State v. FenterState v. Fenter
Appeal from Paulding County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR-19-637
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: September 19, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Brian A. Smith for Appellant
Joseph R. Burkard for Appellee
{1} Defendant-appellant, Samantha C. Fenter, appeals the December 7, 2021 judgment of the Paulding County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{2} In the early hours of November 12, 2019, Sergeant Ron McCabe and Deputy Cierra Moran, law enforcement officers with the Paulding County Sheriff‘s Office, arrived at a residence in Melrose, Ohio to execute felony arrest warrants for Fenter and her partner, Lauro Sanchez. The deputies encountered Sanchez on the front porch of the residence and began to take him into custody. Fenter came out of the residence onto the porch. When the deputies advised Fenter she too was being arrested for an outstanding arrest warrant and ordered her to turn around to be handcuffed, Fenter ran back into the house. Sergeant McCabe pursued Fenter approximately 30 feet inside the residence where he arrested her. While in pursuit of Fenter, Sergeant McCabe observed her toss a plastic baggie onto the floor in the house. The baggie was subsequently determined to contain methamphetamine.
{3} On December 12, 2019, the Paulding County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Fenter with a single count of possession of methamphetamine in violation of
{5} On November 30, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Fenter‘s motion to suppress. On April 22, 2021, the trial court filed a judgment entry denying Fenter‘s motion to suppress. On August 11, 2021, the trial court issued a supplemental judgment entry further explaining its reasoning for its denial of Fenter‘s motion to suppress. The trial court‘s additional journal entry specifically rebuffed Fenter‘s argument that her arrest was unlawful because the deputies entered the residence without a search warrant.
{6} On October 28, 2021, Fenter appeared for a change-of-plea hearing. Under a negotiated plea agreement, Fenter withdrew her plea of not guilty and entered a no contest plea to the count in the indictment. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend that Fenter be sentenced to community-control sanctions. The trial court accepted Fenter‘s no contest plea and found her guilty of the charge in
{7} At the sentencing hearing held on December 6, 2021, the trial court sentenced Fenter to 33 days of local incarceration with credit for 33 days previously served and imposed community-control sanctions. The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on December 7, 2021.
{8} On January 6, 2022, Fenter filed a notice of appeal. She raises two assignments of error which we address together.
Assignment of Error No. I
Because the trial court incorrectly applied the legal standard in Appellant‘s case, the trial court erred in denying Appellant‘s Motion to Suppress, in violation of Appellant‘s right to be informed of the nature of the charge against her, as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
Assignment of Error No. II
Because the trial court incorrectly applied the legal standard in Appellant‘s case, the trial court erred in denying Appellant‘s Motion to Suppress, in violation of Appellant‘s right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.
{9} Both of Fenter‘s assignments of error allege that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, Fenter argues that the trial court erred in two respects when it denied her motion to suppress evidence. First,
{10} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court‘s conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
{11} The Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides, in pertinent part that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
{12} Specifically, Fenter argues that the execution of the arrest warrant was illegal because the deputies did not inform her of the nature of the charges against her in conformity with
Except as provided in [Crim.R. 4(A)(2)], warrants shall be executed by the arrest of the defendant. The officer need not have the warrant in the officer‘s possession at the time of the arrest. In such case, the officer shall inform the defendant of the offense charged and of the fact that the warrant has been issued. A copy of the warrant shall be given to the defendant as soon as possible.
{13} Fenter alleges that her arrest ran afoul of the Sixth Amendment because the arresting officers did not immediately inform her of the nature of the charges against her. Accordingly, Fenter alleges that the methamphetamine recovered at the scene of her arrest and which forms the basis for the underlying charge, was fruit of the poisonous tree.
{14} The evidence presented at the suppression hearing is largely undisputed and is corroborated by the deputies’ body camera footage of the
{15} Shortly thereafter, Sergeant McCabe informed Fenter that he also had a warrant for her arrest and instructed her to turn around to be handcuffed. Rather than complying, Fenter, who was standing on the porch, immediately ran into the residence through the open door and was pursued by Sergeant McCabe. As Sergeant McCabe followed Fenter through the residence, he observed her remove a small plastic baggie from her person and throw it on the floor. Later, Sergeant McCabe collected the plastic baggie which was subsequently determined to contain methamphetamine.
{17} Deputy Moran‘s body camera footage indicates that Fenter was informed that she was being arrested due to a “pick up order on a Grand Jury Indictment” at the timestamp 2:55, within two minutes of the commencement of the arrest. Moreover, Deputy Moran informed Fenter that she was being arrested for possession of methamphetamine at timestamp 3:08. Fenter was therefore informed of the nature of the charge 15 minutes after the commencement of law enforcement contact.
{18} Accordingly, upon review of the record, we do not find that Fenter‘s arrest violated her right to be informed of the nature of the accusations against her pursuant to the
{20} Fenter‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{22} “The
{24} “The exigent or emergency circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies in a variety of situations, including when entry into a building is necessary to protect or preserve life, to prevent physical harm to persons or property, or to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence, or when officers are in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect or someone inside poses a danger to the police officer‘s safety.” Byrd, ¶ 13.
{25} “The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect is among the recognized situations in which exigent circumstances exist.” State v. Lowe, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2014-A-0010, 2015-Ohio-1064, ¶ 29, citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299, 87 S.Ct. 1642 (1967). In United States v. Santana, which was decided nearly a decade later, the defendant, was initially confronted by the police on her front porch, a public space, retreated into the residence in an effort to avoid the arrest. U.S. v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406 (1976). The United States Supreme Court held that the police, having probable cause to arrest the defendant, could not be thwarted in that effort by the defendant‘s retreat into her residence, a private place. In so deciding, the Supreme Court held that a defendant “may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place * * * by the expedient of escaping to a private place,” including a home, notwithstanding the general prohibition against warrantless entry into a residence. Id. at 43.
{26} In the instant case the deputies had a warrant for Fenter‘s arrest on a felony drug-possession charge. The body camera footage of the encounter indicates that Fenter was standing on the porch, near the open doorway of a private residence, when deputies informed her there was a warrant for her arrest. Rather than complying when the deputies instructed her to turn around to be handcuffed, Fenter immediately fled into the open door of the residence in an effort to avoid arrest and divest herself of the methamphetamine she had on her person. Fenter was placed under arrest after traveling approximately 30 feet into the residence. Accordingly, deputies were in hot pursuit of Fenter when they entered the residence. “It is well established that a warrantless entry is justified under exigent circumstances where there is imminent danger that evidence will be lost or destroyed if a search is not immediately conducted.” State v. Garrett, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27630, 2018-Ohio-4530, ¶ 36. Once Fenter was informed that there was a warrant for her arrest
{27} Nevertheless, Fenter argues that the hot-pursuit exception to the warrant requirement does not apply because, according to Fenter, the police created the exigent circumstances by attempting to carry out an unlawful arrest. Fenter contends that “by failing to inform her of the charge for which she was being arrested, the deputies created the exigency.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 11). Fenter further alleges that “[h]ad the deputies properly informed [her] of [nature of] the charge for which she was being arrested, Fenter would have fully cooperated and submitted to deputies immediately, and the deputies would not have needed to pursue her through the residence.” (Id.). We disagree.
{28} To the extent that Fenter argues that she was justified in fleeing from the deputies because they were attempting to execute the arrest warrant in an
{29} Fenter‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{30} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Paulding County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
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