State v. ChambersState v. Chambers
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Ishmial K. Chambers (hereinafter “Chambers“), appeals the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas’ decision overruling his motion to suppress evidence seized as the result of a traffic stop. We affirm.
{¶2} On October 19, 2009, Trooper Kurt Beidelschies of the Ohio State Highway Patrol stopped Chambers on southbound U.S. Interstate 75 (“I-75“) following a probable violation of
{¶3} On October 20, 2009, the Hancock County Grand Jury indicted Chambers on one count of possession of cocaine in violation of
{¶4} On November 6, 2009, the case was continued to allow Chambers time to file a motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop. (Doc. No. 10). On December 1, 2009, Chambers filed his motion to suppress alleging that: (1) there was no probable cause, nor clear articulable facts to stop his vehicle; (2) there was no probable cause, nor clear articulable facts to justify his continued detention beyond the time necessary to issue a minor traffic citation; (3)
{¶5} On June 2, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on the motion and, afterwards, took the matter under advisement. (Doc. No. 49). On July 16, 2010, the trial court held a hearing to announce its decision on the motion. (Doc. No. 61). The trial court overruled Chambers’ motion to suppress at the hearing, and filed its decision noting the same on July 23, 2010. (Id.).
{¶6} On September 13, 2010, Chambers withdrew his previously tendered plea of not guilty and entered a plea of no contest to the indictment. (Doc. No. 70). Thereafter, the trial court found Chambers guilty and sentenced him to five (5) years of incarceration. (Doc. No. 72).
{¶7} On October 1, 2010, Chambers filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 95). Chambers now appeals raising one assignment of error for our review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT‘S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO A DE MINIMUS TRAFFIC STOP WHERE THERE WAS NO PRIOR OR CONCURRENT EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Chambers argues that the fact he slowed his vehicle to fifty-seven miles per hour (57 M.P.H.) in a sixty-five mile-
{¶9} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id., citing State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972.
{¶10} When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, deference is given to the trial court‘s findings of fact so long as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶8. With respect to the trial court‘s conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must decide whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710, 707 N.E.2d 539.
{¶11} Trooper Kurt Beidelschies of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, Findlay Post 32, testified that he was parked in a marked cruiser facing southbound I-75 traffic while working from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. on October 19, 2009. (June 2,
{¶12} Trooper Beidelschies approached Chambers’ vehicle, informed him of the reason for the stop, and requested Chambers’ driver‘s license, registration, and proof of insurance. (Id.). Chambers provided Trooper Beidelschies his license, but produced several rental agreements for the car instead of the registration. (Id. at 12). Some of the rental agreements had Chambers’ name on them and others did not, so Trooper Beidelschies requested that Chambers have a seat in the front of his cruiser to sort through the paperwork. (Id. at 12-13). Among the several agreements Chambers provided, Trooper Beidelschies located a rental agreement from Hertz rental service in Patricia Board‘s name that listed Chambers as an additional driver. (Id. at 13). Trooper Beidelschies contacted dispatch in order to verify the rental agreement. (Id.). Trooper Beidelschies
{¶13} Trooper Beidelschies testified that he ran a LEADS check on Chambers’ driver‘s license, and that it can take longer to process an out-of-state license, such as Chambers’ Kentucky driver‘s license. (Id.). Trooper Beidelschies further testified that he talked with Travar Board, Chambers’ step-son and a passenger in the vehicle, about their travel. (Id. at 12, 14, 16). Board told Trooper Beidelschies that he had been in Michigan for about a week for a funeral, and that his aunt had driven him from Kentucky to Michigan. (Id. at 16). Board told Trooper Beidelschies that he did not know how Chambers arrived in Michigan. (Id.). Trooper Beidelschies testified that Board‘s story conflicted with Chambers’ story, because Chambers indicated that Board accompanied him from Kentucky to
{¶14} Deputy Smith and canine, Becky, arrived approximately five (5) minutes later and alerted on Chambers’ vehicle. (Id. at 17-18). At that point in time, Trooper Beidelschies explained to Chambers and Board that they were under investigative detention and placed them in the back seat of his cruiser. (Id. at 18). Trooper Beidelschies testified that they located numerous bags of marijuana and a baseball-sized bag of cocaine in a bag of dirty clothes in the vehicle‘s trunk. (Id.). At that time, Trooper Beidelschies returned to his cruiser and informed Chambers and Board of their Miranda rights, and asked the two of them about the drugs. (Id.). At first, both men denied knowledge of the drugs, but Chambers later admitted that the drugs belonged to him, and he did not want his step-son, Board, to get into trouble for what he had inside the vehicle. (Id.). Trooper Beidelschies
{¶15} On cross-examination, Trooper Beidelschies testified that his cruiser was facing west so he could see southbound traffic, and he had his spotlight illuminating the roadway. (Id. at 19-20). Trooper Beidelschies testified that the purpose of using the spotlight was to determine the number of occupants in the vehicle for officer safety. (Id. at 20). He further testified that the use of the spotlight was a standard operating procedure. (Id. at 25). Trooper Beidelschies could not recall how many leasing companies were on the agreements that Chambers provided, nor could he recall the number of lease agreements that Chambers provided. (Id. at 20-21). Trooper Beidelschies also could not recall whether Chambers’ driving status came back valid prior or subsequent to his call for canine assistance. (Id. at 21). He did not copy all of the lease agreements but only the valid lease agreement, which he identified and which was marked as defendant‘s exhibit A. (Id. at 22, 25, 40). Trooper Beidelschies testified that Chambers’ speed was not the reason for the stop, but that Chambers’ rapid deceleration was an indication of possible impairment, which is why he decided to follow Chambers. (Id. at 26, 27). Trooper Beidelschies testified that he did not witness Chambers’ vehicle weaving from side to side, fishtailing, or driving erratically, nor did he smell an odor of alcoholic beverage upon Chambers or
{¶16} On re-direct examination, Trooper Beidelschies testified that he initiates between ten to fifteen (10-15) traffic stops each work night, each averaging between fifteen to twenty (15-20) minutes in duration. (Id. at 38). Trooper Beidelschies testified that, generally, numerous rental agreements, multiple occupants, nervous behavior by occupants of a vehicle, and conflicting stories all can prolong the duration of a traffic stop. (Id. at 38-39).
