STATE OF OHIO v. MATTHEW GLAZE
C.A. No. 18CA011289
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
January 13, 2020
2020-Ohio-53
CARR, Presiding Judge.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO CASE No. 16CR095318
Dated: January 13, 2020
CARR, Presiding Judge.
{1} Appellant, Matthew Glaze, appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{2} The unfortunate circumstances of this case arise out of a traffic accident that occurred in Amherst Township on the morning of July 2, 2016. As Glaze was entering an intersection while driving his Chevy Suburban, he struck a Chevy Cruze containing three women. The Chevy Cruze then collided with a van stopped at the intersection. Two passengers in the Chevy Cruze died as a result of the accident. The driver of the Chevy Cruze and the driver of the van suffered injuries.
{3} On December 8, 2016, the Lorain County Grand Jury returned a 13-count indictment against Glaze. Glaze was charged with four counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, one count of aggravated vehicular assault, one count of vehicular assault, one count of tampering
{4} The matter proceeded to a jury trial where Glaze was found guilty of all the charges against him. After determining that a number of the counts were allied offenses, the trial court imposed a total prison sentence of 14 years.
{5} On appeal, Glaze raises five assignments of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE IS AGAINST THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE CONVICTIONS ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{6} In his first assignment of error, Glaze contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide. In his second assignment of error, Glaze contends that his convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide were against the weight of the evidence. This Court disagrees with both assertions.
Sufficiency Challenge
{8} Glaze challenges his convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide to the extent that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he acted recklessly.1
{9} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279 (1991).
An appellate court‘s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{10} At trial, the State presented evidence supporting the following narrative. On the morning of July 2, 2016, Glaze was involved in a car accident at the intersection of State Route 113 and State Route 58 in Amherst Township. Glaze was driving a Chevy Suburban when he drove into the back of a Chevy Cruze that was stopped at the intersection. The Chevy Cruze contained three women. L.V. was driving the sedan while I.C. and M.M. were passengers. After being struck from behind by the Suburban, the Chevy Cruze collided with a van driven by R.T. I.C. and M.M. died as a result of the accident. L.V. and R.T. sustained injuries.
{11} Ryon Berkel observed Glaze driving westbound on State Route 113 just prior to the accident. As Berkel was preparing to exit his driveway, he saw Glaze approaching at a high rate of speed. Berkel testified that Glaze‘s vehicle was “going left of center as it was approaching me. That‘s what made me hesitate.” Berkel further testified that in addition to veering outside of his lane, Glaze was “hauling ass[,]” traveling at an estimated speed of 70-75 miles per hour on road with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour.2 Berkel observed that Glaze was not in a normal driving position. Instead, Glaze had a “slouched look” and “was up on top of the wheel.” Berkel saw “parts flying everywhere” when Glaze collided with another vehicle as he entered the intersection of State Route 113 and State Route 58. Berkel could not recall seeing the Suburban‘s brake lights prior to the crash.
{13} In recalling the incident, L.V. testified that she pulled into the left turn lane on State Route 113 as she prepared to turn onto State Route 58. There was a red light and L.V. came to a complete stop behind the van driven by R.T. L.V. did not remember the details of the accident, only that she was laughing with her friends before she suddenly “saw black.” When L.V. was taken to an ambulance at the scene, she observed the damage to the back end of her vehicle and passed out.
{14} First responders arrived on the scene immediately after the accident. Konkiel notified Officer Matthew Gramlich that Glaze had thrown something into the bushes. Thereafter, law enforcement discovered a pipe in that area that tested positive for cocaine.
{15} Glaze was transported to the hospital where urine and blood samples were collected. Dr. Gabrielle Morris, a neurological surgeon, examined Glaze in the emergency room. Glaze‘s urine tested positive for cocaine, opiates, and benzodiazepines. The blood tests were negative for illegal substances. Dr. Morris concluded that Glaze had a “polypharmacy induced altered mental state” based on the urine test results. While Dr. Morris did diagnose Glaze with a concussion, she emphasized that, “in the setting of a positive tox screen and a negative CT [scan,]” Glaze‘s altered mental state could only have been caused by polypharmacy, not a concussion. The State‘s toxicology expert, Dr. John Wyman, testified that a euphoric high from cocaine lasts for a relatively short period of time. The period of euphoria can be followed by a period of dysphoria where the user experiences a crash, characterized by discomfort, fatigue, and agitation. Dr. Wyman noted that the blood sample in this case was collected two and a half hours after the accident. Dr. Wyman testified cocaine will only appear in the blood samples for a short period of time before the body metabolizes the substance and turns it into benzoylecgonine, which would appear in a urine sample for a longer period of time.
{17} The crux of Glaze‘s argument on appeal is that the State failed to demonstrate that he acted recklessly because there was no evidence that he was under the influence at the time of the incident. Glaze emphasizes that while his blood test showed no signs of drugs, his urine tested positive for cocaine. Glaze contends that “[i]t is clear that any ingested cocaine was already through the blood, metabolized, and in the urine[,]” meaning that “[t]here [was] no reckless conduct because there was no intoxication as the drug was in the metabolized waste form.” Glaze further points to his own medical history, noting that he has dealt with syncope and that he has a prescription to take opiates.
{18} Glaze‘s sufficiency challenge is without merit. We remain mindful that we must construe the evidence in favor of the State when resolving a sufficiency challenge. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 279. The State presented evidence that, at the time of the deadly collision, Glaze was driving a Suburban at an excessive rate of speed and was weaving in and out of his lane.
{19} The first assignment of error is overruled.
Manifest Weight Challenge
{20} Glaze‘s manifest weight challenge also focuses on whether he acted recklessly. Glaze renews his position that his “body had already metabolized the cocaine and the State‘s own expert testified that once the cocaine is metabolized, the high would be gone.” Glaze further argues that he suffered a concussion during the crash, which could explain the symptoms he displayed as well as his poor performance on field sobriety tests. Finally, Glaze emphasizes that he suffers from a number of medical conditions, including syncopal episodes, which law enforcement would not have been qualified to detect immediately following the accident.
In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the fact[-]finder‘s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). An appellate court should exercise the power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional cases. Otten at 340.
{22} Glaze‘s manifest weight challenge is without merit. Glaze correctly notes that the State‘s toxicology expert, Dr. Wyman, testified that once someone‘s body metabolizes cocaine, the euphoric high is gone. However, Dr. Wyman further testified that the period of euphoria can be followed by a period of “dysphoria and depression[.]” Dr. Wyman indicated that based upon his review of the reports in this matter, it appeared Glaze was behaving in a manner consistent with opioid impairment after the crash. Moreover, while Glaze contends that his altered mental state may have been due to a concussion, Dr. Morris concluded that his altered mental state was due to polypharmacy. Dr. Morris specifically observed that while Glaze had a concussion, “[h]e did not have any brain injury that required admission, observation, or any further care.” Though Glaze further contends that law enforcement was not qualified to understand his various medical ailments, including syncopal episodes, the State presented ample evidence, independent of the
Conclusion
{23} As Glaze‘s convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the weight of the evidence, Glaze‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE STATE COULD PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY AT TRIAL OF THE DYSPHORIC AFFECTS OF COCAINE AS IT RELATES TO ACCIDENTS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS UNRELIABLE.
{24} In his third assignment of error, Glaze contends that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Wyman to testify because the State failed to demonstrate that his testimony regarding the dysphoric effects of cocaine was reliable. Glaze maintains that the trial court‘s analysis fell short of the reliability standard set forth in
{25} This Court reviews the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. Wade v. Mancuso, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 16CA010978, 2018-Ohio-1563, ¶ 37. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{26}
A witness may testify as an expert if all of the following apply:
(A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception common among lay persons;
(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the testimony; (C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized information. To the extent that the testimony reports the result of a procedure, test, or experiment, the testimony is reliable only if all of the following apply:
(1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is based is objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widely accepted knowledge, facts, or principles;
(2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliably implements the theory;
(3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in a way that will yield an accurate result.
{27} “In evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence, several factors are to be considered: (1) whether the theory or technique has been tested, (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review, (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error, and (4) whether the methodology has gained general acceptance.” State v. Schmidt, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 13CA010499, 2015-Ohio-146, ¶ 9, quoting Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 611 (1998), citing Daubert at 593-594. “A trial court‘s role in determining whether an expert‘s testimony is admissible under
{28} After the State gave notice of its intent to call Dr. Wyman as an expert witness, Glaze filed a request for a Daubert hearing to establish the reliability of Dr. Wyman‘s testimony. The matter proceeded to a hearing.
{29} At the outset of the hearing, the trial court noted that the scope would be “the limited issue of dysphoria with cocaine.” Dr. Wyman testified that he has a doctoral degree in
{30} In addition to opining that Glaze was under the influence of opioids at the time he was driving, Dr. Wyman inferred that Glaze may have been experiencing dysphoria related to his cocaine use. This inference was based on the fact that while there was evidence that Glaze had used cocaine, the cocaine was no longer present in Glaze‘s blood. Dr. Wyman explained that “when you‘ve used cocaine, initially you have euphoria, but after it‘s metabolized it reverts to a state of dysphoria.” In elaborating, Dr. Wyman explained that, as a central nervous system stimulant, cocaine causes neurotransmitters to be released into the body resulting in effects that last for a relatively brief period of time. When the body metabolizes the cocaine and it leaves the blood, the user will experience dysphoria, or a “crash[.]” In a state of dysphoria, the user is “extremely uncomfortable[]” and can experience fatigue, drowsiness, paranoia, and anxiousness. Based on the reports he reviewed, Dr. Wyman concluded that Glaze may have been suffering from dysphoria associated with cocaine use and that Glaze was likely impaired at the time of the accident due to opioid exposure.
{32} Following the hearing, the trial court issued a journal entry noting that the stipulated purpose of the hearing was to determine if Dr. Wyman‘s testimony regarding the dysphoric effects of cocaine was reliable. The trial court ultimately concluded that the “dysphoria associated with cocaine use is well known and accepted in the scientific community” and that Dr. Wyman‘s testimony was based on reliable scientific, technical, and specialized information.
{33} On appeal, Glaze contends that the trial court‘s analysis failed to meet the reliability standard set forth in Daubert and
{34} To the extent that Glaze contends that the trial court disregarded the Daubert standards, “the test of scientific reliability is a flexible one, and the factors outlined in Daubert ‘neither necessarily nor exclusively app[ly] to all experts or in every case.‘” State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27132, 27200, 27133, 27158, 2015-Ohio-5246, ¶ 74, quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). A trial court has “considerable leeway” in determining how to evaluate the reliability of an expert‘s testimony. Jackson at ¶ 74, quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. at 152.
{35} In this case, the trial court pressed the State on the requirements of
{36} The third assignment of error is overruled.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SENTENCING APPELLANT TO TWO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2929.14.
{37} In his fourth assignment of error, Glaze contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to consecutive sentences. This Court disagrees.
{38} Glaze‘s argument focuses on the first three counts in the indictment. With respect to count one, Glaze was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide in relation to the death of M.M. and sentenced to a mandatory term of six years in prison. As to count two, Glaze was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide in relation to the death of I.C. and sentenced to a mandatory term of six years in prison. In regard to count three, Glaze was convicted of aggravated vehicular assault in relation to L.V. and sentenced to a mandatory term of two years in prison. The trial court ordered that the sentences for count one, count two, and count three were to be served consecutively for a total prison sentence of 14 years.
{39}
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct. (c) The offender‘s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{40} The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bonnell held that, “[i]n order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is required to make the findings mandated by
{41} Glaze does not dispute that the trial court made a finding under
{42} “As long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” State v. Kilmire, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27319, 27320, 2015-Ohio-665, ¶ 16, quoting Bonnell at ¶ 29.
{43} Given the record before us, we can only conclude that Glaze‘s argument is without merit. “When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court must state the required findings as part of the sentencing hearing[; h]owever, a word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute is not required[.]” Id. Here, the trial court made findings pursuant to
{44} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING, CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS, WHICH ARE DISPROPORTIONATE WITH THE SENTENCES IMPOSED ON SIMILAR DEFENDANTS.
{45} In his fifth assignment of error, Glaze contends that the length of his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Glaze points to two other defendants who were recently sentenced for aggravated vehicle homicide in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas and maintains that the sentence he received was grossly disproportionate to the sentences handed down in those cases. This Court disagrees.
{46} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, “[a]s a general rule, a sentence that falls within the terms of a valid statute cannot amount to cruel and unusual punishment.”
III.
{47} Glaze‘s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, J.
SCHAFER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
GIOVANNA V. BREMKE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and LINDSEY C. POPROCKI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.