DAVID SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, REHABILITATION AND REENTRY v. DAVID MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
No. 20-1009
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
May 23, 2022
596 U.S. ___ (2022)
OCTOBER TERM, 2021
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, REHABILITATION AND REENTRY v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-1009. Argued December 8, 2021—Decided May 23, 2022*
Respondents David Martinez Ramirez and Barry Lee Jones were each convicted of capital crimes in Arizona state court and sentenced to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed each case on direct review, and each prisoner was denied state postconviction relief. Each also filed for federal habeas relief under
Held: Under
(a) To respect federal-state dual sovereignty, see Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 918, the availability of federal habeas relief is narrowly circumscribed, see Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. ___, ___. For example, only rarely may a federal habeas court hear a claim or consider evidence that a prisoner did not previously present to the state courts in compliance with state procedural rules. Pp. 6–13.
(1) Federal habeas review overrides the States’ core power to enforce criminal law—an intrusion that “imposes special costs” on the federal system. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 128. Two of those costs are particularly relevant here. First, a federal order to retry or release a state prisoner overrides the State‘s sovereign power to enforce “societal norms through criminal law.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 556. Second, federal intervention imposes significant costs on state criminal justice systems. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 90. Pp. 6–8.
(2) In light of these costs, this Court recognizes that federal habeas review is not “a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal,” but is an “extraordinary remedy” that guards only against “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102–103. To ensure that federal habeas retains its narrow role, both Congress and federal habeas courts have set out strict rules requiring prisoners to raise all of their federal claims in state court before seeking federal relief. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires state prisoners to “exhaus[t] the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seeking federal habeas relief.
(3) Nonetheless, a federal court is not required to automatically deny unexhausted or procedurally defaulted claims. For instance, when a claim is procedurally defaulted, a federal court can forgive the default and adjudicate the claim if the prisoner provides an adequate excuse. And if the state-court record for that defaulted claim is undeveloped, the prisoner must show that factual development in federal court is appropriate. Pp. 10–13.
(i) Federal courts may excuse procedural default only if a prisoner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Coleman, 501 U. S., at 750. With respect to cause, “attorney error cannot provide cause to excuse a default” “in proceedings for which the Constitution does not guarantee the assistance of counsel at all.” Davila, 582 U. S., at ___. But in Martinez, this Court recognized a “narrow exception” to that rule, holding that ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel may constitute “cause” to forgive procedural default of a trial-ineffective-assistance claim, but only if the State requires prisoners to raise such claims for the first time during state collateral proceedings. 566 U. S., at 9. Pp. 10–11.
(ii) Excusing a prisoner‘s failure to develop the state-court record faces an even higher bar. Section
(b) Although respondents do not satisfy
(1) Respondents primarily argue that a prisoner is not “at fault” for the undeveloped record if state postconviction counsel negligently failed to develop the state record for a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. But under AEDPA and this Court‘s precedents, state postconviction counsel‘s ineffective assistance in developing the state-court record is attributed to the prisoner. Pp. 13–19.
(ii) Respondents propose extending Martinez so that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can excuse a prisoner‘s failure to develop the state-court record under
(2) Respondents propose a second reading of
937 F. 3d 1230 and 943 F. 3d 1211, reversed.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
No. 20-1009
DAVID SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, REHABILITATION AND REENTRY, PETITIONER v. DAVID MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
DAVID SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, REHABILITATION AND REENTRY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. BARRY LEE JONES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May 23, 2022]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
A federal habeas court generally may consider a state prisoner‘s federal claim only if he has first presented that claim to the state court in accordance with state procedures. When the prisoner has failed to do so, and the state court would dismiss the claim on that basis, the claim is “procedurally defaulted.” To overcome procedural default, the prisoner must demonstrate “cause” to excuse the procedural defect and “actual prejudice” if the federal court were to decline to hear his claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 750 (1991). In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1 (2012), this Court explained that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel is “cause” to forgive procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, but only if the State required the prisoner to raise that claim
Often, a prisoner with a defaulted claim will ask a federal habeas court not only to consider his claim but also to permit him to introduce new evidence to support it. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the standard to expand the state-court record is a stringent one. If a prisoner has “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” a federal court “shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim” unless the prisoner satisfies one of two narrow exceptions, see
The question presented is whether the equitable rule announced in Martinez permits a federal court to dispense with
I
In this case, we address two petitions brought by the State of Arizona. See Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F. 3d 1230 (CA9 2019); Jones v. Shinn, 943 F. 3d 1211 (CA9 2019).
A
On May 25, 1989, David Ramirez fatally stabbed his girlfriend, Mary Ann Gortarez, and her 15-year-old daughter, Candie, in their home. 937 F. 3d, at 1234–1235; State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 119, 121, 871 P. 2d 237, 240, 242 (1994). Ramirez stabbed Mary Ann 18 times in the neck with a pair of scissors, and Candie 15 times in the neck with a box cutter. Id., at 121, 871 P. 2d, at 242. Police also found physical evidence that Ramirez had raped Candie, and
Ramirez then filed his first petition for state postconviction relief. That petition raised myriad claims, but it did not raise the one at issue here: that Ramirez‘s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for “failing to conduct a complete mitigation investigation” or “obtai[n] and present available mitigation evidence at sentencing.” App. 402. Ramirez did not raise this ineffective-assistance claim until he subsequently filed a successive state habeas petition, which the state court summarily denied as untimely under Arizona law. See ibid.
Ramirez also petitioned the U. S. District Court for the District of Arizona for a writ of habeas corpus under
The District Court permitted Ramirez to file several declarations and other evidence not presented to the state court to support his request to excuse his procedural default. See 937 F. 3d, at 1238. Assessing the new evidence, the District Court excused the procedural default but rejected Ramirez‘s ineffective-assistance claim on the merits. See id., at 1240.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Like the District Court, it held that Ramirez‘s state postconviction coun-
Arizona petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing that the Ninth Circuit‘s remand for additional evidentiary development violated
B
On May 1, 1994, Barry Lee Jones repeatedly beat his girlfriend‘s 4-year-old daughter, Rachel Gray. See 943 F. 3d, at 1215–1216; State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 391, 937 P. 2d 310, 313 (1997). One blow to Rachel‘s abdomen ruptured her small intestine. See id., at 391, 937 P. 2d, at 313. She also sustained several injuries to her vagina and labia consistent with sexual assault. Ibid. Early the next morning, Jones drove Rachel to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead on arrival. See ibid. Rachel died of peritonitis—“an infection of the lining of the abdomen caused by a ruptured intestine.” Ibid. A jury convicted Jones of sexual assault, three counts of child abuse, and felony murder. Ibid. The trial judge sentenced Jones to death, ibid., and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on direct review, see id., at 401, 937 P. 2d, at 323.
Jones then petitioned for state postconviction relief. He alleged ineffective assistance by his trial counsel, but not the specific trial-ineffective-assistance claim at issue here:
Jones next filed a habeas petition in the U. S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The District Court held that Jones’ trial-ineffective-assistance claim was procedurally defaulted, so Jones, like Ramirez, invoked his postconviction counsel‘s ineffective assistance as grounds to forgive the default. Ibid. To bolster his case for cause and prejudice, Jones also moved to supplement the undeveloped state-court record. Ibid. The District Court held a 7-day evidentiary hearing with more than 10 witnesses and ultimately decided to forgive Jones’ procedural default. See id., at 1219, 1225–1226. The court then relied on the new evidence from the cause-and-prejudice hearing to hold, on the merits, that Jones’ trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. See id., at 1219.
Arizona appealed, arguing that
As in Ramirez, Arizona petitioned for rehearing en banc. And, also as in Ramirez, the Ninth Circuit denied Arizona‘s petition over the dissent of Judge Collins, joined by seven other judges. Jones v. Shinn, 971 F. 3d 1133 (2020).
C
As noted above, Arizona petitioned for a writ of certiorari in both Ramirez and Jones. The State maintains that
II
A state prisoner may request that a federal court order his release by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus. See
A
“From the beginning of our country, criminal law enforcement has been primarily a responsibility of the States.” Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 19). The power to convict and punish criminals lies at the heart of the States’ “residuary and inviolable sovereignty.” The Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison);
Because federal habeas review overrides the States’ core power to enforce criminal law, it “intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). That intrusion “imposes special costs on our federal system.” Engle, 456 U. S., at 128; see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, 453, n. 16 (1986); Davila v. Davis, 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 15). Here, two of those costs are particularly relevant.
First, a federal order to retry or release a state prisoner overrides the State‘s sovereign power to enforce “societal norms through criminal law.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 556 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is so because habeas relief “frequently cost[s] society the right to punish admitted offenders.” Engle, 456 U. S., at 127; see also Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2021) (slip op., at 6) (“When previously convicted perpetrators of violent crimes go free merely because the evidence needed to conduct a retrial has become stale or is no longer available, the public suffers, as do the victims“). “Only with real finality can the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral judgment will be carried out.” Calderon, 523 U. S., at 556. “To unsettle these expectations is to inflict a profound injury to the powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty, an interest shared by the State and the victims of crime alike.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Second, federal intervention imposes significant costs on state criminal justice systems. It “disturbs the State‘s sig-
B
In light of these significant costs, we have recognized that federal habeas review cannot serve as “a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Harrington, 562 U. S., at 102–103. The writ of habeas corpus is an “extraordinary remedy” that guards only against “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Id., at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 633–634 (1993). To ensure that federal habeas corpus retains its narrow role, AEDPA imposes several limits on habeas relief, and we have prescribed several more. See, e.g., Brown, 596 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11–13). And even if a prisoner overcomes all of these limits, he is never entitled to habeas relief. He must still “persuade a federal habeas court that law and justice require [it].” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As relevant here, both Congress and federal habeas courts have set out strict rules requiring prisoners to raise all of their federal claims in state court before seeking federal relief. First, AEDPA requires state prisoners to “exhaus[t] the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seeking federal habeas relief.
State prisoners, however, often fail to raise their federal claims in compliance with state procedures, or even raise those claims in state court at all. If a state court would dismiss these claims for their procedural failures, such claims are technically exhausted because, in the habeas context, “state-court remedies are ... ‘exhausted’ when they are no longer available, regardless of the reason for their unavailability.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U. S. 81, 92–93 (2006). But to allow a state prisoner simply to ignore state procedure on the way to federal court would defeat the evident goal of the exhaustion rule. See Coleman, 501 U. S., at 732. Thus, federal habeas courts must apply “an important ‘corollary’ to the exhaustion requirement“: the doctrine of procedural default. Davila, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4). Under that doctrine, federal courts generally decline to hear any federal claim that was not presented to the state courts “consistent with [the State‘s] own procedural rules.” Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U. S. 446, 453 (2000).
Together, exhaustion and procedural default promote federal-state comity. Exhaustion affords States “an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights,” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U. S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam), and procedural default protects against “the significant harm to the States that results from the failure of federal courts to respect” state procedural rules, Coleman, 501 U. S., at 750. Ultimately, “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal
C
Despite the many benefits of exhaustion and procedural default, and the substantial costs when those doctrines are not enforced, we have held that a federal court is not required to automatically deny unexhausted or procedurally defaulted claims. When a claim is unexhausted, the prisoner might have an opportunity to return to state court to adjudicate the claim. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 520 (1982). When a claim is procedurally defaulted, a federal court can forgive the default and adjudicate the claim if the prisoner provides an adequate excuse. Likewise, if the state-court record for that defaulted claim is undeveloped, the prisoner must show that factual development in federal court is appropriate.
1
“Out of respect for finality, comity, and the orderly administration of justice,” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U. S. 386, 388 (2004), federal courts may excuse procedural default only if a prisoner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,” Coleman, 501 U. S., at 750. To establish cause, the prisoner must “show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel‘s efforts to comply with the State‘s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 488 (1986). Then, to establish prejudice, the prisoner must show not merely a substantial federal claim, such that ” ‘the errors at ... trial created a possibility of prejudice,’ but rather that the constitutional violation ‘worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage.’ ” Id., at 494 (quoting
With respect to cause, “[a]ttorney ignorance or inadvertence” cannot excuse procedural default. Coleman, 501 U. S., at 753. “[T]he attorney is the petitioner‘s agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must bear the risk of attorney error.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). That said, “if the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the State.” Murray, 477 U. S., at 488. That is not because a constitutional error “is so bad that the lawyer ceases to be an agent” of the prisoner, but rather because a violation of the right to counsel “must be seen as an external factor” to the prisoner‘s defense. Coleman, 501 U. S., at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted). “It follows, then, that in proceedings for which the Constitution does not guarantee the assistance of counsel at all, attorney error cannot provide cause to excuse a default.” Davila, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).
In Martinez, this Court recognized a “narrow exception” to the rule that attorney error cannot establish cause to excuse a procedural default unless it violates the Constitution. 566 U. S., at 9. There, the Court held that ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel may constitute “cause” to forgive procedural default of a trial-ineffective-assistance claim, but only if the State requires prisoners to raise such claims for the first time during state collateral proceedings. See ibid. One year later, in Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U. S. 413 (2013), this Court held that this “narrow exception” applies if the State‘s judicial system effectively forecloses direct review of trial-ineffective-assistance claims. Id., at 428. Otherwise, attorney error where there is no right to counsel remains insufficient to show cause. Martinez, 566 U. S., at 16.
There is an even higher bar for excusing a prisoner‘s failure to develop the state-court record. Shortly before AEDPA, we held that a prisoner who “negligently failed” to develop the state-court record must satisfy Coleman‘s cause-and-prejudice standard before a federal court can hold an evidentiary hearing. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1, 9 (1992). In Keeney, we explained that “little [could] be said for holding a habeas petitioner to one standard for failing to bring a claim in state court and excusing the petitioner under another, lower standard for failing to develop the factual basis of that claim in the same forum.” Id., at 10. And, consistent with Coleman, we held that evidentiary development would be inappropriate “where the cause asserted is attorney error.” 504 U. S., at 11, n. 5.
Four years later, Congress enacted AEDPA and replaced Keeney‘s cause-and-prejudice standard for evidentiary development with the even “more stringent requirements” now codified at
Even though AEDPA largely displaced Keeney,
III
Respondents concede that they do not satisfy
A
Respondents’ primary claim is that a prisoner is not “at fault,” Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 432, and therefore has not “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,”
As stated above, a prisoner “bears the risk in federal habeas for all attorney errors made in the course of the representation,” Coleman, 501 U. S., at 754, unless counsel provides “constitutionally ineffective” assistance, Murray, 477 U. S., at 488. And, because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, see Davila, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6), a prisoner ordinarily must “bea[r] responsibility” for all attorney errors during those proceedings, Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 432. Among those errors, a state prisoner is responsible for counsel‘s negligent failure to develop the state postconviction record.
Both before and after AEDPA, our prior cases have made this point clear. First, in Keeney, “material facts had not been adequately developed in the state postconviction court, apparently due to the negligence of postconviction counsel.” 504 U. S., at 4 (citation omitted). We required the prisoner to demonstrate cause and prejudice to forgive post-conviction counsel‘s deficient performance, see id., at 11, and recognized that counsel‘s negligence, on its own, was not a sufficient cause, see id., at 10, n. 5.
Second, in Michael Williams, we confirmed that “the opening clause of
Third, in Holland v. Jackson, 542 U. S. 649 (2004) (per curiam), we again held a prisoner responsible for state post-conviction counsel‘s negligent failure to develop the state-court record. Seven years after the prisoner‘s conviction, and after he had already been denied state postconviction relief, the prisoner found a new witness to provide impeachment testimony. See id., at 650–651. The prisoner claimed that he discovered the witness so late because “state post-conviction counsel did not heed his pleas for assistance.” Id., at 653. Citing Coleman and Michael Williams, we rejected the prisoner‘s claim. “Attorney negligence,” we held, “is chargeable to the client and precludes relief unless the conditions of
In sum, under
2
Respondents dispute none of this. Instead, they rely almost exclusively on Martinez‘s holding that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can be “cause” to forgive procedural default of a trial-ineffective-assistance claim if a State forecloses direct review of that claim, as Arizona concededly does. See 566 U. S., at 9. Respondents contend that where, per Martinez, a prisoner is not responsible for state postconviction counsel‘s failure to raise a claim, it makes little sense to hold the prisoner responsible for the failure to develop that claim. Thus, respondents propose extending Martinez so that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can excuse a prisoner‘s failure to develop the state-court record under
Congress foreclosed respondents’ proposed expansion of Martinez when it passed AEDPA. Martinez decided that,
The same follows here. We have no power to redefine when a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings.”
Respondents propose that Congress may have actually
We do not agree. First, “[g]iven our frequent recognition that AEDPA limited rather than expanded the availability of habeas relief . . . it is implausible that, without saying so,” Fry v. Pliler, 551 U. S. 112, 119 (2007), Congress intended this Court to liberalize the availability of habeas relief generally, or access to federal factfinding specifically. Second, in Coleman, we “reiterate[d] that counsel‘s ineffectiveness will constitute cause only if it is an independent constitutional violation,” and surmised that a hypothetical constitutional right to initial-review postconviction counsel could give rise to a corresponding claim for cause. 501 U. S., at 755; see also Martinez, 566 U. S., at 8-9. Since then, however, we have repeatedly reaffirmed that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., Davila, 582 U. S., at (slip op., at 6).
We also reject respondents’ equitable rewrite of
Finally, setting aside that we lack authority to amend
To be sure, Martinez recognized that state prisoners often need “evidence outside the trial record” to support their trial-ineffective-assistance claims. Id., at 13. But Martinez did not prescribe largely unbounded access to new evidence whenever postconviction counsel is ineffective, as respondents propose. Rather, Martinez recognized our overarching responsibility “to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism.” Id., at 9. In particular, the Court explained that its
The cases under review demonstrate the improper burden imposed on the States when Martinez applies beyond its narrow scope. The sprawling evidentiary hearing in Jones is particularly poignant. Ostensibly to assess cause and prejudice under Martinez, the District Court ordered a 7-day hearing that included testimony from no fewer than 10 witnesses, including defense trial counsel, defense postconviction counsel, the lead investigating detective, three forensic pathologists, an emergency medicine and trauma specialist, a biomechanics and functional human anatomy expert, and a crime scene and bloodstain pattern analyst. See 943 F. 3d, at 1219, 1225-1226. Of these witnesses, only one of the forensic pathologists and the lead detective testified at the original trial. See id., at 1223-1225. The remainder testified on virtually every disputed issue in the case, including the timing of Rachel Gray‘s injuries and her cause of death. See id., at 1226-1228. This wholesale relitigation of Jones’ guilt is plainly not what Martinez envisioned.
B
Martinez aside, respondents propose a second reading of
There are good reasons to doubt respondents’ first point, but we need not address it because our precedent squarely forecloses the second. In Holland, we explained that
Respondents all but concede that their argument amounts to the same kind of evasion of
This follows from our decision in Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U. S. 465 (2007). There, we held that a federal court, “[i]n deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove factual allegations [that] would entitle [him] to federal habeas relief.” Id., at 474. “This approach makes eminent sense,” for if “district courts held evidentiary hearings without first asking whether the evidence the petitioner seeks to present would satisfy AEDPA‘s demanding standards, they would needlessly prolong federal habeas proceedings.” Cullen, 563 U. S., at 208-209 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). Here, holding a Martinez hearing when the prisoner cannot “satisfy AEDPA‘s demanding standards” in
C
Ultimately, respondents’ proposed expansion of factfinding in federal court, whether by Martinez or other means, conflicts with any appropriately limited federal habeas review. In our dual-sovereign system, federal courts must afford unwavering respect to the centrality “of the trial of a criminal case in state court.” Wainwright, 433 U. S., at 90. That is the moment at which “[s]ociety‘s resources have
The dissent contends that we “overstat[e] the harm to States that would result from allowing” prisoners to develop evidence outside
* * *
Because we have no warrant to impose any factfinding beyond
It is so ordered.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. This Court has recognized that right as “a bedrock principle” that constitutes the very “foundation for our adversary system” of criminal justice. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1, 12 (2012). Today, however, the Court hamstrings the federal courts’ authority to safeguard that right. The Court‘s decision will leave many people who were convicted in violation of the Sixth Amendment to face incarceration or even execution without any meaningful chance to vindicate their right to counsel.
In reaching its decision, the Court all but overrules two recent precedents that recognized a critical exception to the general rule that federal courts may not consider claims on habeas review that were not raised in state court. Just 10 years ago, the Court held that a federal court may consider
This decision is perverse. It is illogical: It makes no sense to excuse a habeas petitioner‘s counsel‘s failure to raise a claim altogether because of ineffective assistance in postconviction proceedings, as Martinez and Trevino did, but to fault the same petitioner for that postconviction counsel‘s failure to develop evidence in support of the trial-ineffectiveness claim. In so doing, the Court guts Martinez‘s and Trevino‘s core reasoning. The Court also arrogates power from Congress: The Court‘s analysis improperly reconfigures the balance Congress struck in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) between state interests and individual constitutional rights.
By the Court‘s telling, its holding (however implausible) is compelled by statute. Make no mistake. Neither AEDPA nor this Court‘s precedents require this result. I respectfully dissent.
I
The majority sets forth the gruesome nature of the mur-
A
Respondent Barry Lee Jones was charged with the murder of his girlfriend‘s 4-year-old daughter, Rachel Gray. The State argued that Rachel died as a result of an injury she sustained while in Jones’ care. Jones’ trial counsel failed to undertake even a cursory investigation and, as a result, did not uncover readily available medical evidence that could have shown that Rachel sustained her injuries when she was not in Jones’ care. Having heard none of this evidence, the jury convicted Jones and the trial judge sentenced him to death.
Jones filed for postconviction review in Arizona state court. Under Arizona law, Jones was not permitted to argue on direct appeal that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance; accordingly, state postconviction review was his first opportunity to raise his trial-ineffectiveness claim. See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, 39 P. 3d 525, 527 (2002). At this stage, however, Jones was met with another egregious failure of counsel. Arizona state law sets minimum qualifications that attorneys must meet to be appointed in capital cases like Jones‘, but the Arizona Supreme Court waived those requirements in Jones’ case, and the state court appointed postconviction counsel who lacked those qualifications. See Jones v. Ryan, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1214 (Ariz. 2018) (citing
Jones then sought federal habeas relief, at last represented by competent counsel, and alleged that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing adequately to investigate his case. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing at which Jones presented evidence that the injuries to Rachel could not have been inflicted at the time the State alleged that Jones was with her, and that this evidence would have been readily available to Jones’ trial and state postconviction counsel, had they investigated the case. The District Court concluded that Jones’ postconviction counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise this claim in state postconviction proceedings and therefore held that Jones could raise it for the first time in federal court under Martinez. The District Court also relied on this evidence to hold, on the merits, that Jones received ineffective assistance at trial. The court found that there was a “reasonable probability that the jury would not have unanimously convicted [Jones] of any of the counts” if Jones’ trial counsel had “adequately investigated and presented medical and other expert testimony to rebut the State‘s theory” of Jones’ guilt. 327 F. Supp. 3d, at 1211.
Arizona moved to stay the granting of the habeas writ by arguing that
B
Respondent David Ramirez was convicted for the capital murders of his girlfriend and her daughter. At the sentencing phase, the state court appointed a psychologist to conduct a mental health evaluation. Ramirez‘s counsel failed to provide the psychologist with evidence that Ramirez had an intellectual disability and failed to develop a claim of intellectual disability to present in mitigation against the imposition of a death sentence and in support of the imposition of a sentence of life without parole. Ramirez was sentenced to death.
As in Jones’ case, an Arizona state court appointed Ramirez counsel for his state postconviction claim. And as in Jones’ case, state postconviction proceedings were Ramirez‘s first opportunity to raise a claim of trial ineffectiveness. Ramirez‘s postconviction attorney, however, did not conduct any investigation beyond the existing trial record, despite being aware of indications that Ramirez might have intellectual disabilities, including that his mother drank when she was pregnant with him and that he demonstrated developmental delays as a child. Nor did Ramirez‘s postconviction counsel argue that Ramirez‘s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to develop and present this mitigating evidence. Arizona courts denied Ramirez‘s postconviction petition.
Citing “‘concerns regarding the quality‘” of Ramirez‘s
The District Court denied relief on Ramirez‘s trial-ineffectiveness claim and declined to allow further evidentiary development. On appeal, Arizona conceded that Ramirez‘s postconviction counsel performed deficiently. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Ramirez had satisfied the requirements of Martinez because postconviction counsel had provided ineffective representation and Ramirez‘s trial-ineffectiveness claim was substantial. The Ninth Circuit directed the District Court to allow evidentiary development of Ramirez‘s trial-ineffectiveness claim, recognizing that he had been “precluded from such development because of his post-conviction counsel‘s ineffective representation.” 937 F. 3d, at 1248.
II
Martinez and Trevino afford habeas petitioners like Jones and Ramirez the opportunity to bring certain trial-ineffectiveness claims for the first time in federal court. The question before the Court is whether Jones and Ramirez can make good on that opportunity by developing evidence in support of these claims, or whether AEDPA nevertheless requires them to rely on the state-court records, constructed by ineffective trial and postconviction
Under this Court‘s precedents, the answer is clear. Martinez and Trevino establish that petitioners are not at fault for any failure to raise their claims in state court in these circumstances. Other precedents hold that AEDPA‘s
A
This Court‘s precedents, culminating in Martinez and Trevino, explain the circumstances under which habeas petitioners are deemed accountable for their attorneys’ failures to present claims in state court. A petitioner who does not properly present a claim in a state proceeding generally may not raise the claim in federal court, because the claim has been “procedurally defaulted.” See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 486 (1986).
A federal court, however, can excuse a procedural default and permit a petitioner to raise a claim for the first time in federal court if the petitioner can “demonstrate cause for the procedural default in state court and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Maples v. Thomas, 565 U. S. 266, 280 (2012) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). This Court has held that “[c]ause for a procedural default exists where something external to the petitioner . . . that cannot fairly be attributed to him impeded his efforts to comply with the State‘s procedural rule.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
As a general matter, attorney error does not constitute
Coleman left unanswered the question whether ineffective assistance of counsel at the postconviction stage, where defendants generally do not have a constitutional right to counsel, could also constitute cause to excuse default. See id., at 755. This question is critical in Arizona and other States that do not allow defendants to raise trial-ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal, where individuals are constitutionally entitled to effective counsel, and instead require them to raise these claims for the first time in collateral proceedings, in which this Court has not recognized a constitutional right to counsel.
Martinez, 566 U. S. 1, held that in these States, postconviction counsel‘s failure to raise a substantial trial-ineffectiveness claim could constitute cause to excuse a procedural default. The Court observed that where a state collateral proceeding is the first time that a petitioner can press a trial-ineffectiveness claim, the collateral proceeding is “the
A year later, in Trevino, 569 U. S. 413, the Court reaffirmed and extended Martinez‘s core holding. Trevino held that where a State does not offer “a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal,” a defendant whose collateral-review counsel renders ineffective assistance has demonstrated cause to excuse the procedural default of his trial-ineffectiveness claim. 569 U. S., at 428.3
B
There is no dispute here that respondents’ trial-ineffectiveness claims clear the procedural default hurdle under Martinez and Trevino. The question is whether a habeas petitioner can be faultless for a procedural default under
Precedent establishes that
Williams found further support for its fault-based reading of “failed to develop” in pre-AEDPA cases that foreshadowed the language of
The reasoning of Martinez and Trevino applies with equal force to the threshold diligence/fault standard of Keeney, Williams, and
Any other reading hollows out Martinez and Trevino. Martinez repeatedly recognized that to prove a trial-ineffectiveness claim (or even to show that it is “substantial“), habeas petitioners frequently must introduce evidence outside of the trial record. See, e.g., 566 U. S., at 13 (“Ineffective-assistance claims often depend on evidence outside the trial record“). Ineffective-assistance claims frequently turn on errors of omission: evidence that was not obtained, wit-
C
Applying this interpretation of
By definition, Jones and Ramirez are not at fault for their state postconviction counsel‘s failures to develop evidence. Jones and Ramirez acted diligently, but their attorneys’ errors, paired with the State‘s choice of how to structure their review proceedings, constituted external impediments. As a result, Jones and Ramirez have not “failed to develop” the factual bases of their claims, and AEDPA‘s
III
Rejecting the teachings of Martinez and Trevino, the Court adopts an irrational reading of
The Court‘s analysis rests on two fundamental errors. First, the Court eviscerates Martinez and Trevino and mischaracterizes other precedents. Second, the Court relies upon its own mistaken understanding of AEDPA‘s policies and the state interests at issue, recycling claims rejected by the Martinez Court and ignoring the careful balance struck by Congress. In doing so, the Court gives short shrift to the egregious breakdowns of the adversarial system that occurred in these cases, breakdowns of the type that federal habeas review exists to correct.
A
The doctrinal consequence of the Court‘s distortion of precedent is to render Martinez and Trevino dead letters in
The Court‘s analysis also rests on a misplaced view of Williams. The Court fixates on Williams’ statement that
The Court further charges that respondents’ interpretation of
Finally, the Court finds it implausible that Congress would have considered the threshold diligence inquiry under
B
Much of the Court‘s opinion focuses not on the text of
It is of course true that AEDPA‘s rules are designed to “ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism.” Martinez, 566 U. S., at 9. The enacting Congress, however, did not pursue these aims at all costs. AEDPA does not render state judgments unassailable, but strikes a balance between respecting state-court judgments and preserving the necessary and vital role federal courts play in “guard[ing] against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102-103 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “‘Congress has recognized that federal habeas corpus has a particularly important role to play in promoting fundamental fairness in the imposition of the death penalty.‘” Christeson v. Roper, 574 U. S. 373, 377 (2015) (per curiam). Absent that role, what this Court regularly calls “the Great Writ” hardly would be worthy of the label. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 649 (2010).
