STATE OF OHIO v. RAMON R. BRYANT
C.A. No. 26774
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
November 13, 2013
2013-Ohio-4996
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CR 2004 05 1527
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Ramon Bryant appeals a judgment of the Summit County Common Pleas Court that denied his motion to vacate sentence. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} In April 2005, a jury found Mr. Bryant guilty of murder, aggravated murder, attempted murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, felonious assault, and possession of cocaine. The trial court sentenced him to 72 years to life in prison. Mr. Bryant appealed, but this Court upheld his convictions. This Court also upheld his sentence, but its decision was reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court under State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856.
{¶3} When the trial court resentenced Mr. Bryant in December 2007, it imposed the same prison term. On appeal, this Court vacated the sentence because the trial court had not properly imposed post-release control. In February 2010, the trial court resentenced Mr. Bryant again and imposed the same prison term. Mr. Bryant appealed, but this Court affirmed.
{¶4} In December 2012, Mr. Bryant moved to vacate his sentence, arguing that the trial court had failed to properly merge allied offenses at his second resentencing hearing. The trial court construed the motion as a petition for post-conviction relief. It determined that the petition was untimely, that Mr. Bryant‘s arguments were barred by res judicata, and that his arguments were without merit. It, therefore, denied the motion. Mr. Bryant has appealed the court‘s ruling, assigning three errors.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT TREATED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO VACATE SENTENCE AS AN UNTIMELY PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO MERGE ALLIED OFFENSES AND MULTIPLE FIREARM SPECIFICATIONS.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CONTRADICTORY WHEN IT SENTENCED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO MULTIPLE FIREARM SPECIFICATIONS.
{¶5} Mr. Bryant argues that the trial court incorrectly treated his motion as a petition for post-conviction relief, incorrectly held that his claim was barred by res judicata, and incorrectly determined that he was not entitled to relief. According to him, because the trial court did not comply with
{¶6} This Court has held that the failure to merge allied offenses of similar import does not result in a void sentence, but “instead results in plain error.” State v. Abuhilwa, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25300, 2010-Ohio-5997, ¶ 8. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Bryant‘s argument that
{¶7} Under
{¶8} Mr. Bryant‘s sentence is not void. The trial court correctly construed his motion to vacate sentence as a petition for post-conviction relief and correctly determined that he was not entitled to relief. Mr. Bryant‘s assignments of error are overruled.
III.
{¶9} The trial court correctly denied Mr. Bryant‘s motion to vacate sentence. The judgment of the Summit County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
MOORE, P. J.
CONCURS.
CARR, J.
CONCURRING.
{¶10} While I recognize that this Court has not always been consistent in addressing untimely petitions for post-conviction relief, I think the better approach is that most recently espoused in State v. Daniel, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26670, 2013-Ohio-3510, ¶ 9-10. There, we concluded that the trial court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an untimely petition. This approach is consistent with the language of the statute and with the standard adopted by the majority of the districts in the State. See
APPEARANCES:
RAMON R. BRYANT, pro se, Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
