State v. BerkstresserState v. Berkstresser
- When a party fails to brief an issue, that issue is deemed waived or abandoned.
- To determine whether a lesser included offense instruction is factually appropriate, a court must consider whether there is some evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, emanating from whatever source and proffered by whichever party, that would reasonably justify the defendant‘s conviction for that lesser included crime.
- A district court commits instructional error by failing to sua sponte give a lesser included offense instruction that is both legally and factually appropriate. On appeal, to obtain reversal of a conviction based on that error, a defendant who has failed to request the instruction bears the burden to firmly convince a reviewing court the jury would have reached a different verdict had the error not occurred.
- Appellate courts do not ordinarily consider an issue not raised by the parties but may do so sua sponte when the issue‘s consideration is necessary to serve the ends of justice or prevent the denial of fundamental rights after notice to the parties and allowing them an opportunity to address the issue raised by the court.
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed December 23, 2021. Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; DAVID J. KAUFMAN, judge. Opinion filed December 2, 2022. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed, and the case is remanded with directions.
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BILES, J.: The State challenges a Court of Appeals decision reversing Ryan M. Berkstresser‘s conviction for felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. The panel ordered a new trial after it held the district court erred by failing to give an unrequested jury instruction on a lesser included misdemeanor offense and that this error justified reversal. State v. Berkstresser, No. 122,557, 2021 WL 6068708 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion). We reverse the panel and affirm the conviction because the panel misapplied the standard required to determine when such an instructional error necessitates reversal.
If a reviewing court determines a district court erred by failing to give an unrequested lesser included offense instruction, its next step is to consider the degree of resulting prejudice by deciding whether it is firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict had this instructional error not occurred. State v. Valdez, 316 Kan. 1, 6, 512 P.3d 1125 (2022). But here, after the panel found error, it reversed the conviction because it held the jury “could have reasonably determined Berkstresser failed to yield to the officer but did not drive with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of other persons or property as reflected in the dashcam video.” (Emphasis added.) Berkstresser, 2021 WL 6068708, at *6. This substantively differs from deciding whether the court is firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict on the felony charge.
We hold the panel erred by using a lower standard of doubt about the outcome to declare this unpreserved error reversible. See State v. Carter, 305 Kan. 139, 159, 380 P.3d 189 (2016) (clear error is in reality a heightened standard of harmlessness); Garner‘s Modern American Usage, p. 869 (3d ed. 2009) (“Writers often use would to condition statements that really ought to be straightforward.“). We further hold the failure to give a lesser included offense instruction for the misdemeanor offense was not clearly erroneous because we are not firmly convinced based on the trial evidence that the jury would have reached a different verdict if such an instruction had been given, so we affirm the conviction.
That result, however, does not end the matter. We must remand this case to the district court with directions to merge Berkstresser‘s two alternative convictions of felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer under State v. Vargas, 313 Kan. 866, Syl. ¶¶ 1-3, 492 P.3d 412 (2021).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Neither party disputes what happened, although they portray the facts very differently. Haysville Police Officer Randy Nowak noticed a Mitsubishi sedan following too closely to another car. His dispatch advised the Mitsubishi‘s license plate was assigned to a different vehicle. Nowak began a traffic stop by activating his patrol car‘s overhead emergency lights and siren. His car displayed Haysville Police Department decals. The driver, later identified as Berkstresser, did not stop. He increased his speed, reaching 72 miles per hour in a 50-mile-per-hour zone.
Berkstresser turned west onto a country road, reaching 65 miles per hour in an unposted area where Nowak believed the speed limit was 45. Berkstresser then went north. In doing so, he made a complete stop at a stop sign but did not properly signal the turn. He pulled into a residential driveway and drove across two front yards—near multiple parked vehicles and a bystander—before moving back onto the street without stopping or yielding. Again headed north, he swerved right across the fog line toward a ditch then left across the center line into the southbound lane before entering another driveway without signaling. He stopped and fled on foot. Officer Nowak caught up with
The State charged Berkstresser with: (1) fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer by committing five or more moving violations in violation of
The jury returned guilty verdicts on the two alternatively charged felony counts of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, as well as driving with a suspended license. It acquitted him on the proof-of-insurance charge. The district court sentenced Berkstresser to 15 months’ imprisonment for the reckless driving fleeing and eluding conviction but did not sentence him for the alternative conviction (five or more moving violations). The court also sentenced him to six months in jail for the suspended license. We note the panel states the district court ordered the two sentences run concurrent. Berkstresser, 2021 WL 6068708, at *3. But our review of the record reflects the district court ordered these sentences run consecutive.
Berkstresser appealed, raising eight trial-error claims. Of those, the panel addressed just one that it considered dispositive: Whether the district court committed clear error by not instructing the jury on the lesser included misdemeanor fleeing offense for the count alleging reckless driving. The panel held there was error requiring it to reverse the reckless driving conviction and remanded for a new trial. 2021 WL 6068708, at *6. Inexplicably, the panel did not discuss the trial-error claims associated with the jury‘s remaining alternative felony conviction for five or more moving violations before remanding the case for a new trial.
The State petitioned for review on the panel‘s reversal of the conviction. Neither party sought review for the issues left undecided, so those are not before us. See
We granted the State‘s petition for review. Jurisdiction is proper. See
DISCUSSION
The State argues two points: (1) a misdemeanor instruction was not factually appropriate so no error occurred; and (2) even if the instruction was factually appropriate and should have been given, that omission did not prejudice Berkstresser to the degree necessary to reverse his felony conviction. As explained, we agree with the State‘s second argument.
Was a misdemeanor instruction factually appropriate?
A court reviews alleged instructional error in a sequential manner. See State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1, 283 P.3d 202 (2012) (establishing four-step progression with step 2 considering whether the instruction was legally appropriate and step 3 considering whether the instruction was factually appropriate). The State chose not to dispute that an instruction for the misdemeanor crime would have been legally appropriate, so our focus is drawn to factual
A legally appropriate lesser included offense instruction must be given when there is some evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, emanating from whatever source and proffered by whichever party, that would reasonably justify the defendant‘s conviction for that lesser included crime.
It asserts appellate courts should instead review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State when the defendant did not request at trial the lesser included offense instruction in dispute. This shift, it argues, more closely aligns with the clear error standard required by
But the State faces insurmountable barriers here because it did not ask the panel to reconsider the perspective it now finds offensive. In fact, the only caselaw the State cited to the panel as supporting authority for the standard of review was Plummer, which expressly held “the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction.” (Emphasis added.) Plummer, 295 Kan. at 163. So when the panel referenced the Plummer perspective, it was just following the authority the State provided to it. A party cannot be heard to complain when this happens. Cf. State v. Gulley, 315 Kan. 86, 91, 505 P.3d 354 (2022) (“‘Under the invited error doctrine, a litigant may not invite error and then complain of that same error on appeal.‘“).
Granted, the State made vague mention of an unrequested instruction‘s factual appropriateness being “closely akin” to evidentiary sufficiency questions that are reviewed in a light most favorable to the State when a jury convicts on a charged crime. But this meager allusion does not fairly place the question before the panel and equates to failing to brief the issue. See Tracy, 311 Kan. at 610;
Moving to the merits, the State argues a misdemeanor conviction must be supported by evidence showing Berkstresser did not engage in reckless driving during the police pursuit. It reasons reckless driving is a required statutory element for the felony charge, so Berkstresser needed to demonstrate a lack of evidence on that felony element to reasonably justify giving the misdemeanor instruction. Addressing these arguments requires statutory interpretation for which we have unlimited review. State v. Downing, 311 Kan. 100, 103, 456 P.3d 535 (2020). We start with the statute.
Keeping this statutory language in mind, we look first at Berkstresser‘s felony charge. The district court instructed the jury on felony fleeing by committing reckless driving under
“In Count 2, the defendant is charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer.
“The defendant pleads not guilty.
“To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved:
“1. The defendant was driving a motor vehicle.
“2. The defendant was given a visual or audible signal by a police officer to bring the motor vehicle to a stop.
“3. The defendant intentionally failed or refused to bring the motor vehicle to a stop, or otherwise fled or attempted to elude a pursuing police vehicle.
“4. The police officer‘s vehicle was appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle.
“5. The defendant engaged in reckless driving.
“6. This act occurred on or about the 17th day of February, 2018, in Sedgwick County, Kansas.”
Note the first four elements standing alone constitute misdemeanor fleeing when the defendant is a first- or second-time offender, and the record shows no prior violation of
Our caselaw applying
We hold the record contains ample support to reasonably justify a misdemeanor conviction under
Despite the panel‘s flawed reasoning, it correctly held the district court erred in failing to give a misdemeanor fleeing and eluding instruction. We consider next whether we are firmly convinced this error prejudiced the trial‘s outcome.
Because Berkstresser did not request an instruction on misdemeanor fleeing, we review any prejudice resulting from the district court‘s failure to give the instruction for clear error. See State v. Owens, 314 Kan. 210, 235, 496 P.3d 902 (2021). This means the conviction must be affirmed unless the reviewing court is firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict had the instructional error not occurred. Valdez, 316 Kan. at 6. Berkstresser bears the burden to show this. State v. Solis, 305 Kan. 55, 65, 378 P.3d 532 (2016).
The panel began its prejudice analysis by correctly stating the test. Berkstresser, 2021 WL 6068708, at *6 (“To reverse, we must be firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict had it been given the option.“). But its application went askew. The panel held the district court committed clear error because “[a] jury could have reasonably determined Berkstresser failed to yield to the officer but did not drive with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of other persons or property as reflected in the dashcam video.” (Emphasis added.) 2021 WL 6068708, at *6. It explained its conclusion by noting: “Nowak‘s dashcam video showed Berkstresser pass a few vehicles throughout the pursuit, but the roads were mostly free of traffic. The vehicles Berkstresser did pass yielded to the police lights and sirens. Berkstresser used turn signals and stopped at stop signs during the chase.” 2021 WL 6068708, at *6.
The panel‘s holding does not align with the correct test for prejudice. Having determined the district court should have instructed on the lesser included offense, the prejudice question is not whether a jury could have reasonably convicted a defendant on a lesser included offense, but whether the jury would have reached a different verdict on the felony conviction without the instructional error. Valdez, 316 Kan. at 6. These two standards are not interchangeable. See How to use “Could,” “Would,” and “Should,” The Britannica Dictionary, https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/eb/qa/How-to-Use-Could-Would-and-Should#:~:text=Just%20remember%20that%20could%20is,I%20hope%20this%20helps (“[C]ould is used to talk about something that can happen, [and] would is used to talk about something that will happen in an imagined situation.“); Garner‘s Modern American Usage, p. 869.
Harmless error rules “‘serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.‘” State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 560, 256 P.3d 801 (2011). And the various, context-dependent standards for prejudice our court applies represent “a ‘sliding scale of probabilities,‘” each of which “is formulated differently to set a higher or lower threshold or level of certainty as to whether the error affected the outcome.” 292 Kan. at 563-64.
The harmless error scale is finely graduated. Errors implicating a defendant‘s rights under the United States Constitution, for example, must be “‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.‘” 292 Kan. at 564. This requires a court holding an error harmless to conclude there is no “‘reasonable possibility‘” the error contributed to the verdict. 292 Kan. at 564. On the other hand, a less stringent standard for nonconstitutional errors requires a court to find only that there is no “reasonable probability” the outcome would have been different, but for the error. 292 Kan. at 565.
Here, the clear error standard bars a conviction‘s reversal unless the reviewing court determines the jury “‘would have reached a different verdict.‘” Valdez, 316 Kan. at 6. Clear error is “in reality a heightened standard of harmlessness.” State v. Carter, 305 Kan. 139, 159, 380 P.3d 189 (2016). So by failing to observe the critical distinction between what the jury “could have” done and what it “would have” done, the panel‘s analysis diluted the applicable test for prejudice and afforded less deference to the jury‘s verdict. This was error.
Given this record, we are not firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict by rejecting the State‘s allegation that Berkstresser drove recklessly during the pursuit. We affirm his felony conviction.
Remand is required under Vargas.
One issue remains: Whether we must remand the case to the district court to address the alternative convictions because when a jury returns guilty verdicts on two alternatively charged counts, a district court must enter only one conviction. See State v. Vargas, 313 Kan. 866, Syl. ¶¶ 1-3, 492 P.3d 412 (2021). That was not done here.
Recently in Vargas, this court held “[a] district court has no authority to hold one of two convictions for alternatively charged counts in abeyance,” and therefore “[w]hen a jury returns guilty verdicts on two alternatively charged counts, a district court may enter only one conviction.” 313 Kan. 866, Syl. ¶¶ 1-2. Two convictions for alternatively charged counts “should merge by operation of law . . . and result in one conviction.” 313 Kan. at 873.
Neither party raised the Vargas merger issue, but we directed them to be prepared to address it at oral argument. This court has the power to sua sponte address a new issue under certain circumstances. See
Consistent with Vargas, we remand this case to the district court with directions to enter an amended journal entry reflecting Berkstresser‘s
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed, and the case is remanded with directions.
* * *
ROSEN, J., concurring: I agree with the majority‘s conclusion there was no reversible instructional error, and I agree with the direction to enter an amended journal entry reflecting merged convictions. I write separately because I would not have repudiated the Court of Appeals analytical approach to assessing whether an instruction on misdemeanor fleeing and eluding was factually appropriate.
The State charged Berkstresser with felony fleeing and eluding. This crime consists of five elements, including reckless driving.
The majority called the panel‘s approach error, admonishing it for going beyond a sufficiency test to assess whether the evidence suggested the jury would have rejected the reckless driving element of the charged crime. This court explicitly set out the majority‘s chosen approach in State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 204, 290 P.3d 640 (2012). In Haberlein, the defendant was charged with first-degree premeditated murder. While there was overwhelming evidence of premeditation—the only element setting premeditated murder apart from the lesser count of intentional murder—the majority held an instruction on intentional murder would have been factually appropriate because “at least in theory, the jury could have chosen to convict Haberlein of second-degree intentional murder without having its verdict subject to reversal for insufficient evidence.” 296 Kan. at 204. I wrote separately, because “the test set forth in
I have reiterated my position many times prior to and since Haberlein, and I maintain it today. See State v. Williams, 308 Kan. 1439, 1463, 430 P.3d 448 (2018); State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 350, 409 P.3d 1 (2018); State v. Fisher, 304 Kan. 242, 265, 373 P.3d 781 (2016); State v. Qualls, 297 Kan. 61, 73, 298 P.3d 311 (2013); State v. Tahah, 293 Kan. 267, 280-84, 262 P.3d 1045 (2011); State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 627-31, 186 P.3d 755 (2008). The factual appropriateness inquiry on jury instruction errors should not be synonymous with a theoretical sufficiency of the evidence assessment. Such a test requires a district court to instruct a jury on a lesser included offense regardless of how unbelievable it would be for a jury to reject the higher crime and convict of the lesser. This conflicts with
Because the majority‘s opinion conflicts with the directive in
STEGALL, J., joins the foregoing concurring opinion.