943 N.W.2d 193

Minn. Ct. App.

2020

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Carrie Lynn Friese, Appellant.

A19-0451

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

Filed April 6, 2020

Bratvold, Judge

Olmsted County District Court File No. 55-CR-17-7131

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Jennifer D. Plante, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan Judge.

S Y L L A B U S

The plain meaning of the phrase “be exposed to,” as used in Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b) (2016), requires the state to prove that a defendant knowingly caused or permitted methamphetamine to be accessible to a child or subjected a child to methamphetamine and does not require the state to prove that the child had physical contact with methamphetamine.

O P I N I O N

BRATVOLD, Judge

In this direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction, appellant Carrie Lynn Friese challenges her conviction for knowingly causing or permitting her child to be exposed to methamphetamine under Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b). Friese contends that the state failed to prove that she “physically subjected” her child to methamphetamine because the evidence shows only that she “allowed her nine-year-old son” to sleep “one night with her in a bedroom containing hidden and stored methamphetamine.”

We conclude that the statute is unambiguous and that the state may prove a defendant has knowingly caused or permitted a child to “be exposed to” methamphetamine without proving that a child had physical contact with methamphetamine. Because the direct evidence is sufficient to prove that Friese knowingly caused or permitted her son to be exposed to methamphetamine, we affirm.

FACTS

On the morning of October 19, 2017, police officers, based on a tip, obtained and executed a search warrant for narcotics at a house in Rochester. The officers found Friese and her nine-year-old son sitting on a bed in an upstairs bedroom. Friese told one officer that she and her son had slept in the room overnight, she did not think there were any drugs in the house, several drug users had recently moved out, and she had occupied the bedroom for about one week.

A second officer searched Friese‘s bedroom and found a small black purse with a Snoopy logo tucked between the bed and the wall. A pillow rested on the bed and covered the space where the officer found the purse. The officer opened the purse and found two small plastic baggies. One baggie contained small, rolled-up plastic baggies. The other baggie contained a substance that the officer believed to be methamphetamine. The officer found no identification in the purse and found Friese‘s checkbook and a letter addressed to her inside a white bag on the bedroom floor.¹

The state charged Friese with three counts: fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2016) (count one); storage of methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence of a child under Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(a)(2) (2016) (count two); and child endangerment under Minn. Stat. § 609.378, subd. 1(b)(1) (2016) (count three). Friese pleaded not guilty to all charges.

The Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) tested the substance in the baggie found in the purse. The results were positive for methamphetamine. The state amended count two to knowingly causing or permitting a child to be exposed to methamphetamine under Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b).

During the jury trial, the state called seven witnesses—six police officers, each of whom participated in the search, and the owner of the house. The police officers testified to the facts summarized above. The district court received the BCA test results into evidence during the testimony of one of the officers. Friese stipulated that the BCA test results were accurate and agreed that the state could present the test results at trial without first having a BCA scientist testify.

The homeowner testified that his husband used methamphetamine at the house, invited other drug users to the house, and allowed some drug users to stay at the house. About one week before the search occurred, the homeowner‘s dog got sick after eating from a garbage bag. He took the dog to a veterinarian and the dog tested positive for methamphetamine. The homeowner obtained a restraining order against his husband and told the other drug users to vacate the house, which they did.

Friese began staying at the house in July 2017, about three months before the search. Mostly, Friese slept on the couch. After the homeowner got the restraining order, he allowed Friese to remain and move into the upstairs bedroom, which had been previously occupied by one of the drug users. According to the homeowner, “There had been [many] people in and out of that room, but [Friese] was the only person who was, like, permanent.” Friese and the homeowner were the only people living at the house during the week between the husband‘s departure and the search.

Friese testified in her own defense. She testified that she was homeless before she began staying at the house, initially slept on a couch in the living room, then moved into the upstairs bedroom after the homeowner “kicked out” the other occupants. She testified that the person who lived in the upstairs bedroom before she did was known to use drugs. Friese also testified that she had last used methamphetamine about three weeks before the search and was sober on the night before and the morning of the search.

Friese testified that, on the evening of October 18, she agreed to take her son overnight. She usually visited her children at a hotel because of active drug use at the house, but “thought it was going to be safe for [her son] to be there because everybody was gone.” She picked up her son and they arrived at the house to spend the night at about 11:00 p.m. Friese testified that they went straight to her upstairs bedroom and stayed there until the police arrived. Friese denied knowing there was any methamphetamine in the upstairs bedroom.

The jury found Friese guilty of all three counts. The district court convicted Friese of amended count two, the knowing-exposure charge, and determined that counts one and three, the fifth-degree possession and child-endangerment charges, were lesser-included offenses. The district court sentenced Friese to one year and one day in prison, but stayed execution for five years on certain conditions. Friese appeals.

ISSUE

Is the evidence sufficient to uphold Friese‘s conviction of knowingly causing or permitting a child to be exposed to methamphetamine under Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b), where the state presented no evidence that the child had physical contact with methamphetamine?

ANALYSIS

Friese argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for knowingly causing or permitting a child to “be exposed to” methamphetamine under Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b). She argues that the phrase “be exposed to” is unambiguous and means that the state must prove she “physically subjected [her son] to methamphetamine—i.e., that the chemical of methamphetamine somehow was on or inside the child‘s body.” The state agrees that “be exposed to” is unambiguous and argues that the statute does not “imply or require that any physical contact occur.”

A sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument that focuses on the meaning of a criminal statute presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. 2018). Our review follows two steps: first, we interpret the meaning of the statute and determine whether it is ambiguous; second, we determine “whether the evidence was sufficient” to establish guilt applying that interpretation. State v. Robinson, 921 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 2019).

We keep several principles in mind while interpreting a statute. Our objective is to “ascertain and effectuate the Legislature‘s intent.” State v. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280, 284 (Minn. 2015). To do this, we determine whether the statute is unambiguous. State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017). We apply the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. Id. A statute is ambiguous if it has more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. When the legislature does not provide a statutory definition for relevant terms, this court will “generally turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of a statutory phrase.” State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). To help determine the everyday or ordinary meaning of undefined words or phrases in a statute, we “look to the dictionary definitions of those words and apply them in the context of the statute.” Id.

Friese was convicted and sentenced for violating the knowing-exposure statute, which provides, “No person may knowingly cause or permit a child or vulnerable adult to inhale, be exposed to, have contact with, or ingest methamphetamine, a chemical substance, or methamphetamine paraphernalia.” Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b). While section 152.137 includes statutory definitions for chemical substance, child, and methamphetamine paraphernalia, it does not define “be exposed to.” See id., subd. 1 (2016). We therefore turn to relevant dictionary definitions to ascertain the ordinary meaning of this phrase. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d at 488.

“Expose” is defined as “[t]o subject or allow to be subjected to an action, influence, or condition,” with the examples of disease or classical music. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 625 (5th ed. 2011). “Subject” is defined as “likely to incur or receive; exposed.” Id. at 1735. “Expose” is also defined as “to submit or make accessible to a particular action or influence.” Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary 441 (11th ed. 2012). “Submit” is defined as “to subject to a condition, treatment, or operation,” id. at 1244; “access” is defined as “to get at,” id. at 7; and “accessible” is defined as “capable of being reached,” id.

The Merriam-Webster and American Heritage dictionaries contain other definitions of the transitive verb, “expose.”² For example, expose means “to make known,” with the example of “something shameful” or “to cause to be visible or open to view,” with the example of revealing the face of a playing card. Id. at 441; see also American Heritage,

supra, at 625 (defining expose as “to make visible,” as in the grain of wood, or “to make known,” as in “something discreditable“). We reject these alternative definitions of expose as unreasonable in the context of section 152.137, subdivision 2(b). Causing or permitting a child to be exposed to methamphetamine is more like subjecting a child to a condition such as disease, hunger, or the elements, than it is to uncovering something shameful or revealing something that is hidden or covered.³

Reading the definitions of expose in the context of what it means to expose a child to methamphetamine, we conclude that the meaning of “be exposed to” in section 152.137, subdivision 2(b) is unambiguous. We hold that for a defendant to knowingly cause or permit a child to “be exposed to” methamphetamine, the state must prove that the defendant knowingly caused or permitted methamphetamine to be accessible to a child or subjected a child to methamphetamine.

Friese contends that the phrase “be exposed to” is unambiguous, and urges us to conclude that “be exposed to” means “be physically subjected to.” (Emphasis added.) Not only does her argument have no support in any of the dictionary definitions already discussed, but also her position is inconsistent with the meaning of other terms in subdivision 2(b), which criminalizes conduct that knowingly “cause[s] or permit[s]” a child to be exposed to methamphetamine. “Permit” means “[t]o allow the doing of (something)” and “[t]o afford opportunity or possibility for.” American Heritage, supra, at 1315. By using the word “permit,” the legislature intended to criminalize conduct that allows or makes possible a child‘s exposure to methamphetamine and did not require that a child be physically subjected to methamphetamine. If “be exposed to” were interpreted to require proof that a defendant physically subjected a child to methamphetamine, then subdivision 2(b) would no longer criminalize conduct that allows or makes possible a child‘s exposure to methamphetamine.⁴

Friese also argues that “the dictionary is not the be-all and end all.” Rather, Friese relies on two canons, which we discuss each in turn.

Noscitur a sociis or the word-association canon

Friese argues that “be exposed to” means “subjecting someone to a physical condition” under the canon of noscitur a sociis, a Latin phrase that means “it is known by its associates” (word-association canon). Friese notes that Minnesota has long applied the word-association canon, and caselaw recognizes that “the meaning of doubtful words in a legislative act may be determined by reference to their association with other associated words and phrases.” State v. Suess, 52 N.W.2d 409, 415 (Minn. 1952).

Friese uses the word-association canon by pointing out that “be exposed to” is part of a list of prohibited acts in the knowing-exposure statute. Section 152.137, subdivision 2(b), criminalizes knowingly causing or permitting a child “to inhale, be exposed to, have contact with, or ingest methamphetamine, a chemical substance, or methamphetamine paraphernalia.” Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b) (emphasis added). Friese urges that the meaning of “exposed” must be determined by looking to the other statutory terms it is linked to—inhale, contact, and ingest.

The ordinary meaning of “inhale” is “[t]o draw (air or smoke, for example) into the lungs by breathing.” American Heritage, supra, at 903. “Contact” means “[a] coming together or touching, as of objects or surfaces” and “[t]he state or condition of touching or of immediate proximity.” Id. at 395. “Ingest” means “[t]o take into the body by the mouth for digestion or absorption.” Id. at 902. Friese argues that causing or permitting a child to inhale, contact, or ingest methamphetamine requires subjecting a child to a “physical condition,” therefore, causing or permitting a child to “be exposed to” methamphetamine is “another means by which the chemical enters the body.”

We disagree for two reasons. First, Minnesota caselaw establishes that the word-association canon is one of statutory construction, not one of interpretation. In other words, we use the word-association canon only when the terms in a statute are ambiguous and the legislature‘s intent is unclear. See Wilbur v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 892 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Minn. 2017) (“We consider the canons of statutory construction only after determining that a statute is ambiguous.“). Friese claims that the word-association canon is “pre-ambiguity” but cites no legal authority for this assertion.

