D. Scott and Charlotte Summer appeal from the district court’s judgment dividing among the parties the proceeds of sale of jointly owned real property. We affirm.
I.
Factual and Procedural Summary
Christ and Maureen Troupis were co-owners with D. Scott Summer and Charlotte Summer as tenants in common of real property located at 385 S. Locust Grove Road, Meridian, Idaho. The Troupises alleged that from September 8, 2006, up to the filing of their lawsuit to partition and sell the real property, they incurred expenses for the common benefit of the co-owners amounting to $40,560.54. The expenses included real estate taxes, principal and interest payments on the mortgage and line of credit secured by the real property, insurance, utilities, and weed removal. After the lawsuit was filed, the Troupises incurred further expenses to keep the property out of foreclosure, raising their claim to $52,453.65.
On October 3, 2007, the Troupises filed a verified complaint for partition of the real property. The complaint requested the following relief: partition and sale of the real property, reimbursement of all sums incurred by the Troupises in maintaining the property for the common benefit of the parties, and division of the net proceeds of the sale between the parties.
D. Scott Summer filed a verified answer pro se, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuit under Idaho Code sections 6-501 and 6-541. He also alleged as an affirmative defense that he was entitled to an equitable setoff for wage claims and “wrongfully appropriated [partnership monies.” Charlotte Summer appeared through an attorney, and her answеr similarly attacked the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter. 1 Charlotte also asked the court to equitably set off amounts due to the Troupises for Scott’s wage claims and certain payments made by the Summers for utilities, mortgage indebtedness, and other expenses.
While thе lawsuit was pending, the parties found a buyer for the real property and the property was sold on March 20, 2008, pursuant to agreement of the parties. After all taxes and mortgage liens were satisfied, $114,202.92 of the proceeds remained payable to the Troupises and Summers. The Summers objected to any division of
the
sale
The Troupises moved for summary judgment, asking the court to distribute the proceeds of the sale. Hearing was held on May 12, 2008. The Summers filed no affidavits to support their objections to the Troupises’ claims. Instead, the Summеrs called the court five minutes before the hearing to advise that they would not appear. After the hearing, the court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in which it found the Troupises to be the prevailing party and awarded them $52,453.65, representing the money they expеnded for the common benefit of the parties, plus accrued interest. The court also allowed the Summers $4,611.42 for expenditures they made for the common benefit of the parties, plus accrued interest. Finally, the court ordered that the remaining sale proceeds were to be divided equally between the parties.
The district court awarded the Troupises $168.00 in costs and $13,920.00 in attorney fees for a total award of $14,088.00. The Summers appealed to this Court.
II.
Issues on Appeal
The following issues are presented to this Court on appeal: (1) whether the district court hаd jurisdiction to divide the sale proceeds of the jointly-held property; and (2) whether the district court erred in awarding the Troupises attorney fees and costs.
A.
Standard of Review
The issue of whether the district court had jurisdiction over this action is one of law, over which this Court exercises free rеview.
Taylor v. Maile,
B.
The Summers argue that Idaho Code section 6-501, under which this suit was brought, does not grant subject matter jurisdiction to the district court to distribute the proceeds of the sale of jointly-owned property when the sale was not judicially ordered. Under the Summers’ reading of section 6-501, the district court has the authority to order the sale, but lacks subject matter jurisdiction to divide the resulting proceeds of sale. The Summers assert that section 6-501 confers jurisdiction over real property only, and not the proceeds of a real property sale, which are personal property.
The Troupises contend that the district court had equitable jurisdiction over the sale proceeds because both parties asserted equitable claims related to the proceeds of the sale of the tenancy-in-common reаl property in their pleadings. The Troupises point out that the Idaho Constitution and statutes grant the district court jurisdiction over eases like this one and allow the district court to make compensatory adjustments between parties when deciding the case.
Subject matter jurisdiсtion is a key requirement for the justiciability of a claim and cannot be waived by consent of the parties.
Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata,
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the right of the court to exercise judicial power over that class of cases; not the particular case beforе it, but rather the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending; and notwhether the particular case is one that presents a cause of action, or under the particular facts is triable before the court in which it is pending, because of some of the inherent facts that exist and may be developed during trial.
The district court in this case had jurisdiction becausе it is a court of general jurisdiction and there has been no showing that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking. First, Idaho’s Constitution provides that “[t]he district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity.” Idaho Const, art. 5, § 20. Second, the relevant statutes — all part of Idaho Cоde, title 6, chapter 5, entitled “Partition of Real Estate” — provide for jurisdiction over both the class of cases presented and over the specific remedy sought. The lawsuit was filed pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-501, which reads:
When partition may be had. When several сotenants hold and are in possession of real property as parceners, joint tenants or tenants in common, in which one (1) or more of them have an estate of inheritance, or for life or lives, or for years, an action may be brought by one (1) or more of suсh persons for a partition thereof, according to the respective rights of the persons interested therein, and for a sale of such property, or a part thereof, if it appears that a partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners.
I.C. § 6-501. The statutory and constitutional provisions, when taken together, demonstrate that the district court, as a court of general jurisdiction, had the authority to hear this matter when filed because it was in fact dealing with the partition of real property under the authority grantеd by Idaho Code section 6-501.
To support their claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Summers rely on
Platts v. Platts,
which presents a situation entirely inapplicable to the question presented here.
Furthermore, the district court retained jurisdiction even after the property was sold, as indicated by the plain language оf Idaho Code, title 6, chapter 5. There are several provisions of chapter 5 which show the Legislature intended for the district
This Court has long recognized “that equity having obtained jurisdiction of the subject matter of a dispute, will retain it for the settlement of all controversies between the parties with respect thereto and will grant all proper relief whether prayed for or not.”
Boesiger v. Freer,
C.
The Summers argue that the award of attorney fеes should be vacated because the district court had no jurisdiction to make its ruling, and therefore, no jurisdiction to award attorney fees. As discussed above, the court had jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the Summers’ arguments that the attorney fee award should be vaсated is likewise without merit. The Troupises request attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code sections 12-120(3) and 12-121. We award fees under section 12-120(3).
Idaho Code section 12-120(3) compels an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action to recover on a commercial transaction. I.C. § 12-120(3);
BECO Constr. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Eng’rs, Inc.,
III.
The decision of the distriсt court is affirmed. The Troupises are awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Notes
. D. Scott Summer initially attempted to appear pro se on behalf of his wife; however, the district court determined thаt Scott could not represent his wife’s interest pro se, and therefore she had to appear pro se herself or hire an attorney.
. The Summers also argued in the court below, although they have failed to do so in their briefing to this Court, that the issue before the court is moot. Because this Court does not hear moot cases, the issue of mootness will be addressed.
Comm. for Rational Predator Mgmt. v. Dept. of Agric.,