STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. VARAINA C. DULANEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 11-12-04
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT PAULDING COUNTY
September 16, 2013
2013-Ohio-3985
Appeal from Paulding County Common Pleas Court, Trial Court No. CR 12 521. Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded.
Peter R. Seibel for Appellant
Joseph R. Burkard and Matthew A. Miller for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Varaina Dulaney, appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Paulding County convicting her of aggravated vehicular homicide and sentencing her to an 18-month prison term. On appeal, Dulaney argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a purportedly invalid search warrant. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court‘s judgment.
{¶2} On February 10, 2012, the Paulding County Grand Jury indicted Dulaney with aggravated vehicular assault in violation of
{¶3} On April 23, 2012, Dulaney filed a motion to suppress any blood alcohol test results obtained from the seizure of samples of her blood. The basis for the motion was that the search and seizure was executed pursuant to an invalid
{¶4} The search warrant for the seizure of Dulaney‘s blood samples was signed on November 30, 2011 by a judge of the Paulding County county court.1 The warrant authorized the seizure of the samples from Defiance Regional Medical Center in Defiance County, Ohio. Before obtaining the warrant, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Alec Coil originally asked a judge of the Defiance Municipal Court to sign it on either November 28 or 29. However, the municipal court judge refused to sign the warrant because the accident occurred in Paulding County, Ohio, which is not within the territorial jurisdiction of Defiance Municipal Court. Trooper Coil executed the search warrant on November 30, 2011 in Defiance County and Dulaney‘s blood samples were tested for the presence of alcohol and other drugs.
{¶5} On June 8, 2012, the trial court issued a judgment entry denying Dulaney‘s motion to suppress. Although the trial court found that the State failed
{¶6} After the trial court‘s denial of her motion to suppress, the State dismissed the charge of aggravated vehicular assault and Dulaney entered a plea of no contest to the remaining charge of aggravated vehicular homicide. On October 25, 2012, the trial court sentenced Dulaney to 18 months in prison.
{¶7} Dulaney filed this timely appeal, presenting the following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE WHICH WAS SEIZED IN DEFIANCE COUNTY, OHIO ON A WARRANT WHICH HAD BEEN SIGNED BY A JUDGE IN PAULDING COUNTY, OHIO (OHIO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 41).
{¶8} In her sole assignment of error, Dulaney argues that the trial court should have suppressed the blood alcohol test results obtained from the purportedly illegal seizure of her blood samples. We find that the trial court erroneously denied Dulaney‘s motion to suppress on the basis that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. As a result, we reverse the trial court‘s ruling on the motion to suppress insofar as it found that the State did not violate Dulaney‘s Fourth Amendment rights when it seized her blood samples pursuant to an invalid warrant. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that suppression was the necessary
Standard of Review for Motions to Suppress
{¶9} “Appellate review of a decision on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. The trial court serves as the trier of fact and is the primary judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence presented. State v. Johnson, 137 Ohio App.3d 847, 850 (12th Dist. 2000). Therefore, when an appellate court reviews a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress, it must accept the trial court‘s findings of facts so long as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 100. The appellate court must then review the application of the law to the facts de novo. Burnside at ¶ 8.
Crim.R. 41(A) and R.C. 2933.21
{¶10}
The Issuing Judge‘s Authority to Issue Search Warrants
{¶11} One of the “defining features” of a constitutionally executed search warrant is that it was “issued by a judicial officer.” United States v. Kone, 591 F.Supp.2d 593, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The United States Supreme Court “frequently * * * employ[s] the term ‘magistrate’ to denote those public officials who may issue warrants.”2 Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348, 92 S.Ct. 2119 (1972). The Court has defined “magistrate” as “a public civil officer, possessing such power – legislative, executive, or judicial – as the government appointing him may ordain.” Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1, 7, 29 S.Ct. 605 (1909). As such, a judge/magistrate for Fourth Amendment purposes is an
{¶12} This matter is unlike Shadwick and Griffin since the Paulding County county court judge who signed the warrant for Dulaney‘s blood samples was not authorized under Ohio law to issue warrants for searches and seizure of property in Defiance County.3
{¶13} The facts of this matter are indistinguishable from Master, which compels us to adopt its reasoning. The Paulding County county court is a creation of statute, Pannozzo Family Ltd. Partnership v. Italian Oven of Boardman, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 92 C.A. 75 (Sept. 2, 1993), and its subject matter jurisdiction is limited as set forth in
There is hereby created in each county of the state, in which the territorial jurisdiction of a municipal court or municipal courts is not coextensive with the boundaries of the county, a court to be known as the county court. The county court shall have jurisdiction throughout a county court district that shall consist of all territory within the county not subject to the territorial jurisdiction of any municipal court. County courts are courts of record for all purposes of law.
Moreover,
{¶14} In finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, the trial court relied on Ridenour. There, a Meigs County Court of Common Pleas judge issued a search warrant for property located in Gallia County. The Fourth District found that these facts did not produce a constitutional violation. Ridenour, 2010-Ohio-3373, at ¶ 2. We find that Ridenour is distinguishable from this matter because it involved the issuance of a search warrant by a Court of Commons Pleas judge,5 which does not raise an inference of jurisdictional and constitutional infirmity. Since the
{¶15} The State also points us to Hardy, supra in support of its argument
{¶16} We decline to follow Hardy‘s and Bowman‘s guidance here since we find that the rule of law announced in those cases is contrary to well-settled federal
{¶17} Moreover, we view Hardy and Bowman as improper extensions of the Ohio Supreme Court‘s decision in State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251 (1986).8 In Wilmoth, the court created a test to distinguish between “fundamental” and “non-fundamental” violations of
{¶19} The same cannot be said for the facts present in this matter or for the facts that were addressed in Hardy and Bowman. The Paulding County county court judge, like the Dayton Municipal Court and Franklin County Municipal Court judges, manifestly lacked the statutory authority to issue the search warrant for property located in a foreign county, outside of her jurisdiction. Consequently,
{¶20} In sum, the Paulding County county court judge lacked statutory authority to issue a search warrant for Dulaney‘s blood samples located in Defiance County. Under well-settled federal law, this lack of authority indicates that the issuing judge was not a judge for Fourth Amendment purposes and renders the warrant void ab initio. Accordingly, the investigating officers executed their search pursuant to an invalid warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court‘s finding to the contrary was in error and requires that we reverse its judgment.
Suppression of the Evidence
{¶21} Although we find that the search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, it is well-settled that not all Fourth Amendment violations give rise to suppression of the evidence illegally obtained. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006) (“Suppression of evidence * * * has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.“); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 13, 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995) (“In Whiteley [v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031 (1971)], the Court treated identification of a Fourth Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule to evidence secured incident to that violation. Subsequent case law has rejected this
{¶22} When determining whether suppression is appropriate, courts must consider the policy consequences and goals of the exclusionary rule. On the one hand, the exclusionary rule‘s application may cause “the loss of probative evidence and the secondary costs that arise from the ‘less accurate and more cumbersome adjudication that therefore occurs.‘” State ex rel. Wright v. Adult Parole Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 82, 89 (1996), quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (1984). Conversely, the United States Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he exclusionary rule operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through the rule‘s general deterrent effect.” Evans at 10. As a result of these conflicting policy considerations, courts
{¶23} Here, the trial court found that the State did not violate the Fourth Amendment when it seized Dulaney‘s blood samples pursuant to an invalid search warrant. We have concluded otherwise and reversed the trial court‘s decision in that regard. Based on its erroneous decision regarding the Fourth Amendment violation, the trial court never reached the issue of whether suppression was appropriate. Since it never reached this issue, the appropriate disposition is to remand this matter to the trial court so that it may consider whether suppression is appropriate based on the principles we enunciated above. See id. (remanding matter so that trial court could conduct the above balancing test); State v. Oliver, 112 Ohio St.3d 447, 2007-Ohio-372, ¶ 13 (same).
{¶24} In sum, we reverse the trial court‘s denial of Dulaney‘s motion to suppress, which was based on that court‘s finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. We find that the seizure of Dulaney‘s blood samples violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Nevertheless, we remand this matter to the
{¶25} Accordingly, we sustain Dulaney‘s sole assignment of error.
{¶26} Having found error prejudicial to Dulaney, in the particulars assigned and argued, we reverse the trial court‘s judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
WILLAMOWSKI and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr
Notes
(Emphasis added.) Hardy, supra (Fain, J., concurring).Plainly, the Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant issue from a “neutral and detached magistrate.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367 (1948). In my view, this must refer to a public officer authorized by law to issue search warrants. No matter how neutral and detached, or generally capable, a self-appointed “magistrate” may be, or a “magistrate” designated by General Motors, for example, anyone other than a public officer authorized by law to issue search warrants cannot, in my view, be considered a magistrate for Fourth Amendment purposes.
A judge of a court of record in Ohio is authorized by
R.C. 2933.21(A) to issue a search warrant “within his jurisdiction.” In my view, then a judge of a court of record in Ohio is not authorized by law to issue a search warrant outside of the judge‘s jurisdiction and can no more be considered a magistrate for Fourth Amendment purposes than anyone else lacking that authority – be that judge the finest jurist who can be found in a sister state or a foreign country.I would overrule the assignment of error in this case, and affirm, because the police officer conducting the search and seizure was in good faith in believing that he had a valid warrant, even though he in fact did not. Once we allow for reasonable police officers within this jurisdiction to become acquainted with the territorial limits upon a magistrate‘s authority to issue search warrants, however, claims of good-faith exceptions to the warrant requirement are likely to be unavailing.