State v. DhimalState v. Dhimal
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Achyut Dhimal appeals an order issued by the trial court authorizing the involuntary administration of psychiatric medication. Finding no error, we affirm.
{¶ 2} In March 2024, a Butler County grand jury indicted Achyut Dhimal on one count of burglary, one count of kidnapping, one count of abduction, and one count of gross sexual imposition. The charges arose from allegations that Dhimal slipped under a partially open garage door into a home in Monroe, moved a cordless drill from the garage to the spot where he left his backpack and shoes near an interior doorway, and wrestled with and groped a young woman who was asleep in the basement.
{¶ 3} At his arraignment, Dhimal filed a suggestion of incompetency and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. After a hearing in April 2024, the trial court found him incompetent to stand trial and ordered him into treatment. A review hearing in February 2025 found his competency restored, but in May 2025 the court determined that he had decompensated and was again unable to stand trial. The State then moved to have the court retain jurisdiction under
{¶ 4} While Dhimal was hospitalized, his treating psychiatrist, Dr. James Xidas, asked the court by a December 2, 2025 letter to authorize the involuntary administration of 60 medications. The court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on December 19, 2025. Dhimal attended with appointed counsel. The court admitted Dr. Xidas‘s letter as a joint exhibit, and Dr. Xidas was the only witness.
{¶ 5} Dr. Xidas testified that Dhimal had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and that, after his placement at Summit, Dhimal had been taking his medication and was generally calm. In the weeks before the hearing, however, Dhimal‘s paranoia and agitation increased. He became violent and threatening, throwing or attempting to flip
{¶ 6} On December 22, 2025, the trial court issued an order authorizing involuntary administration of medication. Relying on Steele v. Hamilton Cty. Community Mental Health Bd., 90 Ohio St.3d 176, 2000-Ohio-47, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Dhimal lacked the capacity to give or withhold informed consent to treatment, that the medication was in his best interest, and that no less intrusive treatment would be as effective. It authorized Summit to administer 59 of the 60 requested medications (prohibiting one), gradually and as necessary, to treat Dhimal‘s illness and the behaviors creating a risk of harm to himself and others.
{¶ 7} Dhimal appealed.
II. Analysis
{¶ 8} The forcible injection of mind-altering drugs into a nonconsenting person‘s body “represents a substantial interference with that person‘s liberty.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990). And the Ohio Supreme Court has described the right
A. The Requirement to Appoint an Independent Psychiatrist
{¶ 9} The first assignment of error alleges:
THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED DHIMAL OF HIS DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE OHIO SUPREME COURT‘S DIRECTIVES WHEN IT FAILED TO APPOINT AN INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIST TO EVALUATE HIM, REVIEW THE PROPOSED MEDICATION PLAN, AND FILE A REPORT.
{¶ 10} Dhimal contends in the first assignment of error that the trial court deprived him of procedural due process and departed from the directives of the Ohio Supreme Court in Steele, when it ordered him forcibly medicated without first appointing an independent psychiatrist to examine him, evaluate the proposed medication plan, and report to the court.
1. Standard of Review
{¶ 11} A trial court‘s decision to grant a request to change the conditions of a committed person‘s confinement, including a request to administer medication by force, is ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jung, 132 Ohio App.3d 369, 372 (6th Dist. 1999), citing State v. Johnson, 32 Ohio St.3d 109, 112-113 (1987). Dhimal, however, does not challenge the trial court‘s exercise of discretion or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting its findings. He raises a purely legal question, namely, whether
{¶ 12} We note at the outset a problem of preservation. Dhimal was present at the December 19, 2025 hearing with appointed counsel. He received notice, cross-examined Dr. Xidas, and had every opportunity to be heard. At no point did he request an independent expert evaluation, object to the absence of one, or otherwise alert the trial court to the argument he now makes. He has therefore forfeited all but plain error. Dhimal implicitly concedes as much, for his argument is that the trial court was required to appoint an independent psychiatrist sua sponte. As explained below, that argument fails under any standard of review, so we need not decide how demanding the plain-error inquiry would be in a proceeding that, though arising in a criminal case, is civil in nature. See State v. Williams, 2010-Ohio-2453, syllabus; Dhimal, 2026-Ohio-1805, at ¶ 41, fn. 7 (12th Dist.).
2. The Governing Substantive Framework
{¶ 13} Because the trial court retained jurisdiction over Dhimal under
3. Steele Supplies the Governing Procedural Framework
{¶ 14} A state‘s parens patriae power “allows it to care for citizens who are unable to take care of themselves.” Id. at 185, citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). Because the trial court invoked this power, making the three findings prescribed by paragraph six of the Steele syllabus, the procedural discussion in Part V of Steele is relevant to this case. That discussion distinguishes the police-power route, under which “a trained physician determines the relevant facts,” from the parens patriae route, under which the forced-medication determination “is a uniquely judicial function.” Id. at 189. It is for that judicial function that the Supreme Court described the procedures Dhimal invokes: appointed counsel if the patient is unrepresented, notice of all hearings, the opportunity to be present, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the appointment of an independent psychiatrist or a licensed clinical psychologist and a licensed physician “to examine the patient, to evaluate the recommended treatment, and to report such findings and conclusions to the court.” Id. at 189-190.
