State v. BriggsState v. Briggs
DECISION
Rendered on September 29, 2020
On brief: Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael P. Walton, for appellee. Argued: Michael P. Walton.
On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Robert D. Essex, for appellant. Argued: Robert D. Essex.
APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{1} Defendant-appellant, Antoine T. Briggs appeals the August 30, 2018 judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas following his pleas of guilty and sentencing him in these three cases to an aggregate prison term of 15 years. Briggs asserts three assignments of error. Because we conclude that the trial court‘s decision to order Briggs to be removed from the courtroom was an abuse of the trial court‘s discretion, we sustain Briggs’ second assignment of error and remand all three cases to the trial court for further proceedings.
{2} On July 2, 2018 and according to a plea agreement, Briggs pled guilty to aggravated vehicular homicide in Franklin C.P. No. 17CR-1732, possession of cocaine in
{3} After expressing its sympathy to the victim‘s family, the trial court addressed Briggs:
THE COURT: Let me say to you, Mr. Briggs, there are very few times when I am supremely irritated with and disgusted by the choices of the defendant, and I am both of those things today. I am irritated with and I am disgusted by your choices. And I will tell you why I am disgusted by your choices. I am disgusted because as I read your presentence investigation report, while you say you do not remember what happened, what you told law enforcement on that night is I don‘t know, I don‘t even know who was driving, but it was not me.
You had the presence of mind, even though you don‘t remember the specifics of this accident, to assign the blame and the responsibility to someone else. And I am irritated by that. What?
THE DEFENDANT: I didn‘t know what was going on. I was found in the passenger seat, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You had the presence of mind to say I don‘t know who was driving, but it wasn‘t me. I don‘t care where they found you, but that was the statement that you made. And you know
that when you were in the vehicle, were you riding with someone? Or you don‘t know, that is something else. You don‘t know, you just know that it wasn‘t you. I am bothered by that. I am bothered by the fact that you framed this as an accident. That is something, an accident is something you don‘t mean to do intentionally. But when you consume alcohol or when you consume illegal drugs and you get behind the wheel of a vehicle, that is an intentional choice that you make to take a chance with your life and with the lives of others. That is not an accident. And I am bothered that you frame it in that way.
Your choice to engage in this behavior has consequences that spread across not only the victim‘s family, but your family. What are your children supposed to do now? Did you think about that when you were making this choice? Did you? I am asking you.
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma‘am.
THE COURT: You didn‘t think about your children. You didn‘t think about anybody but yourself. And I am equally bothered by the fact that in your presentence investigation report, you encourage me to consider - - let me find it specifically, because I was amazed that you would even make this statement. “I want the judge to see the pattern. All my criminal activity is because of drugs and alcohol.”
I have no responsibility to see the pattern. If you understand that you have that challenge, then it is your responsibility to manage it. What I do here is not a professional baby-sitting service. You know that you make terrible decisions when you drink and use drugs. So why wouldn‘t it be your responsibility to find a program or to find an alternative so that you are not engaging in criminal activity? Why is that my responsibility to see the pattern? Do you see the pattern?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‘am.
THE COURT: What have you done to address it?
THE DEFENDANT: Nothing.
THE COURT: So then why would I need to address it? I am asking you. Why should I address it if you have taken no responsibility to address it?
THE DEFENDANT: I don‘t know.
THE COURT: I will answer. I have no responsibility to address it. If it is not important to you, then why should it be important to me?
You seem to have this pattern of assigning blame for your choices to other people and to other circumstances, and that stops today.
Tr. at 46-49.
{4} The trial court then addressed the sentencing factors set forth in
THE COURT: So that is a total of 15 years of incarceration with the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. There are 418 days of credit in case 1732, and then there will be zero days in 3824.
THE DEFENDANT: Wow.
THE COURT: So I am also going to immediately find that Mr. Briggs is an obstreperous defendant. I am not going to be disrespected when you have caused complete chaos and confusion across a wide spectrum of lives.
Deputy, he can be removed, since I have imposed the sentence, and I will conclude this without his presence.
THE DEFENDANT: God bless you.
THE COURT: Bless you.
{5} The court completed its sentencing after Briggs was removed from the courtroom, at which point it waived fines and costs but imposed post-release control and a lifetime driver‘s license suspension. Id. at 59-60. After a brief recess, the court reconvened and stated the following:
THE COURT: We‘re back on the record in State of Ohio versus Antoine Briggs. There were, again, four cases, 17CR-1732, 17CR-3824, 17CR-6236, 16CR-5268.
