteen days after the verdict is rendered “unless it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for a new trial[.]”
{¶13} On appeal, Jones argues that the trial court’s basis for denying his motion for leave concerns only the proposed motion for a new mitigation trial and not the timeliness of the motion for leave. Jones further contends that the trial court erred because it “should have made findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether or not Jones met the requirements found in
{¶14} First, we note that
{¶15} In Hurst, the United States Supreme Court invalidated Florida’s capital sentencing statute because it limited the jury’s role in sentencing to an advisory recommendation and did “not require the jury to make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty.” Hurst, 136 S.Ct. at 622. However, as cited by the trial court below, the Supreme Court of Ohio has expressly recognized that “Ohio’s capital-sentencing scheme is unlike the laws at issue in * * * Hurst. In Ohio, a capital case does not proceed to the sentencing phase until after the fact-finder has found a defendant guilty of one or more aggravating circumstances.” State v. Belton, 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, ¶ 59. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio again rejected the argument that Ohio’s death penalty scheme was unconstitutional under Hurst when it considered the defendant’s appeal of the Third District decision cited by the trial court in its journal entry. State v. Mason, 153 Ohio St.3d 476, 2018-Ohio-1462, ¶ 29-43.
{¶17} Therefore, Jones’ assignments of error are overruled.
III.
{¶18} Jones’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
TEODOSIO, J.
CONCURS.
CARR, J.
DISSENTING.
{¶19} I respectfully dissent. As noted by the majority, Jones filed his motion for a new mitigation trial while Jones III was pending before this Court. “An appeal is perfected when a written notice of appeal is filed[.]”
APPEARANCES:
KIMBERLY RIGBY, Supervising Attorney, and ADRIENNE M. LARIMER, Assistant State Public Defender, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.