{¶17} Hancock County Sheriff‘s Deputy Fred Smith testified that he was working on October 19, 2009 with his canine, Becky, who is trained and certified for detection of marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and their
{¶18} We now turn to Chambers’ arguments. Chambers first argues that the fact he slowed his vehicle to fifty-seven miles per hour (57 M.P.H.) in a sixty-five mile-per-hour (65 M.P.H.) zone did not provide Trooper Beidelschies with probable cause to stop his vehicle.
{¶19} In order to constitutionally stop a vehicle, an officer must, at a minimum, have either: (1) a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and
{¶20} An officer‘s “reasonable suspicion” is determined based on the totality of the circumstances. Moore, 2008-Ohio-2407, at ¶11, citing Andrews, 2008-Ohio-625, at ¶8, citing State v. Terry (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 253, 257, 719 N.E.2d 1046, citing State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565 N.E.2d 1271. “‘Specific and articulable facts’ that will justify an investigatory stop by way of reasonable suspicion include: (1) location; (2) the officer‘s experience, training or knowledge; (3) the suspect‘s conduct or appearance; and (4) the surrounding circumstances.” Purtee, 2006-Ohio-6337, at ¶9, citing State v. Gaylord, 9th Dist. No. 22406, 2005-Ohio-2138, ¶9, citing State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178-79, 524 N.E.2d 489.
{¶21} Trooper Beidelschies testified that he began to follow Chambers after he noticed Chambers decelerate very rapidly as Chambers approached his parked
{¶22} Chambers also argues that the fact that he was a person of color did not provide Trooper Beidelschies with probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. Although we generally agree with Chambers’ proposition of law, the trial court, as trier of fact, specifically found that the record lacked sufficient evidence that Chambers’ race played a role in initiating the traffic stop. (July 16, 2010 Tr. at 18-19). Additionally, even if this Court were to assume that Trooper Beidelschies initiated the traffic stop based upon Chambers’ race, that fact does not affect the
{¶23} Finally, Chambers argues that Trooper Beidelschies did not have further indicia of criminal activity to justify his further expansion of the traffic stop, i.e. to request canine assistance.
{¶24} “‘[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.‘” State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶12, quoting State v. Keathley (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 130, 131, 562 N.E.2d 932. See, also, State v. Whitman, 184 Ohio App.3d 733, 2009-Ohio-5647, 922 N.E.2d 293, ¶11. “This measure includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver‘s license, registration, and vehicle plates.” Batchili at ¶12, citing State v. Bolden, 12th Dist. No. CA2003-03-007, 2004-Ohio-184, ¶17, citing Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660. Further, “‘[i]n determining if an officer completed these tasks within a reasonable length of time, the court must evaluate the duration of the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently conducted the investigation.‘” Batchili at ¶12, quoting State v. Carlson (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 598-99, 657 N.E.2d 591, citing State v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 521-22, 605 N.E.2d 70, and U.S. v. Sharpe (1985), 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605.
{¶25} “The use of a drug-detection dog does not constitute a “search,” and an officer is not required, prior to a dog sniff, to establish either probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that drugs are concealed in a vehicle.” Whitman, 2009-Ohio-5647, at ¶9, citing Illinois v. Caballes (2005), 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842; United States v. Place (1983), 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110; Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d at 594; United States v. Seals (C.A.5, 1993), 987 F.2d 1102, 1106. A law enforcement officer needs no suspicion or cause to “run the dog around” a stopped vehicle if he does it contemporaneously with the legitimate activities associated with the traffic violation. Whitman, 2009-Ohio-5647, at ¶9, citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
{¶26} The record herein demonstrates that Chambers’ vehicle was lawfully detained based upon probable cause of a violation of
{¶27} Chambers’ assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶28} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI, J., concurs.
ROGERS, P.J., concurs in Judgment Only.
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