{¶ 15} The State urges us to disregard that discussion as dicta because it was not carried into the syllabus. Under the reporting rules in effect when Steele was decided in 2000, the syllabus stated the law. See Williamson Heater Co. v. Radich, 128 Ohio St. 124 (1934), paragraph one of the syllabus. And the current rule treating the entire opinion as authoritative,
{¶ 16} The key question is what Part V requires. In Steele itself, the independent psychiatrist entered the case by operation of the civil-commitment statute,
{¶ 17} Part V, in short, describes the elements of a constitutionally adequate process. It does not establish a checklist whose omission renders an order void without regard to whether the protection was ever sought, and it nowhere addresses the situation presented here, in which a represented patient, with notice and full participation through counsel, never requests the evaluation. Procedural due process rights secure an opportunity, and a party who has the opportunity to exercise procedural rights but declines to do so has not been denied due process. See State v. Brotherton, 2024-Ohio-5045, ¶ 19-20 (12th Dist.). Were the rule otherwise, any patient could remain silent, await the outcome, and claim automatic reversal. We recognize the concern that a person adjudged
{¶ 18} The case law confirms this understanding. In Jung, 132 Ohio App.3d at 371 (6th Dist.), the trial court “granted appellant‘s request for an independent psychiatric evaluation at the state‘s expense” and withheld its decision until the report arrived. In State v. Rowe, 2006-Ohio-1883, ¶ 39-40 (3d Dist.), the defendant “filed a motion to have a licensed expert appointed,” the trial court denied it, and the appellate court reversed because the defendant “was improperly denied access to an independent expert evaluation.” Rowe establishes that a court may not refuse a committed person‘s request for an independent evaluation before ordering forced medication. No Ohio court has held that an order is invalid because the trial court failed to require an evaluation that no one sought. Dhimal was not denied access to anything.
4. The Statutory Scheme Points the Same Way
{¶ 19} The structure of
{¶ 20} There is a textual wrinkle.
{¶ 21} Where the General Assembly wanted independent review to occur automatically, it said so: a recommendation for nonsecured status or termination of
5. No Plain Error
{¶ 22} Because Dhimal never requested an independent evaluation or objected to its absence, he must demonstrate plain error. He cannot. The trial court did not accept Dr. Xidas‘s request uncritically. It heard his testimony, permitted cross-examination, made each of the three Steele findings, refused authorization for one of the 60 requested medications, ordered that the remaining medications be administered gradually and only as necessary, and set the matter for further hearing on January 5, 2026, just two weeks after its order was entered. That prompt review comports with Steele‘s admonition that all such orders “should be periodically reviewed” and supported by competent medical evidence. Steele, 90 Ohio St.3d at 190. And Dhimal remains free to invoke his right to an independent expert evaluation at that hearing or at any later one. On this record, the absence of an unrequested evaluation resulted in no miscarriage of justice.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 24} The second assignment of error alleges:
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIST TO EVALUATE DHIMAL AFTER THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO DO SO SUA SPONTE.
{¶ 25} Dhimal argues in the alternative that if the trial court had no sua sponte duty to appoint an independent psychiatrist, then his counsel was ineffective for failing to request one. A commitment proceeding under
{¶ 26} To prevail, Dhimal must show both that counsel‘s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced as a result. Strickland at 687-688; State v. Hensgen, 2017-Ohio-8793, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.). Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and to have made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment, and the failure to make an adequate showing on either prong is fatal to the claim. Hensgen at ¶ 27. To establish prejudice, Dhimal must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶ 27} Dhimal‘s argument runs into problems on both the first prong and the second. As to performance, the failure to file a motion is not per se ineffective assistance. State v. Schlosser, 2011-Ohio-4183, ¶ 34 (3d Dist.). Counsel here was not idle. He
{¶ 28} Prejudice presents an even bigger problem, and Dhimal makes no serious attempt to establish it. He establishes, at most, that a motion for appointment probably would have been granted, and on that point we agree. Given
{¶ 29} Having failed to demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice, Dhimal has not established ineffective assistance of counsel. The second assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 30} We have overruled both assignments of error. The trial court applied the correct substantive standard, made each necessary finding, tailored its order, and scheduled prompt further review. Dhimal possessed, but did not exercise, a statutory right to an independent expert evaluation, and his counsel‘s decision not to invoke that right was neither unreasonable nor shown to be prejudicial. The trial court‘s judgment is affirmed.
PIPER, P.J., and SIEBERT, J., concur.
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Costs to be taxed in compliance with
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Presiding Judge
/s/ Mike Powell, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge