State v. GlynnState v. Glynn
PER CURIAM:
{¶ 1} Jared Michael Glynn appeals the trial court’s June 9, 2020 Decision finding him competent to stand trial. The underlying criminal matter is ongoing and not yet complete.
{¶ 2} The State of Ohio filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as arising from an order that is not final and appealable. Glynn filed a response; the State filed a reply. Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments and the relevant case law in Ohio, we SUSTAIN the motion to dismiss.
{¶ 4} Generally, a final appealable order arises in a criminal case only after a final conviction and sentence have been entered by the trial court and journalized by the clerk. See State v. Gilbert, 143 Ohio St.3d 150, 2014-Ohio-4562, 35 N.E.3d 493, ¶ 8. However, some other orders may be considered final and appealable before a case has been resolved where the order satisfies one of the statutory definitions. See State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 8 (“[I]n order to decide whether an order issued by a trial court in a criminal proceeding is a reviewable final order, appellate courts should apply the definitions of ‘final order’ contained in
{¶ 5} For example, as relevant here, “an order finding a criminal defendant incompetent to stand trial and committing the defendant to an institution for the restoration of mental competency is a final, appealable order under
{¶ 7} Here, we agree with Glynn that the trial court’s Order finding him competent to stand trial was entered in an ancillary proceeding that fits within the definition of a provisional remedy in
{¶ 8} The parties’ dispute here is over the third requirement, which asks whether “a delay in review of the order until after final judgment would deprive the appellant of any meaningful or effective relief.” Upshaw at ¶ 15;
the final appealable order decision in the present case must rest upon whether there would be an effective remedy by appeal following adjudication of the entire case. The potential loss of a meaningful or effective remedy associated with an incompetency finding as in Upshaw would simply not exist in cases where there is a competency finding. An incompetency finding would be
followed by a commitment until a competency finding is made in order for the trial to proceed. The time spent in a treatment facility waiting to be found competent to stand trial cannot be recouped. In contrast, when a party is declared competent to stand trial, the trial proceeds to final disposition, and an appeal may follow. Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, we find that a competency finding is a provisional remedy. However, such finding does not meet [
R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) ] since appellant will have a meaningful and effective remedy by way of appeal after the case is completely resolved in the trial court. Therefore, we conclude that the order finding appellant competent to stand trial is not a final appealable order.
In re J.W. at ¶ 14-15. This court and others have held similarly. See, e.g., State v. Demmons, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28711 (March 20, 2020); Shine, supra; Eyajan, supra; State v. Blankenship, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2019-A-0018, 2019-Ohio-1304; In re E.H., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-680, 2016-Ohio-1186, ¶ 15-17.
{¶ 9} The State points to several of these cases in support of its motion to dismiss. Glynn does not point to any cases holding that a competency finding is immediately appealable. Glynn instead analogizes his right not to stand trial if incompetent to the double jeopardy right protected in State v. Anderson, 138 Ohio St.3d 264, 2014-Ohio-542, 6 N.E.3d 23. In Anderson, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the denial of motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was a final appealable order under
{¶ 10} While there may be similarities between the right at issue here and in Anderson, the weight of authority in Ohio holds that a defendant found competent does have an meaningful remedy in an appeal after trial, as discussed above. We therefore hold in accordance with these authorities and conclude that the order on appeal here is not a final appealable order that this court can review at this time. Without a final order, we lack jurisdiction to proceed. Gen. Acc. at 20. We accordingly SUSTAIN the State’s motion to dismiss. This matter, Montgomery Appellate Case No. 28824, is DISMISSED.
{¶ 11} Pursuant to
SO ORDERED.
MICHAEL L. TUCKER, Presiding Judge
MICHAEL T. HALL, Judge
JEFFREY M. WELBAUM, Judge
Copies to:
Christian Cavalier
P.O. Box 10126
Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Appellant
Sarah Hutnik
301 W. Third Street, 5th Floor
Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Appellee
Hon. Mary L. Wiseman
Montgomery County Common Pleas Court
41 N. Perry Street
P.O. Box 972
Dayton, Ohio 45422
CA3/KY