State v. BernardState v. Bernard
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender
Nicole S. Murray, Assistant Appellate Defender
Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
WECHSLER, Judge.
{1} A jury convicted Defendant Eric Bernard of four counts of receiving or transferring stolen vehicles or motor vehicles, contrary to
BACKGROUND
{2} Defendant received four convictions for the possession of four stolen vehicles, three of which were unlawfully taken in 2012 from Tim Kelley‘s property located near Durango, Colorado. At the time of the theft, Kelley and his family were away from the property recovering from multiple injuries they had sustained earlier that year when their home was destroyed by a propane leak explosion. Jerry Spinnichia, who was convicted in Colorado of the theft of Kelley‘s vehicles, testified at Defendant‘s trial that he, Defendant, and another person drove onto Kelley‘s property and located a twenty-seven foot enclosed trailer. According to Spinnichia‘s testimony, the perpetrators loaded some items in the trailer, hitched the trailer to their vehicle, and towed the trailer off the property. Included among the stolen items inside the trailer were Kelley‘s snowmobile and Polaris Ranger side-by-side ATV. Spinnichia also testified that he and Defendant then drove the enclosed trailer containing the snowmobile and the Polaris ATV to the home of Steven Murch near Aztec, New Mexico. Police officers testified that they later recovered the stolen vehicles from Murch‘s property. Inside the trailer, officers also found a Honda side-
{3} Defendant was arrested and charged with four counts of receiving or transferring stolen vehicles or motor vehicles, in violation of
A. Receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle or motor vehicle consists of a person who, with intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle or motor vehicle as defined by the Motor Vehicle Code [66-1-1 NMSA 1978] that the person knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken, receives or transfers possession of the vehicle or motor vehicle from or to another or who has in the person‘s possession any vehicle that the person knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken[.]
{4} After hearing the evidence at trial, the jury received instructions for the essential elements of the offense of possession of a stolen vehicle under the statute. The instructions given, which conformed with the uniform jury instructions, specified that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had possession of each stolen vehicle and “knew or had reason to know that [the] vehicle[s] had been stolen or unlawfully taken[.]” UJI 14-1652. The jury convicted Defendant on all four counts for his possession of the stolen enclosed trailer, the snowmobile, the Polaris
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE, SECTION 30-16D-4(A)
{5} Although the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with the applicable uniform jury instructions in this case, Defendant first argues that the jury instructions were fundamentally flawed by failing to include an essential element of the offense of possession of a stolen vehicle. Defendant‘s argument hinges on his construction of
Standard of Review
{6} Our determination whether the “intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle” is an essential element of the offense of possession of a stolen vehicle under
History and Plain Meaning of Section 30-16D-4
{7} Prior to 2009, the statute codifying the crime of receiving or transferring stolen vehicles or motor vehicles resided in the Motor Vehicle Code. That language read:
Any person who, with intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle or motor vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken, receives, or transfers possession of the same from or to another, or who has in his possession any vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken, . . . is guilty of a fourth degree felony[.]
{8} In 2009, the Legislature amended the language of the crime of receiving or transferring stolen vehicles or motor vehicles and recompiled the statute in the Criminal Code as
A. Receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle or motor vehicle consists of a person who, with intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle or motor vehicle as defined by the Motor Vehicle Code [66-1-1 NMSA 1978] that the person knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken, receives or transfers possession of the vehicle or motor vehicle from or to another or who has in the person‘s possession any vehicle that the person knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken[.]
{9} With the exception of a new subsection related to penalties, the 2009 amendments left the statute largely unchanged. See State v. Brown, 2010-NMCA-079, ¶ 28 n.1, 148 N.M. 888, 242 P.3d 455 (stating that
{10} According to Defendant‘s interpretation, the comma previously functioned to separate the offense of possession of a stolen vehicle from the offense of receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle or motor vehicle. Defendant claims that, by discarding the comma, the Legislature intended to graft the mens rea requirement of “intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle” onto the offense of possession of a stolen vehicle. Defendant concludes that this mens rea requirement, which previously applied only to receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle or motor vehicle, now equally applies to the actus reus element of possession of a stolen vehicle. Defendant therefore argues that the jury instructions given at trial were an incorrect statement of the law because they have not been updated to reflect the statutory change. We believe that Defendant overstates the significance of the Legislature‘s removal of the comma.
