State v. B. Y.State v. B. Y.
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 3, 2023, at Willamette University College of Law, Salem, Oregon.
Christa Obold Eshleman, Youth, Rights & Justice, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett, DeHoog, and Masih, Justices and Balmer and Baldwin, Senior Judges, Justices pro tempore.**
GARRETT, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
* Appeal from Columbia County Circuit Court, Ted E. Grove, Judge. 319 Or App 208, 510 P3d 247 (2022).
**Nelson, J., resigned February 25, 2023, and did not participate in the decision of this case. Bushong and James, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 371 Or 364 (2023)
GARRETT, J.
The juvenile code provides a maximum amount of time that a youth can be committed to the custody of the Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) for each type of offense that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime.
While on juvenile parole related to a commitment to OYA in an earlier case, youth was adjudicated to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for interfering with a peace officer. Based on that conduct, the juvenile court imposed a new disposition, which also committed youth to OYA custody, to commence at the conclusion of youth‘s existing
We allowed the state‘s petition for review to consider that question of statutory interpretation, and we now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in part and affirm in part.1
I. BACKGROUND
The facts, which are undisputed on review, are taken from the opinion of the Court of Appeals. In 2017, youth was committed to the custody of OYA for three and a half years. That commitment was the result of a combined disposition for multiple unlawful acts following a probation violation. Youth was placed in a youth correction facility for much of that time. He was paroled to a residential placement, but he ran away. When police attempted to apprehend him, he refused to comply with an order to stop and get on the ground. For that conduct, which at the time, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the Class A misdemeanor of interfering with a peace officer, former
Youth timely appealed while he was still in OYA custody, arguing that
The Court of Appeals majority agreed with youth. Noting that the statutory text did not resolve the issue, the court relied on the context and history of the statutory scheme. B.Y., 319 Or App at 218-19. The court first looked to its prior case from 1976, T., 27 Or App at 409, which held that juvenile courts have the authority to impose consecutive commitments. It stated that T.‘s holding had been based on the premise that, at the time, the juvenile code had expressly linked the maximum commitment term for a youth
to the maximum sentence that an adult could serve for the same conduct. The court then reasoned that, because criminal courts in 1976 had broad statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences for adult offenders, it had logically followed in T. that juvenile courts had similar authority.
However, as the court explained, the legislature amended the juvenile statute in 1999 and severed that “linkage” between a juvenile court‘s authority and a criminal court‘s sentencing authority in adult cases. In addition, the court explained that intervening changes to the criminal sentencing statutes, following the T. decision and prior to the
In dissent, Chief Judge Lagesen reasoned that the statutory scheme gives the juvenile court broad discretion to determine the conditions and duration of an OYA commitment and provides factors for the court to consider, including other conduct by the youth. The dissent noted that the 1999 amendments did not address the consecutive-commitment question. The dissent also explained that “juvenile courts long have been understood to have [the] authority” to impose consecutive commitment terms, and concluded that, “[a]bsent a clear indication from the legislature that it intended to displace that status quo,” the court should maintain it. Id. at 222 (Lagesen, C.J., dissenting) (citing T., 27 Or App at 407).
The state petitioned for review, which we allowed.
II. ANALYSIS
Before addressing the interpretive question in this case, we provide a brief description of juvenile delinquency proceedings. When a youth engages in conduct that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, the state may petition the juvenile court to find the youth within its jurisdiction.
The court then holds a hearing, which constitutes the “adjudication” phase.
The terminology used in the juvenile code is unique to this context. Therefore, we clarify a few terms before addressing the question in this case. “Commitment to OYA” and “OYA custody,” as the state explained at oral argument, are used interchangeably throughout the juvenile code and are distinguished from the physical location where a youth is “placed.” See, e.g.,
The question in this case is whether a juvenile court may impose a commitment term that runs consecutively to a previously imposed commitment term when the consecutively imposed commitment is the result of conduct that occurred while youth was in OYA custody for the earlier commitment. Youth argues that the juvenile court does not have the authority to impose consecutive commitment terms because
A. Mootness
We first address the fact that youth is no longer in OYA custody nor under the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction. A case becomes moot when a court‘s decision will no longer have a “practical effect on the rights of the parties.” Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 405, 848 P2d 1194 (1993). Often, that occurs because an event “render[s] it impossible for the court to grant effectual relief.” Hamel v. Johnson, 330 Or 180, 184, 998 P2d 661 (2000) (citation omitted). A party moving for dismissal bears the burden to establish mootness. State v. K.J.B., 362 Or 777, 786, 416 P3d 291 (2018).
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion in April 2022. The parties did not provide a notice of probable mootness to that court, and that court did not address mootness in its opinion. After the state petitioned for review, we asked the parties to submit briefing on mootness. We then allowed review.
The parties agree that this case is reviewable under
“(1) The party had standing to commence the action;
“(2) The act challenged by the party is capable of repetition, or the policy or practice challenged by the party continues in effect; and
“(3) The challenged policy or practice, or similar acts, are likely to evade judicial review in the future.”
The parties both argue that all three of those requirements are met, and we agree that they are. First, youth had standing to challenge the juvenile court‘s imposition of the consecutive commitment term because he was in
OYA custody at the time that he challenged it. Second, the imposition of that
We further conclude that we should exercise our discretion to review the issue in this case. Clarifying the scope of the juvenile court‘s dispositional authority is important to the public and will have implications for future cases. See ORAP 9.07 (setting forth factors to consider in determining whether to allow discretionary review).
It is true that, in some cases, we have remanded to a lower court for consideration of whether it is appropriate to adjudicate an otherwise moot case when that question was not addressed below and when we conclude that the claims are justiciable under
B. The Authority to Impose Consecutive Commitments Under ORS 419C.501
The question in this case is whether
We begin with the text.
“(1) The court shall fix the duration of any disposition made pursuant to this chapter and the duration may be for an
indefinite period. Any placement in the legal custody of the Department of Human Services or the Oregon Youth Authority under ORS 419C.478 or placement under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board underORS 419C.529 shall be for an indefinite period. However, the period of institutionalization or commitment may not exceed:“(a) The period of time specified in the statute defining the crime for an act that would constitute an unclassified misdemeanor if committed by an adult;
“(b) Thirty days for an act that would constitute a Class C misdemeanor if committed by an adult;
“(c) Six months for an act that would constitute a Class B misdemeanor if committed by an adult;
“(d) Three hundred sixty-four days for an act that would constitute a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult;
“(e) Five years for an act that would constitute a Class C felony if committed by an adult;
“(f) Ten years for an act that would constitute a Class B felony if committed by an adult;
“(g) Twenty years for an act that would constitute a Class A felony if committed by an adult; and
“(h) Life for a young person who was found to have committed an act that, if committed by an adult would constitute murder or any aggravated form of murder under
ORS 163.095 ,163.107 , or163.115 .“(2) Except as provided in subsection (1)(h) of this section, the period of any disposition may not extend beyond the date on which the young person or adjudicated youth becomes 25 years of age.”
The text of the statute does not expressly address the question before us. It instructs us that the juvenile court must “fix the duration” of a disposition in its order and that placement in OYA custody must be for an indefinite period.
At issue in this case is the meaning of the latter provision. The use of the indefinite article “an,” used with the singular noun “act,” could be interpreted in two ways. First, “an” can be used before an unspecified noun—synonymous with “any.” See Lake Oswego Preservation Society v. City of Lake Oswego, 360 Or 115, 126, 379 P3d 462 (2016). Second, “an” can be used “quantitatively” to signal that the noun is part of a class, whether that class is defined expressly or implicitly in the context in which the indefinite article appears. Id. at 126-27. Both interpretations indicate that “an” refers to a single thing—here, a single act. In other words, the statute provides that the juvenile court shall “fix the duration of any disposition” for “an act,” but it does not expressly address what should happen in a situation involving multiple acts. Finding limited evidence of the legislature‘s intent in the text of
As relevant to this case, the statutory context for
As noted, when determining an appropriate disposition, the court must consider numerous factors set out in the statute.
Other provisions regarding dispositions further support that understanding. The court has authority to direct the youth to remain in the legal custody of the youth‘s parents, to be placed in the legal custody of a relative or a foster home, or to be placed in the legal custody of a care center when imposing a probation term.
