State v. Staffin, 07ca2967 (1-29-2008)State v. Staffin, 07ca2967 (1-29-2008)
{¶ 1} On July 11, 2005, the State arrested Duane A. Staffin on charges of Theft from an Elderly Person. On May 17, 2007, 674 days later, the Ross County Court of Common Pleas dismissed the charges on the grounds that the statutory time limit for a speedy trial had expired. On appeal, the State argues that a continuance granted to the State tolled the speedy trial period. The trial court had concluded this continuance did not toll the time because the entry granting it did not state which party had sought the continuance or against whom it would be charged for speedy-trial purposes. However, where the record affirmatively indicates the party requesting the continuance and the reasonableness of the continuance, the speedy trial period is tolled. Nonetheless, we hold that this continuance does not toll the time limit because the record supports the trial court‘s alternative finding that the State did not act diligently in securing its
{¶ 2} Staffin presented a prima facie case that the State failed to bring him to trial within 270 days. Because the State has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the speedy-trial period had not lapsed, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.
I. Facts
{¶ 3} On July 8, 2005, a Ross County grand jury indicted Staffin on charges of Theft from an Elderly Person, a violation of
{¶ 4} The trial court scheduled a status hearing for December 15, 2006, which the court continued to January 19, 2007, on Staffin‘s motion. On January 26, 2007, the trial court set a trial date for May 21, 2007. That same day, Staffin moved for an order compelling the State to produce a written report prepared by one of the investigating officers because he believed it contained exculpatory evidence. The State did not respond to this motion before the hearing date set for April 12, 2007. At the hearing, the officer testified that he did not recall there being any such report; however, he also stated that no one had asked him to search for a report prior to the morning of the hearing. The trial court orally ordered the State to turn over any reports it located in the future. On May 17, 2007, Staffin moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the State had violated his rights to a speedy trial. After the trial court granted this motion and dismissed the case, this appeal followed.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 5} The State has raised one assignment of error: “The Trial Court erred in its dismissal of this case based upon its calculation of speedy trial pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Sections
III. Standard of Review
{¶ 6} Appellate review of a trial court‘s decision regarding a motion to dismiss based on a violation of the speedy trial provisions involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Pinson, Scioto App. No. 00CA2913, 2001-Ohio-2423. We accord due deference to the trial court‘s findings of fact if supported by competent, credible evidence. However, we independently review whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts of the case. State v. Floyd Thomas, Adams App. No. 06CA825, 2007-Ohio-5340, at ¶ 8. Furthermore, when reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy trial claim, we must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the State. Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57, 1996-Ohio-171, 661 N.E.2d 706.
IV. The Right to a Speedy Trial
{¶ 7} The State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its case against Staffin on the basis of a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The State must bring a person arrested and charged with a felony to trial within 270 days.
{¶ 8}
The time within which an accused must be brought to trial * * * may be extended only by the following:
* * *
(E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused;
* * *
(H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused‘s own motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused‘s own motion * * *
The State bears the burden to show that actions or events chargeable to the defendant have tolled enough time so that the defendant is tried within the speedy-trial period. State v. Whitt, Scioto App. No. 04CA2962, 2005-Ohio-5154, at ¶ 16; State v. Brewster (1st Dist.), 157 Ohio App.3d 342, 2004-Ohio-2722, 811 N.E.2d 162, at ¶ 6.
{¶ 9} When computing how much time has run against the State under
{¶ 10} The trial court found that two periods of time must be charged against the State. First, the trial court concluded that the speedy trial period was not tolled during a continuance granted to the State between November 23, 2005, and January 31, 2006. The journal entry is clear that the court granted the continuance because of the unavailability of the State‘s witness. However, the trial could decided that, because the entry does not state against whom the continuance was charged and whether the speedy trial period continued to be tolled, this 69-day period must be charged against the State. The trial court also noted that “[t]he State waited seven weeks after it was notified of the hearing date before issuing a precipe for subpoenas for the two witnesses it intended to call. The State waited three weeks after the service of the subpoenas on Agent Kessler to seek a continuance based on his unavailability.” It appears that the trial court concluded that if the State had acted more diligently, the next available date for a hearing would have been sooner than January 31, 2006.
{¶ 11} We agree with the State that this time period does not have to be charged against the State by virtue of the trial court‘s failure to journalize the party against whom the continuance is charged and whether the speedy trial period has been tolled. Staffin relies on State v. Corfias (1994), Gallia App. No. 93CA03, unreported, a plurality opinion, for the proposition that “the court‘s failure to identify the party against whom the
{¶ 12} In this case, the record clearly establishes the court granted the State‘s request for a continuance because a key prosecution witness was unavailable for the suppression hearing. We have previously held that the unavailability of a witness may be an appropriate ground for a continuance that tolls the speedy trial time limitation under
{¶ 13} However, the trial court also charged the delay caused by this continuance against the State because of its lack of diligence in subpoenaing its witnesses and its lack of diligence in seeking a continuance. In State v. Reeser (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 189, 191, 407 N.E.2d 25, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a continuance is not “reasonable” for purposes of
{¶ 14} Next, the trial court concluded that the speedy trial limitation period was not tolled while Staffin‘s motion to compel discovery was pending, a period of 76 days. The State cites State v. Brown, 98 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-7040, 781 N.E.2d 159, at ¶ 23, for the proposition that a defendant‘s discovery request tolls the running of the speedy trial period. However, in Brown, the court explained that it was sensible to interpret
{¶ 15} However, in State v. Sanchez, 110 Ohio St.3d 274, 2006-Ohio-4478, 853 N.E.2d 283, at ¶ 26, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
{¶ 16} We are also concerned about the 364 days it took to decide Staffin‘s motion to suppress. A defendant‘s motion to suppress tolls the speedy trial period.
{¶ 17} Staffin filed his motion to suppress on August 25, 2005. The court originally set a hearing on that motion for November 23, 2005, but moved it to January 31, 2006. At the two-day hearing, the parties presented the testimony of four witnesses and generated a transcript of 159 pages. Following the hearing, the court ordered the parties to file additional briefs, which occurred on March 29, 2006. However, following that date, there was no action of record for the next 148 days. There were no additional hearings held or motions, orders, or even requests for subpoenas filed until the trial court entered its order granting the motion to suppress on August 24, 2006. The motion does not appear to raise any uncommon or unusually complex legal issues; Staffin moved to suppress his statements to police on the grounds that they were obtained before the police read Staffin his Miranda rights. Staffin was interrogated in the presence of a local attorney who was not representing Staffin and who testified that Staffin was in custody and not read his rights when the police obtained his statement. The trial court concluded that the investigators in this case were not credible, that Staffin was in custody when he first made his statements to police, and that Staffin‘s pre-Miranda statements tainted his later post-Miranda statements.
{¶ 18} Although the Supreme Court has held that a defendant‘s motion tolls the speedy time period for a reasonable time:
[t]his does not imply that the state may prolong its response time or that a trial court has unbridled discretion in taking time to rule on a defense motion. * * * [A]s we have already stated, “[a] strict adherence to the spirit of the speedy trial statutes requires a trial judge, in the sound exercise of his judicial discretion, to rule on these motions in as expeditious a manner as possible.”
Sanchez, 2006-Ohio-4478, at ¶ 27, quoting State v. Martin (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 289, 297, 384 N.E.2d 239. This Court and others have suggested that the 120-day period prescribed in Sup. R. 40 for ruling on a motion “serves as an indication of what a reasonable amount of time would be in a typical case.” State v. Keaton (1996), Pickaway App. No. 95CA15, unreported (discussing predecessor rule); see also State v. Baker, 12th Dist. No. CA2005-05-017, 2006-Ohio-2516, at ¶ 43 (“At best, appellant can only be charged with 120 days as a result of his filing his motion to reconsider, as the record fails to demonstrate that the trial court needed any more time than the 120-day period prescribed in Sup. R. 40 for ruling on that motion.“); State v. Fields, 5th Dist No. 05-CA-17, 2006-Ohio-223, at ¶ 26 (“Pursuant to Sup. R. 40, * * * 120 days is a reasonable amount of time within which to rule on appellant‘s * * * Motion to Suppress.“). Further, the Supreme Court of Ohio has suggested that, in addition to the facts and circumstances of the case, courts should consider the time limits imposed by court rules in determining how long to toll the speedy trial period. See State v. Palmer, 112 Ohio St.3d 457, 2007-Ohio-374, 860 N.E.2d 1011, at ¶ 24 (holding that, in calculating the time in which the speedy trial period was tolled because of a defendant‘s failure to comply with the State‘s reciprocal discovery request, “a trial court shall determine the date by which the defendant should reasonably have responded to [the] request based
{¶ 19} Here, the record is silent concerning why it took one-year to decide Staffin‘s motion to suppress. The State bears the burden to demonstrate that the speedy trial period was extended by Staffin‘s motion, which requires the State to show that it took a reasonable amount of time to decide the motion. Whitt, 2005-Ohio-5154, at ¶ 16 (“Once [the defendant] established a prima facie case for discharge, the burden of proof shifted to the state to show that the speedy-trial time limit had not expired.“); Shilling, supra (“A `reasonable’ amount of time spent by the trial court considering an accused‘s motion is attributable to the accused.“). We hold that a one-year delay in deciding Staffin‘s motion to suppress was presumptively unreasonable. And there is nothing in the record that justifies such a lengthy period. See Easley, 2005-Ohio-767, at ¶ ¶ 18 (“With no explanation for the delay set forth in the judgment entry, and with no evidence in the record to substantiate that it should be attributed to appellant, we have no choice but to apply it against the speedy trial time limit.“).
{¶ 20} Accordingly, we hold that the State has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the speedy trial period was tolled. Therefore, we affirm the judgment dismissing the charges against Staff in.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the Appellee recover of Appellant costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Abele, P.J. Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.