{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Michael T. Gravely, appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, we affirm that judgment.
{¶ 2} On April 28, 2008, Officer Ronald Branham of the Columbus Police Department Narcotics Bureau Intac Unit
1781 E. RICH STREET (Two story white sided and brown brick house, buy came from 1st floor rear door; 2nd house east of the 1st alley east of Fairwood Avenue on the south side of E. Rich Street)
{¶ 3} On the evening of April 30, 2008, officers of the Intac Unit attempted to execute the first search warrant. They approached the rear door of the house, where the drug buy had occurred, in a single-file line. Officer John Kifer’s role that night was to provide armed cover for the other officers, who would attempt to gain entrance to the house. He stood to the side of the back porch to allow the next officer, Anthony Garrison, to get to the door. Garrison’s role was to breach the back door. Garrison first attempted to open the door, but it was locked. He then knocked on the door and announced that the police were there to serve a search warrant. Garrison heard people scurrying inside the house, so he hit the door with his battering ram to break down the door. The door did not move.
{¶ 4} After Garrison hit the door, Kifer heard and saw gunshots coming though the door. Garrison was shot in the hip but continued to hit the door with his battering ram until he was shot a second time, this time in the arm. Garrison dropped the battering ram and left the porch. Kifer returned fire to provide cover for Garrison. Officer John Gillis, who had been standing to the side of the door, picked up the battering ram and hit the door. The door still would not open. Shots were again fired from inside the house. One shot hit Gillis in the leg. He fell down and rolled off the porch. Kifer and another officer returned fire to provide cover for Gillis.
{¶ 5} The injured officers left the scene to receive medical treatment, and the remaining officers found cover in the house’s backyard. The officers ordered the people inside the house to come out. Shortly thereafter, several people exited the house through the rear door. Officer Kevin Tilson, who was performing containment of the scene, saw a person trying to leave the house through a basement window. That person, later identified as Derrick Foster, crawled out of the window and told Tilson that he had a gun. Tilson took the gun, threw it on the ground, and placed Foster under arrest.
{¶ 6} Other officers entered the first floor of the house to secure it and to search for suspects or any injured people. Once the house was secured, Detective James McCoskey, who was called to the scene after the shooting,
1781 E. Rich street, a light colored, vinyl siding covered two-story house located on the south side of the street facing north and curtilage
{¶ 7} Shortly thereafter, Columbus Police Crime Scene Search Unit officers arrived at the house. Outside the house, the officers found a Smith & Wesson Model SW .40F handgun that contained six .40 caliber rounds. Inside the house, the officers recovered two more guns: a Glock Smith & Wesson .40 caliber found inside the home’s furnace, and a Springfield Armor USA XP .45 found in the home’s basement. The Springfield Armor .45 was a two-tone gun, green on the bottom and black on the top. The officers also found a number of spent bullet casings inside the house. Specifically, they found two .40 casings and five .45 casings inside the house.
{¶ 8} Columbus Police Officer Detective William Gillette, the lead detective in this investigation, arrived at the scene later that morning and entered the house. As he walked through the house, he discovered steps leading up to a second-floor apartment. He and another officer knocked on the door of that apartment and told the people inside to come out. No one responded. Police later learned from Foster that people could still be inside that second-floor apartment. Based on that information, Detective McCoskey obtained another search warrant (“the third search warrant”) to search for those individuals. The warrant sought to search:
1779 E. Rich street, Columbus, Ohio, located on the second floor of a two-story, light colored, vinyl sided house, setting on the south side of the street facing north and curtilage
{¶ 9} Shortly thereafter, the Columbus Police Department’s SWAT team entered the house’s second-floor apartment. They found two people in the apartment: appellant and another man.
{¶ 10} After discovering that the second-floor apartment had a separate address from the first-floor apartment, Branham obtained another search warrant (“the fourth search warrant”) to search for evidence of drugs in the second-floor apartment. The warrant sought to search:
1781 EAST RICH STREET (Two story, white sided and brown brick house. Second house east of the first alley east of Fairwood Avenue on the south side of East Rich Street. Target is second floor only.)
Pursuant to the fourth search warrant, officers from the Crime Scene Search Unit entered the second-floor apartment and found drugs and drug paraphernalia.
{¶ 12} On January 14, 2009, another Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellant in case No. 09CR01-275 with one count of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11, another count of possession of cocaine that included a major-drug-offender specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1410, one count of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11, and one count of having a weapon while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13. Appellant again entered a not-guilty plea to the charges and proceeded to trial.
{¶ 13} Before trial, appellant sought to suppress the evidence police obtained from their searches of 1779 and 1781 East Rich Street. Appellant argued that the evidence should be suppressed because the first three search warrants listed an incorrect address for the portion of the house searched. Specifically, the house contained two units with different addresses: 1779 East Rich Street is the address for the downstairs unit, and 1781 East Rich Street is the address for the upstairs unit. However, the only street address visible from the front of the house was 1781. The front door of the house opens up to a staircase that goes directly to the second floor of the house. There also was a side door of the house that provided access to the first floor. Over the side door was a small sign indicating that the address was 1779. No address was listed for the rear door of the house that also opened into the first floor.
{¶ 14} Each of the first three search warrants identified the intended search target (the area of the house that could be accessed through the back door) with the wrong address. Police executed the first and second search warrants on the downstairs unit of the house but identified the search target as 1781 East Rich Street, which was the address for the upstairs unit. Likewise, police executed the third search warrant on the upstairs unit of the house but identified the target as 1779 East Rich Street, which was the address for the downstairs unit. The fourth search warrant identified the correct address of the targeted unit (the upstairs unit).
{¶ 15} The state argued that even though the three search warrants contained incorrect addresses, suppression was not proper because the warrants contained descriptions of the target areas that were sufficient to allow the executing officers to locate and identify the intended target with reasonable effort. Following a
{¶ 16} The two indictments were jointly tried to a jury.
{¶ 17} Foster testified that he was on the first floor of the house gambling with a number of other men when he heard a loud noise at the back door, like someone was trying to kick the door in. Everyone inside the house began scattering and yelling that they were being robbed. Foster ducked into a corner and heard shots fired from inside the house. He did not see who fired the shots.
{¶ 18} The state presented evidence linking appellant to the drugs found in the house and to the shots fired from inside the house. Jamie Armstrong, a forensic scientist with the Columbus Police Department Crime Laboratory, testified that she found appellant’s DNA on a number of baggies that contained cocaine and were found in the house. She also found appellant’s DNA on the Springfield Armor USA XP .45 handgun found inside the house that night. Appellant was the major donor of the DNA on the gun, meaning that although there were multiple DNA types on the gun, his DNA was present in the greatest concentration.
{¶ 19} Mark Hardy, another forensic scientist with the Columbus Police Department Crime Laboratory, testified regarding the guns and ballistic evidence found at the scene of the shooting. He stated that he analyzed one bullet fragment found inside the house and concluded that it had been fired from the Springfield Armor USA XP .45 handgun found inside the house. He also
{¶ 20} The jury found appellant guilty of two counts of felonious assault with firearm specifications, one count of trafficking in cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine with a major-drug-offender specification, and one count of possession of heroin.
{¶ 21} Appellant appeals and assigns the following errors:
[1.] Appellant was denied a fair trial when the trial court refused to suppress the search of the premises in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.
[2.] The appellant was denied a right to a fair trial when the trial court overruled defendant’s motion to sever the two indictments.
[3.] There was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant.
[4.] The verdict is against the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 22} Appellant argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. We disagree.
{¶ 23} Appellate review of the denial of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside,
{¶ 25} Because a search warrant and supporting affidavit usually contain more information than just an address to identify the intended search target, a search warrant is not necessarily invalid if it describes the property to be searched with an incorrect address. State v. Scott, 7th Dist. No. 02 CA 108,
{¶ 26} Here, the trial court concluded that the first three search warrants, notwithstanding the incorrect addresses, contained descriptions that were sufficient to enable the executing officers, with reasonable effort, to locate and identify the intended premises. The description also made mistaken searches unlikely. We agree.
{¶ 27} The first search warrant accurately described the house to be searched as a two-story, white-sided, brown-brick home on East Rich Street. The front of the house identified the address as 1781 East Rich Street, which was the address listed on the search warrant. This description allowed the executing officers to locate and identify the house with reasonable effort. The search warrant also stated that the drug buy occurred from a rear door on the first floor of the house. This information was sufficient to identify the target premises and enabled the executing officers to locate the premises with reasonable effort. We also note that the house had been under surveillance before the search, and the officer who drafted the affidavit used to obtain the first search warrant also participated in the execution of that search warrant. These facts diminish the chances of a
{¶ 28} Similarly, the third search warrant described the same two-story house and specifically identified the second floor of the house as the intended search target. Therefore, notwithstanding the mistaken use of the address for the first-floor unit, that warrant’s description was also sufficient to enable the executing officers to identify the correct premises to be searched and to prevent mistaken searches.
{¶ 29} The description of the intended search target in the second search warrant was not as specific as the other two search warrants. It only described the target as “1781 E. Rich street, a light-colored, vinyl siding covered two-story house.” However, the second search warrant was requested shortly after the shootout outside the first-floor rear door. The police did not leave the scene of the shooting. The warrant sought to collect evidence relating to the shooting at the same location. Thus, even though the warrant contained the address of the second-floor unit, the executing officers could identify the actual property to be searched (the first floor) with reasonable effort, and there was no chance of a mistaken search. We also note that the executing officers searched the first floor of the house pursuant to this warrant and did not search the second floor.
{¶ 30} Although the three search warrants contained incorrect addresses for the intended search targets, under these circumstances, the property descriptions were sufficient to enable the executing officers to locate and identify the correct premises with reasonable effort and to minimize the chances of a mistaken search. Because the trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress, we overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.
{¶ 31} Appellant contends in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever the two indictments. However, the record indicates that appellant never asked the trial court to sever the two indictments. A day before the filing of appellant’s second indictment, he requested the trial court to sever the drug charges from the felonious-assault charges in case No. 08CR05-3601 and to separately try those charges. The trial court denied that request. One day after the filing of the second indictment, the state requested the trial court to join the two indictments. The trial court granted the state’s motion and joined the indictments. Appellant did not request severance of the indictments before, during, or after trial.
{¶ 33} Under Crim.R. 52(B), plain errors affecting substantial rights may be noticed by an appellate court even though they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. To constitute plain error, there must be (1) an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule, (2) that is plain or obvious, and (3) that affected substantial rights, i.e., affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Barnes (2002),
{¶ 34} The law favors the joinder of multiple offenses in a single trial. State v. Brinkley,
{¶ 35} Appellant argues that the trial court should have severed the indictments because he was prejudiced by the joinder. We disagree.
{¶ 36} A defendant claiming error in the trial court’s refusal to allow separate trials has the burden of affirmatively showing that his rights were prejudiced. State v. Torres (1981),
(¶ 37} Appellant also argues that joinder of the indictments confused the jury regarding the identification of the shooter on the felonious-assault charges. Specifically, he argues that the jury was more likely to convict him of the assault charges if they believed he was a drug dealer. This is also nothing more than speculation and does not rise to the level of prejudice necessary to sever indictments. See State v. Broadnax, 2d Dist. No. 21844,
{¶ 38} Even if appellant could establish prejudice in this case, the state can negate claims of prejudice in two ways. State v. Cameron, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-56,
{¶ 39} Evidence is “simple and direct” if the jury is capable of segregating the proof required for each offense. Id. at ¶ 40. “The rule seeks to prevent juries from combining the evidence to convict the defendant, instead of carefully considering the proof offered for each separate offense.” Id. Here, the evidence of the offenses is simple and direct and is not confusing or difficult to separate. The offenses in each indictment were analytically and logically separate: assault charges in which appellant allegedly shot at police officers and drug charges in which appellant allegedly possessed drugs. Although the offenses occurred at the same time and in the same residence, the offenses were separate and not so complex that the jury would have difficulty separating the proof required for each offense. Tipton,
{¶ 41} Appellant contends in his third and fourth assignments of error that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 42} The Supreme Court of Ohio delineated the role of an appellate court presented with a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument in State v. Jenks (1991),
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 'could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. * * *
{¶ 43} Whether the evidence is legally sufficient is a question of law, not fact. Thompkins,
{¶ 44} A manifest-weight-of-the-evidence claim requires a different review. The weight of the evidence concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence offered to support one side of the issue rather than
{¶ 45} A defendant is not entitled to a reversal on manifest-weight grounds merely because inconsistent evidence was presented at trial. State v. Raver, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-604,
{¶ 46} Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts, manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding of sufficiency. State v. Braxton, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-725,
{¶ 47} While not clearly articulated, appellant appears to argue that the state failed to prove that he committed felonious assault because the state failed to prove that he was the one who fired a gun at the officers. We disagree.
{¶ 48} Derrick Foster was the only person inside the house at the time of the shooting who testified. Although he heard shots fired from inside the house, he did not see appellant shoot a gun. In fact, no one testified that appellant fired a gun that night. However, it is well established that circumstantial evidence possesses the same probative value as direct evidence. Id. at ¶ 92, citing Treesh,
{¶ 49} Foster testified that before he fired his gun, another person inside the house fired a gun. Foster also testified that appellant was one of only two other men inside the house who had a gun that night. Mark Hardy testified that there two guns were fired from inside the house: Foster’s gun and the Springfield Armor USA XP .45. A picture of that gun introduced at trial shows a two-tone gun, green on the bottom and black on the top. That is how Foster described the gun appellant had with him that night. Jamie Armstrong testified that appellant was the major donor of DNA on the Springfield Armor USA XP .45. This is evidence demonstrating appellant’s connection to this gun. The state also presented evidence indicating that the Springfield Armor USA XP .45 was fired inside the house that night. Hardy testified that a bullet fragment found inside the house was fired from the Springfield Armor USA XP .45. Five other casings found inside the house had marks indicating that they were at some point chambered in the Springfield Armor XP .45.
{¶ 50} In light of this circumstantial evidence, the jury did not clearly lose its way in concluding that appellant fired a gun at the officers. Accordingly, appellant’s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. This resolution is also dispositive of appellant’s claim that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. Sowell,
{¶ 51} In conclusion, we overrule appellant’s four assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. The Intac Unit investigates complaints of drug activity and executes search warrants of homes engaged in drug activity.
. Before trial, the trial court dismissed one count of possession of cocaine and having a weapon while under disability.
. Foster was named as a co-defendant in appellant's first indictment and was charged with two counts of felonious assault. At some point before appellant's trial, Foster entered into a plea agreement with the state in which he pleaded guilty to two counts of felonious assault with a firearm specification and received a five-year prison sentence. Foster also agreed to testify against appellant. The state agreed not to oppose judicial release for Foster after four years.
. Foster also admitted to firing shots that night from his Smith & Wesson .40 handgun. Police found casings inside the house that were fired from his gun.
. The trial court found appellant guilty of one count of having a weapon while under disability.
. Although appellant's trial counsel again raised the issue of severance of the drug charges and the felonious-assault charges at trial, he did not request severance of the two indictments at trial.
. In these assignments of error, appellant addresses only his felonious-assault convictions. Accordingly, we will not address his other convictions.