State v. JacksonState v. Jackson
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Randall L. Porter, Assistant State Public Defender, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, OH 43215-9308, and John P. Parker, 988 East 185th Street, Cleveland, OH 44119 (For Defendant-Appellant).
O P I N I O N
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Nathaniel Jackson, appeals the judgment entered by the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court denied Jackson’s
{¶2} Jackson was charged with various crimes, including aggravated murder, for the shooting death of Robert Fingerhut. At the time of his death in 2001, Fingerhut was residing with his former wife, Donna Roberts. Roberts was also charged with
{¶3} In November 2002, Jackson was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of aggravated robbery. Under both of the aggravated murder counts, the jury recommended the death penalty. After independently weighing the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating facts, the trial court concluded the death penalty was appropriate. In addition, the trial court imposed separatе sentences on the charges of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and the merged firearm specifications. In January 2003, Jackson filed a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court affirmed Jackson’s convictions and the imposition of the death penalty. State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-1.
{¶4} In 2004, Jackson filed his original petition for postconviction relief under
{¶5} In responding to Jackson’s petition, the state moved to dismiss each of the claims without a hearing on the basis that Jackson had not made a prima facie showing that his constitutional rights were violаted during his trial. In June 2004, the trial court rendered a 33-page judgment entry in which it dismissed each of the claims raised by Jackson. As to all of the claims, the trial court held that Jackson had failed to establish substantive grounds to warrant postconviction relief. Also, the trial court held that many of the claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata because the issues either were, or could have been, raised in his direct appeal from his conviction.
{¶6} Jackson appealed the trial court’s judgment entry denying his petition for postconviction relief to this court. This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Jackson, 11th Dist. No. 2004-T-0089, 2006-Ohio-2651, at ¶155. Jackson appealed this court’s judgment to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which declined jurisdiction. State v. Jackson, 111 Ohio St.3d 1469, 2006-Ohio-5625.
{¶7} On August 2, 2006, the Supreme Court of Ohio released its decision in Roberts’ direct appeal. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665. The trial court in the instant matter presided over the underlying trials of both Jackson and Roberts. Between the penalty-phase hearing of Roberts’ trial and the sentencing hearing, the trial court engaged in ex parte communications with an assistant county prosecutor about the sentencing opinion in Roberts’ case. Id. at ¶155. The trial court utilized the assistant prosecutor to draft the sentencing entry but failed to include defense counsel in the process. Id. In Roberts, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated the death sentence and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to personally
{¶8} Presumably based on the Roberts decision, Jackson filed a
{¶9} In October 2006, Attorney Randall L. Porter, counsel for Jackson, filed an application and affidavit seeking the disqualification of the trial court in the instant matter, citing a statement by the trial court at a hearing in Roberts that it had similarly relied on the prosecuting attorney to prepare paperwork for it in other criminal cases. See In re Disqualification of Stuard, 113 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2006-Ohio-7233, at ¶1, 3. The trial court responded to the affidavit, acknowledging that it held similar ex parte communications with the prosecuting attorney’s office in both Roberts and Jackson before sentencing each of them to death. Id. at ¶4. Upon consideration, the Chief Justice declined to disqualify the trial court from further participation in this matter. Id. at ¶10.
{¶10} The trial court denied Jackson’s
{¶11} “The trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion for relief from judgment and an evidentiary hearing.”
{¶12} In his sole assignment of error, Jackson argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for relief from judgmеnt without a hearing.
{¶13} Ohio’s postconviction proceedings are civil in nature, and a
{¶14} “A reviewing court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment to determine if the trial court abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted.) Bank One, NA v. SKRL Tool and Die, Inc., 11th Dist. No. 2003-L-048, 2004-Ohio-2602, at ¶15. See, also, GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 150. “‘The term “abuse of discretion” connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” (Citations omitted.) Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219.
{¶15} Relief from judgment may be granted pursuant to
{¶16} “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
{¶17} A party must comply with the following requirements when filing a motion for relief from judgment:
{¶18} “To prevail on a motion brought under
{¶19} Initially, it is important to specify what is, and what is not, before this court. Jackson has filed a motion for relief from the trial court’s judgment entry denying his petition for postconviction relief. In addition, Jackson has filed a separate motion, in which he asks the trial court to conduct a new sеntencing hearing due to the trial court’s presumed use of the prosecutor to assist it in preparing the underlying sentencing entry. However, the trial court’s denial of Jackson’s
{¶20} In its judgment entry denying Jackson’s motion for relief from judgment, the trial court essentially acknowledged that it used the prosecution’s assistance in drafting the judgment entry denying Jackson’s petition for postconviction relief, stating, “Ohio law permits the prosecution to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law dismissing a post-conviction petition even in death cases.”
