THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DUDAS, APPELLANT.
No. 2023-0393
Supreme Court of Ohio
March 7, 2024
Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-775
DEWINE, J.
Submitted December 13, 2023
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Dudas, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-775.]
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SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-775
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DUDAS, APPELLANT.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Officiаl Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Dudas, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-775.]
(No. 2023-0393—Submitted December 13, 2023—Decided March 7, 2024.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 111875, 2023-Ohio-535.
DEWINE, J.
{¶ 1} This case concerns the deadline for filing a petition for postconviction relief. A statute,
{¶ 2} In this case, the defendant filed a delayed appeal. A delayed appeal is one that is filed after the ordinary 30-day deadline with the permission of the appellate court pursuant to
{¶ 3} We hold that under the plain terms of
Background
{¶ 4} On January 20, 2021, Michael Dudas was sentenced to prison for murder and other crimes. Dudas did not file an appeal within the required 30 days, but he later filed a motion for delayed appeal. The Eighth District granted his mоtion for delayed appeal on June 15, 2021, and the trial transcript was filed in the court of appeals on July 26, 2021. After considering the appeal, the Eighth District affirmed Dudas‘s convictions and sentence. State v. Dudas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110573, 2022-Ohio-931.
{¶ 5} On July 14, 2022, Dudas filed a petition for postconviction relief. The trial court summarily denied his postconviction petition. See
{¶ 6} The Eighth District affirmed the triаl court‘s judgment. It held that the trial court was not required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, because Dudas‘s appeal was untimely. 2023-Ohio-535, ¶ 15. The court of appeals
shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appеals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication * * *. If no appeal is taken, * * * the petition shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the expiration of the time for filing the appeal.
{¶ 7} The court held that a defendant who is granted leave to file a delayed appeal must file a petition for postconviction relief within 365 days from the expiration of the time for filing a timely appeal. 2023-Ohio-535 at ¶ 13. In other words, the court found that in the case of a delayed appеal, the applicable deadline was not the direct-appeal deadline of 365 days from the date of the filing of the trial transcript but rather the no-appeal-taken deadline of 365 days from the expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal.
{¶ 8} Dudas appealed to this court, arguing that a petition for postconviction relief following a delayed appeal is timely when “filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the Court of Appeals.” We аccepted jurisdiction, 170 Ohio St.3d 1449, 2023-Ohio-1979, 211 N.E.3d 127, and now reverse the court of appeals.
Dudas Prevails Under a Plain Reading of the Statute
{¶ 9} Dudas argues that a delayed appeal is a type of a direct appeal and that we should apply the direct-appeal deadline that runs from the filing of the trial transcript in the court of appeals. The statе argues that a delayed appeal is not a direct appeal and therefore we should apply the deadline that applies when no appeal is filed. Thus, we begin by considering whether a delayed appeal is a direct appeal.
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} We have explained that “[o]nce granted, a delayed appeal proceeds as any timely appeal would proceed, and the assertion of error is virtuаlly the same as it would have been but for the delayed filing.” State v. Silsby, 119 Ohio St.3d 370, 2008-Ohio-3834, 894 N.E.2d 667, ¶ 14. Thus, “[s]ubstantively and procedurally, there is no discernable difference between a direct appeal and a delayed appeal. [The two] differ only in the timeliness of the filing.” Id.
{¶ 12} Ohio law uses thе word “direct” as a modifier of “appeal” to distinguish challenges to a judgment of conviction that are reviewed directly through the appellate process from collateral attacks on such a judgment. Columbus Bar Assn. v. Armengau, 160 Ohio St.3d 445, 2020-Ohio-1421, 158 N.E.3d 570, ¶ 12-13 (distinguishing “direct appeal” from “collateral attack“); Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Deрt. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 17-18 (same). In line with this distinction, the only use of the phrase “direct appeal” in our appellate rules is in
{¶ 14} The staff notes to the 1994 amendment to
{¶ 15} Thus, a delayed appeal is a direct appeal. Under a plain reading of
{¶ 16} The Eighth District‘s decision cannot be squared with the statutory text. Not only does the Eighth District‘s construction assume that a delayed appeal is not a direct appeal, but it also requires a strained reading of the remainder of
We Construe Statutes Based on Their Text, Not Policy Concerns
{¶ 17} In eschewing the plain text, the Eighth District relied on its line of precedent that construed
{¶ 19} In this regard, we note that the United States Supreme Court in construing a statute that sets a deadline for applying for federal habeas relief, reached a similar result to the one we reach today. There, a state court “grant[ed] a criminal defendant the right to file an out-of-time direct appeal.” Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 121, 129 S.Ct. 681, 172 L.Ed.2d 475 (2009). The government argued that allowing the delayed appeal to reset the time for filing a federal habeas petition would “undermine[] the policy of finality that Congress established” for habeas petitions by pinpointing “a uniform * * * date of finality that does not vary from State to State.” Id. at 120. The United States Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that “it is the рlain language of [the statute] that pinpoints the uniform date of finality set by Congress.” Id. at 121. The same goes here. The General Assembly‘s policy is reflected in the deadlines established by the plain language of
{¶ 20} Nor do we share the Eighth District‘s worry that applying the plain reading of the statute would mean that there is “‘no time limit at all for filing [postconviction] petitions,‘” 2023-Ohio-535 at ¶ 13, quoting Fields, 136 Ohio App.3d at 398, 736 N.E.2d 933. As an initial matter, a delayed appeal cannot be pursued without leave of court. And in exercising its discretion whether to allow a delayed appeal, a court will appropriately consider the length of time the defendant took to initiate the appeal. See State v. Gibbs, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2014-G-3201, 2014-Ohio-5772, ¶ 11. And even in those limited instances where a court has granted leave to file a delayed appeal, thе time to file a postconviction petition is circumscribed—the petition must be filed within one year of the filing of the trial transcript.
Conclusion
{¶ 21} Dudas timely filed his postconviction petition within 365 days after the transcript was filed in the court of appeals in his delayed appeal. The Eighth District erred by affirming the trial court‘s judgment on the basis that Dudas‘s petition was untimely. We reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, and we remand the matter to that court for it to consider Dudas‘s assignments of error.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., concur.
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahоga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel T. Van and Frank Romeo Zeleznikar, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Michael V. Wilhelm, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Elizabeth R. Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Patrick T. Clark, Managing Counsel, and Russell Patterson, Assistant Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender.