STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. QUINTEL L. ESTELLE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 1-20-50
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY
August 2, 2021
[Cite as State v. Estelle, 2021-Ohio-2636.]
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court, Trial Court No. CR2019 0217, Judgment Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
Laurel A. Kendall for Appellant
Jana E. Emerick for
MILLER, J.
{1} Defendant-appellant, Quintel L. Estelle, appeals the October 5, 2020 judgment of sentence of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{2} On May 4, 2019, Estelle and his stepson, A.H., were at Estelle‘s house in Lima, Ohio when they got into an argument over A.H.‘s refusal to wash dishes. The argument became physical. A.H. testified that Estelle “grabbed [him] and [they] tussl[ed] and then [he] slipped and fell and [Estelle] * * * got on top of [him] and put his forearm on [his] jaw.” (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 160). Estelle testified that he merely “secured [A.H.‘s] person” in an effort to prevent A.H. from leaving the house, and while he stated that he and A.H. fell to the ground, he denied placing his forearm across A.H.‘s jaw. (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 493-494). Regardless, when the physical altercation ended, A.H. was incensed. A.H. placed a phone call to Donald Smith, whom A.H. regarded as his father, to tell Smith that Estelle had “put his hands on [him] again.” (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 163).
{3} Within minutes, Smith arrived and parked his vehicle in the street in front of Estelle‘s house. By the time Smith arrived, a small group of people had gathered in front of Estelle‘s house. In addition to Estelle and A.H., this group included Latavia Estelle, who is Estelle‘s wife and A.H.‘s mother. As Latavia was attempting to deescalate the conflict between Estelle and A.H., Smith exited his vehicle and strode across the front yard toward Estelle. Estelle and Smith exchanged a few words as Smith approached. When Smith reached Estelle, Smith punched Estelle once in the face. The force of the punch caused Estelle, who was standing either on the bottommost of the steps leading up to his covered front porch or just in front of the steps, to fall backward onto the steps. After stumbling backward, Estelle stood up immediately, mounted the steps, and ran into his house. Meanwhile, Smith proceeded
{4} After Estelle retreated into his house, Estelle remained there for anywhere from “a minute, a minute and a half, half a minute” up to “at least two/three minutes.” (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 315, 467). When Estelle eventually emerged from his house, he was armed with a handgun. According to Estelle, he retrieved the handgun from his bedroom because he “was frightened after [Smith] had punched [him] and [Smith] was arguing with [Latavia] still outside.” (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 512).
{5} After exiting his house, Estelle descended the front porch steps and walked across the front yard toward Smith, who was still standing in the street near his vehicle talking to the 911 operator. Estelle claimed it was not his intention to hurt Smith and that he “just was trying to scare him to let him know, ‘you need to just leave so this don‘t need to go any further.‘” (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 502). Estelle stated that when he reached the “tree lawn,” the strip of grass between the public sidewalk and the street, he observed Smith duck behind his vehicle. Estelle testified that he “really panicked” when Smith ducked because he feared that Smith might be retrieving a gun. (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 502). However, Smith did not have a gun, and no other witness testified to seeing Smith duck behind his vehicle.
{6} According to Estelle, after Smith “rose up” from behind his vehicle, he fired a shot at Smith. (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 502). The bullet struck Smith. Estelle testified that after he fired the first shot at Smith, Smith “stumbled towards * * * around the door area,” which caused Estelle to “fire[] a second shot because [he] thought [Smith] was * * * still raising up or something.” (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 503). The second bullet also struck Smith. While Estelle insisted that he fired the second shot from approximately the same position on the tree lawn that he occupied when he fired the first shot, other witnesses testified that after firing the first shot, Estelle left the tree lawn, walked into the street, circled around the front of Smith‘s vehicle, and stood over Smith as he shot him again. In addition, some witnesses recalled Estelle telling Smith something to the effect of, “I bet you won‘t put your fucking hands on me again,” when he shot Smith for the second time. (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 295, 317).
{7} Law enforcement officers were already en route to Estelle‘s house in response to Smith‘s 911 call. Once they arrived, the responding officers administered CPR until paramedics arrived. Unfortunately, efforts to save Smith proved unsuccessful, and Smith died just before 10:00 p.m. Estelle, who fled the scene of the shooting before the responding officers arrived, remained at large for six days until he turned himself in to the Lima Police Department.
{8} On June 13, 2019, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Estelle on one count of purposeful murder in violation of
{10} The sentencing hearing was held on October 5, 2020. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court determined the two counts of murder merged for purposes of sentencing. The State elected to have the trial court sentence Estelle for felony murder as well as for its associated firearm specification. The trial court sentenced Estelle to a mandatory term of 15 years to life in prison for his felony-murder conviction and a mandatory term of 3 years in prison for the accompanying firearm specification. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively for an aggregate term of 18 years to life in prison. The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on October 5, 2020.
{11} On October 29, 2020, Estelle timely filed a notice of appeal. He raises four assignments of error for our review.
II. Assignments of Error
- The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant‘s request for a jury instruction on self-defense.
- In the alternative, the trial court abused its discretion when it refused Appellant‘s request for jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as an inferior offense to purposeful murder.
- Appellant‘s conviction for purposeful murder was not supported by sufficient evidence of a specific intent to kill.
- Appellant‘s conviction for murder was against the manifest weight of the evidence as to the element of intent.
We will address Estelle‘s assignments of error in the order presented, but for ease of discussion, we will consider Estelle‘s first and second assignments of error together. We will also consider Estelle‘s third and fourth assignments of error jointly.
III. Discussion
A. First and Second Assignments of Error: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to instruct the jury on self-defense or voluntary manslaughter?
{12} In his first and second assignments of error, Estelle argues the trial court erred by declining to issue his requested jury instructions. In his first assignment of error, Estelle maintains the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense because the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to submit the issue of self-defense to the jury. In making this argument, Estelle focuses particularly on where the confrontation with Smith occurred and how the location of the confrontation affected his right to defend himself against Smith. Estelle contends that “because the initial confrontation occurred on the covered front porch of his house, which is arguably part of the residence pursuant to statute, and because the events herein were arguably one continuous event, * * * [he] had no duty to retreat because this event started in his residence.” According to Estelle, because the confrontation started in his residence and there was evidence supporting the other elements of self-defense, the jury should have been instructed
i. Standard of Review
{13} “Trial courts have a responsibility to give all jury instructions that are relevant and necessary for the jury to properly weigh the evidence and perform its duty as the factfinder.” State v. Shine-Johnson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-194, 2018-Ohio-3347, ¶ 25. “Requested jury instructions should ordinarily be given if they are correct statements of law, if they are applicable to the facts in the case, and if reasonable minds might reach the conclusion sought by the requested instruction.” State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 240. Yet, a trial court may refuse to issue a requested jury instruction if “‘the evidence adduced at trial is legally insufficient’ to support it.” State v. Juntunen, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 09AP-1108 and 09AP-1109, 2010-Ohio-5625, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Barnd, 85 Ohio App.3d 254, 259 (3d Dist.1993). “[T]he trial judge is in the best position to gauge the evidence before the jury and is provided the discretion to determine whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to require an instruction.” State v. Fulmer, 117 Ohio St.3d 319, 2008-Ohio-936, ¶ 72. Accordingly, “[a] court reviewing a trial court‘s refusal to submit to the jury a requested instruction must determine whether the trial court‘s decision constituted ‘an abuse of discretion under the facts and circumstances of the case.‘” Juntunen at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Wolons, 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 68 (1989). An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error in judgment; it suggests that a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).
ii. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the presumption of self-defense.
{14} Estelle first argues the trial court abused its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on the presumption of self-defense set forth in
a person is presumed to have acted in self-defense * * * when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if the person against whom the defensive force is used
is in the process of unlawfully and without privilege to do so entering, or has unlawfully and without privilege to do so entered, the residence * * * occupied by the person using the defensive force.
As used in
{15} Estelle acknowledges that Smith was standing in the street when the fatal shots were fired, but he nonetheless argues that he was entitled to a jury instruction on the presumption of self-defense because Smith initiated the confrontation near the front porch steps, a part of Estelle‘s residence as defined in
iii. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense.
{17} Although we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the presumption of self-defense set forth in
{18} Under
(A) Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements of the offense is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an
affirmative defense other than self-defense * * * as described in division (B)(1) of this section, is upon the accused.
(B)(1) A person is allowed to act in self-defense * * *. If, at the trial of a person who is accused of an offense that involved the person‘s use of force against another, there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused person used the force in self-defense * * *, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense * * *.
{19} To determine whether a defendant satisfied his burden of production, the court must consider whether the evidence, from whatever source it may come, “tends to support” the defendant‘s claim of self-defense. See State v. Parrish, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190379, 2020-Ohio-4807, ¶ 14, citing State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus, and State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 103, 111 (1976). Evidence “tends to support” the defendant‘s use of force in self-defense if it “‘serve[s], contribute[s], or conduce[s] in some degree or way’ to support that he used the force in self-defense * * *.” Petway at ¶ 74, quoting TEND, Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th Ed.2019); State v. Tolle, 4th Dist. Adams No. 19CA1095, 2020-Ohio-935, ¶ 24. Stated differently, “evidence ‘tends to support’ that a defendant used force in self-defense, and a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of self-defense under
{20} “The elements of a self-defense claim differ based on whether the defendant employed deadly or non-deadly force to defend against their perceived assailant.” State v. Crowe, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-19-12, 2019-Ohio-3986, ¶ 15. There is no doubt that Estelle employed deadly
{21}
{22} Estelle notes that the trial court‘s refusal to issue a self-defense instruction was predicated on its determination that he had a duty to retreat before using deadly force against Smith. Estelle maintains that the trial court‘s determination was in error because he should be considered to have been in his residence when he shot Smith, thus relieving him of any duty to retreat.
{23} Estelle is mistaken. It is uncontroverted that when Estelle first shot Smith, Estelle was standing in the tree lawn between the public sidewalk and the street. In addition, the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that Estelle was standing either in the tree lawn or in the street when he fired the second shot at Smith. In any event, Estelle was clearly not inside his residence when he fired the shots that killed Smith. See Moore, 2020-Ohio-4321, at ¶ 21 (concluding that
{24} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the evidence presented at trial did not tend to show that Estelle complied with his duty to retreat before using deadly force against Smith. The evidence presented at trial established that after Smith punched Estelle, Estelle safely withdrew into his residence. There was no evidence Smith tried to prevent Estelle from retreating into his residence or that Smith attempted to pursue Estelle. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrated that after punching Estelle, Smith walked away from Estelle‘s residence and back to his vehicle. Thus, within moments after Smith punched Estelle, Estelle was in the safety of his residence, with Smith, who made no attempt to enter the residence, some distance away. Rather than remaining in the safety of his residence, Estelle elected to leave his residence and walk toward Smith. Once Estelle cleared the boundaries of his residence, each step Estelle took toward Smith was a step taken in violation of his duty to retreat. See Crowe, 2019-Ohio-3986, at ¶ 19 (the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that evidence did not support that defendant complied with his duty to retreat where defendant “moved toward [the victim] and met him in the middle of the room instead of attempting to escape through the front door“); State v. Chandler, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105246, 2017-Ohio-8573, ¶ 17 (defendant was properly denied instruction on defense of another where the defendant‘s wife “was in the safety of her home, with the victim a significant distance away” when the victim was shot and wife “could not have claimed self-defense if she were the one confronting the victim in the parking lot after the fact“); State v. Waller, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013-CA-26, 2014-Ohio-237, ¶ 50-51 (self-defense instruction was properly denied where instead of retreating from victim, defendant “got angry” and moved toward victim). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense.
iv. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.
{25} Lastly, Estelle argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Estelle contends that because Smith “stormed onto [his] property, screamed at his wife, punched him such that he fell onto the steps of his front porch, and generally escalated a family disagreement into a neighborhood disturbance,” a reasonable jury could conclude that he was “directed by passion rather than reason” when he shot Smith.
{27} “Before giving a voluntary-manslaughter instruction in a murder case, the trial court must determine ‘whether evidence of reasonably sufficient provocation occasioned by the victim has been presented to warrant such an instruction.‘” State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, ¶ 130, quoting Shane at paragraph one of the syllabus. “Whether the provocation was reasonably sufficient to prompt sudden passion or a sudden fit of rage involves both an objective and a subjective analysis.” State v. Lee, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-908, 2018-Ohio-3957, ¶ 49. First, in the objective inquiry, the court must consider whether the alleged provocation was “reasonably sufficient to incite deadly force, meaning ‘it must [have been] sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person beyond the power of his or her control.‘” Id., quoting Shane at 635. “Then, if [the objective] standard is met, the inquiry shifts to the subjective component of whether [the defendant], in this particular case, actually was under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage.” Shane at 634.
{28} After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Even assuming that Smith‘s actions were sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person beyond the power of his control, the evidence presented at trial did not support that Estelle actually was under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage when he shot Smith. Estelle repeatedly testified that he was “scared” and “panicked” when he shot Smith. (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 501-502, 513-514). Estelle also stated that he was “frightened” after Smith punched him and that he was “afraid” when he fired the first shot at Smith. (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 512). In fact, when Estelle was asked on cross-examination whether he was “scared” or whether he was “really mad,” Estelle responded that he “was scared” and that “[i]t was out of fear.” (Aug. 25-27, 2020 Tr. at 513).
{29} “Fear alone is insufficient to demonstrate the kind of emotional state necessary to constitute sudden passion or fit of rage.” State v. Mack, 82 Ohio St.3d 198, 201 (1998). Indeed, a defendant‘s fear for his own safety or for the safety of others “does not constitute sudden passion or a fit of rage as contemplated by the voluntary manslaughter statute.” State v. Harris, 129 Ohio App.3d 527, 535 (10th Dist.1998). Thus, “[s]hooting someone ‘out of fear rather than rage or passion [does] not support a jury instruction for voluntary manslaughter.‘” State v. Hodge, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-95, 2019-Ohio-4012, ¶ 39, quoting State v. Stevenson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-512, 2018-Ohio-5140, ¶ 29. Accordingly, because the
{30} Estelle‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
B. Third and Fourth Assignments of Error: Did the State present sufficient evidence that Estelle committed purposeful murder and does the evidence weigh in favor of finding that Estelle committed purposeful murder?
{31} In his third and fourth assignments of error, Estelle challenges the evidentiary basis for the jury‘s finding that he committed purposeful murder. In his third assignment of error, Estelle argues the State presented insufficient evidence to support that he committed purposeful murder because “[t]here was no testimony that [he] intended to harm the victim” and the shooting was “committed without any premeditation but in a state of great emotional disturbance.” In his fourth assignment of error, Estelle contends the evidence weighs against finding that he committed purposeful murder because there was no testimony that he specifically intended to harm Smith.
{32} However, we need not consider whether sufficient evidence supports the jury‘s finding that Estelle committed purposeful murder or whether the evidence weighs in favor of that finding. “‘[W]hen counts in an indictment are allied offenses, and there is sufficient evidence to support the offense on which the state elects to have the defendant sentenced, the appellate court need not consider the sufficiency [or weight] of the evidence on the count that is subject to merger because any error would be harmless’ beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Adkins, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-19-71, 2020-Ohio-6799, ¶ 39, quoting State v. Ramos, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103596, 2016-Ohio-7685, ¶ 14.
{33} In this case, Estelle was found guilty of both purposeful murder in violation of
{34} Estelle, however, has failed to mount a challenge to the evidence underlying his felony-murder conviction. He implies error in the fact that “he also was not charged or convicted of any felonies of the first or second degree” in connection with his felony-murder conviction, but he cites no legal authority for this claim. In the absence of a proper challenge to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting Estelle‘s felony-murder conviction, we assume the evidence as to his felony-murder
{35} Estelle‘s third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{36} For the foregoing reasons, Estelle‘s assignments of error are overruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr