STATE OF OHIO v. AMANDA A. ANDREWS
Court of Appeals No. OT-22-056
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OTTAWA COUNTY
November 22, 2023
[Cite as State v. Andrews, 2023-Ohio-4237.]
MAYLE, J.
Trial Court No. 21 CR 243
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Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Drew Wood, for appellee
Brian A. Smith, for appellant.
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MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Following a jury trial, the defendant-appellant, Amanda Andrews, was convicted of violating a protection order, menacing by stalking, and two counts of failure to pay child support. The Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas imposed an aggregate seven-month prison sentence for these convictions, suspended the prison sentence, and granted Andrews community control. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Andrews was charged by way of an indictment on November 4, 2021. Originally, Andrews was charged with seven offenses, but three counts were dismissed before trial, leaving the following to be tried: violation of a protective order, in violation of
{¶ 3} The Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas commenced a jury trial on August 30, 2022. During the trial, evidence was introduced regarding other civil and criminal cases filed against Andrews, including a judgment entry of divorce granted in Ottawa County; a domestic violence civil protection order (DVCPO) obtained by Andrews‘s former girlfriend, M.K., in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division; two misdemeanor cases charging Andrews with telephone harassment in the Ottawa County Municipal Court; and a felony case in Lucas County, charging Andrews with similar offenses as those alleged in this case. The judgment entries and other proceedings from those cases were authenticated and made part of the record herein.
{¶ 4} This case involves allegations that Andrews violated the DVCPO (that was granted in Lucas County), committed the offense of menacing by stalking, and failed to pay child support. All the offenses are alleged to have occurred in Ottawa County.
{¶ 6} Andrews was romantically involved with a different woman, “M.K.,” from April of 2019 through October of 2020. Beginning in early 2021, Andrews began threatening and harassing M.K. with unwanted text messages and phone calls. M.K., who lives in Toledo, sought a protection order in Lucas County. Following an ex parte hearing on June 4, 2021, the trial court issued a DVCPO, ex parte, pursuant to
{¶ 7} Andrews continued to harass, intimidate, and threaten M.K. over the summer. On June 26, 2021, Andrews contacted M.K. and called her a “whore,” among other vulgar terms, and threated to burn down the camper and gazebo where M.K. and her children were camping. Andrews told M.K. that, “your trashy, trashy gazebo will go up in flames nice when I burn your camper down, white trash bitch.”
{¶ 8} On July 15, 2021, Andrews called M.K., leaving “voicemails” and sent text messages, asking if M.K. had “a bad day” and calling her a “cunt” and a “hole.” M.K.
{¶ 9} The June and July incidents resulted in two separate cases in the Ottawa County Municipal Court. On April 1, 2022, Andrews pled guilty and was convicted, in both cases, of telecommunication harassment, in violation of
{¶ 10} M.K. testified that Andrews continued her harassment on August 17, 2021. On that date, M.K. went to the casino near her home in Toledo. M.K. went alone and was not expecting to see anyone she knew, especially Andrews who lived an hour away. When Andrews appeared at the casino, asking to talk, M.K. agreed. But, when the “harassing” and “nasty talk” began, M.K. left the casino without Andrews. Later, M.K. was awakened at 4:40 a.m. by Toledo police. The police told M.K. that they had Andrews in custody and that she had been on M.K.‘s property. M.K. learned that Andrews had called 911 and falsely reported that M.K. was suicidal, which prompted the police to visit M.K.‘s property, where they encountered Andrews and ultimately arrested her. When M.K. reviewed footage from her exterior security cameras, she could see “[Andrews] walking around [her] house, walking on [her] picnic table, waving to the camera and then taking it down, and [asking], where you at, cunt.” The next day, M.K. located the missing cameras, in the front seat of Andrews‘s car, which was parked near M.K.‘s home. M.K. summed up the incident as “just another act of her terrorizing me
{¶ 11} On August 30, 2021, the Lucas County court held a full hearing on the petition for a DVCPO. M.K. and her attorney attended the hearing and offered multiple exhibits into evidence. Andrews did not attend and was not represented. Following the hearing, the trial court issued an Order of Protection, which found that Andrews had engaged in an “ongoing campaign to malign and harass” M.K. by sending “hundreds of * * * threatening, harassing and menacing” texts, calls, and emails. For example, Andrews texted M.K. that she was going to kill M.K. “in front of her children,” “slit [M.K.‘s] children‘s throats,” and burn down M.K.‘s house. The court also found that Andrews made 17 “completely false” and “malicious” 911 calls, telling authorities that M.K. was “suicidal and had hung herself,” that M.K. was “being raped,” or that M.K. was “raping someone else.” On one occasion, Andrews went to M.K.‘s home and attempted to “set [M.K.] on fire with a lighter” when M.K. opened the door. The trial court also found that, after the June 4, 2021 ex parte order was issued, Andrews had “damaged the security cameras installed at [M.K.‘s] home.” The court concluded that, by her actions, Andrews had attempted to cause M.K. bodily harm, placed M.K. in fear of imminent serious physical harm, and engaged in a pattern of conduct that knowingly caused M.K. mental distress. The court granted a full protection order, to be effective until June 4, 2026, five years from the ex parte order. The court specifically ordered Andrews not to abuse, harm, attempt to harm, threaten, follow, stalk, harass, force sexual relations upon, or
{¶ 12} In the early morning hours of September 22, 2021, M.K. began receiving text messages and phone calls from unknown numbers that lasted for hours. Some of the texts accused M.K. of “accessing my accounts” while others, from a different number, were vile and racist. Based on some of the personal content and “rambling” nature of the messages, M.K. knew that the sender was Andrews. At 6:00 a.m., M.K. answered her phone and heard Andrews‘s voice on the other end, asking why she, M.K., was calling Andrews. M.K. testified, “but I wasn‘t calling her. I was sleeping. It was 6:00 in the morning.” At 6:26 a.m., M.K. received some “group” text messages that included a third party named “Maggie” whom M.K. identified as Andrews‘s friend. The sender of the text messages “accus[ed]” M.K. of hacking into that person‘s iCloud account and deleting material and asked “Maggie” to “keep a copy of this text.” M.K. testified that she lacked “the technical ability” or interest in “hacking” into other people‘s internet accounts. M.K. provided “screen shots” of the messages and phone calls to the police.
{¶ 13} A few weeks later, on October 14, 2021, M.K. was in a Southfield, Michigan hotel room for a business trip, when she received several “no caller ID calls” and FaceTime video calls from Andrews. M.K. answered some of the calls and “asked [Andrews] to stop calling [because] there‘s a protection order.” Andrews told M.K. that she did not initiate the calls, and she told M.K. to “stop calling me” and asked M.K. “why are you calling me?” Because of this, M.K.—who had two phones with her—used her personal phone to answer the incoming video calls, and used her work phone to video the
{¶ 14} In the video recordings, which were played for the jury, Andrews denies initiating the calls, denies the existence of any protection order, accuses M.K. of texting her children‘s soccer coach, and asks what the coach‘s wife “is going to think about [M.K.] texting him at three o‘clock in the morning.” M.K. testified that she was “concerned that [Andrews] was going to call and disrupt the family [alleging] some kind of misconduct which actually did not happen. A family who I see regularly for, you know, four-year-old-soccer. And that‘s not the first time she had done that to a family.” In all, the state produced evidence that Andrews initiated 19 calls to M.K. that night.
{¶ 15} Under cross-examination, M.K. admitted that she voluntarily saw Andrews “probably” three times while the CPO was in effect, including two trips to Cleveland in the summer of 2022, where she and Andrews “had sex.”
{¶ 16} When the state rested its case, Andrews moved for an acquittal, which the court denied. However, the trial court did order Count 2 to be reclassified from a felony to a first-degree misdemeanor because the state failed to present any evidence that Andrews violated the protection order “while committing a felony offense.”
{¶ 17} Andrews testified in her own defense. Andrews claimed that she went to the casino in August 2021 because she believed that the ex parte order, which barred her from having any contact with M.K., was no longer in effect. In support of her belief,
{¶ 18} Andrews was found guilty and convicted as to all four counts. Although the trial court‘s judgment entry correctly indicates that Andrews was “found guilty by jury trial of Count #2, Violation of Protection Order, a misdemeanor of the first degree (M1),” it incorrectly refers to the felony provision of the statute, i.e.
{¶ 19} For its sentence, the trial court ordered Andrews to serve six months in jail as to Count 2 (i.e. violation of a protection order); seven months in prison as to Count 3 (menacing by stalking); and six months in prison as to Count 6 and as to Count 7 (failure to pay child support), all terms to be served concurrently. The court suspended the terms of incarceration and placed Andrews on community control for a period of two years, subject to her complying with the community control conditions, attending three
{¶ 20} Andrews appealed and assigns four errors for our review:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I: Appellant‘s convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II: The trial court erred in failing to order severance of Counts Two and Three of the Indictment from Counts Six and Seven of the Indictment, in violation of Rules 8 and 14 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure and Appellant‘s right to Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III: The failure of Appellant‘s trial counsel to renew Appellant‘s Motion for Relief from Improper Joinder either at the close of the State‘s evidence, or at the close of the evidence, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of Appellant‘s right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV: The cumulative errors of Appellant‘s trial counsel constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of Appellant‘s right to counsel under the Sixth and Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
A. The convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 21} In her first assignment of error, Andrews claims that her convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 22} When reviewing a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether the jury clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Unlike a sufficiency analysis, we do not view the evidence in a light most favorable to the state. “Instead, we sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and scrutinize ‘the factfinder‘s resolution of the conflicting testimony.‘” State v. Robinson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1369, 2012-Ohio-6068, ¶ 15, citing Thompkins at 388. Reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for “the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
1. Violating a Protection Order
{¶ 23} We begin with Andrews‘s conviction for violating the protection order.
{¶ 24} As an initial matter, we note that the alleged voicemail was not marked or admitted as an exhibit, does not appear to have been played for the jury, and is not part of the appellate record. Regardless, Andrews allegedly received this voicemail on August 17, 2021—which was almost a month before she was served with the full protection order on September 13, 2021. Given that Andrews received service of the DVCPO on September 13, 2021, the jury did not lose its way when it concluded that she recklessly violated this order by repeatedly contacting M.K. on October 14, 2021.
{¶ 25} Andrews also argues that it was “reasonable” for her to believe that the full DVCPO had been dismissed—“even after being served with [it]” on September 13, 2021—because M.K. “had extensive contact with Andrews until at least October 14, 2021.” We disagree. As Andrews acknowledged at trial, the DVCPO clearly advised, “IF YOU VIOLATE ANY TERM OF THIS ORDER EVEN WITH THE PROTECTED PERSON‘S PERMISSION, YOU MAY BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OR ARRESTED. ONLY THE COURT CAN CHANGE THIS ORDER. YOU ACT AT YOUR OWN RISK IF YOU DISREGARD THIS WARNING.”
{¶ 26} For these reasons, we find that the jury did not lose its way in concluding that Andrews behaved recklessly when she violated the DVCPO on October 14, 2021.
{¶ 27} Andrews also complains that her conviction for menacing by stalking was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Under
{¶ 28} M.K. testified that she willingly met with Andrews on “probably” three occasions, two of which occurred in Cleveland during the summer of 2022. According to the indictment, however, Andrews committed the menacing offense between September 13 and October 14, 2021. Thus, we agree with the state that the two 2022 encounters are wholly irrelevant because they occurred after Andrews had committed the menacing offense.
{¶ 29} Regardless, even though M.K. “probably” had one or more consensual encounters with Andrews during the indictment period, the jury heard M.K. express her “embarrass[ment]” and regret for “ever [having] gone anywhere near” Andrews “because it backfire[d] on [her] every time.” Although we consider the credibility of witnesses under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, “we extend special deference to the finder of facts credibility determinations given that it is the finder of fact that has the
{¶ 30} Finally, Andrews urges the court to reject M.K.‘s testimony as untrustworthy because M.K. supposedly admitted to making a “false police report.” Under cross-examination, M.K. was asked if she recalled “a time” when she called the Oak Harbor Police Department and reported that Andrews was driving under the influence of alcohol. M.K. admitted that, when she called the police, she was not “following” Andrews, as she told the dispatcher. Instead, she was monitoring Andrews‘s location on her phone, while standing in her kitchen with Toledo Police officers present. M.K., however, stood by the substance of the report—i.e. that Andrews was “drunk and driving” and that she only avoided getting arrested because a friend came and got her.
{¶ 31} Here, the jury had the advantage of observing M.K. and Andrews testify, and it was free to accept or reject their testimony, in whole or in part. “Just because the jury resolved issues of fact in the state‘s favor does not mean that the jury lost its way.” State v. Ahreshien, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1184, 2021-Ohio-1223, ¶ 42.
{¶ 32} We find that Andrews‘s conviction for menacing by stalking was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 33} Finally, Andrews claims that her two convictions for failure to pay child support are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Under
{¶ 34} On appeal, Andrews insists that she “demonstrated [her] inability to pay” with evidence that she was incarcerated, which had a “horrific” impact on her legal practice. But, Andrew‘s longest stretch of time in jail—a period of 118 days—began on November 12, 2021, which was after the period of time identified in the indictment. Likewise, Andrews‘s law license was suspended on November 8, 2021—i.e., after the relevant period of non-support. And, although Andrews argues that she made a “substantial payment” to B.A. following the sale of the marital home, this payment occurred in January of 2023—i.e., after her trial and convictions in this case.
{¶ 35} Finally, we note that an obligor‘s “ability to pay” does not depend solely on whether the payor is generating an income. See, e.g., State v. Roders, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20962, 2002-Ohio-3867, ¶ 27 (Jury‘s rejection of affirmative defense was not against
{¶ 36} For the reasons set forth above, we find that Andrews‘s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, Andrews‘s first assignment of error is found not well-taken.
B. The trial court did not err in denying Andrew‘s Crim.R. 14(A) motion to sever.
{¶ 37} In her second assignment of error, Andrews claims that the trial court erred when it denied her pretrial motion to sever Counts 2 and 3 (the protective order and menacing counts) from Counts 6 and 7 (failure to support counts).
{¶ 38} Under
The law favors joinder for public policy reasons, such as: to conserve judicial economy and prosecutorial time; to conserve public funds
by avoiding duplication inherent in multiple trials; to diminish the inconvenience to public authorities and witnesses; to promptly bring to trial those accused of a crime; and to minimize the possibility of incongruous results that can occur in successive trials before different juries.
Id. at ¶ 36, quoting State v. Dunkins, 10 Ohio App.3d 72, 460 N.E.2d 688 (9th Dist.1983), paragraph one of syllabus.
{¶ 39} Although joinder is favored by Ohio law, a defendant may move to sever the charges under
A defendant claiming error in the trial court‘s refusal to allow separate trials of multiple charges under
Crim.R. 14 has the burden of affirmatively showing that [her] rights were prejudiced; [she] must furnish the trial court with sufficient information so that it can weigh the considerations favoring joinder against the defendant‘s right to a fair trial, and [she] must demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in refusing to separate the charges for trial.
State v. Gordon, 152 Ohio St.3d 528, 2018-Ohio-2595, 98 N.E.3d 251, ¶ 21, quoting State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 421 N.E.2d 1288 (1981), syllabus.
{¶ 41} “If a motion to sever is made at the outset of a trial, it must be renewed at the close of the state‘s case or at the conclusion of all of the evidence so that a
{¶ 42} Here, Andrews moved the trial court to sever the failure to support counts at the outset of trial but failed to renew the motion, either at the close of the state‘s case or once all the evidence had been presented. Accordingly, we review for plain error.
{¶ 43} Andrews argues that she was prejudiced by the joinder of Counts 2 and 3 with Counts 6 and 7. She claims that, by combining different kinds of offenses—i.e. claims involving allegations of harassing conduct with claims involving allegations of financial misconduct—she was unfairly portrayed to the jury as “a habitual offender.” She also complains that the state tried multiple counts together to “make Andrews less sympathetic.” In other words, Andrews argues that she was prejudiced by the mere fact that the state tried multiple counts together in the same trial. This is not a viable argument. Merely trying a defendant for multiple offenses, without more, does not violate the joinder rule or create prejudice.
{¶ 44} Andrews also claims that she was prejudiced by joinder because, according to her, “it is very likely that the nonsupport charges would not have gone to trial,” but for the fact that they were joined with the other counts. Andrews bases her theory on the fact that B.A., the obligee in the child support counts, was paid a lump sum, following the sale of the marital home. However, the proceeds from the sale were not applied to Andrews‘s child support arrearage until January of 2023, five months after the case was tried, and, even then, an arrearage of $55,000 remained.1 Therefore, we find no support for Andrews‘s argument that the nonsupport counts would likely not have gone to trial if they had been severed from the other counts.
{¶ 45} Finally, Andrews claims that the state failed to defeat her case of prejudice because “there is no set of circumstances” under which evidence of her alleged failure to pay child support would be admissible to prove the other counts, i.e. that she violated the protective order or committed the offense of menacing by stalking. That is, Andrews
{¶ 46} But, even if we assume that
{¶ 47} Here, the evidence proffered by the state in support of each offense was simple and direct. Although Andrews concedes that Counts 2 and 3 have “no factual connection” to Counts 6 and 7 because “the evidence concerns two different alleged victims” and involved different “type[s] of conduct,“—i.e. M.K. as the victim in the protection order and menacing counts, and B.A. as the victim in the nonsupport counts—she argues that the evidence nonetheless overlapped because the jury heard testimony that the respective victims, M.K. and B.A., communicated with one another.
{¶ 48} But it was Andrews—not the state—that introduced evidence regarding communications between M.K. and B.A. That is, under cross-examination, M.K. denied
{¶ 49} Finally, the trial court cautioned the jury, immediately prior to deliberations, to consider each count, and the evidence applicable to each count, separately and to state its findings as to each count uninfluenced by its verdict on any other counts. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the jury followed the instructions of the trial court. Gibson at ¶ 30 (Finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court denied defendant‘s motion to sever where the evidence of the crimes alleged in two indictments was simple, direct and capable of being separated and where the court gave a similar instruction to the jury).
{¶ 50} In sum, we find that there was no error, let alone plain error, in the trial court‘s decision to deny Andrews‘s request to sever under
C. Andrews failed to establish a case of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
{¶ 51} In her third assignment of error, Andrews alleges that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the motion to sever during trial.
{¶ 53} In order to show counsel‘s conduct was deficient or unreasonable, the defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel provided competent representation and must show that counsel‘s actions were not trial strategies prompted by reasonable professional judgment. Strickland at 689. Counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675, 693 N.E.2d 267 (1998). Tactical or strategic trial decisions, even if unsuccessful, do not generally constitute ineffective assistance. State v. Frazier, 61 Ohio St.3d 247, 255, 574 N.E.2d 483 (1991). Rather, the errors complained of must amount to a substantial violation of counsel‘s essential duties
{¶ 54} Andrews claims that counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to renew the motion to sever and that she was prejudiced by this failure because the motion “would have been granted, and the cases [would have been] reset on a different date.” She claims, “[a]t the very least,” that the issue would have been preserved for appeal and not relegated to plain error review.
{¶ 55} As discussed above, we found “no error, let alone plain error, in the trial court‘s decision to deny Andrews‘s request to sever under
{¶ 56} We find Andrews‘s third assignment of error not well-taken.
{¶ 57} In her fourth assignment of error, Andrews identifies “other crucial errors” by trial counsel which she claims amounts to cumulative error.
{¶ 58} First, Andrews argues that trial counsel failed to elicit testimony that she says would have “undercut” a necessary element of the menacing offense—i.e. whether M.K. actually believed Andrews would cause her physical harm or mental distress. Andrews claims that her attorney erred by “waiting until redirect” to ask a defense witness “about seeing Andrews and [M.K.] together after the civil protection was in place” because the trial court sustained the state‘s objection to this question as beyond the scope of cross examination. On appeal, Andrews speculates that the testimony would have “corroborated” her claim that M.K. voluntarily chose to spend time with Andrews, even after the civil protection order was in effect.
{¶ 59} We reject the argument for two reasons. First, because the witness was ordered not to answer the question, there is no evidence in the record to support Andrews‘s contention as to how he would have testified. Second, assuming the witness would have testified as Andrews claims, the testimony would have been, at most, duplicative of Andrews‘s testimony. Thus, we cannot say that the additional testimony would have had any effect on the jury‘s decision to find Andrews guilty of menacing. Accord Ahreshien, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1184, 2021-Ohio-1223, at ¶ 50 (Although trial counsel‘s questioning “may have ‘opened the door’ to other testimony of [defendant‘s] bad acts, it did not prejudice the outcome of this case, because it was duplicative of other, more relevant evidence of appellant‘s abuse of [the victim]“).
{¶ 61} Third, Andrews faults her trial counsel for failing to object when the prosecutor repeatedly described Andrews as having “tracked” M.K.‘s location. Andrews specifically denied that anyone had engaged in “tracking.” On appeal, Andrews complains that counsel‘s failure to object allowed the jury to “conclude, incorrectly, that Andrews had been tracking [M.K.‘s] phone.” Andrews may not like the term, but she specifically admitted at trial that she reviewed phone records that showed M.K.‘s “location.” Given that an objection may have drawn undue attention to Andrews‘s use of technology to determine M.K.‘s location—whether or not such conduct should be
{¶ 62} Finally, Andrews complains that trial counsel failed to object to a line of questioning regarding her arrest and guilty plea to a charge of telephone harassment in June of 2021. Andrews argues that evidence regarding this conviction was “irrelevant and prejudicial” because it occurred before the time period identified in Counts 2 or 3. Andrews, however, neglects to mention that she introduced this evidence under cross examination when she told the prosecutor, “I want to talk about the June incident.” Further, Andrews‘s counsel did object to the June of 2021 criminal proceeding as being “outside the time frame of the criminal charges.” Thus, counsel‘s performance was not deficient.
{¶ 63} In sum, there is no merit to Andrews‘s assertion that a cumulation of alleged errors by her trial counsel resulted in cumulative error. “[W]hen none of the individual claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have merit, cumulative error cannot be established simply by joining those meritless claims together.” State v. Graham, 164 Ohio St.3d 187, 2020-Ohio-6700, 172 N.E.3d 841, ¶ 170. We find her fourth assignment of error not well-taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 64} In sum, Andrews‘s assignments of error are found not well-taken, and the trial court‘s October 24, 2022 judgment is affirmed.
{¶ 66} Andrews is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R.24.
Judgment affirmed and remanded.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.
JUDGE
CONCUR.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.