State v. EsparzaState v. Esparza
Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
Charles D. Agoos, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
OPINION
MEDINA, Judge.
{1} Defendant Juan Montelongo Esparza appeals his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident (no great bodily harm or death), in violation of
BACKGROUND
{2} On June 12, 2015, at approximately 3:40 p.m., a vehicle driven by Defendant collided with a vehicle driven by Freddy Marquez. Marquez was ejected from his vehicle and was severely injured. Marquez‘s girlfriend was also in the vehicle at the time of the accident, however, she sustained only minor injuries. Shortly after the collision several drivers stopped and unsuccessfully attempted to render aid to Marquez, who died shortly thereafter from his injuries. Based on witness testimony, emergency personnel arrived on the scene between fifteen and forty-five minutes after the collision.
{3} After the collision, a witness saw Defendant sitting in his vehicle talking on a cellphone but could not understand what Defendant was saying because Defendant was not speaking English. Defendant did not approach Marquez or his girlfriend at any time after the accident. At some point, Defendant got out of his car, began pacing back and forth, and then left the scene on foot. One witness estimated that Defendant left the scene between fifteen and twenty minutes after the accident, while another believed that Defendant left the scene forty-six minutes after the accident. In either case, Defendant left the scene before the first emergency responder arrived. When he left the accident scene, Defendant left behind his resident card which included his name, along with his vehicle registration and insurance card, in the glove compartment of his vehicle.
{4} Police located Defendant approximately two hours after the accident, four miles from the accident scene. Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and smelled strongly of alcohol. Defendant‘s blood alcohol content measured 0.04 grams per 100 milliliters of blood, approximately four hours after the accident. A forensic expert estimated that at the time of the collision Defendant had consumed the equivalent of four-and-a-half beers.
{5} The State charged Defendant with multiple crimes as a result of the accident, including homicide by vehicle (DWI), in violation of
DISCUSSION
{6} Defendant raises two arguments on appeal. First, Defendant argues the district court committed fundamental error in instructing the jury. Second, Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We address each argument in turn.
Jury Instructions
{7} Defendant argues the district court fundamentally erred in failing to instruct the jury on the scope of his legal
{8} The hit-and-run statute applicable to leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries—such as the tragic accident in this case—provides, “The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible, but shall then immediately return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 66-7-203[.]”
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and shall upon request exhibit his driver‘s license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle collided with and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person.
Depending on whether the accident resulted in “great bodily harm or death” and whether the driver “knowingly fail[ed] to stop or to comply with the requirements of Section 66-7-203[,]” the driver may be found guilty of a misdemeanor, a fourth degree felony, or a third degree felony. See
{9} There is no Uniform Jury Instruction (UJI) for the crime of leaving the scene of an accident.1 See State v. Hertzog, 2020-NMCA-031, ¶ 9, 464 P.3d 1090 (“[T]here are no uniform jury instructions for the crimes that Section 66-7-201 defines[.]“). Accordingly, the district court “was required to give an instruction that substantially follows the language of the statute in order to be deemed sufficient.” State v. Luna, 2018-NMCA-025, ¶ 21, 458 P.3d 457 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted), cert. denied, 2018-NMCERT-___ (No. S-1-SC-36896, Mar. 16, 2018). The court instructed the jury to find Defendant guilty if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) “[D]efendant operated a vehicle involved in an accident“; (2) “[t]he accident resulted in injury to Freddy Marquez“; and (3) “[D]efendant failed to immediately stop, return[,] and remain at the scene[.]”2
{11} While our appellate courts have previously dealt with appeals from convictions for leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury under
statute, unless this leads to an absurd or unreasonable result and unless the Legislature indicates a different interpretation is necessary.” Hertzog, 2020-NMCA-031, ¶ 12 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “[W]hen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{12} Defendant argues, and we agree, that the plain language of the last clause of
{13} Given that a defendant is not required to remain at the scene of an accident under all circumstances—a requirement the instruction in this case directly suggests—it follows that the jury must be instructed on this element. Otherwise, a driver could be convicted of leaving the scene of an accident despite complying with
{14} Given the plain language of
attending any vehicle collided with“; and (3) render “reasonable assistance” to any person injured in the accident.
{15} The State argues that it was only required to prove that Defendant “simply failed to remain” at the scene and contends any other conclusion is contrary to Guzman, 2004-NMCA-097, because—according to the State—this Court “stated [in that case] that the prosecution is required to prove that the defendant ‘failed to stop and/or failed to remain at the scene of the accident[.]’ ” Id. ¶ 20. We reject this argument. In Guzman, we reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a conviction for leaving the scene of an accident. In setting forth the elements for our sufficiency review, we stated,
In order to convict [the d]efendant of [leaving the scene of an] accident[] involving death or personal injuries, the [s]tate was required to prove that [the d]efendant (1) operated a motor vehicle; (2) was involved in an accident which caused great bodily harm or death of the victim; (3) failed to stop and/or failed to remain at the scene of the accident; and (4) failed to render reasonable aid to the victim.
Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added). Given the fourth element—which incorporates one of a driver‘s duties under
{16} The State also cites
to stop—made it unnecessary to instruct the jury on whether Defendant complied with
{17} We are unpersuaded by the State‘s logic. Reading
{18} It is undisputed that Defendant stopped his vehicle at the scene of the accident in this case. Consequently, in order to convict Defendant of violating
Fundamental Error
{19} Having found error in the jury instructions, we must now determine whether it was fundamental. As stated earlier, failure to instruct the jury on an essential element is generally fundamental error; we will only affirm in such cases “when, under the facts adduced at trial, that omitted element was undisputed and indisputable, and no rational jury could have concluded otherwise.” Lopez, 1996-NMSC-036, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); id. (stating that “the question to be answered when an essential element has been omitted is whether there was any evidence or suggestion in the facts, however slight, that could have put the omitted element in issue” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). Thus, “[i]f the evidence does not indisputably establish the missing element or elements, there exists fundamental error, and we must reverse.” Luna, 2018-NMCA-025, ¶ 23; see State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 46, 279 P.3d 747 (“[F]undamental error occurs when, because an erroneous instruction was given, a court has no way of knowing whether the conviction was or was not based on the lack of the essential element.“).
{20} For the following reasons, we conclude the omitted element of whether Defendant complied with
{21} It is also noteworthy that the jury failed to convict Defendant of his stand-alone violation of
{22} For this count, the jury was instructed to find Defendant guilty if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) “[D]efendant operated a vehicle involved in an accident“; (2) “[t]he accident resulted in damage to a vehicle“; (3) “[D]efendant did not give his name, address and registration number of [his] vehicle“; and (4) “[D]efendant did not render assistance to any person injured or make arrangements for treatment[.]” As the first two elements were undisputed, it follows that the jury found the State‘s evidence lacking regarding Defendant‘s purported failure to “give his name, address and registration number of [his] vehicle” and/or “render assistance to any person injured or make arrangements for treatment.” While not necessarily dispositive of our fundamental error analysis, this fact counsels in favor of finding fundamental error.4
{23} In light of the foregoing evidence and arguments, it does not appear that the missing essential element of whether Defendant complied with the requirements of
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{24} Despite concluding the failure to instruct the jury on Defendant‘s obligation to remain at the scene until he satisfied
{25} Defendant concedes that the State presented sufficient evidence to convict him of leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries under the erroneous jury instructions. Defendant also acknowledges that our appellate courts generally review sufficiency claims against the erroneous jury instructions used at trial. See State v. Dowling, 2011-NMSC-016, ¶ 18, 150 N.M. 110, 257 P.3d 930 (“We review [the d]efendant‘s [sufficiency of the evidence] claim under the erroneous instruction provided to the jury at trial.“); State v. Akers, 2010-NMCA-103, ¶ 32, 149 N.M. 53, 243 P.3d 757 (“In a case such as this one in which an erroneous instruction was apparently given, we nonetheless review the sufficiency of the evidence under the instructions as given.“). Nonetheless, Defendant asks this Court to depart from established case law and measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the statutory elements of leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries.
{26} Even were we to agree with Defendant, our Supreme Court has determined that appellate courts review sufficiency claims “under the erroneous instruction provided to the jury at trial.” Dowling, 2011-NMSC-016, ¶ 18. We must, therefore, reject Defendant‘s request to depart from precedent. See State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 2004-NMSC-009, ¶ 22, 135 N.M. 375, 89 P.3d 47 (reiterating principle that “the Court of Appeals is bound by Supreme Court precedent“). Given Defendant‘s concession, and given the evidence presented above, we conclude sufficient evidence supported Defendant‘s conviction and retrial is therefore permitted.
CONCLUSION
{27} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
{28} IT IS SO ORDERED.
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge
WE CONCUR:
J. MILES HANISEE, Chief Judge
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge