State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Carlos Ramone Sargent, Appellant.
A19-1554
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS
Filed September 28, 2020
Larkin, Judge
Cass County District Court File No. 11-CR-18-139
Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
David M. Robbins, Special Assistant Public Defender, Meyer Njus Tanick, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
An officer may expand the scope of a traffic stop to investigate a suspected pretrial-release violation if the expansion is reasonable as defined in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), that is, if the government interest in public safety outweighs the
OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for unlawful possession of ammunition. He contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the ammunition, which was found in appellant‘s clothing after he was arrested during a traffic stop for a pretrial-release violation and searched incident to arrest. Given the balance of the government and individual interests at stake and the totality of the circumstances, the police reasonably expanded the traffic stop to investigate appellant‘s suspected violation of a condition of pretrial release. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
In May 2017, the state charged appellant Carlos Ramone Sargent with fifth-degree controlled-substance possession and driving while impaired. The district court ordered conditional bail, which included requirements that Sargent not use intoxicants and submit to random testing for intoxicants.1 Sargent posted the conditional bail and was released from custody pending further proceedings.
In November 2017, the Leech Lake Tribal Police arrested Sargent for violating his conditions of release. During a search incident to arrest, the police found three shotgun
At the motion hearing, the state presented evidence that on the evening of November 4, 2017, a Leech Lake Tribal Police Officer stopped a vehicle driven by E.H. because she had turned without signaling. E.H. had three passengers in her vehicle, including Sargent. The officer testified that he knew Sargent from “previous law enforcement contacts” and that Sargent had “a pretty good record.” The officer testified that on October 25, 2017, he had investigated Sargent‘s involvement in an assault. At that time, the officer did “a warrant check and probation check” and learned that Sargent was on pretrial release.
The officer testified that he smelled an odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle. The officer asked E.H. if she had been drinking, and she responded, “No.” The officer asked the passengers, including Sargent, if they had been drinking. Sargent responded, “Yes.” E.H. submitted to a preliminary breath test (PBT), which confirmed that she had not been drinking. After E.H. submitted to the PBT, the officer asked Sargent if he was on a “no-drink” condition, and Sargent responded, “Yes.” Sargent agreed to submit to a PBT and provided a breath sample that indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.03.
In support of his motion to suppress, Sargent argued that the initial traffic stop was pretextual and that the police unreasonably expanded the traffic stop to investigate his pretrial-release status. He also argued that his random-testing condition was unconstitutional and therefore did not provide a basis for the PBT, which he deemed a warrantless search.
The district court denied Sargent‘s motion to suppress. The court concluded that there was a valid basis for the stop and that Sargent‘s random-testing condition provided a valid basis for the PBT. The district court further concluded that, even if reasonable, articulable suspicion was necessary to exercise the random-testing condition, the odor of alcohol emanating from E.H.‘s vehicle established such suspicion. Sargent requested reconsideration. The district court reconsidered the issue, but the court once again refused to suppress the evidence, reasoning that the ammunition was discovered during a valid search incident to arrest.
ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Sargent‘s motion to suppress?
ANALYSIS
“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). We review the district court‘s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). In reviewing the district court‘s factual findings, this court defers to the district court‘s credibility determinations. State v. Miller, 659 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003).
Sargent challenges the district court‘s denial of his motion to suppress. Sargent first argues that the officer unreasonably expanded the traffic stop to investigate his pretrial-release status. He next argues that his random-testing condition was unconstitutional. Sargent agrees that this court need not address his second argument if we conclude that the
Traffic Stops Under the Minnesota Constitution
The
Under Terry, a police officer may temporarily detain an individual based on reasonable, articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842-43. In State v. Askerooth, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted “the principles and framework of Terry for evaluating the reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops even when a minor law has been violated.” 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004). In doing so, the supreme court interpreted the Minnesota Constitution as affording greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the United States Constitution.4 Id.
When assessing the validity of an investigative seizure under Terry, a court considers two issues: whether the seizure was justified at its inception, and whether the actions of the police during the seizure were “reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place.” Id. at 364.
The second Terry prong constrains the scope and methods of a search or seizure. An initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes intolerable in its intensity or scope. Thus, each incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible. An intrusion not closely related to the initial justification for the search or seizure is invalid under article I, section 10 unless there is independent probable cause or reasonableness to justify that particular intrusion.
Id. (emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted).
“In essence, Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution requires that each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” Id. at 365 (emphasis added). “[A]n extension of the duration of a stop beyond the time necessary to effectuate the purposes of the stop is unreasonable.” Id. at 371.
We first consider whether the traffic stop was justified at its inception. “Ordinarily, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). In this case, the officer testified that he stopped E.H.‘s vehicle because she failed to signal a turn. Sargent‘s principal brief suggests that the initial stop was invalid, stating that the vehicle “was ostensibly stopped for a minor traffic violation” but “[t]he video evidence in the record . . . is inconclusive and the vehicle driver offered testimony disputing the officers’ accounts.” But the district court found the officer‘s testimony credible, and we defer to that credibility determination. See Miller, 659 N.W.2d at 279. Thus, E.H.‘s failure to signal a turn justified the traffic stop at its inception. See
Justification for Expansion of the Traffic Stop
We next consider whether the officer reasonably expanded the traffic stop to investigate whether Sargent‘s admitted alcohol consumption violated any court-ordered condition of pretrial release.
At oral argument to this court, Sargent clarified that he does not assign constitutional error to the officer‘s initial questioning of E.H.‘s passengers regarding whether they had been drinking. He recognizes that under the circumstances, it was reasonable to ask such questions to determine whether the odor of alcohol was emanating from the driver E.H. or from her passengers. See United States v. Johnson, 58 F.3d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1995)
However, Sargent argues that any suspicion that E.H. was driving while intoxicated was dispelled once E.H.‘s PBT confirmed that she had not been drinking and that, therefore, the investigative seizure should have ended at that time.5 Sargent argues that the officer unreasonably expanded the traffic stop by asking him if he was subject to a “no-drink” condition. Specifically, Sargent argues that a suspected pretrial-release violation is not criminal activity and that the officer therefore was not permitted to investigate any suspected violation. Sargent contends that “[m]ere knowledge that an individual is on pretrial release, even when coupled with the smell of alcohol and admission of use, does not amount to reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”
The state counters that under the circumstances, Sargent‘s admission that he had been drinking justified expansion of the traffic stop to investigate whether Sargent had violated a pretrial-release condition. The state argues that because a pretrial-release violation could be the basis for a criminal contempt charge, such a violation constitutes criminal activity within the meaning of Terry. See
But we are also not persuaded that the noncriminal nature of a pretrial-release violation requires a conclusion that expansion of a warrantless seizure to investigate such a violation is never constitutionally reasonable. Neither party cited any caselaw directly on point. Our research reveals one federal case that touches on the issue. In United States v. Santillanes, a detective saw an individual at an airport in New Mexico, knew that the individual was under indictment for possession of heroin, and was under the impression that individuals under felony indictment were not permitted to leave the county. 848 F.2d 1103, 1104-05 (10th Cir. 1988). Based on that belief, the detective stopped and questioned the individual to see if he had violated his pretrial-release conditions. Id. at 1105. After questioning the individual and patting him down multiple times, the detective found drugs on the individual. Id.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the detective‘s actions constituted a valid Terry stop. Id. at 1107. The court noted that “[s]uch a violation of conditions of release [wa]s not a crime in New Mexico but a matter to be resolved by a
But unlike Santillanes, in which the Tenth Circuit indicated that a suspected violation of a condition of release was a matter only for the court‘s attention, Minnesota‘s court rules permit an officer to make a warrantless arrest for violation of a pretrial-release condition under certain circumstances.
A peace officer may arrest a released defendant if the officer has probable cause to believe a release condition has been violated and it reasonably appears continued release will endanger the safety of any person. The officer must promptly take the defendant before a judge. When possible, a warrant should be obtained before making an arrest under this rule.
Because Minnesota‘s court rules authorize a warrantless arrest for a pretrial-release violation, unlike the Tenth Circuit in Santillanes, we cannot reason that a warrantless
Faced with this apparent issue of first impression, we turn to the standard set forth in Askerooth, which once again requires “that each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” 681 N.W.2d at 365. Because the state does not argue that investigation of Sargent‘s pretrial-release status was justified by either of those first two grounds, we ask whether the investigation was justified by independent reasonableness, as defined in Terry, which is consistent with the parties’ framing of the issue. In doing so, we utilize the
Reasonableness as Defined in Terry
Terry instructs that “what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.” 392 U.S. at 9, 88 S. Ct. at 1873 (quotation omitted). Thus, “the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen‘s personal security.” Id. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79. “[T]here is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search or seize against the invasion which the search or seizure entails.” Id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879 (quotation omitted). We consider the “nature and extent of the governmental interests involved,” as well as the “nature and quality of the intrusion on individual rights.” Id. at 22, 24, 88 S. Ct. at 1880-81; see State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 488 (Minn. 2005) (“And to be reasonable, any intrusion in a routine traffic stop must be supported by an objective and fair balancing of the government‘s need to search or seize and the individual‘s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” (quotations omitted)); State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888, 890-91 (Minn. 1978) (referring to “the now familiar balancing approach for
Balance of Interests
Consistent with Terry, we begin by balancing the government‘s need to question Sargent regarding his pretrial release status against the invasion that it entailed. See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365 (“[T]he focus of our analysis is whether [the officer‘s] intensifying the intrusive nature of the seizure by confining Askerooth in the squad car was justified by some governmental interest that outweighed Askerooth‘s interest in being free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” (quotation omitted)).
As to the government interests involved, pretrial-release conditions are intended to ensure the defendant‘s appearance at future court hearings, as well as public safety.
As to the intrusion on individual rights, Sargent contends that he was “subjected to intrusive questioning aimed at soliciting evidence of a crime.” He argues that the facts of this case are similar to those in State v. Fort, in which the police unreasonably expanded a traffic stop by asking a passenger questions about drugs and weapons in the absence of reasonable, articulable suspicion. 660 N.W.2d at 419. But he also argues—and we agree—that the inquiry regarding Sargent‘s pretrial-release status did not regard criminal activity.
Moreover, Sargent remained seated in the vehicle while the officer investigated whether E.H. had been drinking and driving. After the officer obtained E.H.‘s PBT result, the officer returned to the vehicle and asked Sargent whether he was prohibited from using alcohol while on pretrial release. Sargent remained seated in the vehicle when the officer asked the question. The record does not suggest—and Sargent does not argue—that an unreasonable amount of time passed between E.H.‘s PBT and the question regarding his pretrial-release status.
In sum, although the expansion of the investigation to include Sargent‘s pretrial-release status intruded on Sargent‘s individual rights, the intrusion was de minimis. On balance, the public-safety interest underlying the imposition of conditions of pretrial release outweighs the minimal intrusion that resulted from the officer‘s expansion of the traffic stop to ask Sargent whether he was subject to a “no-drink” condition of release. See Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d at 891 (“We hold that the intrusion into the passenger‘s privacy was minimal and that it may not prevail when balanced against the important public interests involved.“).
Totality of the Circumstances and Reasonable Suspicion
We next consider whether the officer articulated an adequate basis to expand the traffic stop to investigate Sargent‘s pretrial-release status. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28-29,
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to . . . articulate . . . that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for [his suspicion].” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842-43 (quotations omitted). In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001). Reasonable suspicion “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” but it requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” Id. (quotations omitted). An officer may not act based on “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” Marben v. State, Dep‘t of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980) (quotation omitted).
Because Sargent contends that the improper expansion occurred when the officer asked him if he was subject to a “no-drink” condition, we examine the totality of the circumstances at that time, which are undisputed. When the officer approached the vehicle and communicated with its occupants, he smelled an odor of alcohol. The officer asked the driver and passengers if they had been drinking. Sargent responded, “Yes.” The officer knew Sargent from “previous law enforcement contacts” and that he had “a pretty good
Sargent contends that it was unreasonable for the officer to suspect a pretrial-release violation because the officer did not know if Sargent was on conditional pretrial release. Sargent argues that in asking that question, the officer made two unreasonable inferences: first, that Sargent‘s pretrial release was subject to conditions, and second, that one of those conditions prohibited alcohol consumption. However, “trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” Richardson, 622 N.W.2d at 825. Given the officer‘s knowledge of Sargent‘s criminal history and his knowledge that Sargent was on pretrial release ten days earlier, the officer was permitted to infer that Sargent‘s alcohol use might violate a condition of release.
We are once again guided by the Supreme Court‘s instruction in Terry: “[I]t is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?” 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880 (quotation omitted); see also Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (stating same standard). Here, the answer to that question is yes. The totality of the circumstances indicate that the officer reasonably suspected a pretrial-release violation that justified the officer‘s question regarding Sargent‘s pretrial-release condition.
In response to that question, Sargent acknowledged that he was not allowed to consume alcohol while on pretrial release, confirming the officer‘s suspicion and triggering
Our Holding
Because the officer here reasonably expanded the traffic stop to investigate Sargent‘s pretrial-release status, we reject Sargent‘s argument that the ammunition should have been suppressed as the result of an unconstitutional seizure, without addressing
Because the issue is not before us, we do not decide whether an officer can initiate a warrantless investigative seizure based on reasonable, articulable suspicion of a pretrial-release violation. Nor do we suggest that expansion of a traffic stop to investigate an individual‘s pretrial-release status is always reasonable. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996) (recognizing “the endless variations in the facts and circumstances implicating the Fourth Amendment” (quotation omitted)). We only conclude that, depending on the balance of interests at stake and the totality of the circumstances, a suspected violation of a pretrial-release condition can provide a basis to expand a lawful traffic stop. The circumstances here did so.
Pro Se Issues
As to the additional arguments in Sargent‘s pro se brief, Sargent contends that the traffic stop was a pretext for the officer‘s investigation. However, an officer‘s subjective10
Sargent also contends that law enforcement‘s supervision of his pretrial-release condition resulted in a separation-of-powers violation. That issue was not raised in or determined by the district court, and Sargent offers little legal analysis to support his position. Given the procedural posture of this case, the issue is not properly before us. See
D E C I S I O N
The officer in this case reasonably expanded the traffic stop of E.H.‘s vehicle to investigate Sargent‘s suspected violation of a pretrial-release condition. Because the challenged evidence was obtained as a result of that lawful investigative seizure, we affirm the district court‘s denial of Sargent‘s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.