{11} Reading the statute as a whole, our review of the 2009 amendments indicates that the Legislature did not make substantive changes that materially affect the statute in the manner Defendant suggests. See New Mexico Pharm. Ass‘n v. State, 1987-NMSC-054, ¶ 8, 106 N.M. 73, 738 P.2d 1318 (“In interpreting statutes, we should read the entire statute as a whole so that each provision may be considered in relation to every other part.“). Primarily, the Legislature inserted the phrase “[r]eceiving or transferring a stolen vehicle or motor vehicle consists of” to the beginning of the statute‘s provisions. The Legislature further clarified that the vehicles or motor vehicles referenced in the statute are those “defined by the Motor Vehicle Code[.]” Although the Legislature also added a new subsection to the statute that increases the penalties for each offense under the statute, the amendments to
{12} Our conclusion is reinforced by certain principles of statutory construction. First, the lack of a comma before the phrase “or who has in the person‘s possession any vehicle” is not dispositive because the Legislature‘s use of the word “or” indicates that a person who possesses a stolen vehicle is independent from “a person who, with intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle . . . receives or transfers possession of the vehicle[.]”
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
{14} Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions by employing the same statutory interpretation argument he used to attack the jury instructions. Defendant argues that because the “intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle” is an essential element of the offense of possession of a stolen vehicle under the statute, the State failed to present evidence sufficient to prove this essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. Having decided “intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle” is not an essential element of the offense of possession of a stolen
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
{15} Defendant next contends that his four convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects “criminal defendant[s] against multiple punishments for the same offense.” Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A double jeopardy claim is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
{16} Double jeopardy challenges implicate two general categories of multiple-punishment cases. First, cases in which a defendant‘s single course of conduct results in multiple charges under different criminal statutes are classified as “double-description” cases. Swafford v. State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 9, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223. Second, cases in which a defendant faces multiple charges under the same criminal statute for the same conduct are classified as “unit of prosecution” cases. Id. ¶ 8. Defendant advances a unit of prosecution claim by arguing that his four convictions based on a single statute violate the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. He asserts that his possession of the four
{17} Unit of prosecution cases are subject to a two-step analysis that courts utilize to discern legislative intent. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 33. “The relevant inquiry in [a unit of prosecution case] is whether the [L]egislature intended punishment for the entire course of conduct or for each discrete act.” Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 8. In the first step of the analysis, we look to the language of the criminal statute to determine whether the Legislature has defined the unit of prosecution. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 33. Our inquiry is complete if the unit of prosecution is spelled out in the statute. Id. However, if the language is ambiguous, we proceed to the second step of the analysis in which our task is to “determine whether a defendant‘s acts are separated by sufficient ‘indicia of distinctness’ to justify multiple punishments under the same statute.” State v. Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 14, 140 N.M. 644, 146 P.3d 289. If there is not sufficient indicia of distinctness to separate the defendant‘s acts, we apply the rule of lenity to our interpretation of the statute. Id. The rule of lenity requires that we interpret the statute in the defendant‘s favor by invoking the presumption that the Legislature did not intend to create separately punishable offenses. State v. Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, ¶ 34, 130 N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456.
Statutory Language of Section 30-16D-4(A)
{19} Therefore, because ambiguity regarding the proper unit of prosecution under the statute persists, we now turn to the second step in our analysis to determine whether Defendant‘s acts are sufficiently distinct.
Distinctness of Defendant‘s Acts
{20} Defendant argues that his possession of the four stolen vehicles constituted only one violation of the statute because the snowmobile, the Polaris ATV, and the Honda ATV were contained inside the enclosed trailer and “delivered simultaneously, as one item.” We note that the trial record fails to support Defendant‘s assertion that
{21} We decline to extend the single-larceny doctrine to this case. Even though our courts have recognized the validity of the single-larceny doctrine, see Brown, 1992-NMCA-028, ¶¶ 6, 13 (recognizing the validity of the single-larceny doctrine in New Mexico), we see no indication that the doctrine supersedes the well-established two-step legislative intent inquiry in a unit of prosecution case. Defendant‘s reliance on State v. Watkins, 2008-NMCA-060, 144 N.M. 66, 183 P.3d 951, as evidence of our application of the doctrine in a unit of prosecution case, is misplaced. In Watkins, we followed the holding of Alvarez-Lopez and held the single-larceny doctrine was inapplicable to a unit of prosecution analysis under the receiving stolen property statute. Watkins, 2008-NMCA-060, ¶ 11. Our courts have similarly declined to extend
{22} In support of his argument for extension of the single-larceny doctrine to possession of a stolen vehicle, Defendant cites Sanchez v. State for the proposition that “[t]he simultaneous possession of stolen items owned by different individuals is a single act constituting one offense.” 1982-NMSC-012, ¶ 10, 97 N.M. 445, 640 P.2d 1325. Although we recognize Sanchez‘s general rule regarding simultaneous possession, Sanchez was decided prior to Swafford and was not a unit of prosecution
{23} Herron v. State, 1991-NMSC-012, 111 N.M. 357, 805 P.2d 624, established the unit of prosecution indicia of distinctness “under the modern analysis.” Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 15. Although Herron‘s factors were developed in the context of a sexual assault case, our courts have generally applied Herron‘s six factor test in a broad range of unit of prosecution cases. See, e.g., Brown, 1992-NMCA-028, ¶¶ 6-13 (applying the Herron test to multiple convictions for larceny); State v. Handa, 1995-NMCA-042, ¶¶ 19-27, 120 N.M. 38, 897 P.2d 225 (applying the Herron test to
{24} In considering the application of the unit of prosecution indicia of distinctness analysis to Defendant‘s acts, we are mindful of our Supreme Court‘s recent opinion in Olsson. Olsson was the first unit of prosecution case in which our courts considered application of the Herron factors to a possessory offense. The two defendants in Olsson claimed their multiple convictions for possession of child pornography violated double jeopardy. 2014-NMSC-012, ¶¶ 5, 9. Our Supreme Court
{25} We read Olsson to preclude the use of the Herron factors in possession cases due to the “impracticability” of its application in determining the proper unit of prosecution. Id. However, we do not believe that Olsson‘s abandonment of Herron‘s fixed formula requires a wholesale departure from an indicia of distinctness analysis if the facts of a unit of prosecution case render such analysis practicable. See Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 27 (“The conduct question depends to a large degree on the elements of the charged offenses and the facts presented at trial.“). Our Supreme Court in Olsson faced the difficult question of whether the defendants’ possession of numerous separate computer files and dozens of images and videos, which were downloaded at various times and depicted multiple victims and sexual acts, constituted separate offenses. In this case, Defendant‘s unlawful possession of
{26} In the absence of Herron‘s factors, we look to the “guiding principles” previously set forth by our Supreme Court in Swafford in determining whether Defendant‘s acts are sufficiently distinct to justify multiple punishments under a single statute. Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 27. Even though Swafford was a double description case, the analysis in a unit of prosecution case is “substantially similar[.]” Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 16. “In each case, we attempt to determine, based upon the specific facts of each case, whether a defendant‘s activity is better characterized as one unitary act, or multiple, distinct acts, consistent with legislative intent.” Id. Swafford noted that acts may be “sufficiently separated by either time or space (in the sense of physical distance between the places where the acts occurred)[.]” 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 28. If a case cannot be resolved from time and space considerations, then “resort must be had to the quality and nature of the acts or to the objects and
{27} We first examine time and space considerations to determine whether Defendant‘s possession of the enclosed trailer, the snowmobile, the Polaris ATV, and the Honda ATV constituted four distinct acts. The question is whether there was evidence that Defendant, knowing that the vehicles were stolen, possessed each vehicle at a separate location and time sufficient to justify multiple punishments. The jury heard evidence that Defendant and Spinnichia entered New Mexico from Colorado in possession of the stolen trailer, the snowmobile, and the Polaris ATV, which Defendant and Spinnichia took to Murch‘s home in Aztec, New Mexico. The jury also heard evidence that the snowmobile was removed from the trailer and that Defendant rode the Polaris ATV while at Murch‘s property. Although witness testimony further indicated that Defendant rode the Honda ATV at Murch‘s property during the same time period, there was also evidence that the Honda ATV had been stolen from a home in San Juan County, New Mexico. However, evidence of the separate theft of the Honda ATV is not probative of Defendant‘s distinct acts because the trial record does not clearly indicate who took the Honda ATV to Murch‘s property and when it was taken there. The jury could reasonably infer from Spinnichia‘s testimony that Defendant possessed the trailer, the snowmobile, and the
{28} We believe that the objects and results involved in this case are sufficient indicators that Defendant‘s possession of each stolen vehicle constitutes four distinct acts. In applying these indicia, we “may inquire as to the interests protected by the criminal statute, since the ultimate goal is to determine whether the [L]egislature intended multiple punishments.” Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 14. The objects
{29} The Motor Vehicle Code requires owners to register their vehicles so they may be uniquely identified and tracked in a centralized system. Every owner of a vehicle
[A] description of the vehicle including, to the extent that the following specified data may exist with respect to a given vehicle, the make, model, type of body, number of cylinders, type of fuel used, serial number of the vehicle, odometer reading, engine or other identification number provided by the manufacturer of the vehicle, whether new or used and, if a vehicle not previously registered, date of sale by the manufacturer or dealer to the person intending to operate the vehicle[.]
