STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARGARET B. ERTEL, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. CA2015-12-109
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO WARREN COUNTY
4/25/2016
[Cite as State v. Ertel, 2016-Ohio-2682.]
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT Case No. 2015CRB00720
Rittgers & Rittgers, C. Stеphen M. Kilburn, 12 East Warren Street, Lebanon, Ohio 45036, for defendant-appellant
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Margaret B. Ertel, appeals her conviction in the Warren County Court for one count of obstructing official business. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On the afternoon of September 5, 2015, officers from the Warren County Sheriff‘s Office were dispatched to investigate a road rage incident after they received a
{¶ 3} While Deputy Billmaier was outside speaking to Ledbetter, Sergeant Corey Adams and Deputy Matt Landrum were inside speaking with Ertel. During this time, Ertel repeatedly told the officers that no firearm was used during the road rage incident and that Ledbetter was not carrying a gun. However, when informed that Ledbetter had admittеd to pointing a gun at the victim, Ertel acknowledged that she had been lying and knew it was wrong, but that she was scared and did not want to see Ledbetter get in trouble. The gun used in the road rage incident was then recovered from under a couch located approximately ten feet from where Ertel was sitting. According to Deputy Billmaier, although it would have tаken even less time had Ertel simply “c[o]me clean right off the bat,” the entire investigation took approximately 20 to 30 minutes.
{¶ 4} Ertel was then charged with one count of obstructing official business in violation of
{¶ 6} In her single assignment of error, Ertel argues the trial court erred by denying her
{¶ 7} “A
{¶ 8} As noted above, Ertel was convicted of one count of obstructing official business in violatiоn of
{¶ 9} In this case, Ertel argues her conviction must be reversed because her conduct in repeatedly lying to the responding officers regarding the road rage incident did not cause a “substantial stoppage” in their investigation. However, while we find some courts have used the “substantial stoppage” language when reviewing a conviction for obstructing official business, see State v. Grice, 180 Ohio App.3d 700, 2009-Ohio-372, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.); State v. Ellis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24003, 2011-Ohio-2967, ¶ 59, our research has failed to uncover any such case emanating from this court. It is well-established that we are generally only bound by the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court and by past precedent produced by our own district, not those decisions from our brethren within the other eleven appellate districts.
{¶ 10} Regardless, even in those cases where the “substantial stoppage” language has been used, those courts have universally held that there is no finite, definitive, or particular period of time that must elapse bеfore a “substantial stoppage” has occurred. See, e.g., State v. Wellman, 173 Ohio App.3d 494, 2007-Ohio-2953, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.) (“[w]e do not hold that any finite period of time constitutes a ‘substantial stoppage,’ be the delay
{¶ 11} Here, albeit for a period of approximately 20 to 30 minutes, the record firmly establishes that Ertеl‘s repeated lies to the responding officers effectively hampered or impeded their investigation into the road rage incident. In fact, when specifically аsked why Ertel was charged with obstructing official business, Deputy Billmaier testified that it was because “she hindered and obstructed our investigation,” thus necessitating the officers to question Ertel and Ledbetter separately and make further contact with the victim. These lies were clearly intended to hamper or impede the investigation for Ertel readily admittеd to lying to the responding officers because she did not want to see Ledbetter get in trouble.
{¶ 12} Despite this, Ertel argues her conduct cannot be considered the reason for the delay since she ultimately told the truth once Ledbetter admitted to pointing a gun at the victim. However, while Ledbetter also lied, as Deputy Billmaier testified, no delay in thе investigation would have occurred had Ertel simply “c[o]me clean right off the bat.” In other words, contrary to Ertel‘s claim otherwise, nothing about Ledbetter‘s conduct negates that of her own and would, at best, make them complicit with one another. Moreover, the fact that Ledbetter was not charged with obstructing official business is immaterial sincе “‘[t]he prosecutor has great discretion in deciding which charges should be filed and may decide, for a myriad of reasons, not to prosecute on certain chargеs notwithstanding that sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction.‘” State v. Conklin, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA94-03- 064, 1995 WL 128388, *3 (Mar. 27, 1995), quoting State v. Williams, 89 Ohio App.3d 288, 291 (10th Dist.1993).
{¶ 13} As noted by the Ohio Supreme Court, “[t]he making of an unsworn false oral statement to a public official with the purpose to mislead, hamper or impede the investigation of a crime” is punishable conduct within the meaning of
{¶ 14} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL, P.J., and RINGLAND, J., concur.