STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. NIKKI NICOLE BARNETT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 6-22-08
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HARDIN COUNTY
December 19, 2022
[Cite as State v. Barnett, 2022-Ohio-4558.]
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
Aрpeal from Hardin County Common Pleas Court, Trial Court No. 20212203 CRI. Judgment Affirmed.
Michael B. Kelley for Appellant
Andrew R. Tudor for Appellee
{1} Defendant-appellant, Nikki Nicole Barnett (“Barnett“), appeals the May 4, 2022 judgment entry of sentence of the Hardin County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{2} This case stems from Barnett‘s conduct between December 23, 2020 and April 3, 2021, which involved stealing items from Walmart by either not paying for the item or by substituting the price tag on the item with a less expensive price tag to pay less than full value for the item.
{3} On December 30, 2021, the Hardin County Grand Jury indicted Barnett on Count One of money laundering in violation of
{4} On March 25, 2022, Barnett withdrew her pleas of not guilty and entered a guilty plea, under a negotiated-plea agreement, to Count One. In exchange for her change of plea, the State agreed to dismiss Count Two. Further, as part of the agreement, the State agreed to a joint-sеntencing recommendation. The trial court accepted Barnett‘s guilty plea, found her guilty, dismissed Count Two, and ordered a pre-sentence investigation.
{6} On May 11, 2022, Barnett filed her notice of appeal. She raises one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court abused its discretion by ordering Appellant to enter into and complete a CBCF program when the record dоes not support such a term of community control.
{7} In her sole assignment of error, Barnett argues that the record does not support the trial court‘s sentence. Specifically, Barnett contends that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing her “to complete a CBCF in-patient treatment program [because] the record lacks sufficient data to justify a CBCF term and does not support the need for such a term of community control.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 6).
{8}
Analysis
{9} However, under
{11} “‘[T]rial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the statutory range.‘” State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-17, 2015-Ohio-4225, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Noble, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-06, 2014-Ohio-5485, ¶ 9, citing State v. Saldana, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-12-09, 2013-Ohio-1122, ¶ 20. In this case, as a third-degree felony, the sentence for money laundering is controlled by
{12} Hоwever, since Barnett‘s community-control sentence was jointly recommended by the parties and was imposed by the trial court, we need not review
R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) [bars] appeals that would otherwise challenge [a trial] court‘s discretion in imposing a sentence, such as whether the trial court complied with statutory prоvisions likeR.C. 2929.11 (the overriding purposes of felony sentencing),2929.12 (the seriousness and recidivism factors), [or]2929.13(A) through(D) (the sanctions relevant to the felony degree) or whether consecutive or maximum sentences were appropriate under certain circumstances.
{13} Even if we have the authority to rеview Barnett‘s community-control sentence, the Supreme Court of Ohio recently directed Ohio‘s courts of appeal that
{14} At Barnett‘s sentencing hearing and in its sentencing entry, the trial court considered the
{15} Nevertheless, Barnett argues that the trial court‘s community-control sanction thаt she enter (and successfully complete) a CBCF program “was not part of the joint recommendation” and “is not supported by the record.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 6). “Under
{17} “A trial court has broad discretion in setting the conditions of community control.” State v. Wagener, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1162, 2022-Ohio-724, ¶ 13. Consequently, “[w]e review the trial court‘s imposition of community-control sanctions under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Talty at ¶ 10. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).
{18} However, the Supreme Court of Ohio highlights that such discretion “is not limitless.” Talty at ¶ 11. “Community control conditions * * * must reasonably relate to the goals of community control: rehabilitation, administering justice, and еnsuring good behavior.” State v. Ettenger, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-326, 2019-Ohio-2085, ¶ 8. Consequently,
[t]he relevant inquiry to determine whether a court abused this discretion in imposing a condition is three-fold: (1) is the condition reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) does it have somе relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) does it relate to conduct that is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the ends of probation.
{19} In this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that Barnett еnter (and successfully complete) a CBCF program. Importantly, this sanction is an authorized community-control sanction under
{20} Moreover, the residential sanction is related to Barnett‘s money-laundering conviction because the record reflects that her substance abuse is related to her conduct. Specifically, the record reveals that Barnett “tested positive for multiple illegal substances” at the time of her arraignment, that shе tested positive for methamphetamine while on bond for this offense, and that she concedes that she “struggle[s] with drug addiction.” (Doc. No. 9); (May 3, 2022 Tr. at 8).
{21} Nevertheless, “[i]n fashioning the appropriate sentence fоr an offense, the sentencing court may consider facts beyond the offense itself, such as prior
{22} Furthermore, the trial court‘s sanction “is consistent with [her] rehabilitation and the effort to reduce the likelihood of recidivism.” Ettenger at ¶ 11. That is, when ordering that she enter (and successfully comрlete) a CBCF program, the trial court stressed that the sanction is related to rehabilitating Barnett. The trial court also considered that Barnett sought treatment with an outpatient provider, but ultimately determined that in-patient treatment was necessary to compel Barnett‘s compliance since she “did not seek the diagnostic assessment” until six weeks after her arraignment or receive any services. (May 3, 2022 Tr. at 11). Thеrefore, the residential sanction reasonably supports the goals of community control, and it is not overly broad so as to unnecessarily impinge on her liberty. See Ettenger at ¶ 11 (“Therefore, the imposed community сontrol conditions that Ettenger challenges reasonably support the goals of community control, and they are not overly broad so as to unnecessarily impinge on his liberty.“).
{23} For these reasons, Barnett‘s assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlr