State v. HahnState v. Hahn
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Richard Hahn, appeals the judgment of the Akron Municipal Court, denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
I.
{¶2} On March 8, 2015, at approximately 12:55 a.m., Officer Daniel Rafferty of the Springfield Township Police Department observed a white Chevrolet Cobalt leave a bar and travel southbound on South Arlington Road. Officer Rafferty subsequently observed the vehicle driving “outside [of its] marked lane of travel multiple times” before ultimately attempting to make an illegal left-hand turn into a Walmart parking lot. Once the driver of the vehicle in question attempted to make the illegal left-hand turn, Officer Rafferty activated the overhead lights of his cruiser and effectuated a traffic stop.
{¶3} Upon establishing contact with the driver of the stopped vehicle, Officer Rafferty observed that the driver, later identified as Hahn, “had very glassy, bloodshot eyes.” Officer
{¶4} Hahn was subsequently charged with two counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (“OVI“) in violation of
{¶5} Hahn filed this timely appeal and raises two assignments of error for this Court‘s review. As both assignments of error implicate similar issues, we elect to address them together.
II.
Assignment of Error I
The trial court erred as a matter of fact when it found the defendant traveled across marked lanes multiple times[] and attempted to make an illegal left turn.
Assignment of Error II
The trial court incorrectly decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress.
{¶6} In his first and second assignments of error, Hahn argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because Officer Rafferty lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion that he had committed a traffic violation, thus rendering the traffic stop illegal. Specifically, Hahn contends that the trial court‘s factual findings that he committed marked-lane violations and attempted to make an illegal left-hand turn are against the manifest weight of the evidence since the findings are directly belied by the video footage taken from Officer Rafferty‘s cruiser. We disagree.
{¶7} A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court “must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id. at ¶ 8. “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶9} In this case, the trial court concluded that the traffic stop of Hahn‘s vehicle was constitutional. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court found that Officer Rafferty‘s testimony about witnessing Hahn commit marked-lane violations and attempt to make an illegal left-hand
{¶10} Hahn argues that Officer Rafferty‘s testimony at the suppression hearing regarding his alleged traffic violations was not credible because the video footage taken from the police cruiser does not appear to show him committing any marked-lane violations. Hahn also contends that the cruiser‘s video footage clearly depicts him attempting to make an illegal left-hand turn only after Officer Rafferty had already activated the overhead lights of his cruiser and commenced the traffic stop. However, assuming arguendo that the video footage does not depict Hahn committing any traffic violations, Officer Rafferty testified at the suppression hearing that his cruiser‘s video camera only starts recording footage once the cruiser‘s overhead lights are activated. The camera also saves all footage taken one minute immediately prior to the cruiser‘s overhead lights being activated. Officer Rafferty also explicitly testified that he followed Hahn‘s vehicle on South Arlington Road for “probably 45 seconds to a minute” before the cruiser‘s video camera started saving footage. Officer Rafferty further testified that he personally observed Hahn commit marked-lane violations during the brief time that was not saved by the video camera. Although Hahn attempted to demonstrate on cross-examination that Officer Rafferty‘s testimony concerning the alleged traffic violations was not credible, we must defer to the trial court‘s credibility determinations and consideration of the weight of the evidence. See Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d at 366 (“At a suppression hearing, the evaluation of evidence and the credibility of witnesses are issues for the trier of fact.“), citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982).
{¶12} Hahn‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
III.
{¶13} With both of Hahn‘s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the Akron Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Akron Municipal Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, P. J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
CHARLES W. OLMINSKY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
EVE V. BELFANCE, Director of Law, and BRIAN D. BREMER, Assistant Director of Law, for Appellee.