STATE OF IDAHO v. DANIEL C. AMSTAD
Docket No. 45707
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
November 29, 2018
Boise, September 2018 Term
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk
The order of dismissal entered by the District Court is reversed and this case is remanded with instructions.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, attorneys for Respondent. Andrea S. Hunter argued.
BEVAN, J.
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns the interpretation of
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 20, 2017, an officer noticed a vehicle with foggy windows in the parking lot near the Wallace Complex on the campus of the University of Idaho. As the officer approached
The State appealed, asserting that the magistrate court erred by holding that a parking lot belonging to the University of Idaho was not a “premises of any place” under
III. ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether the district court erred when it concluded that a vehicle is not within the scope of
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court exercises free review over statutory interpretation because it presents a question of law. State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3, 343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015). On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court‘s decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on appeal.” Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010).
V. ANALYSIS
A. The district court erred when it held that Amstad‘s presence in a vehicle precluded liability under Idaho Code section 37-2732 .
As we noted in State v. Dunlap,
[t]he objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in
the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory construction.
155 Idaho 345, 361-62, 313 P.3d 1, 17-18 (2013) (quoting State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011)). Alternatively, a statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction. Jen-Rath Co., Inc. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 335, 48 P.3d 659, 664 (2002). That said, “[a]mbiguity is not established merely because differing interpretations are presented to a court; otherwise, all statutes subject to litigation would be considered ambiguous.” Hamilton ex rel. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135 Idaho 568, 572, 21 P.3d 890, 894 (2001) (internal citation omitted).
As a threshold matter, we must consider whether the district court erred when it determined the State was advancing a new theory on appeal. The notice of appeal which the State filed in the magistrate court noted:
The State intends to assert in the appeal that the Magistrate Judge erred in his interpretation of
Idaho Code 37-2732(d) . In particular, the Magistrate erred by holding that a parking lot belonging to the University of Idaho where Defendant is alleged to have violated the statute does not come within the purview of the statute.
The State‘s opening brief to the district court further stated the issue on appeal as follows: “Did the magistrate err in determining that the west Wallace Complex parking lot belonging to the University of Idaho is not ‘the premises of any place’ under
In the proceedings before the magistrate court, Amstad relied on two magistrate courts’ decisions and a report of the Boise City Community Ombudsman addressing the issue. The
Here, the stationary Honda in the Wallace complex parking lot was not used for traveling, but for smoking marijuana. Unlike the vehicles in the three opinions that were used for travelling, CH‘s Honda was in a fixed position, parked, stationary, and not even running. Not only did CH admit that he lets his friends use his car for smoking marijuana, Sharp, the passenger in the backseat, stated that they walked from the dorms to the car to smoke marijuana. Based on these facts, the Honda was not used for travel, but as a place that the three friends walked to for the purpose of smoking marijuana.
Later in its brief, the State argued,
Right now, as enforcement includes cars such as CH‘s Honda, students in dorms walk to their cars to smoke marijuana because it is difficult to conceal in their rooms. Under Defendant‘s proposed construction of the statute, students will be immune from
I.C. § 37-2732(d) if they just simply walk to their cars. This creates even more incentive to smoke marijuana in their cars.Not only will the increased activity in the parking lots lead to more drug use and law violations such as possession, it would create a major risk to society as well.
In light of these arguments, we hold that the State has consistently maintained that a parked car in a parking lot is a “place” for purposes of
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to be present at or on premises of any place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, administration, use, or to be given away. . . .
This word is a very indefinite term. It is applied to any locality, limited by boundaries, however large or however small. It may be used to designate a country, state, county, town, or a very small portion of a town. The extent of the locality designated by it must generally be determined by the connection in which it is used. In its primary and most general sense means locality, situation, or site, and it is also used to designate an occupied situation or building.
PLACE, Black‘s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). On the other hand, “premises” is defined as: “[a] house or building, along with its grounds; esp., the buildings and land that a shop, restaurant, company, etc. uses.” PREMISES, Black‘s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Due to the indefinite nature of the word “place” we hold that the plain language of
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly frequent places where illegal controlled substances are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, administration, use, or to be given away. . . .
Idaho Session Laws 1972, ch. 133 § 6 p. 261. In 1977 the Legislature modified subsection (d) to include the current language:
It shall be unlawful for any person to be present at or on premises of any place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, administration, use, or to be given away. . . .
That said, Amstad asserts that the Legislature did not intend for a person in a vehicle to be criminally liable under
Amstad opened the passenger door of the vehicle and the officer saw a baggie containing what he believed to be marijuana on the driver‘s lap, so Amstad was charged with violating
VI. CONCLUSION
The district court decision affirming the magistrate court is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to reverse and remand to the magistrate court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices HORTON, BRODY, and Justice pro tem TROUT, CONCUR.