STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charles Allen VAUGHN, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 40616.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Jan. 24, 2014.
Review Denied March 12, 2014.
319 P.3d 497
last have fired the rifle and handled the ammunition; and (4) Janet Sylten, a former cleaning lady of the Johnsons who the defense attempted to paint as a suspect, lived at the Magic Reservoir from June 2004 until January 2005.1
Even assuming Hill knew where the gun was located in the guesthouse, he would not have had access to the house or had the knowledge of the house‘s contents necessary to frame Johnson, i.e., knowledge of where she kept her robe or where the gun safe was located to retrieve the nine-millimeter magazine found in Johnson‘s room. As the district court noted, the “totality of the evidence simply does not support Kerchusky‘s theory that Hill was the last person to touch the scope, the gun, or the ammunition.” Moreover, Kerchusky admitted on cross-examination, as he did at trial, that he has no way of knowing when fingerprints аre placed on any given item. Additionally, the fact that no one came forward to verify Hill‘s alibi does not contradict the district court‘s finding of fact that Hill testified credibly that he was camping. Finally, Johnson‘s attempt to cоnnect Hill to Sylten based on the fact that they lived in the same place at two completely different points in time is not supported by any evidence and was not raised below.
Johnson has failed to show that the newly discovered evidence is material or would probably produce an acquittal. As the district court reasoned, the fact that Hill testified as to where and how he touched the rifle “makes the fingerprint testimony even less vаluable than it was at the time of the trial, when the defense could argue that a nameless third party handled the gun, the shells and removed the scope.” We agree with the district court‘s conclusion and hold that Johnson has not met the requirements of Drapeau for a new trial.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court‘s order denying Johnson post-conviction relief on her ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence claims.
Justices EISMANN, J. JONES, HORTON and SCHROEDER, pro tem concur.
Hоn. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
GRATTON, Judge.
Charles Allen Vaughn, Jr., appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony violation of a no contaсt order,
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 30, 2009, Vaughn pled guilty to domestic violence in the presence of a child in Case No. CR-FE-2009-0014391. The district court sentenced Vaughn and entered a no contact order. The order listed the Case No. as CR-FE-2009-21560, а case that was previously dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement on December 3, 2009. Vaughn subsequently filed several motions to modify the no contact order. These motions were all filed under CR-FE-2009-0014391. The court denied the motions to modify. On March 21, 2012, Vaughn was served with an amended no contact order that changed only the Case No. to CR-FE-2009-0014391.
Vaughn violated the no contact order on multiple occasions. The State charged Vaughn with nine cоunts of violating the no contact order. Each charge alleged contact on a date before the court amended the order. Vaughn filed a motion to dismiss the information. He argued the no contact order was void because the case number listed on the order was from his dismissed case. The district court denied the motion, reasoning the dismissed case number was written as a clerical error. Vaughn entered a conditional guilty рlea to a single count of violating the no contact order. Vaughn timely appeals.
Vaughn argues the district court entered the original no contact order without subject matter jurisdiction. Whether a court lacks jurisdiсtion is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004).
“Jurisdiction over the subject matter” has been variously defined as referring to (1) the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought; (2) the class оf cases to which the particular one belongs and the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought; (3) the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to whiсh the particular one belongs; (4) both the class of cases and the particular subject matter involved; and (5) the competency of the court to hear and decide the case. However, subject matter jurisdiction does not depend on the particular parties in the case or on the manner in which they have stated their claims, nor does it depend on the correctness of any decision made by the court. Also, the location of a transaction or controversy usually does not determine subject matter jurisdiction.
State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227-28, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131-32 (2004) (quoting 20 Am. Jur.2d Courts § 70 (1995)). “An order entered without subject matter jurisdiction is void.” State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 612-13, 226 P.3d 552, 554-55 (Ct.App.2010) (citing Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 79, 218 P.3d 1138, 1140 (2009)).
Vaughn argues the court entered the no contact order in a dismissed case, which deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Vaughn‘s argument mischaracterizes the nature of the proceedings below. The district court did not issue the order in a dismissed case, but issued the order in the cаse in which Vaughn pled guilty to domestic violence. A court may order a no contact order pursuant to
(1) When a person is charged with or convicted of an offense under section 18-918 Idaho Code, or any other оffense for which a court finds that a no contact order is appropriate, an order forbidding contact with another person may be issued. A no contact order may be imposed by the court or by Idaho criminаl rule.
Vaughn pled guilty to domestic violence in the presence of a child, a violation of
Vaughn‘s reliance on his order not complying with
A precise use of the term “jurisdiction” refers only to either personal jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter jurisdiction. Unfortunately, however, the term is often used more loosely to refer simply to a court‘s authority to take a certain action or grant a certain type of relief. That is, courts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction when they really mean simply that the court committed error because the action that was taken did not comply with governing law.
Id. at 375, 195 P.3d at 734. Though
Vaughn characterizes the error not as a clerical mistake, but as the court issuing the order in his dismissed case. Vaughn‘s assertion is belied by the record.
In Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574 (1987), the 9th Circuit found: “Errors correctable under Rule 60(a) include those where what is written or recorded is not what the court intended to write or record. The error can be corrected whether it is made by a clerk or by the judge.” Id. at 1577. The court further explained:
The basic distinction between “clerical mistakes” and mistakes that cannot be corrected рursuant to Rule 60(a) is that the former consist of “blunders in execution” whereas the latter consist of instances where the court changes its mind, either because it made a legal or factual mistake in making its original determination, or because on second thought it has decided to exercise its discretion in a manner different from the way it was exercised in the original determination.
Silsby, 140 Idaho at 412, 95 P.3d at 30 (quoting Blanton, 813 F.2d at 1577 n. 2). Thus, a clerical mistake is one of draftsmanship; whereas, a judicial error is a mistake of substance. Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 873, 879, 292 P.3d 264, 270 (2012) (discussing Rule 60(a)).
Vaughn correctly notes that the district court lacked the power to issue a no contact order in the previously dismissed case. However, Vaughn has failed to establish that is what оccurred. The no contact order was filed in CR-FE-2009-0014391—the case in which Vaughn pled guilty to domestic violence. Over several years, Vaughn continued to move the court to modify the order; each motion filed and denied under CR-FE-2009-0014391. In State v. Vaughn, Docket Nos. 39526, 40237, 2013 WL 5989171 (Ct.App. Sept. 5, 2013) (unpublished), this Court affirmed two of the orders denying the motions to modify. The appeal arose from CR-FE-2009-0014391. The district court later amended the order to reflect the case number in which it was filed. Upon reviewing the record, it is apparent that writing the incorrect case number was an oversight that was properly corrected in March 2012. There is no indication that a no contact order was filed in the dismissed case, CR-FE-2009-21560, or anything to suggest the district court intended to file the order in that case. Contrary to Vaughn‘s speculation, a prosecutor described the genesis of the incorrect case number at a preliminary hearing:
When the рrosecutor from my office who took those pleas wrote out the no-contact order on that agreement, she wrote the 21560 number on the no-contact order from Case No. 14391. It was signed by [the judge]. It expires in 2029. It was sеrved on the defendant.
The district court did not file, or intend to file, the no contact order in the dismissed case in which it lacked subject matter jurisdiction; rather, a clerical error simply resulted in the wrong case number being written down. The no contact order was entered at the time of sentencing, filed in the case in which sentencing occurred, the subject of several motions and an appeal within that case, and ultimately correctеd as a clerical mistake. The no contact order was not, as Vaughn contends, entered without subject matter jurisdiction.
The district court issued the no contact order after Vaughn pled guilty to domestic battery. Based оn the initiation of the criminal proceeding in Case No. CR-FE-2009-0014391, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order. The listed case number was a mere clerical error. Therefore, Vaughn‘s judgment of conviction for fеlony violation of a no contact order is affirmed.
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge LANSING concur.
GRATTON
JUDGE