In this аppeal, appellant Carter J. Armstrong challenges his judgment of conviction and probation order as being violative of a plea agreement. We do not address the merits of his argument, however, because an issue raised by respondent State of Idaho is dispositive. The State contends that the district court was without jurisdiction in this case to allow Armstrong to withdraw an earlier guilty plea to a different оffense, and therefore all subsequent orders or judgments in this case have been void for lack of juris *373 diction. Consequently, the State contends, the earlier guilty plea and its attendant conviction and sentence must be reinstated. We are constrained to agree with the State.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Armstrong was originally charged with lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen, Idaho Code § 18-1508. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to an amended charge of felony injury to children, I.C. § 18-1501(1). One of the terms of the plea agreement was that the State would not request a psyehosexxial evaluation. The district court accepted this plea and on March 2, 2005, entered a judgment 1 imposing a unified sentence of six years with three years determinate, suspended the sentence, and placed Armstrong on four years’ probation. No appeal was taken.
Thereafter, Armstrong’s probation officer required Armstrong to- participate in a sex offender evaluation including, apparently, a psychosexual evaluation. Armstrong refused to do so and a report of probation violation was thereupon filed alleging that he was in violation of the terms of probation. Armstrong contested the alleged violation, contending that the requirement of a psychosexual evaluation was a violation of the plea agreement. He requested either specific performance of his plea agreement or, alternatively, that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. The prosecutor agreed to dismiss the alleged violation and further said that if the district court were to find a breach, the Stаte would have no objection to a withdrawal of Armstrong’s guilty plea and reinstatement of the original charge of lewd conduct.
The district court held that the State had not breached the plea agreement because the prosecutor had promised only that the State would not request a psychosexual evaluation for use in sentencing. The district court also concluded that prоbátion authorities were entitled to require a psychosexual evaluation, but that “in fairness” Armstrong would be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea if he wished to do so. Armstrong elected to withdraw his plea,, and the original lewd conduct charge was reinstated.
Over two months later, another plea agreement was reached calling for Armstrong to plead guilty to an amended charge of infamous crime against nаture, I.C. § 18-6605, and for a unified five-year sentence with a one-year determinate term, with the court retaining jurisdiction. The agreement provided that if Armstrong successfully completed the retained jurisdiction program, he would be placed on four years’ supervised probation.
At the close of the retained jurisdiction period, the district court held a hearing at which the court' expressed its intention to suspend the sentence and placed Armstrong on supervised probation for five years. Armstrong objected to the five-year term, contending that the court was bound by the second plea agreement to impose only four years of probation. The district court disagreed and, in its order suspending the sentence, placed Armstrong on probation for five years. Armstrong took this appeal, asserting as his sole claim of error that the probation term violated the binding plea agreement.
The State does not respond to this issue raised by Armstrong but, instead, argues that when the district court allowed Armstrong to withdraw his initial guilty plea in August of 2005, the court had no jurisdiction to do so and, therefore, the original guilty plea, conviction, and sentence for felony injury to children must be reinstated. Armstrong has not chosen to disрute the State’s position.
II.
ANALYSIS
The State rests its jurisdictional argument on
State v. Jakoski,
As the State’s position here illustrates, a determination that a court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue an order or judgment carries far-reaching consequences. In
Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata,
[Bjeeause of the serious ramifications and consequences which could follow from a court acting without jurisdiction over the subject matter, we recognize that it is important to keep that concept cleаrly defined. For example, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is never waived (I.R.C.P.12(h)); purported judgments entered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter are void and as such are subject to collateral attack, and are not entitled to recognition in other states under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution (Restatement of Judgments, § 7 (1942)). In addition, judges whо act without jurisdiction over the subject matter may be liable for damages in civil actions. Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 349 ,98 S.Ct. 1099 ,55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher,13 Wall. 335 ,20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). For these reasons, it may work considerable mischief to confuse lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter with questions of venue, other aspects of jurisdiction, or defenses which may bar relief or render it improper or inappropriate for a court to proceed with a ease even though it has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Id.
at 626-27,
Perhaps with a view toward these serious ramifications, our Supreme Court has at times employed a narrow definition of subject matter jurisdiction. In
Richardson v. Ruddy,
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the right of the court to exercise judicial power over that class of cases, not the particular case before it, but rather the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending; and not whether the particular case is one that presents a cause of action, or under the particular facts is triable before the court in which it is pending, because of some inherent facts which exist and may be developed during the trial.
*375
This narrow definition, or its equivalent, has been followed and applied in many subsequent casеs.
See, e.g., Bach v. Miller,
Such jurisdiction the court acquires by the act of its creation, and possesses inherently by its constitution; and it is not dependent upon the sufficiency of the bill or complaint, the validity of the demand set forth in the complaint, or plaintiffs right to the relief demanded, the regularity of the proceedings, or the correctness of the decision rendered.
Boughton,
“Jurisdiction over the subject matter” has been variously defined as referring to (1) the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought; (2) the class of cases to which the particular one belongs and the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought; (3) the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the particular one belongs; (4) both the class of cases and the particular subject matter involved; and (5) the competency of the court to hear and decide the case. However, subject matter jurisdiction does not depend on the particular parties in the case or on the manner in which they have stated their claims, nor does it depend on the correctness of any decision made by the court. Also, the location of a transaction or сontroversy usually does not determine subject matter jurisdiction.
A precise use of the term “jurisdiction” refers only to either personal jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter jurisdiction. Unfortunately, however, the term is often used more loosely to refer simply to a court’s authority to take a certain action or grant a certain type of relief. That is, courts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction when they really mean simply that the court committed error because the action that was taken did not comply with governing law. For example, our appellate courts have referred to a lack of “jurisdiction” when perhaps more precisely meaning that a motion or complaint was not timely filed, that a condition precedent to the right to filе the action was not satisfied, or that governing statutes or court rules did not authorize the particular decision made by the court.
See, e.g., Park v. Banbury,
Idаho courts are not alone in their tendency to lapse into jurisdiction terminology when they are not really referencing either subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of California recently discussed the imprecision this way:
The term “jurisdiction,” “used continuously in a variety of situations, has so many different meanings that no single statement can be entirely satisfactory as a definition.” (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941)17 Cal.2d 280 , 287,109 P.2d 942 (Abelleira).) Essentially, jurisdictional errors are of two types. “Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.” (Id. at p. 288,109 P.2d 942 .) When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an ensuing judgment is void, and “thus vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at аny time.” (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972)7 Cal.3d 94 , 119,101 Cal.Rptr. 745 ,496 P.2d 817 (Barquis ).)
However, “in its ordinary usage the phrase ‘lack of jurisdiction’ is not limited to these fundamental situations.” (Abelleira, supra,17 Cal.2d at p. 288 ,109 P.2d 942 .) It may also “be applied to a case where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no ‘jurisdiction’ (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrenсe of certain procedural prerequisites.” (Ibid.) “[W]hen a statute authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 290,109 P.2d 942 .) When a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely voidable. (In re Marriage of Goddard (2004)33 Cal.4th 49 , 55,14 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 ,90 P.3d 1209 ; Conservatorship of O’Connor (1996)48 Cal.App.4th 1076 , 1088,56 Cal.Rptr.2d 386 .) That is, its act or judgment is valid until it is set aside, and a party may be precluded from setting it aside by “princiрles of estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or res judicata.” (Conservatorship of O’Connor, at p. 1088,56 Cal.Rptr.2d 386 .) Errors which are merely in excess of jurisdiction should be challenged directly, for example by motion to vacate the judgment, or on appeal, and are generally not subject to collateral attack once the judgment is final unless “unusual circumstances were present which prevented an earlier and more appropriate attack.” (Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell (1955)44 Cal.2d 715 , 727,285 P.2d 636 ; id. at p. 725,285 P.2d 636 [general rule is that a “final judgment or order is res judicata” and not subject to collateral attack “even though contrary to statute where the court has jurisdiction in the fundamental sense, i.e., of the subject matter and the parties”]; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Jurisdiction, § 323, p. 899.)
People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co.,
This tendency to overuse the term “jurisdiction” has been confessed by even the United Statеs Supreme Court. In
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
“Jurisdiction,” this Court has observed, “is a word of many, too many, meanings.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,523 U.S. 83 , 90,118 S.Ct. 1003 , [1010]140 L.Ed.2d 210 [224] (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court, no less than other courts, has sometimes been profligate in its use of the term. For example, this Court and others have occasionally described a nonextendable time limit as “mandatory and jurisdictional.” See, e.g., United States v. Robinson,361 U.S. 220 , 229,80 S.Ct. 282 , [288]4 L.Ed.2d 259 [265] (1960). But in recent decisions, we have clarified that time prescriptions, however emрhatic, “are not properly typed ‘jurisdictional.’” Scarborough v. Principi,541 U.S. 401 , 414,124 S.Ct. 1856 , [1865]158 L.Ed.2d 674 [687] (2004); accord Eber *377 hart v. United States, ante, [546 U.S. 12 ] at 16-19,126 S.Ct. 403 , 405-407,163 L.Ed.2d 14 [18-21] (2005) (per curiam); Kontrick [v. Ryan], 540 U.S., [443] at 454-455,124 S.Ct. 906 [at 914-915], [157 L.Ed.2d 867 at 878-879 (2004)]. See also Carlisle v. United States,517 U.S. 416 , 434-435,116 S.Ct. 1460 , [1470-1471]134 L.Ed.2d 613 [629-630] (1996) (GINSBURG, J., concurring).
On the subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-for-relief dichotomy, this Court and others have been less than meticulous. “Subject matter jurisdiction in federal-question cases is sometimes erroneously conflated with a plaintiffs need and ability to prove the defendant bound by the federal law asserted as the predicate for relief — a merits-relatеd determination.” 2 J. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.30[1], p. 12-36.1 (3d ed.2005) (hereinafter Moore). Judicial opinions, the Second Circuit incisively observed, “often obscure the issue by stating that the court is dismissing ‘for lack of jurisdiction’ when some threshold fact has not been established, without explicitly considering whether the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim.” Da Silva,229 F.3d, at 361 . Wе have described such unrefined dispositions as “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” that should be accorded “no precedential effect” on the question whether the federal court had authority to adjudicate the claim in suit. Steel Co.,523 U.S. at 91 ,118 S.Ct. 1003 [at 1011,140 L.Ed.2d at 225 ].
In the case before us, the State’s argument — -that the order allowing withdrawal of Armstrong’s initial guilty plea and all subsequent orders or judgments are void — can prevail only if subject matter jurisdiction was truly absеnt. This is so because the State did not challenge the court’s jurisdiction at any point during the proceedings below. This Court would ordinarily not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal,
State v. Fodge,
In explaining its decision, the Jakoski Court said:
Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court’s jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal.
Jakoski argues that Article V, § 20, of the Constitution of the State of Idaho grants the district courts unending jurisdiction over a case. That provision states, “The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at lаw and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law.” The word “jurisdiction” refers to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district courts. See Boughton v. Price,70 Idaho 243 ,215 P.2d 286 (1950). Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the abstract power to hear a case of a particular kind and character. Wayne v. Alspach,20 Idaho 144 ,116 P. 1033 (1911). Article V, § 20, grants district courts the power to hear all types of cases, both at law and in equity. It does not grant them perрetual jurisdiction to amend or set aside final judgments in cases that they have heard.
Rule 33(c) of the Idaho Criminal Rules does not include any provision extending the jurisdiction of the trial court for the *378 purpose of hearing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Jakoski was sentenced on December 12, 1994, and the judgment was entered on December 22,1994. He did not appeal the judgment, and it therefore becamе final 42 days later. Thereafter, the district court no longer had jurisdiction to hear a motion to withdraw Jakoski’s guilty plea.
Jakoski,
The Jakoski holding, that a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea after the judgment of conviction becomes final, carriеs the attendant consequences discussed above, including the consequence that the validity of the order may be challenged at any time. In this case, it includes voiding all of the district court proceedings that followed in the months after the court granted Armstrong’s untimely motion to withdraw his initial guilty plea because all of those proceedings occurred without subject matter jurisdiction. In view of the Supreme Court’s explicit holding that subject matter jurisdiction is absent in this circumstance, if such consequences are not to attach, that clarification must come from our Supreme Court.
When Armstrong moved to withdraw his guilty plea to felony injury to children, the time for appeal from the judgment of conviction had expired and no appeal was pending. Therefore, under Jakoski, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the motion. Accordingly, Armstrong’s plea of guilty to felony injury to children and the judgment of conviction entered upon that guilty plea, including the sentence imposed, are reinstated. This disposition renders moot the issue raised by Armstrong in this appeal.
III.
CONCLUSION
Armstrong’s conviction for infamous crime against nature is vacated and the prior judgment of conviction for felony injury to children is reinstated. This casе is remanded to the district court for any further proceedings that may be required to effectuate this decision.
Notes
. Although the March 2, 2005 judgment was confusingly entitled "Minute Entry and Order,” there is no dispute that it was actually a judgment of conviction.
See State v. Thomas,
Docket No. 34741,
. The Jakoski opinion itself does not disclose that the State made no jurisdictional objection in the district court, but the parties' briefing in that case so indicates.