In Suess, the supreme court used the word-association canon to determine the meaning of “other implement” by reference to the term “firearm,” in a statute that criminalized the shining of wild animals while possessing “any firearm or other implement.” 52 N.W.2d at 415. But the supreme court did so only after implicitly determining that “the intent of the legislature is not clear.” Id.; see also Cty. of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 709 (Minn. 2013) (stating that the word-association canon is a canon of construction that may be used to resolve ambiguity of a statutory phrase). As discussed above, the phrase “be exposed to” as used in Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b), is not ambiguous. Because the meaning of “be exposed to” is plain, we conclude the statute is unambiguous and do not consider any canon of construction.

Stated differently, if we were to accept Friese‘s interpretation of “be exposed to” as meaning a child has been “physically subjected” to methamphetamine, we would need to read the term “physical” into the statute. But we cannot “read in” additional language to an unambiguous statute; we must instead “apply the plain language of the statute as written.”

State v. Noggle, 881 N.W.2d 545, 550-51 (Minn. 2016). (“[W]e cannot read in additional language, but rather must apply the plain language of the statute as written . . . .“).

Second, even if we discerned some ambiguity in subdivision 2(b) and applied the word-association canon, Friese‘s position is untenable. We must interpret statutes so that “no word, phrase, or sentence will be held superfluous, void, or insignificant.” State v. Boecker, 893 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Interpreting “be exposed to” to require a child to be “physically subjected” to methamphetamine would render other statutory terms superfluous or void. Section 152.137, subdivision 2(b), already criminalizes knowingly causing or permitting a child to inhale, have contact with, or ingest methamphetamine. If “be exposed to” requires the state to prove a child has been “physically subjected” to methamphetamine so that, as Friese argues, “the chemical enters the body,” then “be exposed to” is the same as the child inhaling, having contact with, or ingesting methamphetamine because these three terms are ways that methamphetamine “enters the body.” We, therefore, decline to use the word-association canon, as argued by Friese, because subdivision 2(b) is unambiguous and, even assuming otherwise, the word-association canon would render other statutory terms superfluous or void.

Whole-statute canon

Friese argues that the “whole-statute” canon must be applied so that subdivisions 2(a) and 2(b) of section 152.137 are read “as a whole and each section is interpreted in light of the surrounding sections” so as to “avoid conflicting interpretations.” Friese relies on State v. Scovel, which interpreted the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and outlined a two-step analysis. 916 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. 2018). First, we read the statutes “as a whole and interpret each section in light of the surrounding sections.” Id. Second, “[w]hen there is an apparent conflict between two provisions, we first attempt to construe the provisions to give effect to both.” Id. (quotation omitted). The whole-statute canon may be considered without first finding a statute ambiguous. See id.

We thus consider subdivision 2(a):

(a) No person may knowingly engage in any of the following activities in the presence of a child . . . ; in the residence of a child . . . ; in a building, structure, conveyance, or outdoor location where a child . . . might reasonably be expected to be present; in a room offered to the public for overnight accommodation; or in any multiple unit residential building:

(1) manufacturing or attempting to manufacture methamphetamine;

(2) storing any chemical substance;

(3) storing any methamphetamine waste products; or

(4) storing any methamphetamine paraphernalia.

Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(a) (2016). Reading subdivision 2(a) together with subdivision 2(b), Friese argues that “be exposed to” cannot be interpreted broadly because “[t]he very fact that the Legislature excluded [storage of] methamphetamine from [the offenses listed in] subdivision 2(a) shows it intended something more than mere presence or proximity” before imposing criminal liability in subdivision 2(b).

We disagree because there are crucial differences in the dangers the legislature sought to protect children from and in the acts criminalized by these two subdivisions. Subdivision 2(a) protects children from the dangers of criminal conduct related to methamphetamine manufacture and the storage of methamphetamine-related chemicals, waste products, or paraphernalia.⁵ Subdivision 2(a) requires the state to prove that a defendant “knowingly engage[d]” in specific criminal conduct, and we have held that “mere knowledge” that another person is manufacturing or storing methamphetamine chemicals or paraphernalia “does not meet the statutory definition.” See State v. Maack, 921 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Minn. App. 2018) (holding that subdivision 2(a)(4) “specifically requires proof that a person be engaged in, and not merely aware of, the unlawful activity occurring in the child‘s home“).

But subdivision 2(a) does not protect children from methamphetamine itself—that is the purview of subdivision 2(b). And subdivision 2(b) requires the state to prove a different act, i.e., that a defendant “knowingly cause[d] or permit[ted]” a child to inhale, be exposed to, have contact with, or ingest methamphetamine. Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b). We noted the difference in the acts required to prove criminal liability under these two subdivisions in Maack, where we reversed a conviction under Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(a)(4), for storing methamphetamine paraphernalia in a child‘s home. 921 N.W.2d at 795. We reasoned that the circumstantial evidence proved only that the appellant knew another person stored methamphetamine paraphernalia in the home and the state‘s evidence did not exclude the “reasonable inference that [appellant] did not participate in the activity of storing methamphetamine paraphernalia in the home.” Id. at 794-95. But we also observed that the evidence may have been sufficient to prove criminal liability under subdivision 2(b): “[Appellant‘s] knowledge that methamphetamine paraphernalia was stored in the home might be more indicative of guilt” had she been charged under subdivision 2(b). Id. at 794 n.1.

Because subdivisions 2(a) and 2(b) protect children from different methamphetamine-related dangers, and because the subdivisions criminalize distinctly different acts, we see no conflict between the plain meaning of subdivisions 2(a) and 2(b) and reject Friese‘s analysis of the whole-statute canon. We therefore hold that a conviction for knowing exposure under Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b), requires the state to prove that a defendant knowingly caused or permitted methamphetamine to be accessible to a child or subjected a child to methamphetamine and does not require the state to prove that the child had physical contact with methamphetamine.⁶

Sufficiency of evidence

Having interpreted “be exposed to” as it is used in Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b), we turn to whether sufficient evidence supports Friese‘s conviction. The state needed to prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Friese “knowingly” (2) caused or permitted a child to be exposed to methamphetamine. Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b).

On appeal, Friese does not argue that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove the first element, her mental state. Rather, she challenges the second element, arguing that her conduct did not cause or permit her son to “be exposed to” methamphetamine. We therefore consider only whether the state presented sufficient evidence that her son was exposed to methamphetamine.

The state provided direct evidence at trial to prove that Friese exposed her son to methamphetamine. See State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (defining direct evidence as “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption” (quotation and alteration omitted)). When an element of an offense is supported by direct evidence, our review is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict that they did. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016). We assume that “the jury believed the state‘s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). We will affirm if, “based on the evidence contained in the record, the [fact-finder] could reasonably have found [the] defendant guilty of the crime charged.” Vasko, 889 N.W.2d at 558 (quotation omitted).

It is undisputed that Friese‘s son spent the night before the October 19 search visiting and then asleep in the bedroom with Friese. During the search, officers found Friese and her son sitting on Friese‘s bed. An officer then found a purse tucked between the bed and the wall, covered only by a pillow, in a place where it would have been easily accessible to a child. The parties stipulated that the baggie in the purse contained methamphetamine. Presented with this evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that Friese exposed her son to methamphetamine because she caused or permitted the methamphetamine in the purse to be accessible to her son or that Friese subjected her son to methamphetamine by sleeping in the same room as methamphetamine in a nearby handbag. We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence supports Friese‘s conviction for knowingly causing or permitting her son to be exposed to methamphetamine.⁷

D E C I S I O N

We conclude that the plain and unambiguous meaning of the phrase “be exposed to,” as used in Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b), requires the state to prove that the defendant knowingly caused or permitted methamphetamine to be accessible to a child or subjected a child to methamphetamine. The state is not required to prove that a defendant knowingly caused or permitted a child to have physical contact with methamphetamine. We also conclude that sufficient evidence supports Friese‘s conviction for knowingly causing or permitting her child to be exposed to methamphetamine. We therefore affirm.

Affirmed.

Notes

A third officer searched the walk-in closet that could be entered from Friese‘s bedroom. The officer found a “glass plate with a white crystalline residue on top of it” sitting on a table. He found the plate in “[v]ery open sight,” in a place where a person “couldn‘t miss it.” And the officer found Friese‘s clothing in the closet. The state‘s brief to this court makes frequent mention of the glass plate and residue. Because the state never tested the plate residue, or otherwise relied on the residue as evidence at trial, we do not consider it in reviewing Friese‘s appeal.

In her brief to this court, Friese does not consider any of the other definitions of expose mentioned in this opinion and advocates for expose to mean physically submitting or subjecting a child to methamphetamine or making methamphetamine accessible to a child. Because we are applying de novo review to the interpretation of a statute, we nonetheless consider the alternative definitions of the transitive verb expose. See generally (“[I]t is the responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with law . . . .“).

The ill effects of causing or permitting a child to be exposed to methamphetamine are well established in medical and legal research. See, e.g., Michael T. Flannery et al., The Use of Hair Analysis to Test Children For Methamphetamine, 10 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 143, 149-50 (2006); see also id. at 171 (children may be “likely to put methamphetamine-contaminated fingers or toys in their mouths“); id. at 175-76 (children exposed to methamphetamine use and manufacture can experience nausea, vomiting, increased irritability, respiratory irritation, and other medical issues); id. at 178-79 (external exposure to methamphetamine occurs, for example, because small children “may absorb toxic chemicals through their skin” and “the effects of inhalation of toxic chemicals could be more significant in small children“). For additional discussion of the hazards of causing or permitting a child to be exposed to methamphetamine manufacture, see infra note 5.

Friese alternatively argues that “be exposed to” is ambiguous, legislative history shows that the purpose of Minn. Stat. § 152.137 was to criminalize child exposure to methamphetamine labs, and this legislative history should factor into our interpretation of subdivision 2(b). We are not persuaded for three reasons. First, Friese‘s brief to this court never articulates two reasonable interpretations of the phrase, “be exposed to.” Second, in this opinion, we determine that Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b), is not ambiguous, so we do not consider legislative history in interpreting the statute. (“In the absence of ambiguity, we do not resort to legislative history to interpret a statute.” (quotation omitted)). Third, section 152.137 is not limited to the dangers associated with methamphetamine labs. Subdivision 2(a) focuses on prohibiting methamphetamine manufacturing in the presence of a child, but also prohibits conduct related to storing methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence of a child. Subdivision 2(b) focuses on conduct that exposes a child to methamphetamine itself and thus is broader in scope than methamphetamine manufacturing, as detailed in the text of this opinion.

We have discussed the dangers of methamphetamine manufacturing in other contexts. See, e.g., (discussing police failure to preserve evidence of methamphetamine manufacture and summarizing testimony that many chemicals used in methamphetamine manufacture are poisonous, inflammable, explosive, and emit toxic fumes and that by-products are considered hazardous waste subject to regulation), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004).

Our interpretation of “be exposed to” accords with our unpublished decisions addressing Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b). Our unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be persuasive. See (holding that unpublished opinions are at best persuasive); see also (finding unpublished decision that addressed the “exact issue” persuasive). See, e.g., (holding that “the plain meaning of the term expose does not require direct contact with methamphetamine“), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2014); (affirming conviction for aiding and abetting exposure of children to methamphetamine even though state offered no evidence of useable form of methamphetamine), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2014).

Friese also challenges the evidence as insufficient to support the jury‘s guilty verdict on two other offenses for which she was not convicted or sentenced. Because we conclude that sufficient evidence supports Friese‘s conviction for knowingly causing or permitting a child to be exposed to methamphetamine, and the district court did not convict Friese of fifth-degree possession or child endangerment, we decline to review the sufficiency of the evidence for those other charges. See (declining to review sufficiency of evidence for unadjudicated offense after affirming sufficiency of convicted offense).