STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. SCOTT CAMELIN, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 18CA3642
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY
DATE JOURNALIZED:3-22-19
[Cite as State v. Camelin, 2019-Ohio-1055.]
ABELE, P.J.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY; CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
James T. Boulger, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellant.
Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela C. Wells, Ross County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Common Pleas Court judgment of conviction and sentence. After the trial court denied a motion to dismiss the indictment based on speedy trial grounds, Scott Camelin, defendant below and appellant herein, pled no contest to three counts of sexual battery.
{¶ 2} Appellant assigns one error for review:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT IN CASE NO. 17CR207, THE STATE HAVING FAILED TO AFFORD THE DEFENDANT A TRIAL WITHIN THE TIME LIMITS SPECIFIED IN
R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) and (E).”
{¶ 4} On the morning of trial on December 4, 2017, the prosecution filed (1) a supplemental bill of particulars, and (2) a motion in limine that requested the trial court to prohibit appellant from introducing evidence at trial that pertained to the victim’s alleged prior acts and conduct, and to prohibit certain witness testimony regarding those prior acts. At that point, when confronted with the more detailed bill of particulars, appellant, understandably, felt compelled to request a continuance of the jury trial. The court granted appellant’s request and continued the matter to April 16, 2018.
{¶ 5} On April 6, 2018, appellant filed an amended notice of alibi and a motion to dismiss the indictment. In particular, appellant alleged that the state had failed to afford him a speedy trial
{¶ 6} On April 16, 2018, the trial court held a hearing to consider the evidence and arguments pertaining to the motions to dismiss and the speedy trial issue. At the hearing, Child Protection Center employee Julie Oates testified that during her interview the victim disclosed very few details about the specific dates and times of the alleged incidents. Chillicothe Police Detective Twila Goble also testified that she first spoke with the victim at her high school, and subsequently at the Child Protection Center, on several occasions at the victim’s home, twice at Children’s Services and three or four times at the prosecutor’s office. Goble testified that, sometimes the victim was vague in her recollection of specific dates and times, but did relate that her abuse occurred “on an almost daily basis” during the three months the family resided at the Quality Inn. Goble further testified that, on the Saturday before the December 4, 2017 scheduled trial date, she spoke with the victim for “hours and hours and hours * * * [b]ecause [A.C.] was remembering specifics and had started talking to us about it.” When asked whether they conveyed to defense counsel the new information the victim had provided on that Saturday, Goble said yes. When asked how many times she met with the victim to attempt to obtain information about the specific dates, Goble replied “at least seven.” Finally, the victim testified about her interviews and the information that she provided to the authorities.
{¶ 7} On April 17, 2018, the trial court overruled appellant’s motions to dismiss. That same day, appellant pled no contest to three counts of sexual battery (Counts 11, 13, and 19 in Case No. 17CR207) in violation of
{¶ 8} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to dismiss the indictment. In particular, appellant contends that, pursuant to
{¶ 9} Ohio’s speedy trial statutes provide that if a defendant’s trial is not held within the time specified in
{¶ 10} A defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial arises from the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). A defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial arises from
{¶ 11} When a defendant requests discharge on speedy trial grounds and demonstrates that a trial did not occur within the speedy trial time limits, the defendant has made a prima facie case for discharge. State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 16CA10, 2017-Ohio-7864; State v. Cottrell, 4th Dist. Ross Nos. 11CA3241 & 11CA3242, 2012-Ohio-4583, ¶ 10. The prosecution then bears the burden to show that actions or events chargeable to the accused under
{¶ 12} In the case sub judice, when appellant requested a continuance on the morning of the December 4, 2017 trial date, it appears that 126 speedy trial days had elapsed. In the case sub judice, the parties appear to agree that the central issue is whether for purposes of speedy trial time computation, the time period from December 4, 2017 to April 16, 2018 should be counted against the appellant, or should be counted against the prosecution.1 Appellant recognizes that this time
{¶ 13} Pursuant to
{¶ 14} In general, child sex abuse cases present many difficult and unusual challenges, including hearing specific and detailed information about the offenses. “An indictment charging sexual offenses against children ‘need not state with specificity the dates of alleged abuse, so long
{¶ 15} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court acknowledged the “extreme difficulty in obtaining specific dates and time evidence for the inclusion in a Bill of Particulars when you are dealing with a child rape case.” The court recognized that also in this particular case
{¶ 16} The purpose of a bill of particulars is “to elucidate or particularize the conduct of the accused.” Sellards, supra, at 171; Lawrinson, supra, at 239. Here, appellant requested a bill of particulars to specifically set forth the dates and times of the various offenses set forth in the indictment. After our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecution’s December 4, 2017 supplemental bill of particulars sufficiently complied with Sellards and Lawrinson. As the trial court indicated, after it heard and reviewed the evidence, the evidence does not support the view that the state acted in bad faith or in an unreasonable or dilatory
{¶ 17} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that the appellee recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to the expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
McFarland, J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY: ________________________________
Peter B. Abele, Presiding Judge
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
Notes
In the case sub judice, we recognize that many speedy trial tolling events occurred during the trial court proceeding. For example, on June 15, 2017 appellant filed a motion to continue the pretrial hearing from June 26, 2017. The trial court continued the hearing to July 18, 2017. On June 19, 2017, appellant filed a motion for bond modification, which the court overruled on July 3, 2017. On August 4, 2017, appellant filed a motion to compel a bill of particulars (in Case No. 17CR207). The state responded on August 7, 2017. On August 15, 2017, the state filed a motion to join all of the indictments and cases for trial. On August 23, 2017, appellant filed another motion to continue, and the court continued the matter from September 7, 2017 to December 4, 2017. On September 6, 2017, the court ordered that the two cases be consolidated. On October 26, 2017, the state filed a motion to compel discovery and the court ordered appellant to submit the requested discovery by November 10, 2017. Appellant, it appears, responded to the state’s motion to compel discovery on November 9, 2017, November 13, 2017 and November 17, 2017.
Thus, in light of the tolling events that occurred during the course of the trial court proceedings, when we compute the number of days to be counted against the state we begin with the day after appellant’s arrest (May 20, 2017).
Under the