State v. BushState v. Bush
GRADY, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant, Enoch Bush, appeals from a final judgment that denied his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶ 2} On or about September 7, 2006, Defendant was charged by complaint in Fairborn Municipal Court with one count of sexual imposition, the victim between thirteen and sixteen years of age,
{¶ 3} On June 4, 2007, the trial court issued its written decision requiring Defendant to register as a sexually oriented offender for period of ten years pursuant to
{¶ 4} After retaining new counsel, on August 24, 2010, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he was never advised at the time he entered his plea that as result of his guilty plea he would be required to register as a sex
{¶ 5} Defendant appealed to this court.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 6} “THIS INDIGENT DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW AND WAS INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED BY APPOINTED DEFENSE COUNSEL, WHICH FAILURE WAS CONJOINED IN BY THE TRIAL JUDGE, IN EACH OR BOTH FAILING TO WARN THE DEFENDANT OF ANY OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER
{¶ 7} Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the failure to advise Defendant at the time he entered his plea about the effect of his plea, specifically that he would be subject to sex offender registration and reporting requirements, constitutes a manifest injustice.
{¶ 8} In State v. Minkner, Champaign App. No. 2009CA16, 2009-Ohio-5625, we stated:
{¶ 9} “{¶ 24}
{¶ 10} “{¶ 25} A defendant who files a post-sentence motion
{¶ 11} “{¶ 26} We review a trial court‘s decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Whitmore, Clark App. No. 06-CA-50, 2008-Ohio-2226, at ¶38.”
{¶ 12} “‘Abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude
{¶ 13} “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision. It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would support a contrary result.” AAAA Enterprises, Inc v. River Place Community Redevelopment (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161.
{¶ 14} Defendant argues that the failure of the court or his counsel to advise him at the time he entered his guilty plea about the effects of that plea, specifically that he would be subject to sex offender registration and reporting requirements, constitutes a manifest injustice and therefore he should be permitted to withdraw his plea. We disagree.
{¶ 15} This court has repeatedly held that a trial court need not inform a defendant about the registration and notification requirements in
{¶ 16} Defendant relies upon our decision in State v. Powell, 188 Ohio App.3d 232, 2010-Ohio-3247. Defendant‘s reliance is misplaced, however, because that case is distinguishable.
{¶ 17} In Powell, the defendant pled guilty to voyeurism in violation of
{¶ 19} Defendant‘s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
HALL, J., concurs.
FAIN, J., concurring:
{¶ 20} I agree with everything stated in Judge Grady‘s opinion for the court. In that opinion, it is noted that we have repeatedly held that a trial court need not inform a defendant about the registration and notification requirements in
{¶ 21} But Bush is not subject to the Adam Walsh Act amendments. His registration and notification requirements arise from the previous version of