State v. JonesState v. Jones
Sarah R. Cofta
P.O. Box 16425
Cleveland, Ohio 44116
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael C. O’Malley
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: John D. Kirkland
Assistant County Prosecutor
Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
- The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant, who did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter into his guilty plea.
- The trial court erred when it failed to properly notify Appellant of postrelease control during his sentencing.
{¶2} Finding merit to his second assignment of error, we remand to the trial court to properly impose Jones’s sentence with respect to his terms of postrelease control.
I. Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶3} In March 2016, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Jones with one count of receiving stolen property in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-16-604475-C. In April 2016, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Jones for the following 15 counts in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-16-604781-A: two counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of robbery, four counts of felonious assault, three counts of kidnapping, one count of carrying a concealed weapon, one count of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises, and one count of criminal damaging or endangering. Based on discussions with the state’s prosecutor, Jones eventually agreed to withdraw his not guilty pleas and plead to an amended indictment for both cases. Specifically, in Case No. CR-16-604475-C, Jones pleaded guilty to the indictment, as charged, and in Case No. CR-16-604781-A, Jones pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery, with a one-year firearm specification, and one count of felonious assault. At the state’s
{¶4} At sentencing, the trial court held a sentencing hearing on both cases, sentencing Jones to a total prison term of four years and nine months. In Case No. CR-16-604475-C, the trial court imposed a nine-month sentence, to be served consecutively to his sentence for his other case. In Case No. CR-16-604781-A, the trial court imposed a four-year sentence: one year for his firearm specification, three years for the underlying count of aggravated robbery, and four years for the count of felonious assault, which was to run concurrent with the other two counts. In addition to his terms of incarceration, the trial court also instructed Jones that he faced “up to five years, mandatory” of postrelease control for his aggravated robbery conviction.
{¶5} It is from this judgment that Jones appeals.
II. Jones’s Guilty Plea
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Jones claims that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty to the amended charges and that the trial court’s acceptance of his plea prejudiced him. We disagree.
{¶7} We review whether the trial court accepted Jones’s plea in compliance with
{¶8} “The underlying purpose of
In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence. (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to a jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶9} While a court must strictly comply with the provisions concerning constitutional rights set forth in
{¶10} In addition to showing that the trial court failed to substantially comply with
{¶11} Jones first claims that the record does not clearly demonstrate the trial court substantially complied with
{¶12} In Avery, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 14CA3613, 2015-Ohio-4251, the appellant argued that the trial court erred in accepting her guilty plea because she did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty. At trial, the court asked the appellant if she was satisfied with her attorney’s performance at the plea hearing, to which the appellant replied, “Not really.” Id. at ¶ 6. After the court informed the appellant that it was halting the proceeding and determined that it could not accept the guilty plea, the appellant’s attorney informed the court that the appellant had misunderstood its question, which the appellant confirmed. As a result, the court proceeded with the hearing, and, when asked again if she was satisfied with her attorney’s efforts, the appellant replied in the affirmative. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeals rejected the appellant’s argument, noting that the trial court properly waited to go forward with the hearing until the appellant and her attorney assured the court that she simply misunderstood the question and corrected her earlier answer. Id. at ¶ 13.
{¶14} Here, comparable to both Avery and Wilson, the record demonstrates that the trial court substantially complied with its obligations under
THE COURT: Have you discussed with your attorney the facts of your case and listened to his advice, or her [advice]?
JONES: No.
THE COURT: Yes? JONES: Yes.
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Have you talked with us?
JONES: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the representations you have received from your attorneys?
JONES: Yes.
Similar to Avery, the court did not continue with the plea until Jones’s counsel clarified the question and Jones affirmed that he spoke with his attorneys. Similar to Wilson, Jones stated that he was satisfied with his attorneys’ representations. Moreover, subsequent to that exchange, the court explained each of the constitutional rights that Jones was waiving as well as the potential punishments for each conviction, and when asked if he had any questions about his cases, Jones stated, “No.” In fact, at no point during the hearing — including the above-mentioned exchange — did Jones or his attorneys express concern over his understanding of the offenses or his attorneys’ performances. Therefore, contrary to Jones’s claim, we find that the record clearly reflects that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleaded guilty.
{¶15} Jones additionally argues that, considering his low intelligence, the totality of the circumstances show that he did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea. Again, we disagree.
The proceedings in this case were not so subtle that an eighteen-year-old with a ninth grade education would have had any trouble understanding. * * * Nothing that defendant said or did gave any indication to the trial court that he failed to understand the guilty plea proceedings, nor does defendant now provide any support for this belated claim.
{¶17} Jones’s totality-of-the-circumstances argument also fails. First, similar to Beckwith, concerns over Jones’s mental abilities were raised only at sentencing, apparently in an effort to mitigate his convictions. Those comments made by Jones’s attorney have no bearing on his subjective understanding at the plea hearing, especially considering the absence of any evidence that Jones was confused or unwilling to enter the plea deal. Besides Jones’s single innocent misunderstanding to the trial court’s question concerning his counsel — which he subsequently corrected upon further explanation by his attorney, Jones indicated that he understood exactly what he was agreeing to. Jones neither asked the court any questions nor expressed any reservations about pleading guilty. In addition, Jones was 19 years old at the time he
{¶18} Furthermore, Jones fails to demonstrate how the court’s alleged
{¶19} Jones’s first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Postrelease Control
{¶21} When applicable, a sentencing court’s failure to impose a mandatory term of postrelease control and notify a defendant of the terms of postrelease control renders that portion of the sentence void, and it must be set aside. State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 26; State v. Mitchell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103364, 2016-Ohio-4956, ¶ 16, citing Fischer. When the postrelease control portion of a sentence is void, a defendant is only entitled to a hearing limited to the “proper imposition of postrelease control[,]” not an entirely new sentencing hearing. Fischer at ¶ 29. We have addressed this issue many times before, and this case is no different. See State v. Palmer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95140, 2011-Ohio-1244, ¶ 19 (“[I]t is insufficient for the court to inform the defendant at sentencing that he ‘may be’ subject to postrelease control when postrelease control is mandatory.”); State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94216, 2010-Ohio-4136, ¶ 5 (vacating the defendant’s sentence because the court did not impose the mandatory term of postrelease control when it told the defendant that he was subject to “up to” five years of postrelease control).
{¶22}
Each sentence to a prison term for a felony of the first degree * * * shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of postrelease
control imposed by the parole board after the offender’s release from imprisonment. * * * [A] period of postrelease control required by this division for an offender shall be one of the following periods: (1) For a felony of the first degree * * *, five years[.]
{¶23} Here, Jones pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and felonious assault, felonies of the first and second degree, in Case No. CR-16-604781-A and receiving stolen property, a felony of the fourth degree, in Case No. CR-16-604475-C. As a result, Jones was subject to a mandatory five-year term of postrelease control in Case No. CR-16-604781-A and a three-year discretionary term of postrelease control in Case No. CR-16-604475-C. At the sentencing hearing, however, the court did not impose the three-year discretionary term. In addition, concerning Case No. CR-16-604781-A, the court informed Jones that he “must be on postrelease control for a period of time of up to five years, mandatory.”1
{¶24} Both Jones and the state acknowledge the trial court’s error. We agree with the state that the proper remedy is to remand the case for a limited resentencing hearing to correct Jones’s sentence concerning his terms of postrelease control.
{¶26} Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. We remand for the trial court to resentence Jones in accordance with
It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed in part, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR