OPINION
{1} On оr about February 14, 2009, Defendant was found in possession of property which the State alleged had been stolen from the home of Phillip Baca and Denise Velarde. Defendant ran from police officers, depositing a stolen watch and a syringe in a garbage bin. He was charged with burglary, possession of stolen property with a value in excess of $500, possession of drug paraphernalia, tampering with еvidence, and resisting arrest. Defendant was ultimately acquitted of both burglary and possession of drug paraphernalia, but convicted of all other charges. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the district court erred in denying his motions for a continuance and to reappoint counsel after Defendant waived his right to counsel and moved to represent himself; (2) there was insufficient evidence that Dеfendant possessed stolen property with a value in excess of $500, a fourth-degree felony and, thus, there was also insufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for tampering with evidence of a fourth-degree felony; (3) the admission of certain statements by one of the State’s witnesses constituted fundamental error and violated Defendant’s confrontation clause rights; and (4) cumulative error deprived Defendant of his right to a fair trial. For the reasons that follow, we find no error and affirm.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant’s Motions for a Continuance and to Reappoint Counsel
{2} Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motions for a continuance and to reappoint counsel. At trial, Defendant was initially represented by counsel but, on June 23,2009, Defendant requested that he he allowed to represent himself. The court conducted an extensive inquiry, advising Defendant of the potential consequences of choosing to proceed pro se. Throughout the inquiry, Defendant continually maintained that he understood the risks and that he still wished to represent himself. The district court granted his motion, finding that Defendant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel and relieved Defendant’s counsel from his representation. On the samе date, Defendant was informed that the matter was scheduled for trial on September 10, 2009.
{3} On September 9, 2009, the day before trial, Defendant moved to continue the trial, asserting that he was unprepared because he had not been able to physically see some of the stolen items to prepare his case and because he had been able to spend only approximately one hour in the detention center library since receiving additional discovery from the State approximately two weeks earlier. The court asked Defendant what specific items he needed to see, and he identified a cell phone, sunglasses, and an earring, all being items which ultimately were not used in securing Defendant’s convictions. The court asked Defendant why the inventory list and photographs that were in his possession were not sufficient, and Defendant merely maintained that he was not given full discovery because he was not able to personally see all actual items. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for a continuance and found that Defendant had not provided sufficient reasons why he was unable to be prepared for trial the next day.
{4} Immediately after Defendant’s motion to continue was deniеd, Defendant made a motion to have counsel reappointed. Defendant asserted the same arguments he made regarding his motion for a continuance, arguing that he had not had adequate time to prepare his case and that he had not received full discovery. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, stressing that Defendant was making the request the day before trial when he had already waived his right to counsel and requested to represent himself.
A. Defendant’s Motion for a Continuance
{5} The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion rests with the defendant. State v. Sanchez,
{6} Factors that a court considers when weighing the merits of a continuance request are (1) the length of the delay, (2) the likelihood that a delay would accomplish the movant’s objectives, (3) the existence of previous continuances in the same matter, (4) the degree of inconvenience to the parties and the court, (5) the legitimacy of the motives in requesting the delay, (6) the fault of the movant in causing a need for the delay, and (7) the prejudice to the movant in denying the motion. State v. Torres,
B. Defendant’s Motion to Reappoint Counsel
{7} Defendant also challenges the court’s denial of his motion to reappoint counsel. In State v. Vincent, we followed the lead of multiple out-of-state jurisdictions to hold that once a defendant has validly waived his right to counsel, he may not later demand the assistance of counsel as a matter of right.
Because [s]elf-representation is a grave undertaking, one not to be еncouraged, the request for reappointment should be granted absent reasons to deny. In some cases, however, there will be reasons to deny — for example, that the request comes on the eve of or during trial, and will delay or interrupt the trial if granted.
Canedo-Astorga,
{8} First, we now adopt the approach taken by the California Supreme Court in People v. Lawrence to provide guidance to the trial court when determining whether to grant a pro se defendant’s motion to reappoint counsel.
{9} After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Defendant’s request for reappointment of counsel, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. Here, we note that Defendant had the benefits of previously appointed counsel who assisted with his case before he movеd to represent himself. Defendant was thoroughly and adequately apprised by the district court of the inherent risks involved in self-representation before he made a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Months later, he moved to reappoint counsel on the day before trial was set to begin.
{10} The district court found that Defendant’s offered reasons to reappoint counsel were insufficient, and we agreе. It was unclear what additional assistance Defendant needed and why he felt the inventory list and photographs of the items in his possession were inadequate to allow him to prepare his defense. He did not explain or articulate why such a personal inspection of certain physical evidence seized from him at the time of arrest was needed to prepare his defense versus viewing the еvidence personally the following day at trial. Further, granting Defendant’s motion would clearly have caused substantial delay to the proceedings, as the request came on the eve of trial and would have required last minute rescheduling for the court, witnesses, and jurors who had been secured to attend the following day. The case itself was a relatively routine stolen property matter and Defendant nevеr expressed any concern regarding its nature or complexity. The dismissal of one of the original charges and the not guilty verdict rendered on one other charge further attest to Defendant’s ability to represent himself in an adequate manner. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Defendant’s request for reappointment of counsel.
{11} Defendant alternatively asks the Court to adopt the approach taken by the state of Washington in State v. Silva,
II. Denise Velarde’s Statements Regarding the Value of the Stolen Property
{12} At trial, the State called Denise Velarde, who resided in the burglarized home with her husband, Phillip Baca. Ms. Velarde testified to the items stolen from their home and the value of those items, including an iPod valuеd at $150, tennis shoes valued at $110, an internet card valued at $220, three cellular phone chargers valued at $25 each, and a watch valued at $100. The State also entered into evidence photographs of the stolen items which were taken by Phillip Baca prior to the burglary. When testifying about the watch, Ms. Velarde stated that she knew how much it was worth because her husband told her the value. Defendant argues on appeal that the admission ofMs. Velarde’s testimony violated Defendant’s confrontation clause rights because Ms. Velarde’s statement regarding the watch’s value constituted inadmissible hearsay, and she otherwise did not indicate how she had personal knowledge of the other items’ values.
{13} We note that Defendant failed to preserve the confrontation and personal knowledge issues in the district court. Because Defendant never objected to the admission of the statements below, we only review the statements to determine whether their admission created fundamental error. State v. Cunningham,
{14} In this case, the admission of Ms. Velarde’s testimony was not fundamental error. We note that even if Ms. Velarde’s statement regarding the watch’s value should have been excluded as hearsay, the value of the other items admitted into evidеnce still totaled more than the $500 threshold amount. Because there was sufficient additional evidence for a jury to find Defendant guilty, we find no fundamental error. See State v. Rodriguez,
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence of the Value of Stolen Property
{15} Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to result in his conviction for fourth-degree receiving stolen property and for tampering with evidence. Our review of a sufficiency of the evidence question involves a two-step process. See State v. Apodaca,
{16} To convict Defendant of fourth-degree receiving stolen property, the State was required to prove that: (1) the iPod, wireless internet card, Pittsburgh Steelers watch, Jordan tennis shoes, and phone chargеrs had been stolen; (2) Defendant kept this property; (3) at the time Defendant kept the property, he knew or believed it had been stolen; (4) the property had a market value of over $500; and (5) this happened in New Mexico on or about February 14, 2009. The jury was further instructed that market value means the price at which the property could ordinarily be bought or sold at the time of the alleged receipt of stolen goods. Defendant challenges only whether the State sufficiently proved that the market value of the items possessed exceeded $500.
{17} We find no basis in the record to support Defendant’s argument that Ms. Velarde only testified to the purchase price of the items, not their market value. Ms. Velarde did, in reference to the tennis shoes and wireless internet card, indicate that she knew the value of the items because she and her husband “bought them.” Ms. Velarde testified that the tennis shoes were purchased only a week and a half prior to the burglary, and that the internet card was purchased from her husband’s workplace. As to the other items, Ms. Velarde was questioned, without objection, as to the “value” of the items. The relationship between the market value and purchase price of these items was never disputed by Defendant or explored further with Ms. Velarde. In the light most favorable to the verdict, Ms. Velarde’s testimony of the value of the stolen items, particularly when coupled with photographic and physical exhibits of the items entered into evidence at trial, was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the market value of the items possessed by Defendant exceeded $500. It is well settled that an owner оf personal property may testify concerning the value of the property and that such testimony is sufficient to support a jury’s determination of value. State v. Dominguez,
{18} Defendant also argues that because there was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant of fourth-degree receiving stolen property, there is also insufficient evidence to convict Defendant of tampering with evidence, another fourth-degree felony. Because we have rejected Defendant’s argument holding that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for possession of stolen property, we also rejeсt Defendant’s identical arguments that there was insufficient evidence of tampering with evidence.
IV. Cumulative Error
{19} Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the various alleged errors outlined above, including Ms. Velarde’s testimony regarding the value of the stolen property and the court’s denial of his motions to continue and to reappoint counsel, denied Defendant a fair trial. “The doctrine of cumulative еrror requires reversal when a series of lesser improprieties throughout a trial are found; in aggregate, to be so prejudicial that the defendant was deprived of the constitutional right to a fair trial.” State v. Duffy,
CONCLUSION
{20} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s convictions.
{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: