State v. ArentState v. Arent
Eric Allen Marks, for appellant.
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DECISION AND JUDGMENT
HANDWORK, J.
{¶ 1} This appeal is from the April 19, 2011 judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, which sentenced appellant, Gregory Arent, after he was convicted by a jury of violating
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE‘S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT‘S MEDICAL CONDITION AND CONTINUING TO PROHIBIT TESTIMONY FROM BEING INTRODUCED AT TRIAL.
{¶ 2} On May 7, 2009, appellant was indicted in a single-count indictment alleging that he voted twice in an election. Appellee moved to exclude all evidence of the defense related to appellant‘s mental state, including his mental history, on the ground that
{¶ 3} In his sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred by holding that
{¶ 4} It is clear under Ohio law that a defendant cannot be found guilty of an offense unless he has committed a prohibited act or failed to do a required act with “the requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental state is specified by the section defining the offense.”
{¶ 5} Most recently, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that
{¶ 6} In the case before us,
(A) No person shall do any of the following:
(1) Vote or attempt to vote in any primary, special, or general election in a precinct in which that person is not a legally qualified elector;
(2) Vote or attempt to vote more than once at the same election by any means, including voting or attempting to vote both by absent voter‘s ballots under division (G) of section 3503.16 of the Revised Code and by regular ballot at the polls at the same election, or voting or attempting to vote both by absent voter‘s ballots under division (G) of section 3503.16 of the Revised Code and by absent voter‘s ballots under Chapter 3509. or armed service absent voter‘s ballots under Chapter 3511. of the Revised Code at the same election;
(3) Impersonate or sign the name of another person, real or fictitious, living or dead, and vote or attempt to vote as that other person in any such election;
(4) Cast a ballot at any such election after objection has been made and sustained to that person‘s vote;
(5) Knowingly vote or attempt to vote a ballot other than the official ballot.
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} Because the Ohio Supreme Court found that
{¶ 9} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that we must first consider the words of the statute to determine the legislative intent. Wac, 68 Ohio St.2d at 87, 428 N.E.2d 428; State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466, 2010-Ohio-3830, 935 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 22; and Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105, 304 N.E.2d 378 (1973). A court must be careful to “give effect to the words used, not to delete words used or to insert words
{¶ 10} In both the Horner and Wac cases, the court held that where the General Assembly stated a culpable mental state element for only one of two subsections of a statute (where each subsection delineates the elements for a separate criminal offense), the court could find a plain indication of a legislative intent to make one of the offenses a strict liability offense. Horner at ¶ 33-34, and Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 242, at ¶ 30. The Ohio Supreme Court has also considered whether the legislative history and whether the General Assembly has altered a statute to differentiate between different types of violations. State v. Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d 329, 331-332, 681 N.E.2d 911 (1997), and State v. Collins, 89 Ohio St.3d 524, 533, 733 N.E.2d 1118 (2000) (Lanzinger, J., dissenting).
{¶ 11} This analysis also applies in the case before us. Here, one offense of illegal voting defined under the statute has a culpable mental state, while the one at issue does not. Furthermore, the General Assembly made a distinction between the false registration statute,
{¶ 13} Finally, whether the court can consider whether there are any indications outside of the statute that “plainly indicate a purpose to impose strict liability” is unclear. In Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 242, the court considered the strong stance the General Assembly had taken against sexual offenses involving minors, evidenced by the number of statutes criminalizing such behaviors, and the fact that the General Assembly added a knowledge requirement for some acts and not for the act at issue before concluding that the General Assembly had plainly indicated an intent to impose strict criminal liability for the offense at issue. Id. at ¶ 30. However, in State v. Collins, 89 Ohio St.3d 524, 733 N.E.2d 1118, the Ohio Supreme Court held that: “It is not enough that the General Assembly in fact intended imposition of liability without proof of mental culpability. Rather the General Assembly must plainly indicate that intention in the language of the statute.” Id. at 530. However, we believe that there may be indications outside the specific statute at issue which support a finding that the statutory language reflects an intention to impose strict liability.
{¶ 15} Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that
{¶ 16} Having found that the trial court did not commit error prejudicial to appellant, the judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the court costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
C.A. No. WD-11-034
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Peter M. Handwork, J.
JUDGE
Arlene Singer, P.J.
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
CONCUR.
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.