The court concluded its sentencing in all four cases. The court actually asked the personnel of the Franklin County [S]heriff‘s [O]ffice to remove Mr. Briggs from the courtroom as it concluded its final phases of sentencing. Mr. Briggs had become an obstreperous defendant. The law does not require that I maintain his physical presence if he becomes obstreperous. So I had him removed. We are currently on the record, and Mr. Briggs is currently not present in court.
Id. at 61.
{6} Briggs now appeals, and asserts three alleged errors for review:
[I.] The trial court committed plain error by imposing consecutive sentences without engaging in the correct analysis required by
[II.] The trial court erred when it ordered the defendant to be removed from the courtroom during his sentencing when the defendant had not engaged in any disruptive conduct and had not been warned that he could be removed for disruptive conduct.
[III.] The trial court committed error in not personally informing the appellant of post-release control which requires this matter be remanded for a hearing pursuant to
{7} Because it is dispositive of this appeal, we begin by analyzing Briggs’ second assignment of error. The sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the trial judge ordered that Briggs be removed from the courtroom before imposition of his sentence was
{8} A defendant “must be physically present at every stage of the criminal proceeding and trial, including * * * the imposition of sentence * * *.”
{9} Briggs’ hearing transcript clearly demonstrates that the trial court did not give him any such warning prior to ordering his removal. Further, the hearing transcript does not demonstrate any pattern of disruptive behavior prior to the trial court‘s decision to order his removal. The state argues that we should infer that Briggs was behaving badly
{10} Briggs’ second assignment of error is sustained. And because this ruling requires a remand for a new sentencing hearing, Briggs’ remaining assignments of error addressing other potential irregularities in the original sentencing hearing are rendered moot. For these reasons, we reverse and remand the judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgments reversed and remanded.
Nelson, J. concurs; Brunner, J. concurring separately.
BRUNNER, J., concurring separately.
{11} I respectfully write separately to ensure that in this decision we address other issues of importance for the sake of legal, conceptual clarity and to avoid future problems, all associated with felony sentencing.
I. INTRODUCTION
{12} The majority has determined to sustain Briggs’ second assignment of error and, based on the need for resentencing, find the other assignments of error to be moot. I
II. DISCUSSION
{13} In the first assignment of error, Briggs alleges, “[t]he trial court committed plain error by imposing consecutive sentences without engaging in the correct analysis required by
{14} Generally there is a presumption that sentences imposed “shall be served concurrently with any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state, another state, or the United States.”
(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct.
(c) The offender‘s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{15} The trial court must make
{16} In this case, all three of the judgment entries (for aggravated vehicular homicide, cocaine possession, and burglary) in the record included boilerplate findings tracking the statutory language of
{17} Nowhere in the transcript does the trial court find or paraphrase the finding, “that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.”
{18} In State v. Beasley, the State argued that the Supreme Court of Ohio should “discern” the trial court‘s views on proportionality from statements about the fact that the
{19} Viewing the record on appeal, I see no evidence that the trial court made the necessary legal findings to impose maximum consecutive sentences in Briggs’ three cases. See
{21} The State asserts that there is a “nearly [] identical situation” that results in a different outcome in State v. Dixon, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-884, 2018-Ohio-3759. (State‘s Brief at 7.) While there are certain similarities between this case and Dixon (involving the same trial judge and an abrupt exclusion of a defendant from the courtroom), there is one vital distinction from the issue raised by the first assignment of error here: The defendant in Dixon was being sentenced in just one case involving two counts that were both part of a single incident of domestic violence. Dixon at ¶ 2-3. Specifically, in Dixon, the trial court stated, “Dixon assaulted the victim when she came to pick up their children and then pursued her when she was able to get away from him. He rear-ended her vehicle and forced her to pull over. Dixon proceeded to beat her a second time. All of this was done in the presence of their three young sons.” Id. at ¶ 12. Because the trial judge discussed the severity of the single incident, we decided the trial court had adequately indicated that it tacitly found that consecutive sentencing for the offenses arising from the incident would not be disproportionate to the severity of the offender‘s conduct. Id. at ¶ 10;
III. CONCLUSION
{22} Rather than avoid the first assignment of error in favor of resolving the case on the second assignment of error, I would squarely address what I view to be an error of greater concern, the first assignment of error. Although I concur in the majority‘s analysis of the second assignment of error, because I would have resolved the case on the first assignment of error, I write separately to express my differing viewpoint.