State v. HillState v. Hill
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-1427
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. HILL, APPELLEE.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Hill, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1427.]
Criminal law—
(No. 2024-0352—Submitted October 29, 2025—Decided April 23, 2026.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, No. 2023-T-0039, 2023-Ohio-4486.
KENNEDY, C.J., authored the opinion of the court, which FISCHER, DEWINE, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined. BRUNNER, J., concurred, with an opinion. DETERS, J., concurred, with an opinion.
{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals presents the question whether a capital defendant may collaterally challenge a prior judgment denying his petition for postconviction relief by filing a motion under
{¶ 2} We hold that
{¶ 3} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Eleventh District and remand the matter to that court for consideration of Hill’s remaining assignment of error.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 4} In 1986, appellee, Danny Hill, was convicted of aggravated arson, kidnapping, rape, felonious sexual penetration, and aggravated murder with a capital specification arising out of the torture and murder of 12-year-old Raymond Fife. See State v. Hill, 1992-Ohio-43 (“Hill I”). Since then, Hill has repeatedly challenged his convictions and death sentence.
{¶ 5} This court decided his appeal as of right in 1992. Id. Hill presented 25 propositions of law, raising a range of alleged constitutional and procedural violations, but the court found none meritorious. Id. We then reviewed the aggravating and mitigating factors and noted that Hill’s intellectual disability was “a possible mitigating factor,” id. at ¶ 129. We also noted that according to the
{¶ 6} In 1996, Hill filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, arguing, among other things, that because of his intellectual disability, he had been prevented from receiving a fair trial. The district court denied his petition in 1999, Hill v. Anderson, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23332 (N.D.Ohio Sept. 29, 1999), and Hill appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In his appeal, Hill added to his claim that because of his intellectual disability, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution bars his execution, see Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 680 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Hill II”). While Hill’s appeal was pending in the Sixth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), holding that the Eighth Amendment’s clause prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the execution of intellectually disabled people. Shortly after Atkins was decided, this court held that to prove intellectual disability, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (2) significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills, such as communication, self-care, and self-direction, and (3) onset before the age of 18.” State v. Lott, 2002-Ohio-6625, ¶ 12. Because Hill had not yet presented his Atkins claim in the state courts, the Sixth Circuit returned the case to the federal district court “with instructions that it remand Hill’s Atkins claim to a state court and stay his remaining claims pending resolution of” that issue. Hill II at 680.
{¶ 7} Hill then filed a petition for postconviction relief under
{¶ 8} Around the same time, the United States Supreme Court decided Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), and Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1 (2017), holding that the Florida and Texas courts had applied incorrect tests for determining a defendant’s intellectual disability in the context of state-court death-penalty proceedings. In response to those decisions, this court held that the test articulated in Lott was “the wrong standard” for determining a defendant’s intellectual disability. State v. Ford, 2019-Ohio-4539, ¶ 95; see also id. at ¶ 94, 97, 100. The new test requires courts to consider:
(1) intellectual-functioning deficits (indicated by an IQ score approximately two standard deviations below the mean—i.e., a score of roughly 70 or lower when adjusted for the standard error of measurement), (2) significant adaptive deficits in any of the three adaptive-skill sets (conceptual, social, and practical), and (3) the onset of these deficits while the defendant was a minor.
{¶ 9} Hill appealed the federal district court’s judgment denying his habeas petition to the Sixth Circuit, and that court reversed, holding that in affirming the trial court’s denial of Hill’s petition for postconviction relief, the state court of appeals had “unreasonabl[y] determin[ed]” that Hill was not intellectually disabled. Hill v. Anderson, 881 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir. 2018). The State appealed the Sixth Circuit’s judgment to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, finding that that court had erred in relying extensively on Moore, because Moore “was not handed down until long after the state-court decisions” in Hill’s case; it remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit with instructions to evaluate Hill’s claim regarding his intellectual disability “based solely on holdings of [the United States Supreme Court] that were clearly established at the relevant time.” Shoop v. Hill, 586 U.S. 45, 46 (2019) (per curiam).
{¶ 10} On remand, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit granted Hill relief in habeas corpus on his Atkins claim with respect to his death sentence. Hill v. Anderson, 960 F.3d 260, 265 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). The warden filed a request for rehearing en banc, which the Sixth Circuit granted. Hill v. Shoop, 11 F.4th 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2021). Under the Sixth Circuit’s local rules, granting the warden’s request vacated the previous opinion and restored the case on the docket as a pending appeal. See 6 Cir.R. 40(d). The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, voted nine to seven to affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief, holding that “the Ohio Court of Appeals did not act unreasonably in relying on the opinions of . . . trained medical professionals who had full access to the extensive record in this case,” Hill v. Shoop at 394. The United States Supreme Court declined to review that decision, with three justices dissenting. Hill v. Shoop, 597 U.S. __, 142 S.Ct. 2579 (2022) (Mem.).
{¶ 12} The trial court, citing State v. Schlee, 2008-Ohio-545, recast Hill’s
{¶ 13} Hill appealed to the Eleventh District, asserting two assignments of error. In the first assignment of error, he argued that the trial court erred in holding that
{¶ 14} The Eleventh District reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Hill’s
{¶ 15} The State appealed to this court, and we agreed to consider the following proposition of law:
A successive post-conviction petition that points to new evidence or a change in law must be brought according to
R.C. 2953.23(A) , and may not be filed as a Civil Rule 60 motion for relief from an adverse judgment on a prior post-conviction petition.
See 2024-Ohio-5529.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} The applicability of the Civil Rules is limited by
These rules, to the extent that they would by their nature be clearly inapplicable, shall not apply to procedure (1) upon appeal to review any judgment, order or ruling, (2) in the appropriation of property, (3) in forcible entry and detainer, (4) in small claims
matters under Chapter 1925 of the Revised Code, (5) in uniform reciprocal support actions, (6) in the commitment of the mentally ill, (7) in adoption proceedings under Chapter 3107 of the Revised Code, (8) in all other special statutory proceedings; provided, that where any statute provides for procedure by a general or specific reference to all the statutes governing procedure in civil actions such procedure shall be in accordance with these rules.
{¶ 18} Therefore, “[t]here are two considerations in determining whether the Civil Rules do not apply: whether the procedural statute governs a special statutory proceeding and whether that statute renders the civil rule at issue ‘clearly inapplicable.’” Ferguson v. State, 2017-Ohio-7844, ¶ 21.
A. Special Statutory Proceedings
{¶ 19} A special statutory proceeding is one that did not exist at common law or in equity but was established by special legislation. See Ferguson at ¶ 23, citing Myers v. Toledo, 2006-Ohio-4353, ¶ 15. Postconviction-relief proceedings clearly meet this definition. The right to file petitions for postconviction relief was created by statute in 1965.
B. Civ.R. 60(B) Is Clearly Inapplicable to Postconviction-Relief Proceedings
{¶ 20} “A civil rule is clearly inapplicable ‘“only when [its] use will alter the basic statutory purpose for which the specific procedure was originally provided.”’” (Bracketed text added in Ferguson.) Ferguson at ¶ 24, quoting Price v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 70 Ohio St.2d 131, 133 (1982), quoting State ex rel. Millington v. Weir, 60 Ohio App.2d 348, 349 (10th Dist. 1978).
{¶ 21} Ohio’s statute authorizing petitions for postconviction relief,
{¶ 22}
A person in any of the following categories may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other appropriate relief:
(i) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense . . . and who claims that there was such a denial or infringement of the person’s rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States;
(ii) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense and sentenced to death and who claims that there was a denial or infringement of the person’s rights under either of those Constitutions that creates a reasonable probability of an altered verdict . . . .
{¶ 23} And
(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period described in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner’s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.
(b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner eligible for the death sentence.
{¶ 24} From the text of these statutes and the context surrounding
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 25} Postconviction-relief proceedings are special statutory proceedings to which the Civil Rules are inapplicable, so Hill may not challenge the judgment denying his petition for postconviction relief by filing a motion under
{¶ 26} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for consideration of Hill’s remaining assignment of error.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
__________________
BRUNNER, J., concurring.
{¶ 27} I agree with the majority opinion, which closes any loophole that may exist in the methods prescribed in
{¶ 28} Technically, in filing his motion under
{¶ 29} I write separately to highlight the context of Hill’s claim and to emphasize the responsibility this court has in ensuring integrity in applying Ohio’s capital-punishment laws, see State v. Wogenstahl, 2024-Ohio-4714, ¶ 45 (Brunner, J., dissenting), quoting State v. Lawson, 2021-Ohio-3566, ¶ 198 (Brunner, J., dissenting) (“It is this court’s duty to ensure that any death sentence imposed in this State is ‘subjected to a reliable, deliberate, and rigorous constitutional review’ . . . .”).
{¶ 30} The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from executing persons who are intellectually disabled. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). To stay within constitutional bounds in implementing the death penalty, states must employ standards based on “established medical practice” to determine whether a person is intellectually disabled. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 711-712 (2014). The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that even “[m]ild levels of intellectual disability . . . remain intellectual disabilities,” Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1, 18 (2017), and that states may not execute anyone who falls into “‘the entire category of [intellectually disabled] offenders’” (emphasis and bracketed text added in Moore), id., quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005).
{¶ 31} Therefore, the process of determining whether a capital defendant is intellectually disabled must be constitutionally rigorous and thorough, and the procedural pathway for a capital defendant to seek such a determination must be clear and accessible. In State v. Lott, this court determined that the postconviction procedures set forth in
{¶ 32} That the State seeks to foreclose Hill’s ability to have his claim that he is intellectually disabled reviewed under the current legal standard is extremely concerning, especially given the substantial evidence that supports Hill’s claim, see Hill v. Shoop, 597 U.S. __, 142 S.Ct. 2579 (2022) (Mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
{¶ 33} On habeas corpus review, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that Hill had been sentenced to death “despite his mental retardation.” Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 2002). Many years later, again on habeas review, the same three-judge panel said that the evidence that Hill is intellectually disabled is “overwhelming.” Hill v. Anderson, 960 F.3d 260, 281 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated by Hill v. Shoop, 11 F.4th 373 (6th Cir. 2021). On en banc review, seven dissenting judges of the Sixth Circuit observed that “[n]o person looking at [the] record could reasonably deny that Hill is intellectually disabled under Atkins.” Shoop, 11 F.4th at 400 (Moore, J., dissenting). And in her opinion dissenting from the United States Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari,1 Justice Sotomayor, joined by two other justices, explained the evidence of Hill’s intellectual disability as follows:
Before Hill filed his state petition for postconviction relief, he had been diagnosed with intellectual disabilities approximately 10 times, beginning at age six. He scored 70 or below on every IQ test he took during his school years. The record before the state courts also revealed significant limitations in Hill’s functional academics, self-care, social skills, and self-direction. He could not sign his own name, never lived independently, was “functionally illiterate” at school and in prison, could not read or write above a third-grade level, and could not perform a job without substantial guidance from supervisors. [Shoop, 11 F.4th] at 407 [Moore, J., dissenting]. He has never been able to take care of his own hygiene independently; even in the rigidly organized environment of prison, he will not shower without reminders. All three medical professionals who testified at the mitigation phase of Hill’s trial concluded that he was within the range of intellectual disability, see State v. Hill, 177 Ohio App.3d 171, 177, 2008-Ohio-3509, ¶¶ 8-11, 894 N.E.2d 108, 112, and the trial court found the record indicated that Hill was “‘mildly to moderately retarded.’” [Shoop,] 11 F.4th at 381 (majority opinion).
Shoop, 597 U.S. at __, 142 S.Ct. at 2579-2580 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
{¶ 34} Hill submitted with his
__________________
DETERS, J., concurring.
{¶ 36} I fully join the majority opinion. I write separately to underscore the injustice to the victim’s family caused by the delay in bringing finality to this case.
{¶ 37} The majority opinion recounts the procedural path that appellee Danny Hill’s appeals have taken since he was convicted and sentenced in March 1986. But the nightmare for 12-year-old Raymond Fife’s family began on September 10, 1985, when Raymond was found by his father after he had been tortured by Hill. State v. Hill, 1992-Ohio-43, ¶ 1-6. Raymond died two days later. Id. at ¶ 7.
{¶ 38} To be sure, “no matter how heinous the crime, any conviction must be secured respecting all constitutional protections,” Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 393 (2022) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). But “[s]erial relitigation of final convictions undermines the finality that ‘is essential to both the retributive and deterrent functions of criminal law.’” Id. at 391, quoting Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998). Raymond’s family and the State of Ohio have been deprived of finality for over 40 years.
{¶ 40} Today, this court takes a step toward preventing further delay in achieving finality in criminal matters by recognizing the inapplicability of
__________________
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles L. Morrow, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; and Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, Mathura J. Sridharan, Solicitor General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Stephen Maher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Stephen C. Newman, Federal Public Defender, and Calland M. Ferraro and Matthew Gay, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, for appellee.
__________________