{¶21} Next, we turn our analysis to the GTE factors. GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries, supra. First, we address the timeliness of Jackson’s
{¶22} It could be argued that Jackson’s
{¶23} Second, Jackson does not assert a meritorious claim to present if relief were granted. The trial court overruled the arguments raised in his underlying petition for postconviction relief. Then, on appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment entry denying his petition for postconviction relief. State v. Jackson, 2006-Ohio-2651, at ¶155. Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined jurisdiction to hear the appeal. State v. Jackson, 111 Ohio St.3d 1469, 2006-Ohio-5625.
{¶24} “The law of thе case is a longstanding doctrine in Ohio jurisprudence. ‘(T)he doctrine provides that the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and the reviewing levels.’ *** The doctrine is necessary to ensure consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution. ***” Hopkins v. Dyer, 104 Ohio St.3d 461, 2004-Ohio-6769, at ¶15. (Internal citations omitted.) See, also, State v. Payne, 11th Dist. No. 2006-L-272, 2007-Ohio-6740, at ¶24, citing Weller v. Weller, 11th Dist. No. 2004-G-2599, 2005-Ohio-6892, ¶14-15.
{¶25} In his aрpellate brief, Jackson makes several individual claims relating to the meritorious claim prong. Jackson claims that the judges in Trumbull County use race as a factor in selecting grand jury forepersons. This court considered and rejected several race-related arguments in its opinion affirming the trial court’s denial of Jackson’s petition for postconviction relief. State v. Jackson, 2006-Ohio-2651, at ¶50, 65-73, 90-95, 104-116, & 124. Further, this court rejected Jackson’s specific contention regarding the alleged improper selection of a grand jury foreperson based on race. Id. at ¶67-68.
{¶26} Jackson asserts that the trial court erred in the underlying trial by failing to conduct a hearing on his letter in which he allegedly requested substitute counsel. This court has considered this argument and found it lacks merit. Id. at ¶30-47 and 100-101.
{¶27} Jackson argues that the trial court’s entry contains an incorrect finding regarding the amount of preparation necessary to conduct a mitigation investigation. However, this court has considered and rejected his claimed error regarding thе trial
{¶28} Finally, Jackson alleges error in regard to the trial court’s finding regarding IQ testing. This court addressed several similar arguments in its prior decision and concluded they all lacked merit. Id. at ¶28-29, 123, 125, & 142-146.
{¶29} Since this court has already addressed and rejected Jackson’s alleged meritorious claims, these claims lack merit at this time under the law of the case doctrine.
{¶30} In his
{¶31} First, this argument is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held:
{¶32} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.” State v. Szefcyk (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 93, syllabus.
{¶33} On June 14, 2004 – only four days after the trial court issued its judgment entry denying Jackson’s petition for postconviction relief – Jackson filed a motion “requesting the court not delegate its judicial function to the prevailing party in drafting findings of fact and conclusions of law.” That same day, Jacksоn filed his notice of
{¶34} Moreover, for the following reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecution to draft its judgment entry denying Jackson’s petition for postconviction relief.
{¶35} Jackson cites the Supreme Court of Ohio’s opinion in Roberts’ direct appeal as support of his argument. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665. Again, the instant appeal does not deal with the trial court’s presumed use of the prosecutor to assist it in preparing the underlying sentencing entry, as Jackson notes in his brief; the instant appeal only concerns the trial court’s use of the procedure when drafting the judgment entry denying Jackson’s motion for postconviction relief. In State v. Roberts, the Supreme Court of Ohio found error in the trial court’s sentencing entry due to the fact the prosecution assisted in the drafting of the document. Id. at ¶153-164. One of the court’s significant concerns was the fact that the resulting judgment entry did not comply with
{¶36} Further, this court has previously held, in State v. Lorraine (Feb. 23, 1996), 11th Dist. No. 95-T-5196, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 642, that a trial court did not err
{¶37} Jackson argues the postconviction statute requires the court to make findings.
{¶38} Jackson also cites to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s opinion in State v. Roberts in support of his argument that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by
{¶39} Jackson argues the trial court erred by conducting ex parte communications with the prosecution. Jackson has not presented any evidence that ex parte communications in fact occurred. We acknowledge that the trial court has admitted that it engaged in ex parte communications when it prepared the underlying sentencing entry in this matter. See In re Disqualification of Stuard, 113 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2006-Ohio-7233, at ¶4. In response to an affidavit of disqualification filed by Jackson’s attorney, the trial court submitted a written submission to the Chiеf Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. However, we note the letter relied on by the Chief Justice is not in the record before this court. Second, even if it was in our record, it would only establish that the trial court used the prosecution’s assistance in drafting the sentencing entry. There is no evidence of a similar admission regarding the drafting of the postconviction entry.
{¶40} Jackson contends he was not served with a copy of the proposed judgment entry as required by Loc.R. 15 of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. If Jackson’s assertion that he did not receive a copy of the proposed judgment entry is correct, this issue is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Jackson should have
{¶41} Thus, Jackson has not demonstrated that one of the
{¶42} Jackson argues the trial court should have conducted a hearing on his
{¶43} Finally, Jackson seeks reversal of the trial court’s judgment under the doctrine of cumulative error. The cumulative error doctrine provides that while certain errors, individuаlly, may not be prejudicial, when those errors are combined the aggregate effect denies the defendant a fair trial. See State v. DeMarco (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 191, paragraph two of the syllabus. We have not found any of Jackson’s individual alleged errors to be meritorious. When viewing Jackson’s claims in the aggregate, we likewise find them to lack merit.
{¶44} The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jackson’s motion for relief from judgment. The trial court was permitted to seek the prosecutor’s assistance
{¶45} Jackson’s assignment of error is without merit.
{¶46} The judgment of the Trumbull County Cоurt of Common Pleas is affirmed.
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J., concurs,
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with Dissenting Opinion.
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{¶47} I respectfully dissent.
{¶48} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for relief from judgment without a hearing. I agree.
{¶49} Ohio’s postconviction proceedings are civil in nature and a
{¶50} To prevail on a motion brought pursuant to
{¶52} “‘A movant is entitled to a hearing on a motion for relief from judgment if “the motion and affidavits contain allegations of operative facts which would warrant relief under the rule.”’” Lewis v. Lewis, 11th Dist. No. 2007-P-0056, 2008-Ohio-730, at ¶21, quoting Mamula v. Mamula, 11th Dist. No. 2005-T-0148, 2006-Ohio-4176, at ¶26.
{¶53} In the present matter, Judge Stuard presided over the instant case as well as the сase involving appellant’s co-defendant, Donna Roberts. Judge Stuard is a fine jurist committed to public service. However, a review of the record reveals that in October of 2006, Attorney Randall L. Porter, counsel for appellant, filed an application and affidavit seeking the disqualification of Judge Stuard, citing a statement made by Judge Stuard at a hearing in Roberts that he had similarly relied on the prosecuting attorney to prepare paperwork for him in other criminal cases. Seе In re Disqualification of Stuard, supra, at ¶1, 3. Attorney Porter set forth competent and relevant material evidence dehors the record that Judge Stuard responded in writing to the affidavit, acknowledging that he held the same kind of ex parte communications with the prosecuting attorney’s office in both Roberts and the instant capital cases before sentencing each of them to death. See Id. at ¶3-4; State v. Delmonico, 11th Dist. No.
{¶54} Judge Stuard also conceded to misconduct and was publicly reprimanded for his violations of Canons 2 and 3(B)(7). Disciplinary Counsel v. Stuard, 121 Ohio St.3d 29, 2009-Ohio-261, at ¶10, 16.
{¶55} By way of a brief bаckground, in May and June of 2003, Judge Stuard presided over the capital murder trial of Roberts. A jury found Roberts guilty of two counts of aggravated murder, among other crimes, and recommended a sentence of death. Between the penalty-phase hearing of Roberts’ trial in early June and the sentencing hearing later that month, Judge Stuard engaged in ex parte communications four times with an assistant county prosecutor about the sentencing opinion in Roberts’ case. Judge Stuard had had an informal practice of enlisting prosecutorial assistance in drafting judgment entries in criminal cases. He employed that practice in preparing the sentencing entry in the Roberts case but failed to include defense counsel in the process. In Roberts, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated the death sentence and remanded the cause with instructions for Judge Stuard to personally review and evaluate the appropriateness of the death penalty. Roberts, supra, at ¶167. The Supreme Court alsо observed that the ex parte collaboration between Judge Stuard and the prosecution to prepare the court’s sentencing opinion was “wholly inconsistent” with the ethical constraints of Canon 3(B)(7) and DR 7-110(B). Id. at ¶161.
{¶56} In light of the acknowledged behavior of Judge Stuard in both the present and companion cases, as well as his public reprimand in Disciplinary Counsel v. Stuard, supra, I believe the evidence establishes that the present matter was handled in a similar manner as that of his co-defendant. This writer is by no means сalling in
{¶57} The record establishes that appellant presented operative facts warranting relief to the trial court. Thus, I beliеve the trial court abused its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his
{¶58} For the foregoing reasons, I believe appellant’s sole assignment of error is well-taken, and the judgment of the trial court should be vacated and remanded.
{¶59} Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.