STATE OF OHIO v. WILLIAM D. DILLEY
No. 99680
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
October 10, 2013
[Cite as State v. Dilley, 2013-Ohio-4480.]
Keough, J., Stewart, A.J., and E.T. Gallagher, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED; Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-558185
William D. Dilley, Pro Se
11720 Regent Park Drive
Chardon, Ohio 44024
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: James M. Price
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{1} Defendant-appellant, William Dilley (“Dilley“), appeals from the trial court‘s judgment summarily denying his petition for postconviction relief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{2} In January 2012, Dilley was charged with one count each of tampering with records, perjury, attempted theft, and theft. Dilley was a financial advisor who counseled clients about their investments and procured investments for them. One of Dilley‘s clients was Betty Montgomery, a 92-year-old woman who suffered from dementia. The charges stemmed from Dilley‘s participation in amending Montgomery‘s trust to make him the sole beneficiary of the trust.
{3} At the close of the state‘s case at trial, the trial court granted Dilley‘s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal as to Count 4 (theft) and denied the motion with respect to the other counts. The trial court subsequently found Dilley guilty of tampering with records, perjury, and attempted theft, and sentenced him to two years on each count, to be served concurrently.
{4} This court affirmed Dilley‘s convictions on direct appeal. State v. Dilley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98098, 2012-Ohio-5288.
{5} Dilley subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the trial court summarily denied. Dilley appeals from that judgment, raising several assignments of error for our review.
I. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
{7}
{8} The purpose of requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law is to apprise the petitioner of the basis for the court‘s disposition and to facilitate meaningful appellate review. Carrion at 19. A trial court “need not discuss every issue raised by appellant or engage in an elaborate and lengthy discussion in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings need only be sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issue to form a basis upon which the evidence supports the conclusion.” Calhoun at 291-292.
{9} A trial court need not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, however, when it dismisses an untimely postconviction relief petition. State ex rel. James v. Coyne, 114 Ohio St.3d 45, 2007-Ohio-2716, 867 N.E.2d 837, ¶ 5.
{10} Moreover, the trial court properly dismissed Dilley‘s petition because it was untimely. The time limit for filing a motion for postconviction relief is jurisdictional. State v. John, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93226, 2010-Ohio-162, ¶ 8, and a trial court has no authority to consider an untimely filed petition for postconviction relief absent certain exceptions.1 State v. Hutton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80763, 2007-Ohio-5443, ¶ 23. Dilley had 180 days from the date the transcript was filed to file his petition. He did not do so, nor did he demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering facts relating to his petition or that any new federal or state right applied. Therefore, because his petition was filed beyond the statutory timeline, it was properly denied.
II. Probate Court Judgment
{12} In his second assignment of error, Dilley argues that the trial court erred in denying his postconviction petition because the probate court‘s final judgment in the Citigroup matter determined that the amended trust was valid and, thus, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, barred any further proceeding involving the validity of the amended trust. Accordingly, he contends that the state was prohibited from criminally prosecuting him, and that his criminal prosecution was in violation of various rights under the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
{13} The trial court properly denied this claim because Dilley‘s petition was untimely. In addition, the claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment or conviction, or an appeal from that judgment.
{14} It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata applies in postconviction relief proceedings. State v. Blalock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94198, 2010-Ohio-4494, ¶ 19. Thus, a defendant may not raise any issue in a motion for postconviction relief if he could have raised the issue on direct appeal. State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 1997-Ohio-304, 679 N.E.2d 1131.
{15} Because Dilley could have raised this argument in his direct appeal, it is barred by res judicata.
III. Dilley‘s Other Claims
{16} In his third assignment of error, Dilley contends that the trial court erred in denying his postconviction petition because his trial counsel was ineffective, in violation of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. In his fourth assignment of error, Dilley contends that the trial court erred in admitting his deposition from the probate case at his criminal trial.
{17} Both of these claims, however, were ripe for review in Dilley‘s direct appeal. Because Dilley could have raised these claims in his direct appeal, they are barred by res judicata.
{19} Affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J., and EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR