State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Patrick James Modtland, Appellant.
A21-0146
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS
Filed February 14, 2022
Reyes, Judge
Isanti County District Court File No. 30-CR-20-41
Jeffrey R. Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Joel Whitlock, Assistant County Attorney, Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Frisch, Judge.
SYLLABUS
A district court does not violate a criminal defendant‘s right to confrontation when, after considering the particular circumstances of the defendant‘s trial, it requires witnesses to wear face masks while testifying to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
REYES, Judge
Following a jury trial, the district court convicted appellant of third-degree possession of a controlled substance and giving false information to police. Appellant argues that his convictions must be reversed and that we must remand for a new trial because the district court (1) violated his right to confrontation by denying his request to require witnesses to remove their face masks while testifying; (2) violated his right to a public trial by closing the courtroom to the public but allowing the public to watch live video of the trial proceedings from a nearby open courtroom; and (3) committed plain error by admitting hearsay statements of a nontestifying police officer regarding the location of the methamphetamine appellant was convicted of possessing. Appellant also submitted a pro se supplemental brief asserting various other claims. We affirm.
FACTS
A police deputy and a sergeant were refueling their police vehicle at a gas station when the deputy noticed appellant Patrick James Modtland walking by and avoiding eye contact with the officers. Appellant had stopped at the gas station in a Chrysler 300 accompanied by S.N., who drove a separate vehicle. The deputy found appellant‘s behavior suspicious, and the sergeant informed the deputy that the Chrysler 300 was registered to a revoked driver. Appellant and S.N. left the gas station in their separate vehicles. The deputy followed the vehicles and, after viewing a photograph of the vehicle‘s registered owner, confirmed that appellant was not the registered owner of the Chrysler 300.
The deputy arrested appellant based on the deputy‘s belief that appellant provided a false name. While searching appellant incident to that arrest, the deputy found a methamphetamine pipe in the back pocket of appellant‘s pants. A field test on the pipe indicated the presence of methamphetamine. A K-9 dog sniffed the Chrysler 300 and alerted to the presence of drugs. The officers searched the vehicle. The sergeant found a container behind the driver‘s seat that contained a bag of a crystalline substance. A field test identified the substance as methamphetamine. Testing by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) confirmed the substance as methamphetamine weighing approximately 23 grams. Officers later discovered that appellant‘s real name was Patrick James Modtland.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with first- and second-degree sale of a controlled substance, third- and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, providing false information to police, and driving without proof of insurance. Appellant had a jury trial in September 2020. The district court implemented coronavirus disease
During trial, the state played the deputy‘s body-worn camera (bodycam) video for the jury. The deputy testified that he had not personally located any drugs in the vehicle and that the sergeant found the methamphetamine behind the driver‘s seat. Appellant did not object to that testimony. The sergeant did not testify. A BCA forensic scientist who prepared the report identifying the substance taken from the Chrysler 300 as 23 grams of methamphetamine testified. And S.N. testified that she had never driven the Chrysler 300, that nothing in it was hers, and that she had no knowledge of the methamphetamine until officers found it during appellant‘s arrest.
The district court granted appellant‘s motion for a directed verdict on the driving-without-proof-of-insurance charge. After trial, the jury found appellant not guilty of first-degree sale of a controlled substance but found him guilty of second-degree sale of a controlled substance, third- and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, and giving a false name to police. The district court granted appellant‘s motion for judgment of acquittal on the second-degree-sale charge after concluding that the state presented insufficient evidence. The district court convicted appellant of third-degree possession of a controlled substance in violation of
ISSUES
- Did the district court violate appellant‘s right to confrontation by denying his request to require witnesses to remove their face masks while testifying?
- Did the district court violate appellant‘s right to a public trial by limiting courtroom access to trial participants and allowing the public to watch the trial proceedings via live video in a nearby open courtroom?
- Did the district court plainly err by admitting statements of a nontestifying police officer regarding the location of the methamphetamine?
- Do any of appellant‘s claims in his pro se brief merit relief?
ANALYSIS
I. Based on the circumstances of appellant‘s trial, the district court did not violate appellant‘s right to confrontation by requiring testifying witnesses to wear face masks to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
Appellant first argues that the district court violated his right to confrontation by denying appellant‘s request to require witnesses to remove their face masks while testifying. We disagree.
A criminal defendant has the right under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions to confront the witnesses against him.
A. Necessity
To satisfy this prong of the Craig analysis, the district court must support its determination that an interference with physical confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy with case-specific findings. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850, 855; see also Tate, slip op. at 16-17. The district court is not, however, required to explore less-restrictive alternatives before determining that a certain interference is necessary. Craig, 497 U.S. at 859-60.
Appellant‘s trial occurred against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic in Minnesota. In March 2020, the governor declared a peacetime emergency in response to the pandemic. Emerg. Exec. Ord. No. 20-01, Declaring a Peacetime Emergency & Coordinating Minnesota‘s Strategy to Protect Minnesotans from COVID-19 (Mar. 13, 2020). Shortly after, the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court suspended all new jury trials and restricted in-person courtroom proceedings. Order Continuing Operations
Consistent with these orders, at the start of appellant‘s September 2020 trial, the district court described the COVID-19 procedures it would implement. The district court noted that everybody would be masked and that the witnesses would be at least six feet away from everybody else. Appellant requested that witnesses remove their masks while testifying so the jury could see their faces to observe their demeanor and assess their credibility. The state took no position and deferred to the district court on the issue. The district court denied appellant‘s request after making the following determination on the record:
[T]his is a question of some import here. It implicates [appellant‘s] right under the United States and Minnesota constitutions to confront the witnesses against him . . . . And it is a profound and delicate balance. There are two kinds of confrontation that are implicated. One is the ability to cross-
examine witnesses. That is something that will occur with or without a mask. The other is the ability to physically face the witnesses against you. That is something that also happens even masked, but to a more limited extent. In the context of the current pandemic, the court, mindful of the Minnesota Constitution article I, section 6, preserving to [appellant] the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, the court denies the parties’ request to unmask the witnesses. Isanti County is a small county. This is a small courtroom. We have done our best under the state-approved guidelines to protect folks. But given the current state of the research, the risks increase absent mask wearing.
The district court determined the public-policy interest to be protecting the health and safety of everyone in the courtroom from the spread of COVID-19. This clearly qualifies as an important public policy. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (“Stemming the spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a compelling interest . . . .“); Tate, slip op. at 17.
The district court also supported its necessity determination with sufficient case-specific findings. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855; Tate, slip op. at 17. Before appellant‘s trial, the district court carefully considered appellant‘s request, the small size of the courtroom, the need to comply with state-approved COVID-19 guidelines, and the research indicating that infection risk increased without masks, and concluded that it was necessary for testifying witnesses to wear masks. We further recognize that the district court made its determination that masks were necessary in September 2020, based on information known and prevalent at the time, months before COVID-19 vaccines were available and when public-health experts were still learning how to best prevent the spread of COVID-19. We
In arguing that the district court failed to satisfy the necessity prong, appellant points to the Chief Justice‘s COVID-19 courtroom guidelines, which gave the district court discretion to authorize testifying witnesses to remove their masks:
[A] face covering worn in the courtroom may be removed only if physical distance requirements in the courtroom in which the proceeding is held are maintained and the presiding judge authorizes that removal. If during a particular proceeding—i.e., . . . witnesses when testifying . . .—unusual circumstances make it necessary to remove a face covering while in the courtroom even though physical distance is not maintained, the presiding judge has the discretion to authorize that removal if alternate measures, such as a face shield or plexiglass barriers, are available.
Order Requiring Face Coverings at Court Facilities, No. ADM20-8001 (Minn. July 7, 2020) (emphasis added).
We are not persuaded. As appellant acknowledges, the Chief Justice gave the district court discretion to allow witnesses to remove their masks, but it did not require the district court to do so. Rather, the Chief Justice‘s orders regarding courtroom safety procedures support, rather than undermine, the district court‘s determination. The Chief Justice‘s and Judicial Council‘s courtroom-procedure orders followed then-existing guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Minnesota Department of Health, which stated that face coverings could reduce the spread of COVID-19 in public settings. Appellant‘s September 2020 trial took place only a few months after the Chief Justice authorized the first jury trials to resume under its new COVID-19 safety
Appellant also argues that the district court should have made more specific findings, such as infection or hospitalization rates within the state or county, comparisons with other risk-reducing measures such as clear face shields, or evidence of individual witnesses’ health vulnerabilities. Appellant cites two cases from other jurisdictions, State v. Jesenya O., 493 P.3d 418 (N.M. Ct. App. 2021), cert. granted, (N.M. Apr. 12, 2021), and People v. Hernandez, 488 P.3d 1055 (Colo. 2021), in which appellate courts concluded COVID-19 procedures did not violate the defendants’ confrontation rights after the district courts made such detailed findings. But these decisions are only persuasive, not precedential, and we find them particularly unpersuasive here, when the analysis focuses on the unique circumstances of appellant‘s trial. While we encourage district courts to make detailed findings on the record regarding the need for any COVID-19-related trial modifications, the district court here provided sufficient findings to show necessity.
Using similar reasoning, appellant points to other Minnesota trials at which the district court allowed witnesses to testify without masks. We are likewise not persuaded by this argument. Embedded within the Chief Justice‘s order granting discretion to the district courts is the recognition that courtrooms are not identically configured and that there may be counties with varying levels of risk of COVID-19 spread based, for example, on local positivity or hospitalization rates. Accordingly, that other district courts in other
Finally, appellant argues that the state‘s failure to offer evidence establishing the necessity of mask-wearing shows, by itself, that the necessity prong is not met. Appellant argues that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Craig requires the state to provide such evidence. But in Craig, the state moved to allow its child witness to testify via video, arguing the need for that procedure to protect the child‘s welfare. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855. Here, the state made no such motion. Instead, the district court implemented a mask-wearing policy, to which the state merely deferred.1 When the district court, not the state, is responsible for a confrontation interference, the district court must justify that interference.2 Because we conclude that the district court did justify its interference with sufficient case-specific findings that mask-wearing furthered an important public policy of preventing COVID-19 infection and spread, it satisfied the necessity prong of the Craig standard.
Under the second Craig prong, the reliability of the testimony must be otherwise assured. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850. The Supreme Court has recognized four elements to ensure that testimony is reliable: (1) the physical presence of the witness; (2) witness testimony is given under oath; (3) the witness is subject to cross-examination; and (4) the trier of fact observes the witness‘s demeanor. Id. at 846. Appellant challenges only the fourth reliability element, arguing that the face masks prevented the jury from observing the witnesses’ demeanor and judging their credibility. We are not persuaded.
The district court, in explaining why it would require testifying witnesses to wear masks, recognized that crucial credibility indicators were still available to the jury. The district court noted that in “its own anecdotal experience . . . . We can see eyes. We can see turn of head. We can hear tone of voice. All of those things that make up the physical confrontation are still present. Credibility of all the witnesses outlined who might testify is still probable and possible given the mask wearing.” We agree with the district court. Although the mask requirement did limit the jury‘s view of the witnesses’ mouths and noses, the jury could still see the witnesses’ eyes, observe witnesses’ body language, and hear witnesses’ tone and vocal inflection. Because all testifying witnesses wore a face mask, the jury could consider each witness‘s demeanor to the same extent and based on the same factors. The masks therefore did not impair the jury‘s ability to observe demeanor to such an extent that the reliability of the testimony was no longer assured.
Appellant relies on People v. Sammons, 478 N.W.2d 901, 908 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), in which the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that allowing a witness to testify
We conclude that the district court did not violate appellant‘s confrontation rights by denying his request to require witnesses to remove their masks while testifying based on the particular circumstances of appellant‘s trial.
Appellant argues that the district court violated his right to a public trial by allowing only trial participants and court staff in the courtroom and providing live video of the trial proceedings in a nearby courtroom open to the public. We disagree.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to a public trial.
As an initial matter, the state argues that appellant waived his public-trial claim because he did not object to the courtroom-access limitations during trial. We note that the standard of review for an unobjected-to public-trial violation appears to be an unsettled
Because appellant did not object to the courtroom-access limitations at trial, the district court did not explicitly reference the Waller factors. The district court‘s on-the-record description of the courtroom and its findings regarding appellant‘s mask-removal request do, however, implicitly address the Waller factors. We accordingly conclude that those findings, though implicit, are sufficient to permit review of its decision. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 45 (noting that findings must be specific enough that reviewing court can determine whether closure was proper).
[E]verybody is masked. We have six-foot distances throughout the courtroom for safety purposes. We‘ve reconfigured the courtroom with the witness six feet away from everybody else . . . . The public is in the overflow courtroom in courtroom C and also can be seen via . . . that large screen . . . . Now the public can see the courtroom.
The district court also explained to the jury during voir dire, “We are required to follow certain guidelines as it relates to safety . . . . You see us spaced out through the courtroom [for that reason].” It also noted that because of “the size of the courtroom and the COVID restrictions,” it had to do jury selection in two groups.
Under the first Waller factor, a courtroom closure is justified when the party seeking closure advances an overriding interest. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. We have already established that preventing the spread of COVID-19 is undoubtedly an overriding interest.
Second, the district court implemented procedures no broader than necessary to protect that interest. The record shows that the district court configured the courtroom to comply with the six-foot social-distancing requirements set forth in the Minnesota Judicial Branch‘s Preparedness Plan. See Minnesota Judicial Branch COVID-19 Preparedness Plan, Minn. Jud. Council (Minn. May 15, 2020). To maintain public access, the district court provided live video of the proceedings in a nearby courtroom that remained open to the public throughout the trial.
The third Waller factor is satisfied because the record also suggests that the district court arrived at its courtroom configuration after considering the alternatives available to
In arguing that the district court implemented a closure broader than necessary and failed to consider reasonable alternatives, appellant cites to the trial of Derek Chauvin in Hennepin County and to various federal court trials in which a district court imposed COVID-19 distancing requirements but nevertheless allowed some public spectators and the parties’ family members into the courtroom. But we are not persuaded that, because other district courts with different courtroom configurations and more resources could safely accommodate additional people, the district court here implemented overbroad procedures or failed to consider alternatives.
Finally, we conclude that the district court‘s on-the-record courtroom description, its COVID-19 safety concerns, and its reliance on the Chief Justice‘s guidance adequately supported its decision to limit public access to the courtroom. Appellant argues that the fourth Waller factor is not satisfied because the district court failed to make explicit findings justifying the courtroom closure. We disagree. As discussed above, although the
III. The district court did not plainly err by admitting the statements of a nontestifying police officer regarding the location of the methamphetamine.
Appellant argues that the district court committed plain error by admitting, through the deputy‘s bodycam video, the sergeant‘s hearsay statements that he found methamphetamine behind the driver‘s seat in the Chrysler 300. We disagree.
Evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but because appellant failed to object to the statements’ admission at trial, we may review the admission for plain error. See
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Because appellant did not object at trial, the state had no opportunity to establish that the challenged statements were admissible under a hearsay-rule exception, such as the residual exception under
Additionally, even if we assumed that the statements were inadmissible hearsay, and further assumed that their erroneous admission affected appellant‘s substantial rights, we conclude that the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or reputation of judicial proceedings. Appellant knew that the deputy‘s bodycam video would be played for the jury and that the video included the sergeant‘s statements. At trial, appellant requested that certain other statements be muted while playing the video for the jury but made no objection to the sergeant‘s statements. The state originally included the sergeant on its witness list but later determined that it would not ask the sergeant to testify or play his bodycam video for the jury because that evidence would be cumulative and unnecessary. Had appellant objected then, the state likely could have addressed appellant‘s
IV. Appellant‘s claims in his pro se brief do not merit relief.
Appellant asserts additional claims in his supplemental pro se brief. None of them merit relief.
Appellant first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to investigate (1) video footage from the gas station, which appellant claims would show that his brake lights were working and that the deputy therefore made an illegal stop and (2) the deputy‘s history of improper conduct. Because this claim involves facts not in the record, the record is insufficient for appellate review. See State v. Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. 2000). We therefore decline to review this claim.
Appellant‘s next two arguments are unsupported by legal citation, so we need not consider them. See State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008). Nevertheless, we briefly address their deficiencies. Appellant asserts that officers discarded the container that the methamphetamine bag was found in and states that “the officers discarded material evidence.” But appellant fails to show that the container had any apparent and material exculpatory value. See State v. Friend, 493 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1992) (“To succeed in a claim that lost or destroyed evidence constitutes reversible error, a defendant must show . . . that the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent and material.“).
Finally, appellant argues that the deputy intentionally covered his bodycam while saying that appellant was walking away during what appellant claims was an unlawful stop. Appellant challenged the traffic stop at the district court. The district court found reasonable articulable suspicion supporting the investigatory stop of the Chrysler 300 based on the deputy credibly testifying that the vehicle‘s brake lights were not working. Appellant‘s arrest occurred after that stop because appellant provided a false name. Officers found the incriminating drugs after a chain of events stemming from their search of appellant incident to that arrest. Because the district court concluded that the deputy lawfully stopped and questioned appellant based on appellant‘s faulty brake lights, the facts appellant disputes are irrelevant to appellant‘s controlled-substance conviction.
DECISION
The district court did not violate appellant‘s right to confrontation by requiring testifying witnesses to wear face masks to prevent the spread of COVID-19. The district court also did not deny appellant a public trial by limiting courtroom access to trial participants and court staff and allowing the public to view the proceedings via a live video
Affirmed.