{30} Likewise, the Legislature crafted provisions of the Criminal Code that operate in tandem with the Motor Vehicle Code to punish criminal conduct that infringes on personal property interests in vehicles. See
{31} Analyzing Defendant‘s case in light of the clear interests protected by the criminal statute, the indicia of “objects and results” sufficiently separate Defendant‘s acts of possession. Defendant received four convictions for possession of four separate and distinct stolen vehicles: an enclosed trailer, a snowmobile, a Polaris side-by-side ATV, and a Honda side-by-side ATV. The jury found that each vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken and Defendant knew or had reason to know that the vehicles had been stolen. Under these circumstances, the indicia of distinctness justify convicting Defendant of four counts under
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
{32} Finally, Defendant argues that his trial counsel failed to meet the constitutional standards of effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant makes multiple ineffective assistance of counsel claims, specifically that trial counsel (1) failed to object to jury instructions that omitted an essential element of the crime of receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicles, (2) failed to articulate in his motion for directed verdict that the State failed to present any evidence that Defendant received the stolen vehicles with the intent to procure or pass title, (3) failed to subpoena crucial witnesses, (4) failed to consult Defendant
{33} We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Martinez, 2007-NMCA-160, ¶ 19, 143 N.M. 96, 173 P.3d 18. In order to make a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show “(1) that counsel‘s performance fell below that of a reasonably competent attorney and (2) that [the d]efendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance.” Id. “A defendant must demonstrate that counsel‘s errors were so serious that the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Gallegos, 2009-NMSC-017, ¶ 34, 146 N.M. 88, 206 P.3d 993.
{34} Defendant has failed to make a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant‘s first two attacks on trial counsel‘s performance are rooted in Defendant‘s unpersuasive interpretation of the statute codifying the crime of receiving or transferring stolen vehicles. Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed at trial to object to the jury instructions, which Defendant contends did not incorporate the essential element of “intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle” in the offense of possession of a stolen vehicle under
{35} Defendant also makes several general allegations related to trial counsel‘s conduct, including the failure to subpoena key witnesses, failure to effectively cross-examine witnesses, and failure to consult Defendant in the preparation of his defense. These types of arguments call into question matters of defense counsel‘s trial strategy and tactics, which “we will not second guess” on appeal. State v. Ortega, 2014-NMSC-017, ¶ 56, 327 P.3d 1076 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We do not find ineffective assistance of counsel if there is a plausible, rational trial strategy or tactic to explain counsel‘s conduct.” State v. Allen, 2014-NMCA-047, ¶ 17, 323 P.3d 925. In addition, despite the strong presumption in favor of trial counsel‘s competency, Defendant in his brief in chief did not provide detailed explanations or record citations to support his allegations that trial counsel‘s performance was deficient or prejudiced him. We decline to review or consider Defendant‘s ineffective assistance of counsel arguments when they are unsupported
{36} Although we hold that Defendant has failed to make a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, he is not precluded from pursuing these issues in a collateral habeas corpus proceeding. See State v. Crocco, 2014-NMSC-016, ¶ 24, 327 P.3d 1068 (noting that “[i]f facts beyond those in the record on appeal could establish a legitimate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [a] defendant may assert it in a habeas corpus proceeding where an adequate factual record can be developed for a court to make a reasoned determination of the issues“).
CONCLUSION
{37} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant‘s four convictions for possession of the stolen enclosed trailer, the snowmobile, the Polaris ATV, and the Honda ATV, contrary to
{38} IT IS SO ORDERED.
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge