STATE OF NEW MEXICO v. MANUEL GUERRA
No. 29,954
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
SUTIN, Judge.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DONA ANA COUNTY, Stephen Bridgforth, District Judge. Gary K. King, Attorney General, Olga Serafimova, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee. Alex Chisholm for Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
SUTIN, Judge.
Defendant appeals his convictions. He argues that he was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of his counsel and also that his constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy and to receive due process were violated by the State‘s use of three-month charging periods, rather than specific dates and times of the offenses. We affirm Defendant‘s convictions.
BACKGROUND
Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background аnd because this is a Memorandum Opinion, we do not provide a detailed summary of the facts. We address the facts and procedure as necessary in the context of our analysis.
DISCUSSION
Defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of cоunsel. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed de novo. State v. Quinones, 2011-NMCA-018, 28, 149 N.M. 294, 248 P.3d 336. “The test for ineffective assistance
To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, [the d]efendant must show that (1) counsel‘s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that [the d]efendant suffered prejudice in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based upon three distinct claims of error. Specifically, Defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective because he (1) failed to ask for a bill of particulars, (2) failed to object to the State‘s requests for extensions of trial dates, thereby violating Defendant‘s right to a speedy trial; and (3) failed to challenge the numbеr of counts in the indictment.
In addition to holding that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant requests that we review the foregoing three issues for fundamental error because the issues were not preserved in the district court. See
A. Bill of Particulars
Defendant‘s first claim of error, that his counsel did not ask for a bill of particulars, is unsupported by any argument to show (1) hоw his counsel‘s failure to request a bill of particulars fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or (2) how he was prejudiced by the failure. See Aker, 2005-NMCA-063, 34 (stating what is required to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). Nor has he shown, under а fundamental error standard, how this alleged error on behalf of his counsel led to a “miscarriage of justice.” Gonzales, 112 N.M. at 548, 817 P.2d at 1190 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Defendant has failed to develop an argument with regard to this issue, we will not consider it further. Sеe State v. Gonzales, 2011-NMCA-007, 19, 149 N.M. 226, 247 P.3d 1111 (“[T]his Court has no duty to review an argument that is not adequately developed.“).
B. Speedy Trial
Defendant‘s second ineffective assistance of counsel claim relates to an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. Defendant‘s argument in this regard has three sub-points. First, Defendant argues that because his counsel did not object to any of
Examining Defendant‘s three speedy trial arguments under the framework of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we note that even were we to assume that the various purported failures of his counsel “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness[,]” Defendant nevertheless fails to show that there was a reasonable probability that “but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Aker, 2005-NMCA-063, 34 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With the exceptions of his unsupported claim that the delay
To the extent that Defendant argues, pursuant to Garza, that the thirty-six-month delay in bringing his case to trial established prejudice, we are not persuaded. See 2009-NMSC-038, 48. In Garza, our Supreme Court “abolish[ed] the presumption that a defendant‘s right to a speedy trial has been violated based solely on the threshold determination that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial.” Id. 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court explained that the “length of delay is simply a triggering mechanism, requiring further inquiry” into the remaining speedy trial factors. Id. Defendant has not made any persuasive argument concerning that reаsons for the delay, the assertion of the right to a speedy trial, the prejudice that he suffered as a result of the delay, or how, on balance, these factors weigh in his favor. See id. 25-27, 31-33, 35-36, 38-39 (discussing the factors relevant to the
C. Challenge to the Indictment
Defendant‘s third sub-point under his broad claim of ineffective assistance of counsel appears to be a claim that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to challenge the State‘s having charged Defendant with one count of ongoing criminal sexual conduct against each of the victims. As a foundation for his argument, Defendant lists the nine factors set out by this Court in State v. Baldonado, 1998-NMCA-040, 26-27, 124 N.M. 745, 955 P.2d 214, which are used to review “whether an indictment is reasonably particular with resрect to the time of the offense.”
Defendant contends that “[b]ecause the [victims] could not put Defendant‘s conduct in any specific time frame, and the prosecution failed to establish any time related reference points, the better practice would be for the prosecution to have charged Defendant with one count each of ongoing criminal sexual conduct against
In sum, Defendant has not shown that his counsel‘s performаnce was so deficient that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness[,]” nor has he provided any argument as to how, but for the errors he claims were committed by his counsel, the outcome of his trial “would have been different.” Aker, 2005-NMCA-063, 34 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nor, as related to any of the three distinct sub-points, has Defendant shown any basis in fundamental error upon which his convictions should be reversed. See State v. Archuleta, 2012-NMCA-007, 13, 148 N.M. 501, 269 P.3d 924 (“Fundamental error occurs only in cases with defendants who are indisputably innocent[] and cases in which a mistake in the process makes a conviction fundamentally unfair notwithstanding the apparent guilt of the accused.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
We further note that Defendant argues that “it is incumbent on this Court to presume [Defendant‘s counsel] was ineffective” because disciplinary actions had been taken against him in 1987 and in 2010. The disciplinary actions against Defendant‘s counsel do not make up any part of the record in this case. See In re Aaron L., 2000-NMCA-024, 27, 128 N.M. 641, 996 P.2d 431 (“This Court will not consider and counsel should not refer to matters not of record in their briefs.“). And Defendant provides no authority to support his assertion that disciplinary actions against counsel establish a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel. See In re Adoption of Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984) (stating that an appellate court will not consider an issue if no authority is cited in support of the issue and will assume that no such authority exists). As such, Defendant‘s reference to the disciplinary actions against his counsel provide no basis for a determination, in this case, of ineffective assistance of counsel. Wе turn now to Defendant‘s argument that his constitutional rights to due process and freedom from double jeopardy were violated.
Defendant claims that the State‘s charging periods failed to provide reasonable notice of the charges against him, causing him “tо be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense, thereby violating his due process rights[.]” Defendant concedes that the due process issue was not raised below, thus the issue was not preserved for our review. “Due process claims will not be addressed when rаised for the first time on appeal.” State v. Martinez, 2007-NMCA-160, 4, 143 N.M. 96, 173 P.3d 18. We therefore limit our analysis to the issue of Defendant‘s double jeopardy claim which, notwithstanding lack of preservation, may be raised on appeal. Id. 5. The issue of double jeopardy involves a constitutional questiоn, which we review de novo. State v. Ford, 2007-NMCA-052, 7, 141 N.M. 512, 157 P.3d 77.
Defendant claims that “[w]ithout some specific time element, the accused is ... subject to double jeopardy.” This assertion, unsupported by authority or argument, is unpersuasive, and will not be considered. See State v. Gutierrez, 2012-NMCA-013, 35, 149 N.M. 482, 269 P.3d 905 (“[T]his Court will not address issues unsupported by argument and interprets Defendant‘s argument to be that the multiple-count indictment subjected him to multiple punishments for the same offense. The State counters Defendant‘s contention by arguing that his right to be free from double jeopardy was not violated because “thе counts in the indictment were factually
CONCLUSION
We affirm Defendant‘s convictions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
WE CONCUR:
CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge