State v. JohnsonState v. Johnson
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
MAURICE JOHNSON
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-16-612031-A
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 13, 2018
Russell S. Bensing
600 IMG Building
1360 East Ninth Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael C. O‘Malley
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Steven N. Szelagiewicz
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Maurice Johnson (“appellant“), appeals from his convictions of rape and kidnapping. Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to explain to him certain sex offender classification reporting requirements prior to accepting his guilty plea and, thus, did not fully comply with
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} Appellant was indicted on December 9, 2016, on the following charges: Count 1, rape, in violation of
{¶3} Thereafter, on March 15, 2017, appellant pled guilty to the indictment as charged. On March 27, 2017, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced appellant to a prison term of ten years to life, with a possibility of parole after ten years. The state elected to have appellant sentenced under Count 1 (rape).
{¶4} On September 29, 2017, appellant filed a notice of appeal. On October 2, 2017, in the trial court, appellant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to
{¶5} On July 3, 2018, this court issued a sua sponte order remanding this matter to the trial court for a correction of the record pursuant to
{¶6} Appellant brings the instant appeal challenging the validity of his guilty plea. He assigns one error for our review.
- The trial court committed reversible error when it did not fully explain the reporting requirements of a Tier III sex offender prior to accepting appellant‘s plea of guilty, in violation of
Crim.R. 11(C) .
II. Law and Analysis
{¶7} Pursuant to
{¶8} In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), the United States Supreme Court articulated a defendant‘s constitutional rights as (1) the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, (2) the right to trial by jury, and (3) the right to confront one‘s accusers. These have been incorporated into
Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant‘s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶9} The nonconstitutional rights are outlined in
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
{¶10} With regards to these constitutional rights outlined in
{¶11} Consequently, a reviewing court will not vacate a defendant‘s guilty plea if the trial court substantially complied with the nonconstitutional requirements of
{¶12} Furthermore, “[w]hen the trial court does not ‘substantially comply’ with
{¶13} In the instant case, appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to notify him of the community notification requirements and residential restrictions pursuant to
{¶14} Sex offender registration duties, notifications, and restrictions are governed by
{¶15} Keeping the above standard in mind, we note the following statements made by the trial court at appellant‘s change of plea hearing:1
The other requirement that goes along with this upon your release is sexual reporting as a sexual offender. There are three tiers. This is a Tier III. It‘s reporting for life every 90 days.
You have to register with the sheriff in the county which you live every 90 days to let them know where you are living. If during the 90 days anything changes, you still have to tell them. If you move in the middle of that 90 days, you have to let them know you‘ve moved, because there is a separate felony for failing to register.
You can face more problems down the road if you didn‘t do that. That can include telephone number, if you change your cell phone number or internet address.
In case of doubt you want to let the sheriff know. If you were to get an
opportunity to work in Akron in Summit County, you got to tell the sheriff in Summit County, I‘m coming. You‘d have to tell the sheriff in Cuyahoga County I‘m leaving, and the same thing when you come back, if you work there for several months and move back. So it‘s a lot of responsibility, but you will have that responsibility, as well.
(Tr. 8-9.)
{¶16} Appellant argues that the trial court was required to discuss the “community notification requirements” with him prior to accepting his guilty plea. Appellant‘s brief at 4. Appellant further argues that “[b]ecause [he] was subject to community notification as a Tier III sex offender, the trial court was required to discuss the community notification sanctions with him prior to accepting his guilty plea.” Appellant‘s brief at 5.
{¶17} In support of his argument, appellant cites to
{¶18} Therefore, to the extent that appellant argues that he was not aware that the community would be notified by his registration duties, we find no merit to this argument.
{¶19} Appellant also argues that the trial court failed to notify him of his residential restrictions pursuant to
No person who has been convicted of, is convicted of, has pleaded guilty to, or pleads guilty to a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense shall establish a residence or occupy residential premises within one thousand feet of any school premises or preschool or child day-care center premises.
In our review of the change of plea hearing transcript, we note that the trial court makes no mention of the residential restrictions pursuant to
{¶20} Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court failed to notify appellant of the residential restrictions, we nevertheless find that the trial court substantially complied with
{¶21} Appellant also argues that because the trial court wholly failed to comply with
{¶22} Lastly, we note that the trial court provided appellant with a sex offender classification form. This form provided appellant with information relative to his duties and responsibilities as a Tier III sex offender and was presented for appellant to sign at the sentencing hearing. Further, as we can discern from the sentencing hearing transcript, appellant signed this form. We can also presume that appellant‘s counsel reviewed this form with him.
{¶23} In our review of the record, we find that the trial court substantially complied with
{¶24} Accordingly, appellant‘s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶25} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR