STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEPH D. KINSWORTHY, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. CA2013-06-053
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO WARREN COUNTY
4/14/2014
[Cite as State v. Kinsworthy, 2014-Ohio-1584.]
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 2012 CR 28221
James S. Arnold, 9737 Loveland-Madeira Road, Loveland, Ohio 45140 and The Farrish Law Firm, Michaela M. Stagnaro, 810 Sycamore Street, 6th Floor, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for defendant-appellant
OPINION
HENDRICKSON, P.J.
{1} Defendant-appellant, Joseph D. Kinsworthy, appeals from his conviction and sentence in the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for menacing by stalking and burglary.
{2} On May 25, 2012, a Warren County grand jury indicted Kinsworthy on the following four counts: (1) domestic violence, in violation of
{3} Kinsworthy, an Iraq veteran who suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and has a traumatic brain injury, began his relationship with Wall in June 2009. One child was born out of the relationship. Kinsworthy and Wall lived together on and off again over the years. Kinsworthy first moved into Walls’ condominium in December 2009 and stayed for three to four months. On March 28, 2010, Kinsworthy committed an act of domestic violence against Wall, and he ultimately pled guilty to that offense. After this incident, Kinsworthy moved out. However, in January 2011, just a few months after the birth of their son, Kinsworthy returned and again resided with Wall. Kinsworthy stayed for approximately three months until March 2011, when the relationship once again ended. After the relationship ended, Wall had the locks changed at her condominium. Although the relationship was over, the two remained in contact for their “son‘s sake.” In November 2011, Kinsworthy began coming around more often and the two spoke about resuming their relationship. In March 2012, Kinsworthy began staying overnight with Wall and their son.
{4} On March 24, 2012, Kinsworthy and Wall got into an argument which increased in intensity as the day progressed. When Kinsworthy left the condominium, he punched a hole in the wall and threw open the front door with such force that it also put a hole in the wall behind the door. On that same day, the two also exchanged text messages, and in one of these messages Kinsworthy threatened to kill himself.
{5} The next day, March 25, 2012, Wall and her son went to see Kinsworthy at a friend‘s house. Wall brought Kinsworthy‘s belongings with her as she decided he could no
{6} Based on this incident, Wall filed an application for a civil protection order (CPO) against Kinsworthy. At the preliminary hearing on April 11, 2012, Kinsworthy‘s visitation rights were temporarily suspended until the day of the full hearing. On May 24, 2012, the court held a full hearing and a CPO was issued against Kinsworthy, protecting Wall and her son for five years.
{7} Wall also filed a police report with the Hamilton Township Police Department regarding the damage to her car that resulted from Kinsworthy kicking the side panel of the vehicle. Photographs were taken of the damage.
{8} On the morning of April 12, 2012, just one day after Kinsworthy‘s visitation rights were temporarily suspended, Wall discovered that someone had smashed her car‘s windshield. Wall reported the incident to police. When interviewed by the police, Wall stated she believed that it was Kinsworthy who had damaged the vehicle.
{9} Just days later, on April 20, 2012, Wall returned to her condominium around 3:00 p.m. and discovered someone had broken into her residence. A key had been broken off in the door‘s lock, the door frame was broken, and parts of the lock were on the floor. Wall contacted the Hamilton Township Police Department and reported a burglary. Two
{10} Thereafter, Kinworthy was indicted on the above four charges. A jury trial was held in September 2012. The jury convicted Kinsworthy of criminal damaging and found him not guilty of domestic violence and second-degree burglary. The jury indicated it was hung as to the lesser-included burglary with the purpose to commit any criminal offense, a third-degree felony, and the menacing by stalking offense.
{11} A second jury trial was held as to these two offenses on March 1, 2013. After hearing the evidence, the jury found Kinsworthy guilty on both offenses. The trial court sentenced Kinsowrthy to serve nine months in prison for menacing by stalking, a fourth-degree felony and 18 months in prison for burglary, a third-degree felony. The two prison terms were ordered to be served consecutively, for a total prison term of 27 months.
{12} Kinsworthy appeals both his convictions and sentence, raising five assignments of error for our review.1
{13} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{14} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY PERMITTING
{15} In his first assignment of error, Kinsworthy argues he was denied a fair trial due to the admission of improper character evidence and improper prior bad acts evidence. Kinsworthy asserts the trial court erred in admitting the testimony regarding: (1) his prior incarceration; (2) his threats to commit suicide; (3) threats he made to kill his mother, Marcia Kinsworthy, and a correctional officer; (4) his behavior of breaking Wall‘s possessions and punching holes in her walls during arguments; and (5) his alcohol use and alcohol-related convictions. Kinsworthy contends this evidence did not prove that he had a history of violence towards Wall, as required for a menacing by stalking conviction. Rather, he asserts that such testimony was elicited as improper character evidence to show he was an “unstable alcoholic, with a propensity for violence.”
{16} The testimony Kinsworthy now challenges on appeal was provided by several witnesses, including Wall, Marcia Kinsworthy, and Kinsworthy himself.2 No objection was ever raised as to any of the testimony in question. Generally, this court will not reverse a trial court‘s decision regarding the admission of evidence absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Freeze, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-11-209, 2012-Ohio-5840, para 43, citing State v. Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179, para 96. However, when a party fails to object to the issue now appealed, we review for plain error.
{17} Pursuant to
{18} Even if the evidence meets the prerequisites of
{19} In prosecutions for menacing by stalking, the victim‘s belief that the defendant will cause physical harm is an element of the offense and such belief is often intertwined with their past interactions. Hart at para 12. Accordingly, prior acts of violence between the victim and defendant are “relevant and highly probative in establishing the victim‘s belief of impending serious harm,” and are particularly important in proving the crime of menacing by stalking. Id., quoting State v. Skeens, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17528, 1999 WL 1082658, * 4 (Dec. 3, 1999). Furthermore, this court has noted, “[o]ther acts evidence can be particularly useful in prosecutions for menacing by stalking because it can assist the jury in understanding that a defendant‘s otherwise innocent appearing acts, when put into the context of previous contacts he has had with the victim, may be knowing attempts to cause mental distress.” Hart at para 12.
{20} In the present case, the record indicates the state sought to prove Kinsworthy committed felony menacing by stalking. In order to prove menacing by stalking, the state was required to show that Kinsworthy, by engaging in a pattern of conduct knowingly caused Wall to believe that he would cause her physical harm or cause her mental distress. See
{21} The record indicates that Wall was aware Kinsworthy had threatened to kill a correctional officer and had threatened to commit suicide in the past. Accordingly, the testimony regarding Kinsworthy‘s frequent threats to commit suicide as well as his threats to
{22} We similarly find the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence testimony regarding Kinsworthy‘s 2010 domestic violence conviction and his resulting incarceration. As the state was required to prove there was a “history of violence” against Wall, the fact that Kinsworthy committed an act of domestic violence against Wall just two years prior was relevant and probative in proving an essential element of the felony offense.3
{23} We also find Wall‘s testimony that Kinsworthy had broken some of her belongings and punched holes in her wall during prior arguments relevant and probative in proving the menacing by stalking charge, namely Wall‘s belief of impending serious harm. This testimony also put the past interactions between Wall and Kinsworthy into context for the jury. See Hart at para 12. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err, let alone committed plain error, in admitting evidence as to Kinsworthy‘s prior incarceration, threats of suicide, threats against a correctional officer, and prior instances where he broke items and bunched holes in the walls of Wall‘s condominium.
{24} We also note that this character evidence and “other acts” evidence Kinsworthy asserts the trial court erred in admitting at trial was the same evidence and testimony that he himself participated in eliciting from the witnesses. For instance, during cross-examination of Wall, defense counsel asked: “I want to direct your attention to the 2010 domestic violence incident. Do you recall being present for the sentencing at Warren County Court?” Later, he
{25} The remaining evidence Kinsworthy challenges as being improper character evidence, including evidence regarding Kinsworthy‘s prior threats to kill his mother, his alcohol use, and related alcohol convictions, present a different issue as arguably none of this evidence was relevant in proving either of the two offenses at the second trial. As to Kinsworthy‘s alcohol use, there is no indication in the record that Kinsworthy was intoxicated at the time of any of the events which gave rise to these charges. See Morris at para 13. Although Wall and Marcia each testified he was more violent and unstable when he was under the influence of alcohol, because there was no testimony that he was intoxicated at the time of the offenses, evidence of Kinsworthy‘s alcohol use was not relevant in proving any of the offenses. Similarly, any prior alcohol-related convictions would also not be relevant. In addition, the fact that Kinsworthy previously threatened his mother was not relevant in proving menacing by stalking as there is no indication that the victim, Wall, was aware of this threat, and therefore it could not have contributed to Wall‘s belief that Kinsworthy would cause her physical harm.
{26} Although the foregoing evidence had questionable relevancy to the case at bar, a review of the record indicates Kinsworthy did not object this evidence when first introduced by the state. Moreover, Kinsworthy repeatedly participated in eliciting this same evidence. For example, after the state questioned Marcia regarding Kinsworthy‘s prior threats to kill her,
Q. Did you actually believe that [Kinsworthy] was going to kill you?
A. Heavens no.
Q. And has Joe ever raised his hand to you or struck you or hit you?
A. Never.
Q. Whether [sic] he made these statements to you about killing you when were those relative to when he returned home from Iraq?
A. It started probably after he came out of his coma and came home * * *[his sergeants told me] that‘s how they pump them up. They teach them that.
{27} On direct examination, Kinsworthy also repeatedly referred to his struggles with alcohol. For instance, counsel asked: “Since your return from active duty have you struggled with alcohol?” Kinsworthy explained:
Yes, that‘s part of my disability. When I came home * * *, I had gone so untreated that I was medicating myself with alcohol and the diagnosis that the VA in the military gave me was posttraumatic stress disorder with alcohol dependence because * * * that was my medication. I‘d use that to kind of get away.
Additionally, the record indicates that Kinsworthy offered the evidence of his alcohol-related convictions. During direct examination, Kinsworthy referred to a prior driving under the influence conviction that had not been previously mentioned by the state‘s witnesses.
{28} From this court‘s review of the record, it appears Kinsworthy‘s defense centered on his PTSD diagnosis and his resulting alcohol dependence. Kinsworthy sought to paint a picture that he often threatened those around him with violence, but that they knew these threats were empty and were just a result of his alcohol use and PTSD. In so doing, he put his character squarely at issue and repeatedly elicited testimony regarding his problems with alcohol and his prior threats of violence towards other people. It is apparent that presenting
{29} Even if this court assumed the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Kinsworthy‘s alcohol use, related alcohol convictions, and his threats to kill his mother, such error would be harmless. In light of the overwhelming amount of other evidence supporting his conviction for menacing by stalking, the outcome of the trial would not have been different absent this evidence. As discussed more fully below, Wall testified regarding the couple‘s tumultuous and often violent history towards one another. In March 2012, Kinsworthy‘s pattern of conduct, which included threats via text messages indicating Kinsworthy would kill Wall and destroy many of her personal belongings, along with his later conduct of damaging her vehicle, all culminated in Wall believing Kinsworthy would harm her. Furthermore, based on the history of their relationship, Kinsworthy was aware that his actions would cause her such fear or mental distress.
{30} For the reasons discussed above, Kinsworthy‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{31} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{32} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING IMPROPER REBUTTAL TESTIMONY WHICH VIOLATED [KINSWORTHY‘S] RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
{33} In his second assignment of error, Kinsworthy asserts the trial court erred in allowing Officer Downs to testify as a rebuttal witness for the state. Kinsworthy maintains Downs’ testimony was inadmissible as his testimony constituted hearsay under
{34} At trial, Kinsworthy called Marcia Kinsworthy, to the stand. During her testimony, Marcia testified she had been contacted by the police “a couple of times” in regards to her son. On cross-examination, the state engaged in a series of questions regarding statements Marcia made about her son to police in May 2012. The state asked whether she had told officers that Kinsworthy “had changed tremendously since returning home [from deployment] and that his temper was so short he was unable to carry on a normal life.” Marcia denied making that specific statement, but testified she told the officers she wanted Kinsworthy to get help and live a normal life. The state also asked Marcia whether she had told officers that Kinsworthy was “unpredictable and very capable of causing great harm to others.” Marcia denied making that statement.
{35} On rebuttal, the state attempted to refute Marcia‘s testimony by presenting the testimony of Officer Downs, who had been present during this conversation. Downs testified Marcia stated Kinsworthy‘s “temper was so short he‘s unable to carry on a normal life.” He further testified that Marcia indicated that she was worried Kinsworthy “may harm somebody else as well or possibly kill them.”
{36} As an initial matter, we note that Kinsworthy failed to object to Officer Downs’ rebuttal testimony. Thus, he has waived all but plain error. See State v. Gray, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-03-064, 2011-Ohio-666, para 56; Lang, 2011-Ohio-4215 at para 108.
{37} Even if this court assumed Downs’ testimony was inadmissible under
{38} Kinsworthy‘s second assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{39} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{40} APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF [HIS] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THUS PREJUDICING [HIS] RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
{41} In his third assignment of error, Kinsworthy asserts he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Kinsworthy asserts his trial counsel committed an array of errors which “significantly prejudiced” him. Specifically, Kinsworthy claims counsel was ineffective in the following ways: (1) counsel failed to mention he had an alibi during opening statements; (2) in his opening statements, counsel stated, Kinsworthy “appeared guilty“; (3) counsel failed to object to certain testimony, including “other acts” evidence, rebuttal testimony of Officer Downs, Wall‘s testimony comparing Kinsworthy to a serial killer, and Officer Workmen and Wall‘s belief that he was the perpetrator of the burglary; and (4) counsel asked Wall and Kinsworthy “damaging” questions. Kinsworthy asserts the following questions were “damaging“: (1) asking Kinsworthy whether he threatened to kill Wall; (2) asking Wall about the letter Kinsworthy wrote in which he threatened a correctional officer; (3) confirming there was no footprint on Wall‘s car door when she left her home the day of
{42} To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Kinsworthy must show trial counsel‘s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and he was prejudiced as a result. State v. Ward-Douglas, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-05-042, 2012-Ohio-4023, para 96, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 693 (1984); State v. Burke, 97 Ohio St.3d 55, 2002-Ohio-5310, para 6. In order to demonstrate prejudice, Kinsworthy must establish that, but for counsel‘s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of trial would have been different; a “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Burke at para 6. The failure to make an adequate showing on either prong is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. State v. Zielinski, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-12-121, 2011-Ohio-6535, para 50.
{43} Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. State v. Hendrix, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-05-109, 2012-Ohio-5610, para 14. It is not the role of the appellate court to second guess the strategic decisions of trial counsel. State v. Lloyd, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2007-04-052, CA2007-04-053, 2008-Ohio-3383, para 61. The decision regarding which defense to pursue at trial is a matter of trial strategy, and trial strategy decisions are not the basis of a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 524 (2001); State v. Murphy, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-05-128, 2009-Ohio-6745, para 24. “[T]he scope of cross-examination falls within the ambit of trial strategy, and debatable trial tactics do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.” Murphy, 2009-Ohio-6745 at para 32, quoting State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, para 101.
{45} The trial transcript indicates part of Kinsworthy‘s defense was that Wall fabricated the crimes to get him “in trouble.” Accordingly, as stated during opening statements, even though it “appeared” Kinsworthy was the perpetrator, counsel asserted he did not commit these criminal acts. As part of this strategy, defense counsel intentionally presented evidence regarding Kinsworthy and Wall‘s volatile relationship. It was the defense‘s intent to paint Wall as a vindictive and vengeful person such that she had a motive to make it appear as though Kinsworthy damaged her vehicle on two occasions and later broke into her home. Simply because the jury chose to reject this version of the events cannot be the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. State v. Davis, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-12-258, 2013-Ohio-3878, para 25 (“The fact that trial strategy was ultimately unsuccessful * * * does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel“). Moreover, as stated above, the decision regarding which defense to pursue at trial is a matter of trial strategy, and trial strategy decisions are not the basis of a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 524.
{46} As to trial counsel‘s failure to mention Kinsworthy‘s alibi during opening statements, there is nothing in the record which suggests that Kinsworthy suffered any prejudice as a result of the opening statement made by counsel. It is well-settled that opening statements are not evidence. See State v. Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 338 (1995). In addition, it is clear from the record that trial counsel did present alibi evidence through the
{47} Based on our resolution of the first and second assignments of error, we also do not find that counsel‘s failure to object to the admission of “other acts” evidence or to the admission of Officer Down‘s rebuttal testimony amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. As to the remaining instances of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, Kinsworthy has failed to offer any argument as to how he was prejudiced by the alleged errors of counsel. He fails to show how he was prejudiced by Wall‘s testimony comparing him to a serial killer or Officer Workmen‘s belief that he was the perpetrator of the burglary. In addition, the alleged errors by counsel, even when viewed cumulatively, do not show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for these alleged errors, the result of trial would have been different. Accordingly, Kinsworthy has failed to make an adequate showing of prejudice.
{48} Kinsworthy‘s third assignment of error is therefore overruled.
{49} Assignment of Error No. 4:
{50} THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND/OR AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT‘S CONVICTIONS.
{51} In his fourth assignment of error, Kinsworthy asserts that his convictions for menacing by stalking and burglary were not supported by sufficient evidence and were also against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{52} Whether the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. State v. Hoskins, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2013-02-013, 2013-Ohio-3580, para 16, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). When reviewing the
{53} On the other hand, a manifest weight of the evidence challenge examines the “inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.” State v. Williams, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2012-08-080, 2013-Ohio-3410, para 30. To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the reviewing court must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Id. In weighing the evidence, circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value and are subjected to the same standard of proof. State v. Williams, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA91-04-060 and CA92-06-110, 1992 WL 317025, * 6 (Nov. 2, 1992), citing Jenks at paragraph one of the syllabus. A conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence is no less sound than a conviction based upon direct evidence. Williams at * 6. “While appellate review includes the responsibility to consider the credibility of witnesses and weight given to the evidence, ‘these issues are primarily matters for the trier of fact to decide[.]‘” State v. Barnes, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2010-06-009, 2011-Ohio-5226, para 81, quoting State v. Walker, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2006-04-085, 2007-Ohio-911, para 26.
{54} “Because sufficiency is required to take a case to the jury, a finding that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence must necessarily include a finding of sufficiency.” Smith, 2012-Ohio-4644 at para 34. Accordingly, a determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency. Id.
Menacing by Stalking
{55} Kinsworthy was convicted of menacing by stalking in violation of
{56} In a prosecution for menacing by stalking, this court has previously held the “state need only show that a defendant knowingly caused the victim to believe that he would cause her mental distress or physical harm.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Bradford, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-04-032, 2010-Ohio-6429, para 23; State v. Hart, 12th Dist. Warren No.
{57} Upon a review of the record, the state provided substantial evidence which indicated not only did Kinsworthy knowingly cause Wall to believe that he would cause her mental distress or physical harm, but that he in fact caused her mental distress. In addition, the state presented significant circumstantial evidence to prove Kinsworthy engaged in a “pattern of conduct” including damaging Wall‘s vehicle on two occasions and burglarizing her home on April 20, 2012.
{58} The state presented evidence which showed that Kinsworthy and Wall had a tumultuous relationship and often argued with one another. Both testified that objects were often thrown and broken during these arguments. On March 24, 2012, the two were involved in a particularly intense argument that lasted much of the day. Wall testified that when Kinsworthy left her condominium, he punched a hole in the wall and opened the door with such force that it put a hole in the wall behind the door. The state also presented the text messages between Wall and Kinsworthy from that day. At one point, Kinsworthy threatened to break several of Wall‘s belongings, including her video game system, television, and iPad. The messages also indicated that Kinsworthy threatened to kill Wall and he also threatened to kill himself. On March 25, 2012, the two met at a friend‘s house. When Kinsworthy saw his belongings in the back of her car he “got really mad,” and “he started cussing at [Wall].” Wall observed Kinsworthy kicking the “side quarter panel” of her car. At this time, their son was in the back seat screaming. Wall testified that it was after this event that she became scared of him.
{59} Wall testified that although she often did not take Kinsworthy‘s threats that he would kill her seriously, after the events of March 25, 2012, she became scared of him. Wall further testified that after seeing Kinsworthy kick her car while their son was inside, “I was
{60} Wall further testified that the day after Kinsworthy‘s visitation rights with his son were temporarily suspended, following the issuance of a temporary civil protection order, she discovered the windshield of her vehicle shattered. Wall contacted the police and indicated she believed Kinsworthy broke the windshield. Although there was no direct testimony presented regarding the damage to the windshield, given the timing of the vandalism and that only Wall‘s vehicle was damaged, there was certainly circumstantial evidence which permitted the jury to conclude that Kinsworthy was the person who broke the windshield. There was also testimony regarding the burglary of Walls’ home that occurred on April 20, 2012. Wall again testified that based on previous threats by Kinsworthy, she believed he was the perpetrator. Officer Workmen also testified that she believed, based upon the items damaged and the items that were stolen, that the “burglary seemed very personal.”
{61} Based on the foregoing, the jury did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice requiring a reversal of Kinsworthy‘s conviction for menacing by stalking. Accordingly, we find Kinsworthy‘s menacing by stalking conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Burglary
{62} Kinsworthy was also convicted of burglary in violation of
{63} Once again, contrary to Kinsworthy‘s arguments, the state is not required to present direct evidence which links him to the crime. See Williams, 1992 WL 317025 at * 6. However, Kinsworthy is correct that the physical evidence presented by the state was inconclusive at best. Although Amy Dalliard, a forensic scientist with the Miami Valley Regional Crime Lab, testified that Kinsworthy‘s DNA evidence was found on Wall‘s bed sheets, given the fact that Kinsworthy often stayed at the condominium, this evidence was of little value.4 However, the state presented significant circumstantial evidence to support his conviction.
{64} Specifically, the state presented testimony that on April 20, 2012, when Wall returned to her condominium, she noticed her door frame had been damaged, there was broken wood and parts of the door lock on the floor in her entryway, and the door was ajar. The jury heard testimony that Kinsworthy had significant experience in breaking down doors due to his experience in the army. The jury also heard testimony from Wall and Kinsworthy that he previously threatened to kill her dog and also threatened to break her video game system, televisions, and iPad. When the police arrived at the scene, they found Wall‘s dog, dead in the laundry room. A veterinarian that treated the dog during its life testified he believed the dog did not die of natural causes, but rather that the dog was suffocated. During the burglary, the television in Wall‘s bedroom, which the couple purchased together, was broken. Yet, the television in her family room was left untouched. In addition, only jewelry which Kinsworthy had given Wall was taken during the burglary. Other, more expensive
{65} Officer Workmen explained the damage to the condominium was not typical for a burglary where the goal is to “steal.” One of the items taken during the burglary was a framed picture of the couple‘s newborn son. In addition, “the entire condo wasn‘t ransacked. Most of the time if there was a TV you‘d find the TV missing instead of damaged.”
{66} Finally, Kinsworthy asserts the testimony regarding his alibi is sufficient to show his conviction for burglary is against the weight of the evidence. During trial, Kinsworthy presented the testimony of his friend Robert Evans. Both Evans and Kinsworthy testified that Kinsworthy was in North Carolina visiting Evans on the weekend of April 20, 2012. Both men also testified that the drive to North Carolina is approximately ten hours and that Kinsworthy arrived at approximately 10:00 p.m. on April 20, 2012. Kinsworthy testified that he left his home in Ohio at approximately 12:00 p.m. As to Kinsworthy‘s whereabouts the morning of April 20, 2012, a transaction log from Kinsworthy‘s debit card was entered into evidence. The transaction log indicated that from 8:26 a.m. to 8:43 a.m., Kinsworthy stopped at a RedBox, Kroger, and McDonalds. The next entry was at 11:59 a.m. when Kinsworthy stopped at a local bank.
{67} Although the jury could have found Evans’ and Kinsworthy‘s testimony about Kinsworthy‘s whereabouts on April 20, 2012 credible, the jury was not required to do so. See State v. Widmer, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-03-027, 2012-Ohio-4342, para 107 (finding jury was permitted to reject those portions of testimony that it did not find credible). From the time he purportedly returned home after 8:43 a.m. until he went to his bank at 11:59 a.m. on April 20, 2012, Kinsworthy was unable to “account for where [he] was at all times.” Although he testified he was at home preparing for his trip to North Carolina, there was no evidence presented which corroborated this testimony. Wall testified that she left home at approximately 7:00 a.m. that morning and did not return until sometime after 3:00 p.m.
{68} Based on the record, the jury did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice requiring a reversal of Kinsworthy‘s conviction for burglary. Accordingly, we find Kinsworthy‘s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{69} As Kinsworthy‘s convictions for menacing by stalking and burglary were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we necessarily conclude that his convictions were also supported by sufficient evidence. See Smith, 2012-Ohio-4644 at para 34. Accordingly, Kinsworthy‘s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{70} Assignment of Error No. 5:
{71} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY IMPROPERLY SENTENCING APPELLANT.
{72} Kinsworthy asserts in his fifth assignment of error that the trial court committed several errors in imposing his sentence. He contends the trial court should have merged his convictions for burglary and menacing by stalking as they are allied offenses of similar import. In addition, Kinsworthy argues the trial court failed to comply with several statutory provisions in imposing an aggregate sentence of 27 months.
Allied Offenses of Similar Import
{73} Kinsworthy argues his convictions for menacing by stalking and burglary should have merged at sentencing because the state “relied upon [a]ppellant‘s ‘violent’ behavior towards Ms. Wall, including the burglary, in convicting him of the [m]enacing count.”
{74} An appellate court applies a de novo standard of review in reviewing a trial court‘s
{75} The Ohio Supreme Court has set forth a test to determine whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import under
{76} If it is possible to commit both offenses with the same conduct, the court must next determine whether the offenses were in fact committed by the same conduct, that is, by a single act, performed with a single state of mind. Lane at para 11, citing Johnson at para 49. If so, the offenses are allied offenses of similar import and must be merged. Lane at para 11,
{77} In the present case, Kinsworthy was convicted of menacing by stalking which states: “No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or cause mental distress to the other person.”
{78} Applying Johnson to the facts of this case, we find Kinsworthy‘s menacing by stalking and burglary convictions are not allied offenses of similar import because, by the very nature of these two offenses, it is not possible to commit both offenses with the same conduct. As menacing by stalking requires a pattern of conduct and burglary only requires that the offender trespass an occupied structure with the purpose to commit a criminal offense, a burglary alone could not be the basis for a menacing by stalking conviction. Rather, the offender must have committed a series of actions which caused another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or cause mental distress to the other person. The offenses of burglary and menacing by stalking simply do not correspond to such a degree that Kinsworthy‘s conduct constitutes the commission of both offenses. Johnson at para 48.
{79} Kinsworthy committed burglary when he forced his way into Wall‘s residence by breaking down the door with the intent to commit any criminal offense once inside. Therefore, once he crossed the threshold and was inside the residence, the burglary was complete. The menacing by stalking offense, however, required a pattern of conduct. One act, such as breaking into Wall‘s home, would have been insufficient to establish menacing
{80} As menacing by stalking and burglary are not allied offenses of similar import, we find the trial court did not err by not merging the two convictions at sentencing.
Imposition of an Aggregate 27-Month Prison Term
{81} Kinsworthy asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence without considering the purposes and principles of sentencing. Furthermore, he argues the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences as it did not make the requisite findings under
{82} As an initial matter, this court once again notes that “the standard of review set forth in
{84} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court considers the purposes and principles of
{85} With these principles in mind, we first note the trial court properly complied with
{86} Kinsworthy next argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. A sentence is contrary to law where the trial court fails to make the consecutive sentencing findings as required by
{87} Pursuant to
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct.
(c) The offender‘s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{88} The trial court is not required to give reasons explaining these findings, nor is the court required to recite any “magic” or talismanic” words when imposing consecutive
{89} Prior to sentencing Kinsworthy to consecutive sentences, the trial court noted that it had reviewed a presentence report, and numerous letters from Kinsworthy‘s family, as well as a victim impact statement from Wall. The trial court took notice of Kinsworthy‘s military experience and the fact that such experience may have exacerbated his problems with controlling his anger and alcohol, but explained to Kinsworthy that he still must be responsible for his actions. In addition, the trial court discussed the seriousness of Kinsworthy‘s conduct, stating: “You terrorized a young woman without any justification whatsoever” and further noted its concern for the public: “I worry about you being amongst us. You are a dangerous person. You‘re a violent person. You‘re a person that cannot completely control his anger.” Finally, the trial court also noted that even though he had previously served a prison term that “didn‘t stop this behavior.”
{90} In light of these facts, the court determined that Kinsworthy‘s sentences for menacing by stalking and burglary should be served consecutively. Specifically, the court stated:
I find that there was a continuing course of conduct that you had already been to prison before you committed these crimes, that no one single sentence would adequately punish you for your behavior that was exhibited here, that it would demean the seriousness of both offenses to not impose consecutive sentences.
From the trial court‘s statements at the sentencing hearing, we find the trial court properly complied with the dictates of
{91} We also disagree with Kinsworthy‘s contention that his sentence was in error
{92} In light of the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err in sentencing Kinsworthy to an aggregate 27-month prison term for menacing by stalking and burglary. Kinsworthy‘s fifth and final assignment of error is overruled.
{93} Judgment affirmed.
PIPER and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.
Notes
5. {a}
{b} (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
{c} (B) Where the defendant‘s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.