The Court today supplants the balance Congress struck with its single-minded focus on finality. In doing so, it overstates the harm to States that would result from allowing petitioners to develop facts in support of Martinez claims. See ante, at 18. Importantly, Martinez applies only where the underlying claim is one of trial ineffectiveness, and only if a petitioner demonstrates that the claim is “substantial.” 566 U. S., at 14. The Court reaches to support its holding by yet again repackaging a dissenter‘s warning, this time
In the same vein, the Court bemoans the “sprawling evidentiary hearing” conducted by the District Court in Jones’ case. Ante, at 19. Of course, the scope of the District Court‘s hearing (including evidence from medical experts, forensic experts, law enforcement personnel, and others) was necessary only because trial counsel failed to present any of that evidence during the guilt phase of Jones’ capital case. Far from constituting an inappropriate and “wholesale relitigation of Jones‘s guilt,” ibid., the District Court‘s hearing was wide-ranging precisely because the breakdown of the adversarial system in Jones’ case was so egregious.
The Court suggests that evidentiary hearings like Jones’ will “encourag[e] prisoners” to “‘sandba[g]’ state courts” by strategically holding back claims from state postconviction review to present them for the first time in federal court. Ante, at 22. That claim is odd, particularly in this context. It is a State‘s decision to divert trial-ineffectiveness claims from direct appeal to postconviction review, and then to provide ineffective postconviction counsel, that results in the failure to raise or develop such claims before state courts. No habeas petitioner or postconviction counsel could possibly perceive a strategic benefit from failing to raise a meritorious trial-ineffectiveness claim in an available forum. Indeed, the whole thrust of Jones’ and Ramirez‘s argument is that their Sixth Amendment claims were so obvious that
On the other side of the ledger, the Court understates, or ignores altogether, the gravity of the state systems’ failures in these two cases. To put it bluntly: Two men whose trial attorneys did not provide even the bare minimum level of representation required by the Constitution may be executed because forces outside of their control prevented them from vindicating their constitutional right to counsel. It is hard to imagine a more “extreme malfunctio[n],” Harrington, 562 U. S., at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted), than the prejudicial deprivation of a right that constitutes the “foundation for our adversary system.” Martinez, 566 U. S., at 12.
Nor will the damage be limited to these two cases. Even before Martinez, this Court recognized that a trial record is “often incomplete or inadequate” to demonstrate inadequate assistance of counsel. Massaro v. United States, 538 U. S. 500, 505 (2003). A trial record “may contain no evidence of alleged errors of omission,” like a failure sufficiently to investigate a case. Ibid. For a court to discern “whether [any] alleged error was prejudicial,” too, it is obvious that “additional factual development” may be required. Ibid. The on-the-ground experience of capital habeas attorneys confirms this commonsense notion. See Brief for Federal Defender Capital Habeas Units as Amici Curiae 3-4. The Court‘s decision thus reduces to rubble many habeas petitioners’ Sixth Amendment rights to the effective assistance of counsel.
Contrary to the Court‘s account, the fundamental fairness concerns that arise from this particular type of breakdown are not unconditionally eclipsed by the need to accord finality and respect to state-court judgments. Ante, at 18. Finality interests are at their apex when the “essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is challenged.”
Ultimately, the Court‘s decision prevents habeas petitioners in States like Arizona from receiving any guaranteed opportunity to develop the records necessary to enforce their Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. For the subset of these petitioners who receive ineffective assistance both at trial and in state postconviction proceedings, the Sixth Amendment‘s guarantee is now an empty one. Many, if not most, individuals in this position will have no recourse and no opportunity for relief. The responsibility for this devastating outcome lies not with Congress, but with this Court.
* * *
Text and precedent instruct that in States that limit review of trial-ineffectiveness claims to postconviction proceedings, habeas petitioners who receive ineffective assistance of both trial and postconviction counsel are not responsible for any failure to raise their substantial claim of trial ineffectiveness, nor for any “fail[ure] to develop” evidence in support of that claim under AEDPA‘s