The juvenile code instructs the juvenile court to determine whether OYA custody is in the youth‘s best interests, and to determine the services and conditions that the youth must receive and adhere to during youth‘s term of commitment to OYA. As discussed above, when the juvenile court determines that OYA custody is appropriate,
In short, the juvenile code entrusts the juvenile court with broad authority to impose an appropriate disposition given the facts and circumstances of each case. The limitations on that authority that the code does provide are quite explicit. See, e.g.,
The first juvenile code was enacted in 1959. Or Laws 1959, ch 432. Former ORS 419.511 (1959), repealed by Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373, provided broad authority for the juvenile court to set an indefinite term of commitment, limited only by the youth reaching 21 years of age. Or Laws 1959, ch 432, §§ 17, 19. The first substantive amendment relevant to understanding maximum periods of commitment was in 1971. The legislature amended the statute to provide that a youth‘s indefinite term of commitment could not exceed the statutory maximum sentence that an adult would receive for the same conduct. Or Laws 1971, ch 571, § 1. In making that determination, the legislature considered the current practice of juvenile courts in addition to arguments both for and against the bill, Senate Bill (SB) 138 (1971). Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 138, Mar 12, 1971, Tape 3, Side 2. According to testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, some cases had resulted in a youth being committed to incarceration from age 15 to age 21, when an adult would have been sentenced to 60 days in jail for the same conduct. Id. Proponents of the bill understood the proposed connection to the statutory maximums in adult sentences to apply to youth in Corrections Division custody (now OYA), and not to other types of dispositions. Id.; see generally Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report §§ 74, 75 (July 1970) (stating the maximum terms for indeterminate sentences under the revised criminal code). In keeping the mandatory indefinite term of commitment, but providing an upper limit on that term of commitment, proponents of the bill understood it to still provide enough flexibility for the Corrections Division to release a youth at the point in time that the youth was rehabilitated, without committing a youth for months or years longer than an adult would serve for the same conduct. We could find no discussion in the legislative history of SB 138 of consecutive terms of commitment for subsequent offenses.
We understand the 1971 amendment to reflect the legislature‘s intent to prevent youths from being committed to the Corrections Division for a longer period of time than adults would serve for engaging in the same conduct. The concerns driving opposition to the bill were that, in some circumstances, it might be in a youth‘s best interest to be committed to OYA custody for a longer period of time than would apply to an adult. Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 138, Mar 12, 1971, Tape 3, Side 2. The text of the law, as passed, indicates that the desire to achieve “equal treatment” between youths and adults for the same conduct carried the day.
Thus, the governing law beginning in 1971 was that a disposition that placed a youth in the legal custody of OYA (then, the Children‘s Services Division and formerly the Corrections Division) was required to be for an indefinite period not to exceed the maximum term of incarceration for an adult who engaged in the same conduct. The legislative history of the 1971 version of the statute suggests that the legislature understood the juvenile court‘s dispositional authority to be broad—it could impose any disposition it determined was appropriate unless the legislature provided an express limitation.
In 1976, the Court of Appeals decided a case interpreting that statute, former ORS 419.511(1) (1971), and answered a question similar to the one presented here. T., 27 Or App at 409. In that case, the youth was adjudicated in a single hearing for two counts of unrelated conduct that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted
The 1999 legislature removed the text that tied the statutory maximum for juvenile commitments to the statutory maximum for adult criminal sentences. Or Laws 1999, ch 964, § 1. It replaced that text with a specific list of durational limits per offense, which remain in the current version of the statute.
The majority in the Court of Appeals concluded otherwise. It similarly examined the prior versions and the legislative history, but it concluded that this case presented “an issue of ambiguous legislative intent.” 319 Or App at 216-17. It explained that T.‘s rationale was rooted in the inherent authority of criminal courts. However, it concluded that that authority had later been limited in the criminal context by
The legislature did impose limits on criminal courts’ ability to impose consecutive sentences in adult cases. Those limits were created in 1987, as noted above. By then, it had been established law for 11 years, since the Court of Appeals’ 1976 decision in T., that juvenile courts could impose consecutive commitments. We presume that the 1987 legislature was aware of that rule, yet it took no action to extend the new restrictions it was creating in the adult criminal context to the juvenile code. See Blachana, LLC v. Bureau of Labor & Industries, 354 Or 676, 691, 318 P3d 735 (2014) (“We presume that the legislature was aware of existing law[.]“).
More significantly, when the legislature next amended the juvenile code in 1999, it did so without indicating any intent to limit the authority recognized in T. or have any bearing on the authority to impose consecutive commitments for subsequent dispositions. Rather, it reveals that the legislature‘s concern at that time was that youth commitments should not be shortened based on a rationale that the Court of Appeals was considering in a pending case.
We conclude from the text, context, and legislative history that the legislature did not intend to prevent juvenile courts from imposing consecutive periods of commitment in circumstances like those here, where a youth was adjudicated for conduct that occurred while he was already in OYA custody. Although the text of
We also find youth‘s arguments to the contrary unavailing. Youth‘s primary argument is that the juvenile code is ”sui generis“; therefore, if the legislature did not expressly grant the juvenile court the authority to impose consecutive commitments, the juvenile court does not have that authority. Stating that a statutory scheme is sui generis, or “of its own kind,” implies no specific legal consequence. Here, it is a description of the statutory scheme that conveys the idea that the juvenile delinquency code is neither
Because we conclude from the text, context, and legislative history that the legislature‘s intent is clear, we do not address youth‘s remaining arguments invoking substantive maxims of statutory construction. Coos Waterkeeper v. Port of Coos Bay, 363 Or 354, 371-72, 423 P3d 60 (2018).
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.